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ABSTRACT
A major part of this study is a test and extension of the work of Durcan, McCarthy and 
Redman on post-war strike activity in the UK. It begins with an appraisal of their approach 
and conclusions. The model developed in Section I builds upon these but has at its core a 
concern with management and worker attitudes, and like the Durcan, McCarthy and Redman 
study, with the capacity to engage in strike activity. In Section II, the operational form of 
this model is developed and is then employed in Sections III and IV to account for variations 
in strike activity at the broad industry level, and in four detailed industry studies, metals, 
shipbuilding and marine engineering, motor vehicles and coal-mining. Sections II and IV 
constitute the main empirical tests of this model and of the factors hypothesised to have an 
influence on longer-term movements in the main dimensions of stoppage activity. The 
longer-term movements in strike activity at the industry level are argued to be linked to 
broader political and economic changes and particularly to phases of industrial growth and 
development and to movements in the elements of the industrial circuit of capital. Critically, 
the study emphasises the importance of managerial responses to changes in stages of 
industrial development and to contradictions in the industrial circuit of capital for increased 
volumes of strike activity.
The empirical results confirm the findings of other writers with regard to the limitations of 
economists’ analyses of strikes but raise additional concerns about the usefulness and 
appropriateness of some of the variables they and writers such as Cronin have employed. 
Whilst the study confirms the role of aggregate economic influences, particularly since the 
early 1970s, the industry studies support the critical role of organisation in strikes, together 
with more localised and industry-specific factors, notably product market changes and the 
ways these are interpreted and acted upon by the parties. It is these product market factors 
and how managers in particular respond to them, together with the role of goverments, which 
are seen as critical in their effects on strike activity, and which most clearly distinguish this 
study from other accounts of strikes. In the context of government, the study confirms 
recent work on the impact of legislation in reducing strike activity since the mid 1980s but 
suggests that policies followed by governments towards public corporations have had a more 
general impact on their industrial relations and strike patterns which have particular relevance 
to longer-term movements in strike activity. In addition, it identifies other, previously 
neglected factors which have affected the strike activity in each of the industries studied.
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INTRODUCTION
The original impetus for this study was the publication in 1983 of Durcan, McCarthy 
and Redman’s work, Strikes in Post-War Britain (hereinafter referred to as DMR) 
which presented an analysis of aggregate strike activity for the period 1946 to 1973. 
The incentive to re-visit and re-appraise their work was prompted by the belief that 
it offered a particularly thoughtful and considered view of strike patterns which 
merited further analysis, and extension beyond its original period of study. A further 
consideration was the view that its analysis has not received the attention it deserved, 
its value being seen more in terms of its periodisation of strike activity (Hyman,
1987) and defence of the role of collective bargaining (Batstone, 1988a) than in its 
contribution to a greater understanding of the factors affecting strike patterns. In part 
this has been a consequence of its over-concern with dissecting strike statistics 
(Edwards, 1984), its methodology and its largely inductive, ad hoc explanatory 
approach. Whilst these are serious issues they do not negate the fact that DMR 
identified a number of important factors contributing to strike activity which could be 
examined further within a clearer framework which incorporated some predictive 
ability.
The main elements of DMR’s approach, together with the main weaknesses and 
criticisms of their work, are discussed in more detail in Chapter 2. In the remainder 
of this Introduction the aim is to provide a further justification and defence of another 
study of strike activity and to give an overview and critical appraisal of previous 
studies of strikes and to establish the ways in which the current work builds upon and 
departs from these earlier studies.
In addition to extending and visiting the work of DMR it is necessary to justify 
another study of aggregate and industry strike activity for a number of reasons. First, 
because a multitude of detailed and informed studies exist already and new data 
sources have produced a wealth of new material and studies to verify or reject causal 
factors at a workplace and bargaining unit level (Blanchflower and Cubbin, 1986,
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Ingram et al. 1991, Metcalf et al. 1993, and Edwards, 1992 for a general survey). 
Second, in the context of declining strike activity in the UK and other ’developed 
economies’ since the late 1970’s, the issue of industrial conflict generally, and of 
strikes specifically is not viewed as an important issue in employee relations to the 
extent they were in the recent past. Third, and relatedly, increasing academic and 
practitioner concerns with HRM, organisation culture and new forms of employee 
involvement have tended to render the study of strikes rather passe. Furthermore, 
the prevailing ideology, which treats behaviour such as striking as increasingly 
deviant and aberrant when organisations are trying to build more consensual relations, 
would tend to dismiss studies of conflict as at best irrelevant and at worst threatening.
In justifying the current work it should be stressed that industrial relations, in 
common with other branches of the social sciences testify to the dangers of crystal 
ball gazing (see McCarthy, 1972 and more recently Leadbetter, 1987) and predictions 
of the inevitability of declining conflict are hardly new. The debate on the ’withering 
away of the strike’ that followed the publication of Ross and Hartman’s work and that 
which surrounded the ‘end of ideology’ (Bell, 1956) and ’incorporationist’ theorists 
(Dahrendorf, 1959) generated arguments that have a familiar ring today. However, 
many would argue that the similarity ends there, stressing the real differences in 
economic and political conditions in advanced capitalist economies from those that 
existed in the 1950s and 1960s (Lash and Urry, 1987) and citing the increasing 
influence of Japan and Japanese techniques of production at the ideological level (e.g 
Wickens, 1986, Oliver and Wilkinson 1988), and the American experience in the 
1980s as a system model for the new industrial relations (Kochan et al. 1986, 
Beaumont, 1987). Before turning to examine how a study of strikes might still have 
relevance in this new paradigm it must be stressed that strikes are not in decline 
everywhere and a further study might have considerable value in the context of newly 
industrialising countries (NIC’s) and parts of Eastern Europe where they appear to 
be on the increase. As Edwards (1992) has noted;
Even if HRM eliminated conflict in the advanced capitalist 
nations, the global extent of a shift to commitment would be 
highly questionable, (p.365).
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Within the context of ’developed’ economies, HRM and ’new industrial relations’ 
emerged out of the perceived need for managers in an increasingly competitive and 
uncertain world to be able to utilise a flexible workforce, divided between core and 
peripheral workers (Handy, 1984, Atkinson and Meager, 1985, 1986) with 
organisations seeking commitment from the former through attractive reward 
packages and individualistic strategies of employee involvement to adapt to the 
changing exigencies of markets. Moreover it is argued that the companies that 
embrace many of these elements are frequently more successful than others and that 
of these, it is non-union companies that are increasingly the role models for other 
companies, with attendant implications for trade union organisation and stoppages 
(Bassett, 1986, Beaumont, 1987). Although there is considerable debate over the 
extent to which many of these are truly novel developments (Maclnnes, 1987), 
whether they constitute a strategic approach to HRM (Pollert, 1987, Hakim, 1990) 
and the extent to which some have been sustained, as well as theoretical and 
methodological questions surrounding certain research (Pollert, 1987, Guest 1990,
1991). There is little doubt many of these developments and trends have gathered 
pace, particularly within the UK in the second half of the 1980’s (Millward et al.
1992). However, taken together they do not negate the value of studies of industrial 
conflict. As Gallie (1978) noted, such changes in the context of an industrial 
relations system can have very different effects at the level of social integration, and 
strikes still occur in most industries and regions in the UK (Edwards, 1991) and are 
increasing in some sectors, notably public services.
Of greater theoretical importance is the place of conflict within the employment 
relationship. Whilst co-operation and conflict may co-exist in the workplace 
(Edwards, 1986), conflict is structured into the employment relationship although 
debate exists as to the structural bases of conflict. This is not the same as saying that 
strikes are an ever present possibility within industrial relations (cf. Batstone et al. 
1977, 1978), as conflict may express itself in different forms, and action such as 
striking may not be a credible or effective option for certain workers (Edwards and 
Scullion, 1982) but the nature of the employment relationship ensures that a basic 
conflict of interests exists, even though that may rarely manifest itself in open
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conflict. If this point is accepted, organisations, their owners and managers have a 
generalised interest to minimise conflict or the threat of it, and so ways of reducing 
strike activity or preventing it are attractive to them. A study of strikes, by 
attempting to unravel their determinants, potentially offers managers a greater insight 
into strike processes and can generate policy options to help minimise strikes and 
their effects (e.g Metcalf et al., 1993).
It should also be stressed that recent initiatives in HRM in the UK have been 
introduced against a backcloth of high unemployment, declining trade union 
membership and a more restrictive legal framework, which have weakened workers’ 
bargaining power and contributed to declining levels of strike activity (Brown and 
Wadwhani, 1990, Edwards, 1992). These contexts have clearly made it easier for 
managers to manage enterprises and implement change and pay less attention to the 
possible threat of industrial action. However, in the event that the contexts alter in 
the workers’ favour more managers may again need to take the threat of strike action 
much more seriously, and studies which offer a greater understanding of causal 
factors in strike activity become of greater value. In this context the issue of 
managing change is particularly important. As it is unlikely that the requirement for 
organisations and their members continually to adapt and respond to market 
requirements will diminish in the near future, particular attention will need to be paid 
to how change is managed. Given the structural bases of conflict, if bargaining 
power changes, the willingness and ability of workers to challenge the substance and 
manner of work changes may increase and encourage managers to devote more 
attention to the processes by which changes are developed and implemented in order 
to avoid overt conflict arising.
The issue of strike activity clearly has additional importance at the public policy level. 
Implicit in the discussion above has been the issue of the costs of strikes for the 
parties concerned, a point returned to below, but at the aggregate level these costs 
may well be far greater than the strike statistics themselves suggest. Although 
calculations based on working days lost have suggested that strikes have cost in total 
less than 0.1 % of working time between 1946 and 1973 (DMR, 1983) there has been
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an increasing body of opinion which has believed that this seriously understated the 
extent of the true costs. This group became more influential in the 1970s and 1980s 
basing their argument on the view that, as well as involving costs for the parties 
directly involved, they imposed significant external costs on third parties, notably the 
general public through disruption and secondary action (Inns of Court Conservative 
and Unionist Society, 1958, Conservative Party 1968, DE 1983), and on the 
perception of the UK abroad thus affecting both inward and outward investment.
The issue of investment flows has assumed particular importance in recent years. 
The UK’s ability to attract foreign investment has been brought into sharper focus in 
the context of European integration and its possible effect on inward investment partly 
explains the antagonism towards the Social Chapter from government and sections of 
industry. Furthermore, the market context facing many organisations places an even 
higher premium than in the past upon ensuring continuity of production, particularly 
where ’just-in-time’ production systems are operating or being considered. Although 
the industrial relations climate is only one of a number of factors relevant in a 
decision to locate in a particular national or regional context, and frequently not the 
most important factor (Wickens, 1987), clearly a wish to avoid disruption to 
production has been a consideration for organisations in location decisions (Bassett,
1988).
At an organisational level, the assumed costs of industrial action have been a factor 
behind the emergence of ’no-strike’deals and the view generally that strikes are an 
inefficient means of achieving results (Gennard, 1981, Metcalf et al. 1993). Whilst 
this may be true in general, recent work suggests that strikes may often pay for 
workers (Metcalf et al. 1993) and that, as evidence from studies of the closed shop 
indicate, workers ability to pose a credible strike threat may ensure that pay is higher 
than it would otherwise have been (Stewart, 1987).
The issue of ’no-strike’ deals merits further discussion. In important respects it 
reflects a focus amongst some economists that strikes are analogous to accidents 
(Hirsch and Addison, 1986, Kennan, 1986, and discussion below) and that the
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provision of more accurate information shared between the parties should substantially 
reduce the likelihood of industrial action occurring. This would have more validity 
if strikes were random events distributed as such across the economy, but we know 
that strikes are heavily concentrated in certain sectors and regions and within these, 
in specific plants (Evans et al. 1978). Where a plant is experiencing around 700 
strikes a year (as Chrysler’s Ryton plant was in the late 1970s, Thoms and Donnelly,
1985), it would seem to be stretching credibility to view each of these as an accident. 
A more useful exercise, would be to appreciate the complexities of such situations in 
terms of context, culture, the structure and nature of workplace relations and the 
labour process, the role of management, unions and shop stewards in order to develop 
policies which may be of more lasting benefit to the organisation and the parties 
involved. The point here is that in such contexts, strikes are clearly perceived as 
’paying’, underpinned by relations of low trust (Fox, 1973, 1974, Waddington, 
1987). Whilst a more open sharing of information might be expected to go some way 
towards establishing trust, in the short-term such an initiative is likely to be viewed 
with considerable suspicion (see Waddington’s, 1987, description of the experiences 
at Ansells brewery in the early 1980’s). Assuming that it is possible to establish a 
climate of co-operation rather than conflict in such a situation, the ways forward 
demand a more considered understanding of the dynamics of the situation than that 
offered by ’accident’ theorists and advocates of ’no-strike’ deals.
These factors taken together do suggest that the significance of stoppages is 
considerably greater than their numerical importance, and the costs associated with 
them, would suggest. In addition, the increasing globalisation and hardening of 
product markets mean that the potential costs of industrial action are significantly 
higher than they have been in the past, further increasing the incentive to avoid 
industrial action (Kelly 1987).
A final impetus to undertake a further study of strike activity is the sense of 
dissatisfaction with existing studies of aggregate and industry strike patterns. The 
remainder of this Chapter is therefore devoted to a critical assessment of previous 
analyses of strikes, from which the main elements of an alternative approach are
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developed. This argues overwhelmingly for a multi-disciplinary framework which 
recognises the importance of the attitudes of both employers and employees and which 
gives adequate regard to the role of effective organisation in shaping and mobilising 
action.
Given the enormous variety of studies on strike activity, what follows is not intended 
to be a comprehensive overview of individual studies. Rather, the focus is upon a 
selection of studies which emphasise the essential characteristics of approaches from 
specific disciplines. It begins with a critical assessment of accounts of strike activity 
developed by economists.
ECONOMIC APPROACHES
The starting point for economic analyses of strikes is considered to be Hicks’s (1963) 
work. Hicks assumed that those involved in negotiations would be equally well 
informed about the other’s willingness to concede (in Hicks’s terms, the position and 
shape of the respective concession curves), and that in consequence no strike would 
take place. In the event that it did occur, this would be the result of an ’accident’ 
(Addison and Siebert 1982) or the result of faulty negotiations as, ex post, all strikes 
are pareto inferior, although Hicks conceded that in the long-run strikes might occur 
simply to reinforce the credibility of a strike threat. The clear implication of this 
work is that if the parties adopt rational behaviour, strikes will not occur, they are 
a hazard of the collective bargaining process and do not pay. Those that do occur are 
therefore the result of irrationality on the part of one or both parties. At the level of 
theory this encounters a major problem. As Kaufman (1980) has shown, strikes can 
occur despite rational behaviour by both parties. Studies of negotiations have shown 
if either party moves too quickly towards an eventual settlement it may cause the 
other side to increase its demands and more generally the approach ignores many of 
the complexities and functions of the negotiating process (Stephenson and Brotherton 
1987). In addition, strikes may be an important means of providing information, 
helping to revise expectations about pay and other demands very quickly, particularly 
as both sides may have an incentive to lie about the position of their respective 
concession curves.
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Subequent work, building upon Hicks’ seminal work has focused upon strikes as 
‘accidents’ (see below) and on strikes arising as a result of asymmetric information 
(Reder and Neumann 1980, Booth and Cressey 1989) where strikes are viewed as the 
result of rational actions in a world of asymmetric and imperfect information 
(Edwards 1992). Although the latter focus is a positive development on from Hicks, 
the work of accident theorists contains serious problems at both theoretical and 
empirical levels. In the first part of this Introduction it was stressed that if strikes 
were the result of accidents then they would be randomly distributed across industries 
(Geroski and Knight 1985, cf Hirsh and Addison 1986) and that empirically, they are 
heavily concentrated in a few plants in a small number of industries. Rather than 
suggesting that these plants have a high percentage of faulty negotiations or accidents, 
a more satisfactory inference might be that stoppages are seen as an ’accepted’ part 
of industrial relations in these situations and as a legitimate and effective means of 
achieving objectives, at least in the short term. Additional problems encountered by 
these approaches and those of economists more generally include a frequent 
unwillingness to take account of the ability of groups to undertake strike activity 
(organisation) or the structure of collective bargaining. The importance therefore of 
trade unions, and divisions within and between them as well as changes in collective 
bargaining institutions are effectively ignored. Overall, in these approaches, if the 
parties adopt rational behaviour, it is difficult to see why strikes begin at all, and 
difficult to reconcile the observed pattern of strikes with the theories.
A second and highly influential approach offered by economists is the ’political’ 
model developed by Ashenfelter and Johnson (1969). This approach follows Ross 
(1948) in assuming three parties in the bargaining process rather than the customary 
two, distinguishing between union leaders and the rank and file on the workers side, 
although in practice this distinction makes little difference to the model (Hirsh and 
Addison 1986). Unlike ’accident’ approaches it is framed in terms of the probability 
of a stoppage occurring (Edwards 1979) which is assumed to depend on the union 
concession curve facing the firm. The firm is assumed to attempt to maximise the 
present value of its future profit stream and will choose the optimum trade-off 
between profits foregone during the strike and the increased costs after a strike so that
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the firm calculates the profitability of a strike to itself. The model relies upon 
asymmetric information, rather than using different information to construct estimates 
of the other’s concession curve (Mauro 1982). Furthermore, it always assumes that 
one party is irrational (Edwards 1979), that strikes are always caused by the union 
side, are solely concerned with wages and that one side attempts to maximise subject 
to given behaviour by the other. Overall, a strike is more likely, the higher the 
union’s minimum acceptable percentage wage increase and the lower its rate of 
concession.
The Ashenfelter and Johnson approach has serious weaknesses at both a theoretical 
and operational level in addition to those noted above. Theoretically, it is 
unsatisfactory to reduce worker expectations to a concern solely with pay (as with 
other economists approaches) and to assume that all stoppages are concerned with 
this. More significantly the approach is located at a micro level, and arguably cannot 
be tested using aggregate data (Edwards 1978), as an aggregation problem may result 
which biases the coefficients. The operational forms of the model often differ 
substantially from the underlying theoretical formulations (Edwards 1978) where the 
variables employed can stand for a number of theoretical measures so that a 
significant identification problem arises. In addition the dependent variable employed 
is normally the number of stoppages and it is debatable whether this is the measure 
which is most appropriate to test given the theoretical formulation (DMR 1983). The 
independent variables are normally a lagged wages term together with those for 
aggregate unemployment, prices (unless real wages are used) and profits. Although 
the empirical tests have been very successful (Ashenfelter and Johnson 1969, 
Pencavel 1970, and for the variables but not the model by Knight 1972, Bean and 
Peel 1974, Shorey 1977) the results for Britain are not stable over time (DMR 1983) 
and are poor predictors of strike activity beyond the 1950-1967 sample period which 
they tend to examine (Moore and Pearce 1982), and for earlier periods (Cronin 
1979). Indeed Snyder (1975) has argued that economic approaches generally only 
tend to work where institutions are stable. Overall, Pencavel’s results and those of 
the Ashenfelter and Johnson model are sensitive to empirical specification and the 
sample period chosen.
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A further weakness is that operationally, the empirical tests normally employ a time 
trend which is significant and strongly related to strike activity. As Mayhew (1979) 
has argued, this may be telling us little other than that stoppages increase over time 
particularly in view of the contribution this term makes in conjunction with seasonal 
dummies to both aggregate and certain industry results of stoppage numbers in 
Pencavel’s work and in subsequent tests (Pencavel 1970, DMR 1983).
Pre-dating the Ashenfelter and Johnson work, but along with Hicks providing the 
basis for much of the theoretical basis for economists approaches is the work of Rees 
(1952) on the relationship between strikes and the business cycle. Much of the recent 
work on strikes as a result of asymmetric information originate from this perspective 
and have undergone something of a revival in recent years with the availability of 
data on individual negotiations in Britain and the USA (Gramm 1986, 1987, 
McConnell 1989, Vrooman 1989, all North American studies cited in Edwards, 1992) 
(Booth and Cressey 1990, Ingram et al. 1991). In its original formulation Rees 
argued that strikes would vary with the business cycle, (as would the number of 
bargaining units and the scope of strikes) being greater in number at the peaks of 
cycles because at these points the expectations of workers and employers would be 
furthest apart. Mayhew (1979) has further argued that the cycle would also affect 
those variables determining the size of the original demands of the parties and the 
forcefulness with which they would stick to their original positions. In themselves 
these factors would not explain why strikes occur if perfect knowledge existed, in 
order to underline the importance of imperfect knowledge the approach has to show 
that the likelihood of mistakes arising would be greater in boom periods than in 
recessions, an explanation for which has been offered by Mayhew (1979).
As with the other approaches Rees’s work suffers from a reductionist view of worker 
concerns and a failure to take adequate account of worker organisation, although its 
focus on stoppage numbers is arguably more appropriate than other measures of 
strikes and it has the advantage of emphasising the importance of the structure of 
collective bargaining and the attitudes of the parties to the machinery. The major 
study of Rees’s work has been that of Mayhew (1979) using CBI business forecasts
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which gives considerable support to the underlying approach. However, recent work 
has cast doubt on aspects of a business cycle approach to strike activity. In most 
formulations movements in business activity are proxied by means of an 
unemployment term, but as Brown (1973) has shown (also Brown and Nolan 1988) 
this does not capture the cost of job loss to those in employment, although alternative 
formulations of this cost have been developed and applied with some success in the 
USA (Schor and Bowles 1987). Similar problems have also beset the use of profit 
terms in the operational forms of the approach (Ingram et al. 1991) but further 
refinement of this and other variables coupled with micro-level data have shed 
considerable light on contributory factors in strike dimensions at this level (see 
summary in Edwards 1992, p.369) and ensure continued interest in these approaches.
The final economic approach considered here is that which focuses upon the labour 
contract. This approach has developed from ’transaction cost economics’ (Williamson 
1984, 1987) and attempts to model the conditions which will influence the observance 
or non-observance of contracts and the extent to which individuals have an incentive 
to act opportunistically. As Edwards (1992) has argued this approach has the merit 
of avoiding viewing conflict as ’accidental’ as it links more with sociological concerns 
of conflict being structured into the employment relationship as well as placing stress 
upon conflict as a result of imperfect information. A further benefit is that it 
addresses issues at the heart of the employment relationship and the factors affecting 
contract obligations and compliance.
Currently, only a limited number of studies have used the approach to analyse strikes 
(Robertson 1990) but it has potential for further studies of workplace strikes and 
conflict more generally. At a theoretical level it retains the weakness of other 
economic approaches in viewing conflict as always initiated by workers, and although 
incorporating aspects of the social organisation of work in contrast to other 
economists accounts, the nature of the employment relationship is incomplete and 
misunderstood (Edwards 1992). As Edwards has argued further there is a tendency 
to stress a managerial concern for efficiency with little acknowledgement that conflict 
could be more basic than the concept of opportunism could allow.
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In summary, economic approaches offer an insight into the determinants of short-run 
variations in strike activity and a plausible account of why strikes occur rather than 
their being alterations in the original positions of the parties. However, their 
tendency to view strikes as general phenomena, and limited attention to trade union 
organisation and collective bargaining ensures that their value lies more in having 
identified a number of background variables which influence the attitudes and 
expectations of the parties to the negotiations and possibly their frequency (DMR 
1983), but only in situations where workers have the organisation (ability) to translate 
grievances arising form economic factors into action.
INSTITUTIONAL APPROACHES
The analyses of strike activity in the ’institutionalist’ tradition have a number of 
distinguishing characteristics. Overall, their focus is more on the form that strikes 
take rather than their frequency (Kelly and Nicholson 1980), and this in turn is the 
result of the primacy placed upon the structure and system of collective bargaining 
in explaining strike patterns. This concentration on collective bargaining as a means 
of containing conflict as well as its form has been a feature of analyses of stoppages 
since Knowles’ (1952) work. Knowles stressed the importance of general economic 
factors in accounting for short-run strike movements but argued that these were less 
pronounced in the UK than the USA due much to the development of effective joint 
industrial machinery in the UK. However, it was in his study of inter-industry 
differences in stoppage activity where the efficacy of collective bargaining machinery 
was emphasised, particularly in the case of textiles and transport. Similarly the work 
of Ross and Hartman (1960) stressed the importance of collective bargaining 
structures on long-run strike patterns and this work, together with that of Turner et 
al. (1967) had a significant influence upon the thinking and recommendations of the 
Donovan Commission’s view of Britain’s strike problem. One member of the 
Commission, Hugh Clegg, subsequently developed a theoretical rationale for 
Donovan’s view on strikes which also encapsulates most of the salient elements of the 
institutionalist approach (Clegg 1976). This work is examined in more detail below.
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Although Clegg (1976) was not exclusively concerned with strikes he devoted a 
chapter to strike patterns and their link with the structure of collective bargaining in 
six countries. Given the particular institutionalist interest in strike form, Clegg 
focused mainly upon size, length and status of strikes (whether official or unofficial, 
constitutional or unconstitutional) as well as their frequency. From an examination 
of strike patterns in the six countries he concluded that the strike pattern was closely 
associated with the structure of collective bargaining and that the nature and level of 
bargaining was the major determinant of strike numbers, size, locus (plant, industry) 
and status over the long-run. According to Clegg, short-run variations in these 
dimensions owed more to economic and political factors, notably changes in real 
incomes, the operation of incomes policies and links between trade unions and the 
government (the latter a central element of Ross and Hartman’s work), although in 
his later work (Clegg 1979) these are expanded to include unemployment, inflation 
and trade union growth.
The approach is refined further in a revision of his major work (Clegg 1979) and 
applied to the industry level. One development of note is the link between the causes 
of stoppages and the level of bargaining. Thus, in studies of pay stoppages, he 
suggests a link between bargaining levels and the nature of the payments system, with 
the former determining;
the points at which pressure for pay increases can be most 
effectively applied and therefore exerts an influence over the 
pattern of strikes (Clegg 1979, p.272).
Although he conceded that in certain industries piecework exerted an independent 
influence upon stoppages. He then applied this to account for strike activity in coal 
mining and three other strike prone industries of the 1950’s and 1960’s, citing the 
effectiveness of the 1966 National Powerloading Agreement and the district 
agreements which preceded it as contributing significantly to the decline in strike 
activity within the industry.
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Clegg’s work offers a long run theory of strike patterns which focuses upon a 
selection of variables but stresses the system of collective bargaining as the main 
explanatory factor. Its generality making it sufficiently flexible to be applied at 
different levels of aggregation, a feature of other ’institutionalist’ accounts of strike 
patterns (DMR 1983). However, a number of significant problems arise with Clegg’s 
approach, specifically its empirical validity and its status as a theory.
At a general level it is a structural explanation of stoppages with little account of 
workers as actors in the drama, and by ignoring attitudes and consciousness omits 
some of the most important insights of sociologists in this area (see below). In its 
concern with long-run movements it also comes close to being a single factor 
explanation of strike patterns, particularly at the aggregate level, and others have 
doubted its status as a theory on the grounds that it does not produce clear refutable 
hypotheses. This latter criticism is less valid. In his (1976) work, Clegg outlines 
some of the implications of his work which in principle are testable. Where Clegg’s 
critics have a point is in arguing that the tests of his theory are difficult because it 
views collective bargaining as the key factor in accounting for strike patterns only 
when the economy is stable, Clegg himself cites the period 1950-1965. Beyond this 
point short-run factors are assumed to have dominated (which are not part of the 
theory) and swamp the effects of collective bargaining so that the sample size for 
longitudinal testing of the approach is limited. A further problem of Clegg’s 
approach is its inability to acknowledge, and therefore account for, strike waves 
which are viewed either as ’discontinuities’ or the result of institutional breakdown.
Two further problems remain with Clegg’s work. First, his emphasis upon collective 
bargaining procedures and procedural reform gives insufficient attention to the role 
of substantive issues. As DMR (1983) have argued, the reform of procedures without 
an attempt to address the underlying sources of conflict (assumed to be substantive 
issues) might have little effect upon reducing levels of strike activity. Second, 
correlation is not causation, and merely identifying a relationship does not tell us the 
direction of that relationship.
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SOCIOLOGICAL APPROACHES
In contrast to the approaches discussed above, sociologists have tended to focus more 
directly upon industrial conflict rather than strikes per se (Eldridge 1968, Edwards 
and Scullion 1982), and with variations in strike proneness between industries, firms, 
workgroups, regions or nations (Hyman 1984). However, in contrast to the work of 
psychologists, where the concern is frequently with the perceptions the parties hold 
of each other (Waddington 1987) sociological studies tend to be united by a focus 
upon worker attitudes and consciousness; differences in the propensity to conflict of 
groups of workers and the relationship between these and aspects of the social and 
organisational structure (Kelly and Nicholson 1980). In spite of these unifying 
themes, these approaches (summarised by Hyman 1984) differ significantly in the 
factors they identify as causing strikes or accounting for variations in strike 
proneness. The remainder of this section concentrates on three sets of concerns for 
sociologists which have particular relevance for the current study.
Workers, Jobs and Communities
One important strand in sociological work on strikes has been the focus upon worker 
characteristics and community integration, most associated with Kerr and Siegal 
(1954). According to Kerr and Siegal, different types of worker have different strike 
propensities because of variations in the communities in which they live. Groups 
with a high propensity to strike are seen as constituting an isolated mass. This term 
has been the subject of much discussion and criticism since their study (see below), 
but for Kerr and Siegal it referred to workers who constituted a largely homgeneous 
and undifferentiated group who, because of living in separate communities with their 
own codes and social standards, failed to integrate into the wider society and 
remained isolated from other workers and social superiors, (In Lockwood’s (1966) 
terms, such workers represent the ’traditional proletarian’ holding a power model of 
society). In contrast, workers living and working in socially and industrially 
integrated towns were assumed to be less strike prone.
Kerr and Siegal argued further that the character of the job ’determines by selection 
and conditioning the kinds of worker employed and their attitudes and that these in
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turn cause conflict or peace’. Thus, ’if a job is physically difficult and unpleasant 
and fosters an independent spirit it will draw tough, unconstant, combative and virile 
workers and they will be inclined to strike’. Although they stressed the role of 
background factors influencing the behaviour of individuals in individual industries 
they argued that the bulk of the differences in industrial strike propensities were due 
to the nature of the industrial environment and its tendency to direct workers into 
isolated masses or integrate them into the wider community. The emphasis 
throughout is upon the ways in which the community shapes workers collective 
consciousness and their attitudes towards striking (Cronin 1979).
A similar emphasis is discernible in Lockwood’s (1966) typology of workers, where 
work and community relationships are seen to generate particular forms of social 
consciousness and affect the propensity to engage in conflict, an approach which later 
found expression in the ’Affluent Worker’ studies (Goldthorpe et al. 1968).
Although extremely influential, and superficially plausible the Kerr and Siegal work 
has encountered many problems at theoretical, operational and empirical levels. 
First, theoretically it is a structural analysis which sees human behaviour as 
mechanically determined by the social structure, a fixed pattern of behaviour is called 
forth by a particular structural situation (Hyman 1984). This necessarily leads to a 
neglect of the ways in which the workplace may have an impact on attitudes and 
behaviour (Daniel 1969). In addition, by constituting a single factor explanation of 
strike activity it does scant justice to the complexity of social reality (Hyman 1984), 
ignoring all the influences on attitudes and behaviour which derive from the wider 
society.
Operationally, one of the problems in testing the approach has been modelling the 
concept of an ’isolated mass’ (Edwards 1977) although recent work has made some 
progress with a degree of support for the thesis (Church et al. 1991). However, it 
is empirically that the approach reveals its major weaknesses. First, whilst it was 
developed to account for cross-sectional strike patterns, when applied to stoppages 
over time, the analysis is less convincing. Whereas the approach is static as social
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structures change relatively slowly, the inter-industry propensity to strike is not. 
Second, despite its attempt to explain why groups such as mineworkers and dockers 
have been traditionally strike-prone it is notable that miners were not noticeably more 
strike prone than other groups before 1920, dockers only increased their militancy 
after 1945 and industrial strike-proneness varies between regions (Knowles 1952). 
Third, it is difficult to see how the concept of an ’isolated mass’ and the approach 
generally can be reconciled with the evidence on the increasing militancy of teachers 
and other public sector workers.
It is also noteable that these problems apply more generally to a number of 
sociological studies of industrial strike activity. Largely structuralist approaches that 
have examined the role of technology (Walker and Guest 1957, Chinoy 1955) and 
organisational structure (Gouldner 1954), have frequently viewed these factors as 
determining behaviour and become little more than single factor explanations of 
complex phenomena. This is not to argue that these factors are not important in 
explanations of strike activity, rather that they need to be seen alongside other 
influences and within the broader organisational and societal context in which they 
are situated.
Labour Process Approaches
Since the publication of Braverman’s (1974) work sociologists have increasingly 
turned their attention to analysis of the labour process (Nichols and Beynon 1977, 
Burawoy 1979, 1985, Wood 1982, Thompson 1983, 1990). The link with patterns 
of conflict is more recent, principally the work of Gordon, Edwards and Reich (1982) 
for the USA, and at a micro-level, Edwards and Scullion (1982) for the UK, and it 
is the latter work which provides the focus for discussion here.
Edwards and Scullion examined the labour process in factories covering four 
industries and the forms of conflict associated with each. Their central point is that 
although conflict is structured into the labour process (the process by which labour 
power is translated into effort) it may remain implicit rather than expressed in an 
overt form by workers. They then attempted to ascertain the extent of conflict, latent
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and manifest through an examination of underlying worker attitudes. Edwards and 
Scullion found that forms of conflict (e.g strikes, overtime bans, turnover, 
absenteeism) varied according to the control exercised by workers over the labour 
process, and in there significance between different contexts. In terms of strike 
activity they argued that their significance needed to be understood in the context of 
the struggle for control as a whole and that strikes could not be treated in isolation 
from this. In some factories a lack of collective awareness and the location of the 
frontier of control meant that certain sanctions did not and could not exist (Blackburn 
and Mann 1979). In contrast to the view of the ’toolbox theory of sanctions’ 
(Batstone et al. 1977, 1978), they argued that this was only relevant in very specific 
work situations, and that the ability to deploy such sanctions rested upon the structure 
of the situation at any moment in time. The importance of their work therefore, lies 
in the elevation of the labour process as providing a grounded explanation of why 
particular sanctions occur in some settings and how these relate to the notion of 
conflict.
The elevation of the role of the labour process is an important development in 
understanding the context in which forms of conflict emerge, although there is a 
danger that this again comes close to a single factor explanation of conflict. 
Furthermore, Edwards (1981, 1986) has argued that the labour process is relatively 
autonomous so that product and labour market factors do not determine the nature and 
form of the labour process that will develop. Indeed, Edwards and Scullion go to 
some lengths to play down the role of product market factors, despite the fact that in 
at least one of the factories they studied (the large metals factory) their own evidence 
appears to confirm the importance of such factors. This evidence may offer some 
support to the view advanced by Kelly (1982, 1985) that the labour process needs to 
be located within the broader circuit of capital and that whilst organisations have an 
interest in control and extracting surplus value, they are also concerned with realising 
it. Kelly suggests that when contradictions within the elements of the full circuit of 
capital become severe, for example when the labour process becomes a barrier to 
realisation and accumulation, product markets may exert a very significant impact 
upon the labour process. This point is returned to in the following chapters but it is
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argued that it is these contradictions and changes to the labour process that derive 
from these that are likely to generate high levels of conflict, by challenging and 
undermining established patterns of indulgency and control. The relative autonomy 
of the labour process may only be a valid notion when external forces are not 
sufficiently problematic, or perceived as being so by management, to threaten 
profitability and future expansion. Two further points are relevant here. Lash (1983) 
has argued that there is little account of the role of technology in influencing the 
nature of the labour process and the frontier of control in the factories they study 
which would be valuable in terms of the relationship between product markets and the 
labour process. A final concern is that it is open to question whether the forms of 
conflict they consider are all forms of conflict, and whether it is valid or valuable to 
treat factory discipline, accidents and the allocation of labour as comparable to strikes 
even accepting that their meaning and significance differs between contexts.
Although sociological studies have frequently been concerned with conflict generally 
and when they have considered strikes, with a cross-sectional firm or industry level 
focus, sociologists have done an important service in identifying the bases of conflict 
and the role of attitudes and organisation as well as the wider context in helping to 
shape these. The specific studies of strikes within this tradition have major failings, 
particularly the structuralist accounts, but clearly identify factors which, in 
conjunction with others may offer a broader understanding of the key factors 
influencing strike activity.
POLITICAL ECONOMY/HISTORICAL APPROACHES
Political economy approaches developed in the 1970s as a counter to institutional 
approaches in particular, seeing the latter as focusing upon variables that mediated the 
effects of more fundamental factors (Edwards 1992). The latter were seen as broader 
political factors, compromises between employers, trade unions and the state. For 
the purpose of brevity, this section concentrates upon the work of Korpi and Shalev 
(1979), and, as an exemplar of the historical approach, the work of Cronin (1979).
Korpi and Shalev provide a cross country explanation of strike trends since the turn
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of this century. Their model derives from the experience of Sweden, although it is 
applied to eighteen countries in all. The essence of the Korpi and Shalev thesis is 
that where the working class gains strength in the industrial and political spheres and 
with the election of a stable socialist government (or after many years of such 
governments, Korpi 1983), the strike weapon is exchanged for the pursuit of their 
long term interests in the political arena. When such developments occur, they 
therefore predict a ’withering away’ of the strike (Hirsch and Addison 1986). The 
approach is then applied, and subsequently refined, to other countries, categorised in 
terms of the level of working class mobilisation and the degree of leftist political 
representation with some success in twelve of the countries in their sample, although 
with some serious anomalies, notably West Germany where low strike rates are 
associated with no political incorporation of the labour movement.
Batstone (1984, 1988a), in a detailed critique of the work suggests that it is flawed 
in a number of crucial respects. First, that there is little account of the strength of 
employers and their organisations which is a significant omission in the context of 
Sweden. Second, despite its claims to be a marxist analysis, it begins from conflict 
within the production process which is then effectively ignored in the remainder of 
the work and more seriously from the perspective of the focus of their analysis, there 
is no account of the nature of the state in capitalist economies. Third, in their 
empirical work, Batstone suggests that the classification of countries in terms of the 
level of working class representation is weak, as well as producing some strange 
’bedfellows’ within each category (Edwards 1983). Furthermore, the analysis for 
most countries is for the period of Keynesian policy domination, 1946-1974 and 
suggests that this as well as the impact of war needs to be given some consideration. 
In addition Batstone argues that the indicators they use to test the theory are not 
entirely satisfactory. Finally, and most damaging is the view that Korpi and Shalev’s 
empirical data do not support their argument (Batstone 1984, Hirsh and Addison
1986). Even in the case of Sweden the decline in strike activity preceded the election 
of a socialist government, which as Batstone suggests lends support to the 
’institutionalist’ thesis rather than their own.
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The work of Cronin (1979), has been one of the most important and influential 
studies of strike activity in recent years and differs in important respects from the 
previous studies considered here. First, it is an analysis of strikes covering a period 
of over a century, second, it is a study by a historian and uses as its central focus an 
historical model of strike activity. Third, it explicitly rejects the view that the history 
of strikes is one of even development, rather one of strike waves as more 
characteristic of historical development in Britain.
The cornerstone of Cronin’s approach is the use of the concept of long waves in 
economic development spanning 40-50 years (Kondratieff 1935), with 20-25 years of 
expansion followed by 20-25 years of slow growth. He argues that it is this uneven 
character of economic growth that underlies the uneveness of industrial conflict. The 
effects of this are that workers are confronted with a different complex of problems 
and grievances at each major economic shift, stimulating a remaking of their 
consciousness and forms of collective organisation every two to three decades. As 
a result, strikes change in their incidence, form and context over time and these 
changes are linked to the nature of the market economy. The resulting strike waves 
are the manifestation of the new attitudes and strategies produced by the impact of 
long waves of economic growth on the working class. In essence, Cronin’s approach 
has three components; the uneven character of economic growth and development, 
the desire/willingness of workers to engage in strike action, and the ability to engage 
in action, the ’resources of organisation’ (Cronin 1979).
More precisely, strike waves are seen as occurring at the end of either phase of a 
long wave during a short term upswing, with major waves in 1889-92, 1910-13, 
1919-20, 1957-62, and 1968-72, periods when both strikes and the number of strikers 
are high. Recent work by Screpanti (1987) has produced evidence for five countries 
supporting the concept of strike waves but with timings different to those identified 
by Cronin. His work suggests that strike waves occur at around the same time in 
these countries and correspond to downturns in the Kondratieff cycles. Further work 
attempting to connect long waves with historical reconstructions of key conjunctures 
in Germany (Boll 1989) and Britain (Cronin 1989) has recently been undertaken with
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some success.
Before critically assessing Cronin’s work it must be stressed that it raises serious 
questions about the value of accounts which rely solely upon short-term determinants 
of strike activity. Furthermore, and in light of Screpanti’s work it casts doubt upon 
the value of aggregate strike explanations which rely upon nation-specific factors and 
finally, it suggests that the 1980s marked the end of a cycle of growth and decline 
rather than an inevitable trend towards the withering away of the strike (Edwards 
1992). These points notwithstanding a great deal of scepticism surrounds Cronin and 
other advocates of a strike wave approach. As Edwards (1992) has argued,
‘long waves are deep structural features of capitalism, and the linkages 
between them and specific actions such as strikes are likely to be very 
complex’ (1992, p .364-5).
A further issue is that by utilising the Kondratieff work the theoretical framework 
only allows for at most, three observations of long waves and five observations of 
strike waves, and that the years in between the waves vary from five to thirty-seven 
years. Cronin also appears to be unclear about the role that employers play within 
the model. In contrast to the work of Mayhew (1979), there is no real statement of 
the behaviour of firms in the face of changes in the desire and ability of workers to 
engage in conflict. A more severe problem is that whilst Cronin emphasises that 
strike activity leads to growth in union membership, his theoretical model stresses the 
prior importance of union organisation in enhancing the ability of workers to engage 
in such action. Finally, it is not clear from Cronin’s work why grievances are 
pursued in the industrial sphere and not in the political arena, a view that strongly 
contradicts the Korpi and Shalev approach outlined above. He also has little to say 
about what happens in between strike waves, most notably in the period from 1921- 
1950 which includes not only the general strike but also the period 1944-46 which 
witnessed an unprecedented increase in stoppage numbers albeit concentrated in coal­
mining.
22
EXPLANATIONS OF STRIKE ACTIVITY: SOME GENERAL POINTS
The aim of this section is to summarise a number of key conclusions arising from 
studies of strike activity and to introduce elements of our own approach which will 
be developed further in subsequent chapters.
Most of the studies surveyed have had a specific focus, to account for strike patterns 
or strike numbers, to explain short-run variations or long-run trends, and/or to 
examine stoppages across industries, regions or countries. Partly as a result of the 
studies’ different objectives and emphases there are few areas of consensus. 
However, it is generally accepted that economic factors play a significant part in 
accounting for short term variations in strike activity (Knowles 1952, Ross and 
Hartman 1960, Clegg 1976, Ashenfelter and Johnson 1969, Pencavel 1970, Mayhew 
1979) and in inter-industry differences in the propensity to strike (Cronin 1979). It 
is also increasingly recognised that Governments play an important role in strike 
incidence and patterns in the short and long run (Turner et al. 1972, Clegg 1976, 
Hibbs 1978, Shorter and Tilly 1974, Korpi and Shalev 1979, Cronin 1979, DMR,
1983). A more negative conclusion is that to do justice to the complexity of social 
life explanations which rely on single factors are unsatisfactory.
The review also suggests that an examination of strike activity needs to take account 
of a number of additional factors. In particular the attitudes of the parties in 
industrial relations and the factors affecting these, particularly in the short-run. This 
involves not just an appreciation of the desires of workers (Cronin 1979), but also 
employers (Mayhew 1979), and necessitates drawing on the work of sociologists, 
economists and political scientists in identifying the structural bases of attitudes and 
the potential changes that may alter these and trigger grievances. A further element 
needed is a means to channel and activate grievances, the role of worker organisation 
to turn a willingness to strike into an ability to do so (Shorter and Tilly 1974, Cronin 
1979, Edwards and Scullion 1982, Edwards 1982, 1983). Finally, some account of 
collective bargaining institutions in affecting both the opportunity to negotiate and the 
form that strikes may take. In the long-run an approach also needs to be sensitive to 
broader changes in social, economic, technological and occupational factors as well
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as institutional changes. This leaves open the potential for wide disagreement on 
exactly what factors affect the elements we have identified but it does construct the 
essential elements of an explanation of stoppages. Such an approach also supports 
Cronin’s view that at the outset what is required ’must be above all multi­
dimensional, encompassing factors that affect the attitudes and desires of workers and 
those that affect their ability to translate consciousness into action’ (Cronin, 1979 p. 
38).
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THE DURCAN McCARTHY AND REDMAN STUDY
The Durcan McCarthy and Redman study, is the most recent and, we would argue, 
the most refined work on strike activity to have emerged from within the 
’institutionalist’ perspective and both modifies and extends earlier approaches within 
this tradition. Underlying the study is a framework which borrows heavily from 
’systems’ approaches in analysing the main dimensions of strikes, although nowhere 
in the work is this made explicit. Our interpretation of their underlying approach is 
presented in figure 1 overleaf.
In this section the main methodological approach adopted by DMR is summarised 
together with the central conclusions of their work, drawing comparisons with earlier 
’institutionalist’ works. This is followed by a brief synopsis of this study’s main 
concerns with their work before outlining the approach adopted here, developing a 
model which retains the essential elements of DMR but which, it is suggested, 
provides a more detailed theoretical framework for analysing strike activity and for 
testing their general conclusions.
The DMR study is an attempt to explain patterns of strike activity over the period 
1946-1973. Their methodology divides up the period into four qualitatively distinct 
sub-periods and examines trends at the aggregate level by recourse to changes in the 
three basic dimensions of strike activity - number of stoppages, workers involved and 
working days lost. This is followed by an analysis of the industrial distribution of 
strike activity and aspects such as reported cause, regional distribution, duration, size, 
percentage known to be official and the significance of major stoppages in each 
sub-period. This constitutes the first part of their work and is essentially a descriptive 
account of strike patterns.
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The second part of their study is a search for explanations of strikes. DMR begin by 
examining macroeconomic factors and their association with strike activity but argue 
that their generality makes them unsatisfactory variables. They conclude that:
The solution would seem to be to combine data at a less 
aggregated level with a more flexible approach that allows for 
the interpretation of a wider range of explanatory 
variables...(so that)...it should be possible to reach more 
meaningful conclusions regarding the relationship between 
strikes and changes in the economic environment (p.238).
Macroeconomic variables are therefore seen as background factors which influence 
strike activity through a number of intermediary variables. To identify these, DMR 
examine the strike patterns of the three most strike-prone industries in the post-war 
period in terms of the numbers of stoppages and the more general role of 
government. The explanatory variables derived from these analyses interact with the 
macroeconomic factors giving a model which, they argue, accounts for changing 
strike activity in the post-war period.
The DMR approach is therefore to move from the aggregate to the industry level in 
searching for explanations of aggregate strike totals and variations in these. Our 
interpretation of the main variables they employ and their relationship to strikes is 
formally presented overleaf.
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S = f[ EA, SS, M, P , L , MI, G, B]
Where:
S = Number of stoppages in period t
EA = Employee attitudes
SS = Existence of effective shop steward systems
M = Macroeconomic factors
P = Local product market factors
L = Local labour market factors
MI = Managerial initiatives
G = Government initiatives
B = Bargaining structures
Although the approach is developed largely to examine strike numbers, the same 
variables are assumed to influence other dimensions of strikes including size, workers 
involved, and length, working days lost. However, the form that strikes take is 
assumed to be largely determined by the bargaining structures prevailing at the time.
S = f[B]
Where:
S = Strike form: size, official/unofficial
B = Bargaining structures: notably the level at which bargaining occurs.
The approach adopted is both loose and flexible. Although it is developed to account 
for changing strike patterns at the aggregate level, it can be argued that the properties 
of looseness and flexibility allow it to be used at lower levels of aggregation and that 
this was intended by DMR. The following is a brief summary of their main 
conclusions.
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a) That strikes develop when union members and officials are capable of 
undertaking them. With stress placed upon the development of effective shop 
steward systems (see above). Indeed, the growth of worker solidarity and 
shop steward systems are seen to;
Provide the final or precipitating condition for strikes....more 
general factors are not sufficient to bring about a crucial 
upward movement in strike activity (1983 p.413).
b) That given (a), any explanation of strikes must rely on a ‘multiplicity of 
factors , but the form they take is affected by the shape and form of existing 
bargaining structures (see the specification of their approach above).
c) That the volume and distribution of total strike activity is influenced by the net 
effect of general economic conditions, product and labour market situations 
and localised influences including the form and level of unionisation.
d) That government policy must form part of a satisfactory explanation of strike 
patterns. DMR argue that "in many ways it is in the analysis of the role of 
government which most clearly distinguishes this study from its predecessors". 
Significantly, they stress that government policies be seen as independent 
variables, not as reactions to economic stimuli. Their rationale being that 
governments can react to economic factors in different ways and:
because the form and scope of government intervention are complex 
and varied (p.419-20).
e) That the interaction of bargaining machinery, substantive terms and conditions 
are crucial in explaining strike activity.
DMR therefore offer a set of broad conclusions from their detailed analysis of
changing strike patterns in the post-war period to 1973. In addition, they also
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highlight contrasts between themselves and other writers in the ’institutionalist’ 
tradition. These are developed in more detail in the section on ’bargaining structures’ 
in the development of the theoretical model but some brief points can be made here. 
First, there is a significant difference between DMR and writers such as Clegg on the 
effectiveness of procedures for containing conflict. Clegg (1976) suggests that 
effective procedures would help to resolve conflicts quickly and reduce the likelihood 
of strikes occurring. In contrast DMR argue that such procedural changes are 
unlikely to reduce conflict per se unless the sources of such conflict are tackled at the 
same time (1983 p.424) by which they seem to mean substantive changes. Thus, 
institutional reforms may only alter the form and not the incidence of strike activity. 
In this context DMR highlight a point made in the introduction that ’institutionalist’ 
approaches have frequently placed too much emphasis upon procedural reform to the 
detriment of substantive issues when examining the incidence and resolution of 
conflict.
The DMR work is also important in its elevation of the role of government as a 
decisive factor in the post-war strike pattern. Government is seen to be significant 
through its involvement in conflict resolution, conciliation mediation and arbitration, 
legislation and judicial decision making in the sphere of employee relations and 
through the operation of incomes policies. Other aspects of government influence are 
largely ignored although DMR do examine the effects of changes in income tax on 
strike activity as a test of Turner et al (1972).
SOME GENERAL COMMENTS
The model developed in the next two Chapters is derived from DMR and, though it 
departs from their work in significant respects, retains the essential elements of their 
approach. Before doing so, however, it is necessary to highlight certain areas where 
this work takes issue with and differs from that of DMR.
The account of strike patterns offered by DMR is essentially a part descriptive, part 
analytical study of past events utilising an enormous number of ex post variables. 
The lack of any coherent explicit theoretical framework does not permit us to analyse
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why strikes occur, or why they occur rather than there being alterations in the 
original positions of the parties, leading to compromise solutions short of a stoppage 
(Ashenfelter and Johnson 1969). In particular, whilst worker attitudes are accorded 
an important role within their work, at no point are these examined in detail and 
remain vague and undefined. The end result is an account of strike patterns which 
is intuitively plausible but has no predictive ability and is not rigorously testable.
A second issue concerns the choice of industries. DMR focussed on the three most 
strike prone industries, in terms of strikes per thousand workers, in the post war 
period, Coal-mining, docks and motor vehicles. They are therefore atypical of the 
strike experience of the rest of the economy and raise questions about the extent to 
which it is possible to account for aggregate changes in strike activity on the basis of 
these industries. If coal-mining is excluded from the aggregate totals, strike activity 
in motor vehicles and the docks together account for around a quarter of workers 
involved, 23% of working days lost and only 16% of the number of net stoppages in 
their period. A further problem with these industries is that, at least for the bulk of 
the post war period, they are characterised by strong, well developed workplace trade 
unionism and bargaining (cf. Zeitlin 1985), which makes it difficult to use them in 
support of some of their conclusions. It also suggests that industries with 
contrasting shopfloor trade union presence might provide a better basis for testing 
these conclusions and their approach generally. A final consideration regarding their 
choice of industries is that they are each relatively homogeneous in that industry-level 
data apply to a similar set of organisations. Where industries are heterogeneous 
groupings, the use of such industry-level data are less valuable and may obscure 
significant changes at the level of individual enterprises. The industry-level variables 
are valuable in the context of the industries they choose but present difficulties in 
areas like engineering which encompasses a wide range of product groupings.
Thirdly, there is no account in DMR of employer and managerial attitudes which is 
difficult to justify in view of the importance placed on the role of managerial 
initiatives. In the model developed here employer attitudes along with those of 
workers are accorded a central role and in the following chapter we outline the main
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factors liable to influence these.
A fourth area concerns the union capacity variable. Whilst it has been stressed by 
many writers that organisation plays a significant role in strike activity (Batstone et 
al 1977, 1978, Edwards 1983) this association is not universally accepted (Turner et 
al 1967). Indeed McCarthy (McCarthy and Parker 1968) in evidence to the Donovan 
Commission emphasised that shop stewards frequently served to dampen down 
conflict and often supported management interests. Similarly, recent work on the 
’bureaucratisation’ of shop stewards (Terry 1978, Hyman 1979) would suggest that 
the relationship between stewards and strike activity is contrary to that assumed by 
DMR. This is not to argue that DMR are wrong in their analysis of the role of shop 
stewards in strikes, rather that they accept too readily a positive association between 
the two, ignoring the difficulties and ambiguity of the steward role.
A final consideration is the elevation by DMR of the role of government as the major 
factor accounting for overall movements in strike activity. It is the contention of this 
work that the sphere of government influence on strike activity is broader and more 
significant than DMR suggest and that this influence has increased greatly in the 
post-war period. This view is based on the direct and indirect effects of policies 
additional to those employed by DMR. First, much of the post-war period has been 
marked by the pursuit of Keynesian demand management policies operating partly 
through changes in taxation, affecting workers’ real wages and thereby firms’ product 
demand with attendant effects on specific industries and sectors of the economy. 
Second, as a result of the above the period has witnessed a great increase in the 
State’s influence within the economy and as a major employer of labour to the extent 
that government actions have a significant effect on the economy and the economic 
well-being of millions of individuals who depend on it directly for their livelihoods. 
Third, there is the impact of government policies in more recent times through 
privatisation programmes and the influence of competitive pressures generally, which 
impinges upon the more contentious issue of the impact of the state in changing or 
influencing attitudes. In this context there is a need to consider whether the political 
complexion of the government of the day has an influence on stoppages. Whilst
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DMR largely ignored this, others (Pencavel 1970, Cronin 1979) have found it to be 
statistically significant. Finally, there is the question of the extent to which 
government initiatives can be seen as independent variables affecting strike activity, 
rather then as responses to the perceived problems of industrial relations and strike 
activity in particular. A consideration of this and the other points will now be 
considered in detail in the next section where our theoretical approach is outlined and 
developed.
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SECTION I 
THE THEORETICAL MODEL
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THEORETICAL MODEL: AN OVERVIEW
In the introduction it was stressed that an adequate account of, and explanation for, 
strike activity must draw upon a range of disciplines in order to give appropriate 
consideration to the attitudes of the parties involved in any possible industrial 
confrontation. It was further argued that it was necessary to give sufficient attention 
to the role of organisation in any account of strike activity so that as well as the 
willingness to undertake (or resist) industrial action, the ability to engage in (or resist 
it) also needs to be considered.
The theoretical approach developed in the following chapters draws heavily on the 
review of competing theories but owes its main debt to the work of Durcan, 
McCarthy and Redman. The model has as its core a systems framework but in 
contrast to many such approaches, elevates to a central position the role of worker 
and employer/managerial attitudes. A diagrammatical representation of the approach 
is presented in the figure overleaf. The approach is drawn to illustrate the role of 
external influences, broader economic, political as well as local labour and product 
market factors which will affect attitudes and actions through the mediating influences 
of structure, organisation and, critically, the ways in which these are acted upon or 
anticipated by managers and other actors, government and trade unions.
The approach contends that variations in strike activity are the result of a complex 
interplay of factors. The willingness of workers to engage in strike action involves 
at least a rudimentary appreciation of the costs and benefits of doing so and the 
likelihood of success, which will be affected by the strength and impact of external 
factors, the resources available to them (their ability to do so) and an appreciation of 
the power and resources of management. The willingness and ability of 
employers/managers to ‘take a strike’ or resist, will similarly be affected by 
movements in broad and localised factors as these can be expected to affect the power 
resources at their disposal. The main elements held to be of major concern to 
workers and employers/managers are discussed in the two attitudes sections that 
follow, togther with union organisation and the role of broader influences that exert 
a potential impact on those attitudes (willingness) and organisation (ability).
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Collective bargaining as in the structural variables, but separated out to indicate interaction with attitudes.
THEORETICAL MODEL
WORKER ATTITUDES
The aim of this section is to locate our approach to worker attitudes within a broader 
theoretical framework. It should be stressed at the outset that many writers would 
object to our formulation on the grounds that worker attitudes derived from actual 
behaviour do not reflect workers true attitudes and interests (see discussion of radical 
writers in Batstone 1984) although psychological work suggests that attitudes may be 
determined by behaviour (Bern 1970, Kiesler et al 1969). This is an important point 
with significance for the present work but accepting the difficulties of identifying 
workers ’true’ interests a formulation based upon perceived interests is developed 
which addresses itself to elements within this radical perspective.
This section details the main elements of worker attitudes from work carried out in 
the UK in the post-war period. A major difficulty with this approach is that little 
large-scale survey evidence exists for the periods apart from the pioneering work of 
Runciman (1966), and the subsequent attempt by Daniel (1975) to replicate this study. 
However, this large-scale evidence has been supplemented by a number of valuable 
plant-level studies (Lupton 1962, Goldthorpe et al 1968, Beynon 1973, Gallie 1978) 
and by broader studies of working-class attitudes and consciousness (Mann 1973, 
Blackburn and Mann 1979, Beynon and Blackburn 1972, Gallie 1983).
Our interpretation of the literature suggests three main factors which can be 
sub-divided into seven which are likely to be of importance to the bulk of workers 
with which this study is concerned. Firstly, job security and job rights (Goldthorpe 
et al 1968, Beynon 1973, Blackburn and Mann 1979), secondly, actual and relative 
earnings growth, as well as the level and stability of earnings (Goldthorpe et al 1968, 
Turner et al 1967, Beynon 1973, Brown and Sisson 1975). Finally, broad 
socio-cultural factors (Gallie 1978, 1983) in influencing attitudes and workers’ 
willingness to engage in industrial action.
37
The first factors identified as influencing worker attitudes are job security and job 
rights, these have traditionally been associated with craft workers and others, who via 
apprenticeship and closed shops could maintain skill levels, but which have been 
viewed as increasingly important for many workers. This view has been inferred 
from two main developments in the post-war period, firstly the growth in public 
sector employment where a degree of job security has existed, and secondly what 
Goldthorpe (1978) has termed the ‘realisation of citizenship’, where rights have 
extended into the sphere of production in the form of job property rights and which 
have been reinforced by the legislation of the 1970’s. Goldthorpe argued that these 
factors have been further reinforced by the view that workers have expectations that 
they will not be exposed to such things as unemployment. Plant-level studies confirm 
this view. In Beynon’s (1973) study the idea that the job embodied certain property 
rights was frequently argued. Similarly, Blackburn and Mann (1979) found 
widespread evidence of the importance of such ’rights’ within their sample of manual 
workers.
Additional support for the importance of job security for workers comes from Cronin 
(1979), where it forms a significant part of his explanation of strike patterns in the 
UK up to the late 1960’s. He argues that the experience of the inter-war years and 
their associated levels of unemployment heavily influenced worker expectations for 
much of the 1950’s and 1960’s. Cronin’s work highlights a number of points for the 
present work. First, worker attitudes are dynamic, the post-depression mentality of 
the immediate post-war period gave way to demands inspired of a confidence that 
problems of unemployment were a thing of the past. Second, his account suggests 
that the relationship of job security to strike activity is difficult to assess. The general 
argument (Cronin 1979) is that fear of unemployment will tend to reduce levels of 
strike activity, but it can be plausibly argued, that if workers have experienced high 
levels of employment for prolonged periods of time, then an increase in 
unemployment which threatens such security may be resisted as workers retain the 
willingness to combat such threats to job security - the experience of the late 1960’s 
and early 1970’s might support this. In addition, at the industry level, an industry 
with rising unemployment may experience worker resistance, if levels of
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unemployment outside the industry are relatively low, falling or rising less quickly, 
on the grounds that alternative job opportunities are available to workers - with 
general skills - in the event of redundancy from their present employment.
The second set of factors identified concern earnings, their level, stability and rates 
of change. A useful starting point is Lockwood’s (1966) description of the ’privatised 
worker’, whose social consciousness is said to encourage a ’pecuniary’ model of 
society where workers have low job and enterprise involvement, isolation from 
workmates and where work and workmates do not constitute central life interests 
(Dubin 1956). For such employees, work is a deprivation performed mainly for 
extrinsic rewards and ’money-mindness’ - the calculated exchange of labour power 
for maximum pay being the main motive for staying in a job (1966 p. 256). The 
worker is wage-oriented at work, frequently joining a trade union though for largely 
instrumental reasons, and consumption oriented at home. The ’privatised’ worker is 
seen as more characteristic of workers in the future, and forms the major focus of the 
‘affluent’ worker studies and of some sociological studies of inflation (see Goldthorpe 
1978). The ‘affluent worker’ studies permit a greater insight into this group of 
workers and highlight the importance of ‘prior orientations to work’. The workers 
in the Luton study were in high paying jobs, frequently having moved to them from 
more interesting but less well paid positions and that they had moved because of their 
‘prior orientations to work’ - in the case of the ’privatised’ worker, an instrumental 
orientation, although other workers would possess other orientations (Watson 1980), 
Later work has suggested individuals may possess a variety of different orientations 
and that a number of major orientations can exist simultaneously (Blackburn and 
Mann 1979). Subsequent work by Blackburn and Mann has also found, evidence of 
a dual consciousness among manual workers and Daniel (1973) has suggested that 
workers behave differently in ’work contexts’ and ’bargaining contexts’(see also 
Beynon and Blackburn 1972, Wedderbum and Crompton 1972) and more generally 
that they have different priorities at different times and in different contexts. The 
significance of dualism is examined further in the section on union capacity in light 
of evidence (Beynon 1973, Batstone et al 1977) that shop stewards play a crucial role 
in fostering the development of a specifically ‘factory consciousness’.
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Overall, criticisms of Goldthorpe et al. have not detracted from the value of the 
concept of orientations, rather that these appear to be more complex than they 
suggested, although instrumentality may tend to dominate considerations at work.
In summary, the post-war period has seen the growth of workers, mainly manual and 
low-grade white collar who possess predominantly instrumental orientations to work 
(White and Trevor 1983 for evidence of instrumentalism of white collar workers). 
This instrumentalism and associated pecuniary consciousness is both opportunistic and 
calculative and is reinforced by an employment relationship that gives little discretion, 
encouraging low trust responses to employers (Fox 1973, 1974), it emphasises the 
importance of financial rewards as the predominant rationale for work in order to 
satisfy demands in the non-work sphere. For such workers it would seem likely that 
as well as levels of reward they are also concerned with pay levels relative to others 
and the relationship between reward and effort, these are examined below.
The importance of relative pay is illustrated by references to comparability made by 
those in negotiations, and by the stability of relative pay of different groups of 
workers over very long periods of time (Phelps Brown and Browne 1962, Routh 
1984). Part of the explanation for this is that wages are indicators of status and 
comparability essential to fair treatment (Shorey 1977). However, as Brown and 
Sisson (1975) show in engineering, comparisons are generally made with reference 
to internally comparable groups rather than with other industries and even when they 
are not, the reference groups of manual workers are frequently restricted (Runciman, 
1966, Adams, 1975, Daniel, 1975, Willman, 1982) to immediate comparisons. 
Runciman’s work in particular is worth considering further. His work offered some 
support for the ‘Affluent worker’ conclusions in citing a greater home-centredness 
among the working class but that in general feelings of relative deprivation in relation 
to class were low in magnitude and frequency even amongst those close to the bottom 
of the social structure and that reference groups were closely circumscribed at all 
levels of society except under some abnormal external stimulus resulting in a marked 
divergence between relative deprivation and actual inequality. It appears from 
Runciman’s work that it was not the extent of hardship that evoked militancy but
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disappointed expectations of improvements or threats to accepted standards, 
suggesting that workers goals are largely defensive (Crouch 1982). Workers concerns 
appeared to be governed more by a resentment of narrow inequalities, the cultivation 
of modest ambitions and the preservations of small differentials rather than by 
attitudes to public policy or the social structure as such.
From a different perspective equity theory offers support to work in the relative 
deprivation tradition. Not only does it reinforce the view that it is close referents that 
matter but suggests that equity is one of a number of norms governing the distribution 
of rewards in social relationships. In many studies of rewards, equity and equality 
emerge as major considerations, with white-collar workers generally concerned with 
equity, blue-collar workers with need (Willman 1982).
Subsequent work to discover whether attitudes had undergone significant changes in 
the period since Runciman’s work was undertaken in the 1970s. The research 
suggested that working people still continued to frame comparisons in relation to 
those much like themselves although this was combined with ‘an expanded sense of 
the possibilities of pecuniary gain for themselves and people of their sort’ (Cronin
1984). Daniel (1975) found little evidence of either a growing sense of relative 
deprivation or a widening of reference groups, although Gallie (1983) suggests that 
this result was achieved by excluding skilled workers from the sample. The second 
by Harrop (1979) undertaken in the period 1976-7 showed a continuing intolerance 
towards inequality with increased pay seen as the route most likely to alleviate this. 
Significantly as Cronin has shown ‘a variety of studies....showed that instrumental 
and pecuniary orientations....were becoming more widespread among extremely 
traditional groups like dockers and shipbuilders’ (Hill 1976, Brown and Brannen 
1970). Overall, whilst little appeared to have changed since Runciman’s work a 
greater emphasis on instrumentality seemed to have emerged as ‘the means by which 
working people sought to improve their standards and status individually and 
collectively’ (Cronin 1984 p.201, also evidence from British Social Attitudes surveys 
throughout the 1980s, e.g Jowell et al. 1987).
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Finally in this section on earnings we have drawn attention to the importance of the 
stability of earnings for workers in affecting attitudes. Much of the evidence on this 
derives from the study of the motor industry undertaken by Turner et al (1967). The 
authors argued that a significant factor in the strike frequency of the industry was the 
instability of earnings and was a factor behind the move by Chrysler and British 
Leyland to adopt measured daywork (MDW) in the early 1970’s. Many of the 
problems of instability derived from the nature of production within the industry and 
particularly the interdependence of workers so that strikes, shortages of parts etc 
would mean periodic lay-offs. Its relationship to strike activity can be explained 
partly as a response to the expectation that managements should make work available 
and to the fact that fluctuating earnings make savings difficult and specifically 
long-term savings commitments, a point which MDW tried, unsuccessfully, to rectify.
One area of particular relevance to the examination of worker attitudes is the 
relationship between wage and effort which is linked to the issue of control. For 
Lockwood (1966), ’the calculative exchange of labour power for maximum pay is the 
predominant motive for staying in the job’ (1966 p.256). Similarly, the work of 
Goldthorpe et al. (1968), Fox (1973, 1974), Batstone et al. (1977, 1978) and 
Blackburn and Mann (1979) point to a ’calculative’ approach to work on the part of 
workers. Fox’s work in particular suggests that the very nature of work coupled with 
an awareness of interests that diverge from those of management will encourage 
forms of behaviour similar to those of Lockwood’s ‘privatised’ worker. Thus, 
workers in low discretion, low-trust relationships, with a calculative view of their 
organisation will have a fairly clear appreciation of the wage-effort relationship or 
‘implicit contract’ (Watson 1980) which exists between themselves and their 
organisation and are likely to have a heightened awareness of any alterations to the 
relationship as may occur.
The concept of an effort bargain was first advanced by Behrend (1958) and 
subsequently developed further by Baldamus (1961). For Baldamus, the labour 
contract, how much of what sort shall be expended at what times and in what ways 
for a given wage, cannot be specified in advance of the work actually being carried
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out, there is therefore an area of indeterminacy in the labour contract. The concept 
of an effort bargain arises as a result of this indeterminacy and helps to bridge the 
gap between analyses of the bases of conflict and consideration of conflict behaviour 
(Edwards 1986). In Baldamus’ view the potential for disparity between wages and 
effort located
the very centre of industrial conflict even if the 
participants themselves are not aware of their 
conflicting interests in terms of changing effort values’
(1961.p. 105, 108, quoted in Edwards 1986 p.33).
The wage-effort relationship is thus an unspecified relationship which underlies every 
employment contract. However, the relationship is not fixed and represents an 
important source of instability in relations between management and workers. It also 
permits us to focus upon an immediate source of conflict at the point of production.
A further source of conflict arises as a result of the distribution of rewards from 
work. The impact of the distribution of work rewards occurs through a number of 
channels. First, through differentials in pay discussed above, second through 
differences in the rewards to labour as opposed to those of capital. Perceived 
inequities arising from these distributional channels may materialise in demands for 
fair pay or a ‘just’ wage embodying a concern for fairness in relation to other 
employees or employers. Focusing on the issue of profits, there is little doubt that 
the level and growth of profits are relevant to employees, frequently being used by 
trade unions in formulating and justifying demands for higher pay on the grounds that 
workers should share in the benefits of high or increasing profits especially where 
these have been increasing faster than pay or at the expense of wages. It has also 
been argued that high profits may increase the likelihood of unofficial stoppages. As 
Smith et al. (1978) have argued;
If the Ashenfelter and Johnson model is used, the ability of 
union leaders to persuade the membership to be content with a 
lower settlement will be diminished.
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The final factor considered to affect worker attitudes is derived from the work of 
Gallie (1978, 1983) who sees them as determined largely by the local industrial and 
community setting (Lockwood 1966), by the industry itself, (Turner, Roberts and 
Roberts 1977) and by differences in socio-cultural attitudes. It is this last factor 
which Gallie lays particular stress upon in his comparison of the class consciousness 
of French and British workers. He argues that in Britain, due much to more 
accommodating managerial styles, shop-floor representatives have achieved effective 
control over many aspects of the work situation. Management have effectively 
conceded substantial rights to trade unions whereas in France, management has 
remained sovereign within the enterprise. The difference between management in the 
two countries, Gallie argued, was the result of historical factors and cultures which 
accounted for the contrasting attitudes towards trade unions and manifested themselves 
in differences in the institutional structures of the two countries. In terms of 
socio-cultural factors and their role in social integration, Gallie emphasised 
management ideology, the way this translated into the power structure in social 
institutions, and the ideology and mode of action of trade unions. In identifying 
factors that are grounded in early industrial development Gallie has built upon 
Lockwood’s work in highlighting important contextual factors which serve as a 
backcloth for the interactions between management and workers at the workplace.
This section has examined a range of studies that have attempted to analyse worker 
attitudes, particularly manual workers, and their behaviour. To reiterate an earlier 
point, many of the studies have attempted to infer attitudes from behaviour (see also 
Armstrong et al. 1981) and whilst accepting the methodological problems with such 
an approach (see beginning of this section and Edwards and Scullion 1982) it has 
been possible to identify seven factors which appear to be central influences upon 
worker attitudes. These are set out overleaf:
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EA = f[ Js, W, WD, Ws, E, P, SCP]
Where:
EA = Worker attitudes
Js = Job security, job rights
W = Earnings growth, real or nominal
WD = Earnings differentials
Ws = Stability of earnings
E = Effort bargain - the wage effort exchange
P = Levels of profit
SCP= Socio-cultural and political factors
This suggests that if any of the underlying factors affecting worker attitudes alters to 
the detriment of the worker he or she will attempt to rectify the perceived imbalance. 
Whether strike action is resorted to will be dependent on a wide range of factors 
including the magnitude of the imbalance, socio-cultural factors (’do strikes pay’) the 
state of external factors, product demand, the availability of alternative employment 
etc and crucially upon the capacity to undertake strike action. It is this capacity, the 
importance of organisation in strikes which is the subject of the next section.
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UNION CAPACITY
Given the existence of worker attitudes favourably disposed towards strike action, an 
essential further requirement is a means whereby these attitudes can be translated into 
strike action. Such a factor is provided by the emergence of effective shop steward 
systems. DMR argue that these impact upon the nature and incidence of strikes in 
three ways. First, in providing a crucial precipitating condition for strike action. 
Second, in accounting for the spread of strike activity across industries - the 
contagion effect - and finally, in influencing the form of strikes in the post-war 
period. This is not to argue that strikes will not emerge in non-union settings or 
where shop steward systems are not highly developed, but to stress the crucial role 
of organisation and leadership in strikes (Batstone et al 1977, 1978, Lane and Roberts 
1971, Hartley et al 1983).
It was noted in the discussion of the DMR study that the association between strike 
activity and shop steward organisation is not universally accepted and requires us to 
locate the steward within a wider context. In particular a structural context which 
acknowledges the importance of factors such as establishment size, bargaining levels 
and incentive payments systems (Brown et al 1981, McCarthy 1966). These factors 
will significantly affect the ability of groups of workers to achieve their objectives by 
increasing or decreasing the bargaining power at their disposal (Hill 1974). In 
addition consideration needs to be given to the methods stewards can employ to lead 
and organise those they represent and their use of ’power over’ in order to exert 
’power for’ these groups (Hyman 1975, 1979).
In the section on the DMR work some of the reservations we have with the union 
capacity variable were highlighted. Their apparent willingness to accept uncritically 
a positive association between shop steward organisation and strikes needs to be set 
against McCarthy’s widely quoted conclusion in a research paper for the Donovan 
Commission that ’the steward was viewed by himself and others as an accepted, 
reasonable and moderating influence, more of a lubricant than an irritant’ (McCarthy
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and Parker 1968 para 15). The two positions are not necessarily contradictory if the 
heterogeneity of the shop steward role is appreciated. As McCarthy and Parker state, 
there are wide variations in the functions, responsibilities and influence of stewards 
in different plants, a factor related to the structural conditions outlined above. In 
addition, the period since Donovan has witnessed considerable changes in steward 
numbers as well as in the nature and extent of organisation which might be expected 
to have affected the level and form of strike activity after the DMR finishing date of 
1973.
The following sections examine the role of shop stewards in the management of 
conflict, their ability to mobilise groups and to set these within a structural context. 
One reason for adopting this approach is that workgroups and stewards with power 
at their disposal may have less recourse to the strike weapon (Batstone et al 1978, 
Edwards and Scullion 1982) suggesting a complex interplay between structure and 
action. It can of course be argued that the focus on such an interplay is of little 
relevance in a time-series analysis conducted at a level of aggregation above the 
individual firm, but two points are necessary here. First, in the context of developing 
a theoretical model it is necessary to examine the components in some detail, 
particularly as the model is developed from attitudes and other factors operating at 
the company and plant levels and some appreciation of how these interlink is 
important. Second, it was noted earlier that the emergence of effective shop steward 
systems was held by DMR to be the main reason for the ’contagion’ effect and some 
examination of the mechanics of shop steward organisation in bringing about this 
spread of strike activity into hitherto ’virgin’ territory would seem to be relevant.
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WORKGROUPS, SHOP STEWARDS AND LEADERSHIP:
The basis of steward leadership and the articulation of interests.
The discussion proceeds from an examination of structural and action categories that 
permit the development of a perspective on the context of shop steward organisation 
and the mechanics of;
The factors which transform workers with a grievance into a 
group with sufficient sense of solidarity to improve their 
bargaining position’. (DMR 1983 p.413)
Or as Batstone et al (1978) have argued;
‘An understanding of the phenomenon of strikes may start from an 
awareness of the subordination of workers but it has to go further 
and recognise the complex historical interplay between structure 
and consciousness as mediated by organisational processes’.
In the previous section we noted the prevalence of largely economistic orientations 
amongst workers but have also cited works which found evidence of a ’dual 
consciousness’ among manual workers (Mann 1973, Beynon 1973, Beynon and 
Blackburn 1972, Batstone et al. 1977, 1978, Armstrong et al 1981), implying that the 
immediate work environment may aid the development of a factory consciousness 
(Beynon 1973, Batstone et al 1977, but cf Edwards and Scullion 1982). Significantly, 
the evidence for ’dual consciousness’ does not appear to be confined to workers in 
situations where the immediate work situation provides them with a significant power 
base (Armstrong et al 1981) but the study by Batstone et al. (1978) in particular 
illustrates the role of stewards and their methods in aiding the development of such 
a ’factory consciousness’.
Before considering the role of shop stewards in the development of consciousness it 
is valuable to identify factors which will influence their behaviour and freedom of 
action. Four main sets of factors can be seen as providing potential constraints and 
opportunities on the shop steward function, management (Brown et al. 1978), the 
external union (Boraston et al. 1975), other shop stewards (Batstone et al. 1977,
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1978) and the workgroup(s) the steward represents. The last factor is particularly 
important in that it provides the immediate power base for any workgroup 
representative and constitutes a major reason for differences in the power and 
effectiveness of shop stewards.
Little work has been carried out on the sources of variation in group behaviour in the 
UK (cf USA, Sykes 1958) although Lupton’s (1963) work is a notable exception. 
However, an attempt to provide a framework for analysing differences in such 
behaviour has been made by Hill (1974) who identifies three sets of factors, structural 
conditions - essentially the lay-out of the production system resulting from the nature 
of technology and the production system. The extent and nature of group 
consciousness; the factors that persuade people to take advantage of conditions and 
how the solidarity of the group is defined. The power position of workers, which is 
seen to derive from the production system, the structure of the labour market (Lupton 
1963) and the role of management and organisational characteristics; the efficiency 
of management control systems. Each of the foregoing factors can encourage 
workgroup formation, facilitate or impede it. Subsequent work by Batstone (1988b), 
on the power resources available to a trade union, lays similar stress upon the 
resources of individual members (their ability to disrupt production, labour market 
position and the political influence workers can wield) as well as the union’s (or shop 
stewards) ability to combine and mobilise these resources. Significantly, the factors 
suggest that managements can greatly influence the number and nature of workgroups 
that develop (Nichols and Beynon 1977) and that some workgroups may develop an 
appreciation of their own power position which they can use without the leadership 
of stewards or in opposition to them (see Turner et al 1967, on unofficial-unofficial 
stoppages). Whilst some groups may develop such consciousness in the absence of 
shop stewards, these instances are likely to be rare as the cluster of factors favourable 
to such a development are uncommon in practice. Consequently the focus below 
is on the role shop stewards may play in fostering a form of collective consciousness.
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Batstone et al. (1977) provide valuable insights into the methods shop stewards 
employ in developing conciousness as well as highlighting the importance of more 
structural bases of power. With regard to the nature of work organisation, Batstone 
et al. suggest that the strength of such organisation is a function of, the extent to 
which group members have skills that cannot easily be replaced or substituted, the 
extent to which group members occupy a crucial position in the organisation’s 
workflow, the immediacy with which group actions can affect or disrupt organisation 
and the extent to which groups can create and cope with uncertainty in the production 
process. These structural factors, whilst important in providing a significant power 
base for groups do not imply a particular course of action. The latter is seen as being 
heavily influenced by the actions of stewards and steward bodies. Batstone et al. 
(1977) identified three aspects of power for stewards and the ways these were 
employed in the ’negotiation of order’ in the workplace. These were, success in 
making decisions, the ability to shape, identify and direct issues in the manner 
required, the maintenance of a particular ideology and the pattern of institutions 
which served to support and legitimate patterns of behaviour. The authors 
discovered that whilst the three dimensions of power were interrelated, stewards who 
were most powerful in terms of the first two dimensions achieved most success 
(leaders) and most frequently referred to the third in their systems of argument. 
Specifically, shop stewards achieved results and mobilised power through the use of 
language (vocabulary), ideology, and their network of contacts. Not surprisingly 
Batstone and his colleagues found that leader stewards were more successful than 
other stewards (populists) in terms of earnings and lower levels of overtime, 
successes which were reflected in a lower resort to both strike action and procedure 
(1977 p.258) and that more generally;
Groups of workers most able to strike (in terms of bargaining 
awareness and collective strength) may rarely in fact have 
resort to strike action’ (1978 p.223).
This discussion has allowed us to establish a link between workplace organisation and 
attitudes which can now be developed further. Batstone et al. (1978) have argued that
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members perceptions of issues can be significantly altered by the efforts of shop 
stewards (see also Waddington 1986), where their ability to do this is dependent upon 
the dual consciousness of the membership. Through the dimensions of power 
identified above shop stewards are able to create a dominant perspective very different 
to that typically found in a plant. However, they stressed that such unity and 
solidarity as developed was focused on the domestic organisation, it was a ’factory 
consciousness’ rather than a clear class consciousness. Its main elements are 
described by Beynon (1973).
(It)...understands class relationships in terms of their direct 
manifestation in conflict between the workers and the bosses in 
the factory. It is rooted in the workplace where struggles are 
fought over the control of the job and the rights of managers 
and workers. In as much as it concerns itself with exploitation 
and power it contains definite elements. But it is a politics of 
the factory. Implicitly tied up with the day-to-day battle with 
the boss.
Such a consciousness was for Batstone et al.(1978) ’very much the creation of the 
stewards’ but tended to be transitory and was always ’brittle and delicate’. It was 
also aided by shopfloor workers having a commitment to trade unionism which was 
an important and crucial condition for their being persuaded to support strike action. 
They argued further that ’once collective opposition to management had developed 
the strike is simply a further tactical extension’ (1978 p.218). However, the creation 
of this awareness was only found amongst their leader stewards and those in the 
steward hierarchy. Populist stewards and those away from the shopfloor faced 
constraints that encouraged them to follow a more sectionalist approach (see Edwards 
and Scullion 1982 who argue a sectional consciousness is widespread and more 
accurately describes the reality of group consciousness than does the concept of 
factory consciousness). Batstone et al. suggested that it was the commitment to trade 
union principles on the shopfloor and amongst leader stewards which significantly 
aided the development of such a consciousness.
Beynon’s account of factory consciousness stressed its political character and the
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importance of the frontier of control. For Batstone et al.(1978) the worker is 
inevitably involved in the wage-effort bargain. When disputes arise they may relate 
less to financial rewards than to the effort side of the equation. Equally, discussion 
of financial rewards is likely to involve effort (particularly for those with a very 
calculative approach to work) and the definition of the work situation begins to alter, 
ceasing to be simply a source of income and instead becomes a political arena. 
Stewards have a role in this in stressing the political dimension using the various 
sources of power and specific vocabularies infused by political ideas.
The notion of a frontier of control is however complex and suggests caution in 
empirical analyses. As Edwards and Scullion (1982) have shown any frontier of 
control is shaped by the interaction of employer and worker strategies so that common 
approaches by management may produce very different clashes over control 
depending upon the positions adopted by workers. They also suggest that 
conventional measures of union strength may not be good indicators of the ability of 
workers to resist management and attain their own ends as union strength can be 
associated with very different patterns of shopfloor relations (Edwards 1981).
THE GROWTH AND CHARACTER OF SHOP STEWARD ORGANISATION
The analysis above has concentrated on establishing a link between shop stewards and 
the ability of workers to undertake strike action. The analysis suggests that this 
ability will vary between different structural contexts (the nature of the work 
organisation) and will be heavily dependent upon the skills the steward can draw upon 
(the aspects of power) and the nature of the workgroups they represent. In what 
follows we examine the development of shop steward organisation in the post-war 
period before considering the role of the external union and briefly consider empirical 
work on the relationship between shop steward organisation and strike activity.
The post-war period experienced a dramatic increase in the number of shop stewards 
together with a deepening of shop steward organisation. Marsh and Coker (1963) 
estimated that the AEU saw an increase in stewards of 56% between 1947 and 1961 
with half of this increase occuring between 1957 and 1961 at a time when AEU
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membership in total increased by only 30%. They further estimated the number of 
stewards in the UK at that time (1961) as between 100000 and 120000 of which 
35000 were in federated establishments in engineering. In a survey for the Donovan 
Commission McCarthy and Parker estimated that the figure for 1966 was around 
175000 with over half in the metal-handling industries and around 13% in the rest of 
manufacturing, although even at this time a third of establishments with over 150 
employees had no shop steward and 10% only one (McCarthy and Parker 1968). 
Clegg (1979) estimated for 1978, after a prolonged period of union growth that the 
total number of stewards had risen to 250000 with 156000 in manufacturing.
Recent work suggests that steward numbers continued to increase in the first half of 
the 1980s with a subsequent decline towards the end of that decade (Daniel and 
Millward 1983, Millward et al. 1986, 1992). The first two WIRS indicated that this 
increased coverage occurred largely outside the traditionally well organised sectors 
of the economy. Thus, despite the decline that occurred in manufacturing after 1979 
there is evidence that where union membership and organisation was well developed 
it has been maintained though where it was weak it has become weaker (Fogarty and 
Brookes 1985). In support of this Terry (1986) claims that the events of the 1980’s 
have on balance reduced shopfloor bargaining power but that it has remained strong 
relative to the decline of trade union power at the aggregate level, a finding also 
supported by the 1990 WIRS (Millward et al. 1992).
The growth in the absolute numbers of shop stewards has been accompanied by an 
increased complexity and hierarchy of steward organisation together with a deepening 
of organisation which has led to a reduction in the size of steward constituencies 
although all are heavily influenced by establishment size (Brown et al. 1981, Daniel 
and Millward 1983, Millward and Stevens 1986). Research suggests that a fully 
developed shop steward organisation needs a critical mass, a minimum number of 
employees on site (500 + , Fogarty and Brookes 1985), as a result, where the size of 
establishment is falling (in terms of numbers employed) the maintenance of that 
effective organisation becomes more difficult. Similarly, steward hierarchies seem 
to be closely related to establishment size. Such hierarchies have been well
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established in the engineering industries, in their study of shop stewards in 
engineering Marsh and Coker (1963) argued that their were few establishments where 
a shop steward committee of some description did not exist. Similarly Evans (1976) 
reporting on the study he, Marsh and Evans carried out in engineering in the late 
1960’s stated that there was;
A tendency for union organisation in an engineering plant of 
any size to develop a hierarchy or superstructure of shop 
steward organisation and that each of the major unions in the 
plant will want to have a senior of their own. (p.90-91)
Whilst such hierarchies initially developed in the engineering industry, a significant 
spreading to other sections of manufacturing, the Public sector and private services 
took place after the 1960’s (Brown et al., 1981). The subsequent work detailed in 
the three WIRS offers a broader perspective and as well as showing the spread and 
strength of steward organisation outside of manufacturing shows that there has been 
a decline in the coverage of combine committees, the number of full-time stewards 
and in the number of establishments with shop stewards generally.
These recent surveys also reinforce the view above that these changes need to be 
placed within a broader structural context. Joint shop Stewards Committees appear 
to be related to workforce size and the number of unions recognised by management 
for collective bargaining purposes. In contrast, combine committees, are associated 
with high trade union density, comprehensive closed shops and a full-time steward 
or representative at the establishment. They were also found to be most significant 
where bargaining at company level was the norm. These studies also suggest that 
high union density and the existence of a closed shop in particular are associated with 
an greater range of topics for negotiation between stewards and management. This 
would imply a greater potential for disagreement and may be linked to an increased 
resort to the strike weapon.
The increase in shop steward hierarchy and organisation has important implications 
for the present work. Hyman (1979) has argued that since Donovan there has been
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a consolidation of hierarchy within steward organisations, encouraged by 
managements, with the role of JSSC’s changing to exercise a largely disciplinary role 
on dissident sections of the membership. He also suggested that there has been 
considerable integration between steward hierarchies and the official trade union 
structure with the latter restructuring to meet the challenge of stewards, developing 
rulebooks which define rights and duties of convenors and JSSC’s. Hyman stresses 
that whilst these trends are not universal they indicate an accentuation of the duality 
inherent in the steward role in that their potential as an agency of power or control 
over their members has emerged more clearly (as opposed to power for) leading to 
what he has termed the ’bureaucratisation of the rank and file’. Terry (1983) also 
lays stress on the active encouragement of management in developing reform 
strategies with respect to shop stewards but emphasises the fact that stewards have 
had to develop more complex forms of organisation to enable them to negotiate with 
a management structure that changed after mergers and takeovers and the internal 
restructuring of the 1960’s and 1970’s.
As well as pursuing reformist strategies with respect to existing steward bodies 
managements actively fostered the emergence and subsequent development of steward 
organisation in those areas with no history of such organisation, so that:
Managements confronted by problems of profitability, adopted 
a range of corporate and industrial relations strategies, leading 
to the spread and formalisation of shop steward 
organisations... .these could be seen as the first moves towards 
company unionism...in effect managements developed a form 
of steward organisation, which they saw as appropriate to their 
needs’ (Terry 1983).
Whilst there is considerable support for increased formalisation in the 1970’s (Brown 
et al. 1981), there is less agreement that this has led to ’bureaucratisation’ (Batstone 
1984, Edwards and Heery 1985). This has important implications for strike activity; 
if Batstone is correct, the impact on strike forms and activity would either be 
negligible or, in engineering particularly, show up prior to the reforms of the late
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1960’s and early 1970’s. However, if as Hyman and Terry argue, stewards are 
’incorporated’ into the managerial decision-making processes we would expect a 
significant decline in strike activity in those sectors where such ’incorporation’ was 
most evident.
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SHOP STEWARD ORGANISATION AND STRIKE ACTIVITY: SUMMARY 
AND EVIDENCE
The discussion of shop steward organisation and its role in strike activity has 
suggested a complex and ambiguous relationship. The studies by Batstone et al. 
(1977, 1978) illustrate the role of leadership in strike action but suggest that those 
organisations with significant power in terms of their own and their workgroups 
resources may have little resort to strike activity. Similarly, the ’bureaucratisation’ 
thesis suggests that stewards, by emphasising ’power over’ as opposed to ’power for’ 
would not be expected to be associated with strike activity. In contrast, Pencavel 
(1970), in his time-series study of UK strike activity suggested that the main factor 
behind the increase the number of strikes in his period was the growth in steward 
numbers and associated workplace bargaining, but the absence of data at the 
aggregate level prevented a further test of this hypothesis. Likewise other time-series 
work and until recently, cross-sectional studies were hampered by the same problems.
These defects have been overcome with data collected as a result of the ’Contours’ 
study (Brown et al. 1981) and WIRS 1 (Daniel and Millward 1983). Both studies 
produced data on steward numbers and organisation along with different forms of 
industrial action which have permitted a more accurate assessment of the relationship 
between shop stewards and strike action than has been hitherto possible.
Edwards (1981) using data from the ’Contours’ study, of industrial action over a 
two-year period found various measures of union organisation significantly related to 
the likelihood of plants experiencing industrial action. However, Edwards argued that 
only 15-20% of the variation in the number of strikes between plants could be 
explained by the largely structural variables he employed, so that, whilst shop steward 
activity was related to strikes and other forms of industrial action, around 80% of the 
variation among plants in their experiences of strikes were the result of differences 
among plants in the day-to-day decisions of management and shop stewards.
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Work using the WIRS 1 database has been undertaken by Blanchflower and Cubbin 
(1986) and permits an examination of all sectors of the economy. They found that 
organisational factors, especially the presence of shop stewards and the percentage of 
full-time manual workers who were union members were significantly associated with 
strike action. Of particular interest was the fact that they found stewards had a 
significant impact on the probability of plants experiencing small strikes as compared 
with those experiencing no strikes at all, but not significant for establishments that 
experienced longer strikes as opposed to those that experienced small strikes or none 
at all (1986 p.34). These findings are important but must be treated with caution (see 
Edwards 1981), many of the independent variables used are significantly related to 
one another, as are the dependent variables in the case of industrial action, giving rise 
to a problem of multicollinearity. In Blanchflower and Cubbin’s work there is also 
no indication of the overall explanatory power of the model, which, like that of 
Edwards’ may be very weak.
THE EXTERNAL TRADE UNION
It is possible to discern from our discussion four main ways in which stewards can 
influence dimensions of strike activity. First, their organising function, providing a 
vehicle for workers with a grievance to enable them to have the capacity to engage 
in strike action. Second, that given the first point, a spread of shop steward 
organisation to hitherto unorganised plants would be expected to increase the 
likelihood of workers engaging in strike action (DMR’s ’contagion effect’) and third, 
sustaining any action if it occurred. Fourth, that where collective bargaining is highly 
decentralised, shop stewards, through their negotiating function will have a significant 
affect on the number of stoppages that may arise (it should be noted that the first 
three points can occur independently of the fourth). The fourth point is relevant in 
relation to DMR where the emphasis on shop steward organisation encompasses strike 
numbers and as a result is heavily influenced by their period of study and, as we 
discussed earlier by their choice of industries. In view of this some consideration 
needs to be given to the role of the external union in strike activity particularly where 
bargaining is centralised. It is possible to identify ten ways in which a trade union 
and trade union structure may influence strikes over and above the influence of shop
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steward organisation.
a) One important way in which the external union may exert an influence upon 
strike activity is through the objectives it strives to achieve and the strategies 
it chooses to pursue in order to achieve them. (Batstone 1988b). External 
circumstances will necessarily influence the extent to which tactical as opposed 
to defensive goals are pursued (Crouch 1982) and ‘rational choice’ models 
suggest unions take a calculated view of objectives and strategies with some 
not being pursued because of the unlikelihood of their achieving success in 
particular situations.
b) According to Clegg (1976) trade union behaviour is largely determined by the 
structure of collective bargaining. Where collective bargaining is centralised 
the tendency will be for trade union structure and Government to centralise. 
In such situations bargaining opportunities will be infrequent and workplace 
organisation embryonic. As a result strike numbers will tend to be low as will 
the ability of the union to sustain a stoppage in view of the lack of any 
effective shop steward organisation.
c) Alternatively, trade unions may be constrained by structural factors from 
developing effective workplace organisation e.g because of establishment size, 
workforce characteristics, management opposition or because of their 
reluctance to encourage the development of such organisation. The 
implications for strike activity would be similar to those in (a) above.
d) If shop steward organisation has been encouraged by the period of full 
employment and opportunities for decentralised bargaining that piecework 
systems of payment provided the external trade union could still influence this 
development. Some trade unions have given significant autonomy to shop 
stewards and workplace organisation (e.g TGWU) particularly in large 
establishments (Boraston et al. 1975, Brown et al. 1978) whereas others in 
principle, if not in practice closely circumscribe the activities of shop stewards
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(e.g AEU). A major development since the 1960’s has been the formalisation 
of the steward role by the external union giving clear guidelines on their 
activities and more closely integrating them into their internal structures 
(Clegg 1979, Hyman 1983).
e) There is considerable evidence to show that strikes are linked to periods of 
rapid union growth (Cronin 1979) and more specifically that the latter is 
associated with strike waves. Notwithstanding the question of causation in 
this approach the rationale for this is unclear. Following Bain and Price 
(1983) a number of business cycle influences are believed to affect workers 
decisions to join a union, including inflation the growth of money wages etc, 
although the theoretical arguments advanced by Bain (particularly Bain and 
Elsheikh 1976) have been subject to considerable criticism. If Bain is correct 
workers joining unions to protect or advance their living standards create 
pressure within unions to achieve significant increases in pay etc to satisfy 
their expanding membership. If employers are unwilling to concede, 
industrial action is a likely consequence.
f) A further factor affecting strike numbers independently of shop steward 
organisation is disputes that arise over trade union recognition which have 
consistently represented a significant percentage of non-wage stoppages.
g) Similarly, multi-unionism at the industry as well as plant levels increases the 
potential for conflict (Metcalf et al. 1993). The number of potential 
disagreements over bargaining objectives and strategy and the problems of 
’leapfrogging’ all increase the likelihood of stoppages. The problem is further 
compounded where multi-unionism involves attempts by different unions to 
recruit the same group of workers leading to considerable inter-union rivalry 
and possible disputes. At a plant level the issue of demarcation has created 
many industrial relations difficulties in some industries (e.g shipbuilding) and 
accentuated the sectionalism within the workforce.
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h) In the Introduction we noted the work of ‘political’ theorists who argued that 
trade unions may trade-off the strike weapon in return for advances in the 
political arena so that moves towards corporatism should be associated with 
a decline in strike activity (Korpi and Shalev 1979, although this may only 
apply to centralised industrial relations systems). Similarly, institutionalist 
writers have argued more modestly that relations between trade unions (or the 
TUC) and the Government have an important influence on strike activity 
(Clegg 1976, Ross and Hartman 1960, DMR 1983).
i) A further point relates to the role of union leaders in strike activity. As we 
have seen already, the Ashenfelter and Johnson model of strikes presumes that 
strikes are used by the leadership as a control device to reduce members pay 
expectations. Whilst this may not be appropriate to the UK (DMR 1983) an 
alternative view might suggest that some leaders, particularly new incumbents 
would be more prepared to take a tough line in negotiations to ’prove a point’ 
to the negotiators and members and increase the potential risk of stoppages 
arising.
j) A final point is the relationships and degree of trust existing between the main
negotiating parties, particularly between union leaderships and management. 
Strong inter-personal relations may ensure conflict can be avoided when other 
factors are working against such an eventuality Walton and McKersie, 1965, 
Stephenson and Allen 1987). The same argument can be extended to 
relationships between trade unions and governments (Ross and Hartman 1960, 
Clegg 1976) and the ability to agree deals and avoid conflict when the 
circumstances are not favourable to such a solution.
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Ill
EMPLOYER/MANAGERIAL ATTITUDES
A consideration of employer attitudes is commonplace in economic accounts of strike 
activity, particularly those derived from bargaining models where such attitudes are 
seen largely as a function of profits. The approach to employer attitudes developed 
here borrows heavily from these economic approaches but also aims to provide a 
more detailed appraisal of these attitudes, highlighting their complexity and the 
difficulties involved in their specification. Before outlining these difficulties we 
summarise the main elements of our employer attitudes variable, the rationale for 
which will be developed in the chapters that follow.
We suggest there is little justification for the distinction in managerialist approaches 
between employers and senior managers in terms of the objectives they adopt for 
organisations or between senior managers and what Fidler (1981) calls the ’core 
company’. It is apparent from work on senior managers (Winkler 1974, Fidler 1981) 
that they are overwhelmingly concerned with cost control and cost minimisation with 
the ultimate goal of profit. This is not to suggest that matters such as wage claims 
will automatically be resisted but rather that such managers will be more concerned 
with the effect of the claim on the size of the wage bill or of those costs in relation 
to total costs, the rate of change of productivity and the impact on prices and 
profitability. As Maclnnes (1987) has argued the fact that employers place a 
premium on cost-control and competitiveness need not lead them to identify industrial 
relations or the organisation of labour as the area where their problems could be 
solved. A further relevant factor in the specification of employer attitudes is the 
diversity of views within the management hierarchy and that, if considerable diversity 
exists, to what extent can lower level managers usurp the policies and authority of 
those in more senior positions. Central to these issues is the effectiveness of the 
management control system which will be affected in part by the number of levels in 
the hierarchy and the span of control. These in turn will be affected by external 
contingencies such as the state of demand, the nature of the product market faced by 
an organisation, particularly in terms of the degree of competition and factors such
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as the type of technology used and the size of the organisation (see Aston studies on 
the importance of these factors for organisational structure and performance) as well 
as by managerial preferences. Finally, there is, following Poole et al. (1982) the 
importance of socio-cultural factors in affecting attitudes and shaping managerial 
initiatives (see earlier discussion of these factors on workers; Gallie 1978, 1983). 
Each of these factors is examined in more detail in the second part of this section, 
here we explore the difficulties of specifying the attitudes variable and provide a 
rationale for the general arguments outlined above.
One of the major debates within social science in the 1950’s and 1960’s concerned 
’managerialism’ and the presumed divorce between ownership and control of business 
enterprises. It is not our purpose to examine this debate in detail but some relevant 
points can be made. First, Reekie (1980) has argued that the pursuit of ’managerial’ 
objectives may, in the long run, be similar in effect to that of pursuing long-run profit 
maximisation. Second, Nichols (1969) found that most directors and senior 
managers in his study were committed to the long-run company interest and that in 
general the distinction between ownership and control appeared to make little 
difference in practice. Support for this view comes from a number of other studies. 
Pahl and Winkler’s (1974) work on ’professional’ managers found their indicators of 
successful performance to be profits, growth and return on investment. Similarly 
Zeitlin (1974) cites managerial goals in terms of growth, sales, technical efficiency 
and a strong competitive position as a means to achieving high corporate profits. 
Subsequent work by Fidler (1981) argues that in the short-term boards of directors 
see themselves as balancing the objectives of disparate groups connected with their 
firms, offering support to ’stakeholder’ theories, and in light of what ’is best for the 
firm in the long term’. In the long-term directors appear to view the interests of all 
concerned as identical and that this equates to the success of the company in making 
profit. Overall we would concur with the summary of Hill (1981) who argued:
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Theorists of the managerial revolution failed to appreciate that 
the issue of managerial behaviour is not....reducible to the 
personal preferences of managers. The policies and actions of 
top management are not constrained but are subject to certain 
external disciplines which operate regardless of their attitudes 
and motivation’. (1981 p.74-5)
Considerable evidence also exists concerning divisions within management (Pettigrew 
1973) but it is difficult to assess what difference these make in practice. Our concern 
is with levels within the managerial hierarchy rather than across levels of management 
and therefore focuses upon the effectiveness of managerial control systems in ensuring 
that policies enacted at Board level are adhered to by those at different levels within 
the hierarchy and the extent to which those at lower levels have relative autonomy in 
decision-making. Our general proposition, which is developed more fully below, is 
that whilst managers have some freedom in setting objectives for their organisation 
in practice they are constrained by a number of ’contingent’ factors. Further, that 
these contingencies, the size of the market and organisation, degree of competition 
etc, will affect the nature and effectiveness of the managerial control system (and 
especially the incentive managers have to improve the effectiveness of that system) 
and the extent to which lower level managers have discretion in framing policies 
which deviate significantly from those of senior managers. As Hill (1981) has again 
argued:
Some managers below top executive level may adopt 
sub-optimal strategies regarding accumulation, they ’satisfice’ 
rather than maximise - profitability not being a central concern 
for them - but the objective and interests of these lower level 
managers are constrained and lower level managers are under 
pressure to act in ways that realise the objectives of senior 
management.
Such a proposition can be criticised for its emphasis on structural constraints to the 
exclusion of human factors. In an attempt to remedy this it is valuable to briefly 
examine some of the evidence on the attitudes of different levels of management, 
beginning with work on directors.
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The attitudes of directors are well-documented. They generally appear to adopt a 
unitary view of their organisations (Fox 1966, as it appears do other levels of 
management, Poole et al 1982) with trade unions seen largely in functional terms 
(Fidler 1981) and where the accounting function predominates (Batstone 1984). A 
number of writers (e.g Winkler 1974, Fidler 1981) have shown that directors have 
limited contact with manual workers and the shop-floor generally, with labour 
invariably treated as a cost to be minimised. In general, directors appear to be 
dominated by financial considerations, be committed to profitability and to be isolated 
socially and spatially from trade unions and the shopfloor.
On management attitudes generally, a contrast is provided by three studies conducted 
over a twenty five year period. Superficially, this might permit an insight into 
whether attitudes have changed over the period but the differences in study design and 
objectives makes such an exercise difficult at least for two of the studies. The first 
is that carried out by the P.E.P (1965) which presented evidence within a 
dichotomous framework contrasting managers characterised in terms of whether they 
were ’thrusters’ or ’sleepers’. The contrasts rely heavily on the belief that the former 
were more common in the newer industries and the latter in the older industries such 
as shipbuilding, suggesting that these attitudes were responsible for the differences 
in performance stating that there existed a ’discernible connection between attitudes 
on the one hand and growth, or adequate or good profit levels on the other’ (p.227). 
Leaving aside the question of cause and effect and the fact that certain firms and 
industries may attract individuals with certain prior orientations (as the earlier 
discussion suggests) the study suggested certain behavioural characteristics of these 
two types. The ’thrusters’ were associated with long term planned initiatives rather 
than management that was reactive, short-term and suspicious of change characteristic 
of the ’sleepers’. It was ’thrusters’ therefore who were most likely to achieve 
favourable results. Although this view receives some support from recent studies of 
successful companies (Peters and Waterman 1982, Goldsmith and Clutterbuck 1984, 
Management Today 1987), work by Maclnnes (1987) on the effects of the period 
since 1979 in the UK suggests that British management has remained wedded to a 
short tern, cost minimising attitude particularly towards labour. In the context of the
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proposition advanced above, the differences in attitudes would be significantly 
influenced by the characteristics and culture of the industries and firms themselves 
rather than to managerial attitudes per se giving rise a form of ’bounded rationality’, 
(Williamson 1976) so that older industries with static/declining markets and strong 
resistance to change might ’encourage’ short-term ad hoc responses leading to a form 
of permanent crisis management, and possibly attract individuals with similar short 
term perspectives.
The second study is that conducted by Poole et al. (1982) based on a survey of 
members of the BIM. Their work stresses the role of cultural factors in shaping 
managerial attitudes and the importance of control to an understanding of these 
attitudes. Anything perceived as curtailing or threatening to curtail the policy and 
executive function of management was viewed with considerable suspicion, 
particularly Government action and the influence of trade unions. Overall, a highly 
unitarist frame of reference predominated amongst their sample of managers.
Poole and Mansfield (1993) replicated Poole et al. to test the validity of their 1981 
results after the ’Thatcher years’. Significantly, the period appears to have 
experienced a strengthening of the unitarist frame of reference amongst managers and 
an increasing preference for ’market’ rather than ’corporatist’ approaches to areas like 
labour markets. The study also confirmed a stability in underlying management 
preferences towards trade unions and government intervention, and a willingness not 
to be constrained by the actions of either, control has remained a key concern as has 
an ideological preference for free enterprise.
Finally, it is necessary to note some general evidence on the attitudes of lower level 
managers and supervisors. Their significance lies in their role in workplace 
bargaining which was significant in some areas of manufacturing (Turner 1969) but 
which has subsequently declined as a result of organisational changes (Child and 
Partridge 1982). In addition, management for such groups is likely to be different 
in kind from other groups of managers, as Batstone et al. (1977) argue, shopfloor 
management in particular is largely ’crisis’ management. Many individuals in these
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groups ’graduated’ from the shopfloor and undoubtably experienced considerable 
stress in their new roles (Thurley and Wirdenius 1973) but in terms of their allegiance 
to key corporate objectives the argument here, following the proposition above, is that 
the degree of freedom they have in making decisions is linked to external factors as 
is the willingness of senior managers to give them this freedom. It should be noted 
that many senior managers were aware of the informality of workplace industrial 
relations in the 1960’s (McCarthy and Parker 1968) and most claimed to be satisfied 
with it. On our argument this would have been possible because the contingent 
factors, (or perception of them) were favourable to such a situation. As Child and 
Partridge (1982) have shown, the scope of the role of supervisors does appear to be 
related to the effect of contingent factors.
Despite our concern with contingencies in affecting managerial attitudes we would 
stress that the former do not determine behaviour. Our analysis suggests managers 
have to take account of contingencies in determining structure, the number of levels 
in the hierarchy, (Turner et al., 1977) the span of control and the organisation of 
production but it acknowledges that they have choices in how they respond to or 
anticipate such changes. In this context the period under consideration has witnessed 
major changes in economic, political and social contexts, particularly growing 
international competition and import penetration which would be expected to affect 
company organisation and management practice which are considered briefly below.
Purcell and Sisson (1983) argued that in the 1950’s the typical pattern of company 
organisation was either, highly centralised control of all functions or of one holding 
company where separate divisions had a high degree of autonomy. Since then there 
has been there has taken place a broad move towards multi-divisional or ’M’ form 
organisation (Williamson 1967) where a small group of senior managers at the heart 
of an enterprise play a key role in developing corporate strategy, controlling 
subsidiary companies by means of strict budgetary control and where these 
subsidiaries are viewed as profit or cost centres. Allied to these developments were 
changes in size, particularly after the mid 1960’s through horizontal and vertical 
mergers and diversification (Utton 1977). More recently there has been evidence of
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companies continuing to reduce centralised direction and develop ’mini-factories’ and 
flexible manufacturing systems (Edwards 1987) with the themes of flexibility and 
employee involvement being stressed, combined with strict cost control (Edwards 
1987, Brown 1986).
Overall, this section has attempted to place the question of employer attitudes within 
the wider context of the organisations and society from which they are largely 
derived. Put simply, organisations, and those that run them, operate within an 
economy organised on capitalistic lines where survival rests on the ability to ensure 
continued growth and profitability via capital accumulation. The pressures to abide 
by the ’rules of the game’ will vary within and between organisations and across 
market contexts, but as the quote from Hill (1981) illustrates, managerial behaviour 
cannot be reduced to managerial preferences, the disciplines exerted by the capitalist 
market economy significantly constrain the objectives organisations can set for 
themselves and the extent to which they can deviate from these. Likewise, the same 
pressures will significantly constrain the degree of freedom managers have in 
deviating from such objectives.
The model of employer/managerial attitudes that can be derived from the above 
discussion has four main elements. These are essentially, organisation’s cost 
structures and changes therein, present and future demand, present and expected 
levels of competition and socio-cultural/ political factors. Thus:
E*A = f [ C, C* Q, Q*, COMP, COMP*, SCP ]
Where:
E*A = Employer/managerial attitudes 
C =  Cost structure 
C* = Changes in cost structure 
Q =  Present demand 
Q* = Expected future demand 
COMP= Present level of competition 
COMP* = Expected level of competition 
SCP = Socio-cultural/political factors
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COST STRUCTURE AND CHANGES IN COSTS
The significance of cost structure for employers is stressed in Marshall’s work on the 
elasticity of derived demand. To summarise, employer attitudes to changes in 
wages/eamings will depend upon the elasticity of demand for the product, their ability 
and willingness to substitute capital for labour, unskilled for semi- or skilled workers 
or non-union for unionised workers (thus significantly affecting the bargaining power 
of particular groups of employees), the extent to which labour represents a 
significant proportion of total costs (much will also depend on what is happening to 
productivity) and labour’s share in value added. Assuming that labour represents a 
significant proportion of total costs for many firms then, ceteris paribus, increases in 
real wages/eamings will be more likely to be resisted, particularly if their ability to 
pass on such costs to consumers is limited. However, recent evidence suggests that 
firms are also interested in the size of the wage bill so that if increases in earnings 
can be traded off against redundancies the pressure on costs may be negligible.
In addition, employers are also concerned with changes to total labour costs (Oi 1962) 
with increases/decreases in payroll taxes. Thus, changes in government policy which 
lead to increases in employers National Insurance contributions may precipitate 
attempts at cost cutting by employers which may increase the likelihood of strikes 
occuring.
PRESENT AND FUTURE DEMAND
Closely linked to the issue of levels of competition considered below. It can be 
expected that firms facing steadily increasing demand for their products can more 
easily respond to employee demands for better pay and conditions in view of their 
increased profitability. In contrast, firms facing a steadily worsening market situation 
in terms of declining demand for their products will be more likely to resist pressure 
from workers for improvements in pay and conditions. In addition, such firms will 
be more likely to initiate measures aimed at increasing efficiency and cost control 
which would again be more likely to be resisted by workers.
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This contingency view assumes that factors such as the nature of demand and 
competition would have implications for organisational structure. Organisations 
facing rapidly growing dynamic product markets will tend to develop ’organic’ 
organisation structures, flexible and decentralised. In contrast, those facing stable and 
largely predictable markets with limited competition will develop ’mechanistic’ 
structures, more rigid, bureaucratic and hierarchical (Bums and Stalker, 1961). 
Although accepting that organisations need both types, product market factors can be 
expected to significantly affect organisations in their choice of structure and internal 
systems.
PRESENT AND FUTURE COMPETITION
These factors will significantly determine the degree of freedom firms have in 
responding to worker demands. For firms in monopolistic and oligopolistic markets, 
the associated levels of competition will give them limited incentives to utilise 
resources efficiently. If such firms are enjoying excess profits, their ability to meet 
demands from workers in the form of higher pay, more relaxed working conditions 
etc, will be increased. Conversely, firms operating in highly competitive markets can 
be expected to use resources efficently and have less freedom for manoeuvre in 
meeting worker demands for improved pay and conditions.
A relevant factor to consider here is Liebenstein’s principle of X-inefficiency 
(Liebenstein 1966). This rests on the assumption that individuals have their own 
utility functions independent of the organisations for which they work. Whilst human 
effort can be varied within set limits, workers may be able to choose the pace and 
quality of work and the amount of time they spend on certain activities. The extent 
to which they can do this (maximise their own utility functions with limited influence 
from their organisations) is likely to be affected by the degree of monopoly power 
enjoyed or degree of competition faced by an organisation. As Hawkins (1973) has 
argued:
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Management may consume part of the potential profits in a 
variety of ways e.g by tolerating inefficiency, by... .overstaffing 
and by spending on prestigious buildings and equipment... .The 
more comfortable the situation the less may be the effort which 
is expended to improve it.
The effect on the employer’s ability to withstand employee demands is similar to the 
account above. Where X-inefficiency exists, firms have more scope to accede to 
worker demands and thus reduce the possibility of strike action occurring.
SOCIO-CULTURAL/POLITICAL FACTORS
Finally, following Poole et al. (1982, 1993), and the work of Gallie (1978, 1983) 
there is the impact of broader economy-wide factors which affect employer attitudes. 
In particular Poole et al. have stressed the importance of control for managers 
manifesting itself in a wariness towards anything that might undermine that control, 
for example government intervention or enhanced power and influence to trade 
unions. Similarly, attitudes towards and perception of trade unions are affected by 
broader attitudes in the wider society and from the experiences of others. A contrast 
is clearly provided here by Gallie (1978) in his account of the differing attitudes and 
behaviour of French and British managers towards trade unions.
Whilst Gallie highlights the importance of deeper cultural bases to attitudes and 
behaviour and in particular the significance of broad national cultures in accounting 
for national differences in attitudes and consciousness the importance of local cultures 
should also be stressed. These would include regional traditions as well as factors 
such as organisational culture, all of which would be expected to exert an influence 
on strike activity.
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IV
MACRO-ECONOMIC FACTORS
In the Introduction it was stressed that for economists, macro-economic factors are 
assumed to have a direct impact upon the impact of stoppages in particular because 
they are assumed to affect worker expectations and/or those of employers. Other 
theoretical approaches outlined suggested a more modest role for economic factors, 
principally as background or precipitating influences (see DMR) which, set in the 
context of structural and organisational factors influence a number of dimensions of 
strike activity. Notwithstanding the criticisms of the approaches employed by 
economists it is possible, given worker organisation and attitudes favourable to the 
use of the strike weapon to identify a number of direct ways in which broad macro- 
economic factors can be expected to influence strike activity.
First, in the short-run, movements in the short-term business cycle, by creating 
uncertainty in the environment affect perceptions of the future held by workers and 
employers. Following Rees (1952) it can be argued that these perceptions are likely 
to be furthest apart at the peak of short-term cycles, thereby increasing the likelihood 
of a higher number of stoppages at the ‘turning point’ of the peak of these cycles 
(Mayhew 1979).
Second, where macro-economic factors are of such intensity and severity that they 
exert a more direct impact on the attitudes and perceptions of the parties. Clegg 
(1979) has suggested that such factors were particularly important in Britain during 
the 1970’s and swamped the effect of other factors, such as bargaining reforms on 
strike patterns during this period. As well as affecting stoppage numbers, economic 
factors can be assumed to affect other dimensions of strike activity. For example, in 
periods of high inflation, ceteris paribus, strike numbers might be expected to 
increase as workers seek to protect real earnings and because the frequency of 
bargaining increases. Furthermore, where the economic climate is particularly harsh, 
more people would be affected, as the organisational and structural factors will be 
unable to provide protection for workers and this may precipitate a spread of strike
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action across industries and establishments. In addition, in a situation of high 
unemployment, stoppages would be expected to lengthen as slack markets provide 
little incentive for employers to find quick solutions to resolve problems that arise.
In the medium to long term, economic factors linked to broader structural changes 
may exert a significant impact upon strike activity, for example through the 
movement of long waves or Kondratieff cycles in capitalist economies (Cronin 1979, 
Screpanti 1987). The build-up of grievances during a downswing or thwarted 
expectations at the peak of an upswing lead to periods of intense conflict in the form 
of strike waves. At these ‘crisis points’ the interests and expectations of employers 
and employees would be expected to be furthest apart. In the case of long waves, 
attitudinal restructuring during an upswing and the establishment of new dominant 
values would generate an expectation of continued benefits into the future. A move 
into downswing would be expected to show up initially for employers because of 
changes in orders and only later for employees and lead to an increasing gulf between 
the expectations of the future held by each group, increasing the likelihood of 
disagreement and reducing the chances of compromise short of a stoppage. 
Furthermore, Cronin (1979) has argued that such waves are associated with a greater 
spread of conflict across industries which would have the effect of increasing stoppage 
incidence.
Overall, although macro-economic factors are normally seen to operate as background 
variables with respect to strike activity. The discussion suggests that macro-economic 
factors can exert a more direct influence on a number of dimensions of strikes, with 
their precise impact affected by specific organisational and structural contexts and 
critically, by the ways in which they are interpreted and acted upon by managements. 
These direct channels emphasise the role of economic factors in creating uncertainty 
in relations between employers and employees and, more specifically in representing 
fundamental changes in the national, international or structural contexts within which 
such relations take place and develop.
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VTHE STATE
In Chapter 2, a summary of the main elements of the DMR analysis was presented 
and the emphasis placed by them on the role of government noted. Their focus on 
government stemmed from the view that:
In each sub-period there have been certain aspects of the post­
war strike pattern where the reactions and policy initiatives of 
successive governments have been decisive (1983: p.414).
In keeping with other ‘institutionalist’ accounts of strikes, DMR employed a 
conception of the state which focused almost exclusively on government and the 
legislature as the main channels through which the state influenced the conduct of 
industrial relations. However, as was noted earlier, these factors were given 
considerably more prominence than is customary in ‘institutionalist’ works.
It is the contention of the present study that DMR are correct in their elevation of the 
role of government as a major factor in the post-war strike pattern but that this role 
is more pervasive than they suggest. In addition, the extent to which government 
initiatives can be treated as exogeneous influences on strike patterns particularly in 
the more interventionist phases of the state since the mid 1960s needs to be examined 
in more detail. This links to a more fundamental concern with their work. Implicit 
in their account is a liberal-pluralist conception of the state with the latter as a neutral 
arbiter regulating conflict through different interest groups. Such a perspective tends 
to explore state initiatives as independent of developments within the wider economy. 
Within DMR the state-economy relationship is unspecified and unexplored, with the 
variables employed reflecting the perceived need to ensure stability and conflict 
resolution within the industrial sphere, rather than examining variables concerned with 
ensuring stability and the management of conflict including class conflict more 
generally. The fact that successive governments may themselves have been the cause 
of some of these conflicts is only briefly explored.
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Perpectives on the State
It is not the purpose of this section to engage in a prolonged discussion of the role of 
the state* in capitalist societies although the following analysis draws upon material 
from a range of perspectives. It should be noted however, that although theories of 
the state have been dominated by debates between liberal-pluralists and marxists and 
within these traditions, the two schools have moved closer together on a number of 
central issues in recent years (Lindblom 1977, Dunleavy 1981, Kelly 1988). In 
particular, marxist writers who subscribe to class theories of the state (Urry 1981, 
Clegg et al. 1986) lay stress upon the often contradictory policies of the state, the 
heterogeneity of capital’s interests (Strinati 1982), the diversity of interests within the 
state (the predominant role of the Treasury) and the unintended consequences of state 
actions, much of which liberal-pluralists would find little to disagree with. Both 
schools also see the state’s role in terms of maintaining order and stability and 
containing class conflict (Middlemass 1979, Miliband 1985), reflected in a parallel 
interest in the emergence of corporatists and neo-corporatists developments in the UK 
and elsewhere in the 1960s and 1970s (Crouch 1977, 1982, Panitch 1980, Strinati 
1982). Similarly, liberals and marxists have many elements in common. They both 
see the state as responding to pressures emanating from within civil society and see 
its actions as determined by the underlying logic of modem market society (Zeitlin 
1985).
The largely deterministic conceptions of the state as developed by a number of 
marxists and liberal writers present an anlysis of the state’s role in respect of strikes 
with some difficulty. If the nature and actions of the state are largely determined by 
the economic base and that the state is essentially a passive respondent to pressures 
from within civil society the state’s role in respect of industrial relations and 
particularly strikes is largely an endogeneous one, and makes it difficult to analyse 
its role in respect of these issues. One approach which potentially overcomes these 
problems and permits an analysis of the state consistent with the general approach of 
DMR is that of Zeitlin (1985).
* The state is here defined as institutions, the government, administration, 
legislature, military and the police, local government and parliamentary assemblies 
and the relationships between these (Miliband 1969, Middlemass 1979, Hill 1981).
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Zeitlin’s work, whilst critical of both marxist and liberal-pluralist conceptions of the 
state could be integrated into the ares of consensus between the two schools. His 
particular concern is with the question of why the state has acted in ways that helped 
to foster shop-floor bargaining and workers job control albeit unintentionally (Tolliday 
1985) and places emphasis upon the interests of state leaders as separate from those 
of the economic base. Zeitlin therefore stresses the need to see the state as a complex 
institution and as potentially autonomous, with its own interests and capacity for 
action. As he argues;
State’s can therefore pursue interests distinct from and 
potentially opposed to, those of all the contending groups which 
make up civil society (1985: p.27).
In the case of the British State in the twentieth century, he cites the requirement for 
it to balance conflicting objectives which aided the prevalence of short-term decision 
making.
Zeitlin’s analysis has particular relevance for the present work, specifically because 
it can be ‘locked onto’ the role of government developed by DMR without altering 
their general approach. It retains the notion of the state as a largely exogeneous 
factor, relatively independent of the economic base, and permits an extension of their 
work rather than its replacement by a different theoretical framework. It has the 
further advantage of extending the range of state influences beyond those commonly 
found in institutional-pluralist accounts. As Tolliday (1985) has argued in the context 
of the state’s influence in the British motor industry industrial relations:
The wide ranging importance of the state to the shape of 
development of industrial relations in this industry.... suggests 
the need for a wider framework for looking at the state, than, 
that for instance used by Clegg....The notion of ‘abstention’ 
which characterises Clegg’s description of the state’s role in 
fact evades most of the difficult substantive questions of how 
the state operates in this area and the actual influence that it 
exerts (1985: p. 139).
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Both Zeitlin and Tolliday provide an important service in highlighting the complexity 
of the state and hitherto benign aspects of the state’s role in influencing industrial 
relations. However, this view can be challenged and such challenges need to be 
addressed before proceeding further. In particular, the case studies on which Zeitlin 
draws, concentrate on an era in which the state played a less interventionist role in 
industrial relations and where the maintenance of social and economic stability was 
achieved through liberal collectivism and the welfare compromise (Crouch 1977, 
Dunn 1987). This rested upon the requirement that economic growth would provide 
sufficient ‘headroom’ to satisfy labour expectations. If the state’s role changed from 
the 1960’s in order to find new ways of securing stability, this, like its predecessor 
might have had unforeseen consequences at the micro and macro levels but was, in 
contrast to Zeitlin’s analysis, a distinct reaction to problems arising within the 
economic base, although this does not negate the point that the state could still choose 
how it responded, and clearly different parts of the state apparatus could and did 
advocate different responses. An additional point is that although the state could have 
responded in different ways to ensure economic and social stability, it was 
increasingly required to provide political solutions to what were problems generated 
from within the economic sphere. When it became apparent that in doing so it was 
having to ‘reconcile the irreconcilable’ the greater was the likelihood of a 
‘legitimation crisis’ to develop in the existing economic and political order (Habermas 
1976).
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THE STATE AND ECONOMY
Although Jessop (1978) has provided a clear rationale for the state’s dependence on 
the economic base and for why it is continually reacting to economic events, as was 
noted above the state can respond in different ways and many writers now argue that 
the relationship between the state and the economic base is not static and changes in 
response to changes in economic performance and the need to maintain stability 
(Crouch 1977, 1982, Strinati 1982). An illustration of this view is provided below 
drawing particularly on the work of Crouch (1977).
Crouch has emphasised the state’s commitment after the second World War to 
maintaining full employment by running the economy at a high level of aggregate 
demand and to the ’welfare compromise’ (what others have termed the ’post-war 
settlement’ (Leadbetter 1987), within a general philosphy of liberal collectivism. We 
have noted above that this depended for its success on the ability of the economy to 
deliver sufficient growth to satisfy worker expectations, employers, in turn had 
confidence that production would continue uninterrupted and that wage increases 
could be conceded with little fear of being priced out of markets (Crouch 1982 p.32). 
However, Crouch argues that by the 1950’s the problems of reconciling conflicting 
objectives began to emerge fuelled by the relatively poor growth performance of the 
economy so that ’headroom’ was provided by inflation interspersed with occasional 
periods of unemployment. Stability was nonetheless achieved until the 1960’s by the 
institutionalisation and limitation of conflict within the compromise and by ideological 
restaints on worker ambitions (Crouch 1982, but particularly Panitch 1976 on the 
commitment to social democracy by the Labour party aiding the integration of the 
working class).
These problems led successive governments to seek ways of controlling rising labour 
costs and improving productivity most notably at the macro level via incomes policies 
and latterly a more restrictive legislative framework in industrial relations. This 
increased awareness of supply - side deficiencies in the economy led fractions within 
capital in the 1960’s to break with the compromise (Price 1986) and provided an
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initial impetus to attempts by the state to influence, if not actively intervene at a 
micro level in production relations. These sections within capital moved to 
restructure elements of the labour process in three ways. First, by changing payment 
systems to reduce the number of issues available for bargaining and the frequency of 
bargaining via measured daywork. Second, by attempts to regain control over the 
utilisation of labour through productivity bargaining, and third, increasing the formal 
rationality of payment structures through job evaluation (Price 1986). These attempts 
to restructure elements of production relations were all subsequently encouraged by 
the State, as was the reform of collective bargaining under the auspices of the CIR 
and latterly AC AS, and capital restructuring in the 1960’s via the IRC. All these 
changes had implications for industrial relations and a potential impact on strike 
activity. In the case of the IRC, the formation of GEC provided an opportunity for 
’rationalisation’ and in BL the creation of a large company from smaller units 
widened the orbits of comparison for pay claims (DMR 1983). With the reform of 
collective bargaining we discussed above the view that this could provide the basis 
for conflict (e.g. Goldthorpe 1977, Hyman 1975). A view which receives substantial 
support in respect of reforms introduced in State owned enterprises such as BL 
(Willman 1984).
That the state felt it necessary to intervene to ensure economic and social stability and 
to ensure the resources of the state and its ability to perform certain functions, did not 
prescribe the strategy or techniques of intervention that it could adopt. As Hill (1981) 
has shown, the state could have responded with a policy of restrictive labour 
legislation and high unemployment although this was generally seen as a politically 
unacceptable option in the 1960’s (see Shonfield: Donovan Report 1968).
Alternatively it could have relied on coercion to achieve what were seen as necessary 
changes or it could (and did) opt for a more consensual approach based on 
corporatism or ’bargained corporatism’ (Crouch 1977, 1982). As Panitch (1980) has 
argued, this may have been the only way in which the State could have, in principle, 
ensured wage restraint and profit levels in the context of maintaining full 
employment. Nonetheless, despite or possibly because of increasing interventionism 
by the state, problems remained. The need to reconcile the contradictory problems
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of containing incomes on the one hand and to prevent damaging disputes on the other 
(Hyman 1975) and more generally, the inadequacy of political solutions to problems 
generated from within the economic sphere. A final problem concerned the 
energence of ’bargained corporatism’ and the increasing importance of political 
exchange for trade unions (Pizzomo 1978) resting as it did on union leaders’ ability 
to ’deliver’ deals negotiated at the level. Such corporatist tendencies relied on the 
unions’ ability to control their members; in the context of a decentralised trade union 
movement such as that in Britain the tension between the national and shopfloor levels 
posed a constant threat to the unions’ ability to deliver at a local level what had been 
‘negotiated’ in the political arena.
Such concerns were evident in the late 1970s and in the emergence of concerns with 
the ‘strong state’ under the Conservative governments in the 1980s (Gamble, 1988). 
The option identified by Hill and discarded in the 1960s was pursued with increased 
vigour in the most recent period with a political concern to ‘free-up’ markets and 
allow enterprise to flourish by ‘creating the conditions’ alleged to be necessary to 
encourage such entrepreneurial zeal. This entailed the enactment of successive pieces 
of restrictive labour legislation, giving rise to claims that a ‘juridification’ of 
industrial relations had taken place (Lewis, 1987), together with a further weakening 
of the labour movement, in part, through the unemployment generated as a result of 
the policies pursued. The important point is that a succession of governments 
committed to a set of political and ideological principles further undermined and 
finally broke the ‘post-war consensus’ and restored the principle of the market 
through encouragement of ‘supply-side economics’ to a central position in economic 
activity.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
This discussion of the role of the state has adopted an approach which views it and 
its relationship to the rest of the economy as being significantly influenced by events 
within that economy, but stresses the degree of choice the state has in intervening (or 
not intervening) to ensure accumulation. In addition, state initiatives are seen to have 
an independent impact on areas of the economy and industrial relations which may
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be unforeseen by policy-makers (Zeitlin 1985, Tolliday 1985).
State initiatives affecting industrial relations take a variety of forms which extend 
beyond the direct industrial relations variables employed by DMR. First, there are 
those factors which impact directly on the conduct of industrial relations, including 
methods of conflict resolution, incomes policies and labour legislation and judicial 
decisions. Second, the generalised effects of state intervention in terms of policy 
changes and the creation of a more uncertain environment within which organisations 
have to operate. Third, those initiatives which feed directly into the determinants of 
worker and employer attitudes, including fiscal and monetary policies. Fourth, 
incentives and encouragement to companies to adopt ’good practice’ in industrial 
relations such as throught the CIR and AC AS, productivity bargaining and the reform 
of collective bargaining. This would also include the state as the model employer and 
more recently the encouragement to strong management initiatives in a number of 
public corporations with the intention of acting as a role model for the private sector 
(Beaumont 1987). Allied to this is the ideological component to state actions, 
statements and inactions in the field of industrial relations. This would include 
general attempts to influence public opinion and workers in particular of the benefits 
of negotiation and compromise and recent assertions of managements’ ’right to 
manage’. More specifically it would include government attempts to influence the 
parties in collective bargaining, such as pressure on the EEF in the late 1950’s and 
more recently the employers sides of negotiating forum within the public sector 
(Winchester 1983).
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VI
PRODUCT AND LABOUR MARKET FACTORS
With the emergence of certain strands of the labour process accounts of strike activity 
(see discussion above), the role of product markets in particular, in accounts of 
strikes has tended to be relegated to the status of a background variable of little 
importance. Indeed the account of product and labour markets offered by DMR 
(1983) emphasises the importance of intervening variables between markets and strike 
activity, in particular the way market changes are acted upon by managers. Their 
argument in respect of product markets is that:
In all three (industries) product market variations evoked
further changes which in turn influenced the level of stoppages.
This does ascribe a greater role to these factors than other writers (e.g Edwards and 
Scullion 1982) and they further emphasise other, more direct channels by which 
product markets influence stoppage activity. In their discussion of the coal industry 
they highlight the role of fluctuations in product demand in influencing the conduct 
of industrial relations and in their coverage of the docks, emphasise the manner of 
demand changes, the ways the distribution of traffic differed among ports and how 
the associated uncertainty affected strike activity. DMR also develop the interplay 
between product markets and labour demand and managerial responses to these. In 
the coal industry they argue that competitive pressures led to the introduction of new 
technology and significant productivity gains which reduced the demand for labour. 
In turn, the likelihood of conflict resulting was determined by whether management 
responded via voluntary or compulsory redundancies (see also their discussion of the 
docks).
Much of the DMR argument concerning product and labour markets therefore rests 
on the variety of techniques management employed in response to changes in labour 
demand and the way the changes were introduced e.g unilaterally or jointly 
determined. Some of their industries allowed natural wastage and a cut back in
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recruitment to occur. Others opted for compulsory redundancies; and on other 
occasions, management responded with alterations in overtime and short-time 
working. The responses of workers to these changes differed, even responding in 
different ways to similar situations. The overall assessment on the role of product 
and labour markets by DMR is illustrated below:
Where changing product and labour market conditions create 
problems for both sides of industry, the result may be to raise 
or lower the level of strike activity, depending on the 
solutions adopted...(they) may exert a powerful influence on 
strike activity, but they are not the determining factor.
(Emphasis added)
In many respects the DMR approach adopts a similar perspective to that of Edwards 
and Scullion (1982) in laying stress on managerial initiatives and worker responses 
in an analysis of strikes and emphasising that product markets do not determine either 
strikes or behaviour more generally. We noted in our earlier discussion that whilst 
the focus of Edwards and Scullion’s work is on the nature and form of the labour 
process and its relationship to forms of conflict whereas DMR are concerned with 
aggregate strike patterns their conclusions are similar. We also noted that Edwards 
and Scullion emphasise that the labour process be seen as relatively autonomous i.e 
that product market factors do not determine the nature and form of labour process 
that develops. Organisations have a number of options with regard to the way labour 
power is translated into effort so that particular market configurations can co-exist 
with very different forms of labour process. Whilst accepting this point it obscures 
a number of ways in which product and labour markets may impact on strike activity 
in addition to those discussed by DMR. First, their are behavioural implications 
(DMR above and Zeitlin 1979) in that markets condition the balance of forces 
between capital and labour and influence relationships within the ranks of workers 
and managers (see attitudes sections above). Second, product markets in particular 
significantly affect aspects of industrial, workplace and workforce structure which 
may permit or constrain certain approaches to the labour process, and third the 
critical point about the relationship between product markets, the labour process and 
strikes may lie in situations where contradictions in the circuit of capital occur and
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precipitate major changes to the labour process, a point taken up in the discussion of 
long term movements in industrial strike activity at the end of the Theoretical Model 
section.
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VII
STRUCTURAL FACTORS
(1) BARGAINING STRUCTURE AND INSTITUTIONS
The term bargaining structures here refers to the levels of institutional means and the 
efficacy of procedures in operation, to resolve conflicts of interest and rights between 
managers and workers. In the introduction we noted that the emphasis on bargaining 
structures is a crucial factor setting ’institutionalist’ accounts apart from other models 
of strikes (Kelly and Nicholson 1980). However, within this tradition there are sharp 
differences of opinion as to the effects of collective bargaining structures in particular 
on patterns of industrial conflict. The effect of collective bargaining on such patterns 
is complicated by the fact that, following Parker et al. (1971), five separate 
dimensions of collective bargaining can be identified, all of which may have an effect 
on the probability of conflict arising. Parker distinguishes between bargaining levels; 
industry, company, plant, workplace; bargaining units, which groups are recognised 
for collective bargaining purposes; bargaining forms, whether formal or informal; 
bargaining scope, the range of subjects open to negotiation; and bargaining principles, 
the attitudes of the parties involved in the bargaining process, from this it is possible 
to hypothesise that, for example, the larger the number of bargaining units, cet par, 
or the wider the scope of bargaining, cet par, the greater are the bargaining 
opportunities and the greater the probability of a failure to agree and conflict to 
result.
Before considering these dimensions in more detail it is valuable to locate collective 
bargaining within a broader framework and discern changes within the 
’institutionalist’ tradition. In the 1950’s and 1960’s much of the interest in collective 
bargaining focused on it as a ’political’ mechanism providing for an 
’institutionalisation of industrial conflict’. For these writers (Harbison 1954, 
Dahrendorf 1959, Lipset 1959, Dubin 1954), collective bargaining provided a means 
of separating industrial from political conflict by channeling industrial issues away 
from the political arena, producing their institutional isolation. Consequently it was 
seen to narrow the focus of conflict by reducing the number of contentious issues so
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that ’workers’ experience in industry does not provide a model for interpreting the 
global structure as being divided into antagonistic classes’ (Kerr et al 1962). For 
Dubin (1954) collective bargaining was ’the great social convention that has 
institutionalised industrial conflict’ and for Lipset provided a means whereby unions 
could integrate their members into the larger body politic giving them a basis for 
loyalty to the system, echoing the view of the Webbs (1897) that when unions and 
collective bargaining were accepted conflict would be reduced. Lastly, it was claimed 
that the political value of collective bargaining could, by helping to resolve industrial 
conflict and enhance the rights and dignity of workers provide ’one of the most 
important bulwarks for the preservation of the private enterprise system’ (Harbison 
1954).
For these writers, collective bargaining would ensure a separation of industrial and 
political conflict and impede the emergence of a coherent class consciousness by 
integrating the trade unions and their members into the wider society. This social 
integration argument is implicit in the work of Ross and Hartman (1960) describing 
the ’withering away’ of the strike on the basis of the ’institutionalisation of industrial 
conflict’ via the joint regulation of terms and conditions of employment. In their 
analysis, the development of industrial society is seen to be associated with more 
mature and responsible trade unions and employers, highly developed bargaining 
structures and, at a political level, government encouragement of joint regulation and 
the development of stronger links between the Labour Party and trade unions. All 
of which would, according to Ross and Hartman, lead to a reduction in levels of 
conflict. Despite the subsequent theoretical and empirical criticisms of this work 
(Hyman 1984), it, and the work of Turner et al. (1967) were very significant in the 
Donovan Commission’s analysis of strike patterns. For Donovan (1968), the number 
of small, short, unofficial and unconstitutional stoppages in Britain in the 1960s could 
be accounted for by the fragmentation of collective bargaining and the attendant 
volume of bargaining at workplace level allied to the growing number of shop 
stewards. In effect, the number and type of strikes in Britain were seen to be a direct 
result of the failure of joint regulation at the industry level and the inadequate conduct 
of industrial relations at company and plant levels. Despite the fact that the
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Commission’s view ’was not grounded in any detailed investigation of the evidence’ 
(Clegg 1979), with little account of how this situation had arisen (DMR 1983), its 
conclusions were interesting and influential. Borrowing heavily from Turner et al. 
(1967) and their concept of ’institutional obsolescence’, the apparent failure to contain 
conflict could be remedied by substantial procedural reform. To borrow Parker’s 
classification, this involved an increase in the scope of bargaining (although 
substantially less than that advocated by McCarthy and Ellis 1973), a formalisation 
of bargaining, a reform of procedures, particularly disputes procedures and to 
introduce them where they did not already exist. The increased use of written 
procedures, and, finally, a change in the levels of collective bargaining towards plant 
level or company level in the case of multi-plant companies.
More recently Clegg (1976), refining the Donovan Commission’s view of strikes, has 
argued that strike patterns are explained largely by means of the system of collective 
bargaining; the level of bargaining, disputes procedures and the indirect effect of the 
level of bargaining through factional competition (1976 p.80). For example, where 
comprehensive and efficient disputes procedures exist, these are associated with a 
small number of official and unofficial strikes and thus a fall in the overall level of 
strike activity. Clegg stressed however, that collective bargaining does not account 
for short term changes in strike patterns, these being the result of external factors 
such as incomes policies, price inflation and changes in taxation and legislation. This 
last point is illustrated by his account of strike activity in the 1970’s when he stated 
that apart from explaining the nature of strikes in the public sector:
The structure of collective bargaining appears to make only 
a modest contribution to accounting for post-Donovan strike 
trends (Clegg 1979).
Overall, Clegg’s analysis implies that if bargaining is reformed we should expect to 
see at best, fewer stoppages and certainly larger and longer stoppages. The latter 
point arises because, as a result of reform only intractable matters will now become 
strikes (Edwards 1982). Finally, as a result of more effective procedures more of the
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strikes occurring would be official and constitutional. In essence therefore, Clegg’s 
argument is that reform of bargaining structure will affect both the form and the 
incidence of strikes and that reform will tend to restore order and relative peace to 
the industrial relations system.
The work of Durcan, McCarthy and Redman (1983) as we have seen represents the 
latest variant of the ’institutionalist’ approach, yet in their discussion of collective 
bargaining institutions appear to share some of the concerns of more radical writers 
(Fox 1973, 1974, Goldthorpe 1977). DMR take issue with Donovan and Clegg over 
what they see as an over-emphasis on procedural reform to the near exclusion of 
substantive issues and argue that changes in the bargaining format per se would have 
little effect on reducing conflict unless these were accompanied by changes in the 
substantive terms. More generally they argue that ‘policies to reduce strikes are 
unlikely to be successful unless they include means which tackle the sources of such 
conflict’ (1983 p.410). There general argument is as follows:
Reform of procedures, along with other forms of bargaining 
change advocated by Donovan might well be expected to have 
an impact on the strike pattern through bringing about a change 
in incidence and form - but unless comparable measures had 
been taken to reduce the scale of conflict any beneficial results 
were likely to be severely limited (p.411).
Thus, for DMR, changes in the bargaining level per se would be likely to affect the 
form that strikes action takes but may over time leave the incidence unchanged.
Finally, DMR stress that the question of procedural inadequacy is closely linked to 
the growth of shop steward organisation and the factors together are held largely 
responsible for the growth of the ’micro-stoppage’ and the ’contagion effect’ (p.411 
and above). The two are seen as:
A kind of transmission mechanism - turning the conflicts 
generated by the clash between worker expectations and 
managerial intentions into bargaining requirements and 
opportunities (p.411).
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In this section the importance of collective bargaining structures have been 
emphasised within the ’institutionalist’ framework as well as the diversity of 
approaches within this tradition. The importance of this last point is illustrated by the 
fact that most ‘institutionalists’ would support a link between the emergence of 
fragmented bargaining in the 1950’s and 1960’s and the increase in strike activity but 
would suggest very different strike experiences in the reform and post-reform era of 
the 1970’s and 1980’s.
In addition to the debates within the ’institutionalist tradition, writers within the 
unitarist framework would have expected reformism to have had limited effects on 
strike patterns, rather that the stimulus to trade union recognition and growth which 
accompanied reform might have been expected to have led to increased strike activity 
(Batstone 1984). Similarly, those within the radical tradition had serious misgivings 
about the reformist prescription and about the Donovan analysis in particular. 
Goldthorpe (1977) suggested that Donovan largely ignored the conflicts which might 
be associated with reform where parties are required to change practices with which 
they are content, a point echoed by marxist writers (Cliff 1970, Hyman 1975) who 
suggested that the degree of consensus between the parties in wishing to pursue 
reform might be minimal. Finally, Batstone (1984) has suggested that Donovan failed 
to account for the possibility of rising expectations as a result of reform. Whilst it 
is not the aim of this work to examine these positions in detail, they suggest 
reformism could be associated with a range of possible outcomes in terms of strike 
activity.
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(2) INDUSTRIAL STRUCTURE
Some consideration of the structure of industries and plant size is a common 
component of many cross-sectional studies of strike activity, but is rarely used in 
time-series work. However, we have argued under the section on employer attitudes 
that structure is likely to be important in relation to these in its impact on the internal 
organisation of companies, the effectiveness of management control systems and the 
conduct of industrial relations. In this section, the implications of industrial structure 
for strike activity are developed in more detail and this is coupled to a brief survey 
of changes in industrial concentration in the post-war period.
In recent years industrial concentration has spawned extensive research (Hannah and 
Kay 1976, Aaronovitch and Sawyer 1975, Hart and Clarke 1979) with a particular 
focus on changes in aggregate concentration. Hannah and Kay identify, in common 
with other writers the significant changes that took place in aggregate concentration 
in the 1960’s. They show that, whereas in the 1940’s the share of the value of total 
assets accounted for by the largest 100 manufacturing companies stood at around 
57%, this had risen to 60.1% in 1957 and to 74.9% in 1969. If the analysis is 
confined to the 50 largest companies the figures for 1957 and 1969 are 48.4% and 
60.6% respectively. According to Hannah and Kay, aggregate concentration 
continued to increase to 1973, although the share of the 50 largest companies shows 
little change between 1969 and 1973, and since this date appears to have changed 
very little. The changes in the internal organisation of these companies, discussed 
above, can be gleaned in more detail from work carried out by Prais (1976). 
Evidence that the average size of firm has been increasing is provided by the fact that 
in 1958, the 100 largest companies averaged 27 plants each, whereas by 1972 this had 
risen to 72. However, over the same period the average employment in these plants 
fell from 750 to 430 employees. Of related interest is the fact that these companies 
appear to be heavily diversified. Utton (1977) in a study of diversification amongst 
the 200 largest manufacturing companies in the UK for 1974 found that, on average, 
they operated equally in over four separate three digit industries.
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The evidence of industrial concentration is broadly similar to that found at the 
aggregate level. Armstrong and Silberston (1965) for the period 1951-8 found that 
’the extent to which many industries are dominated by a few ’giant’ enterprises 
appears to be increasing’, a finding which was subsequently endorsed by Shepherd 
(1966). An appreciation of this trend for the post-war period until the mid 1970’s is 
provided by Hart and Clarke (1979) who argued that the share of the three largest 
enterprises in the typical manufacturing industry in 1935 was 26%, rose to 29% in 
1951, 32% in 1958 and to 41% in 1968, with a slight increase to around 42% in 
1973. This disguises considerable variation between industries but in the classic 
heartland of British industry at least it appears that the scene is dominated by a small 
number of enterprises (Purcell and Sisson 1983).
The implications of these changes for strike activity are not clear. These trends, via 
mergers in particular (Hannah and Kay 1976) towards oligopolistic industries with 
attendant market power might suggest that large firms in these industries would be 
able to secure monopoly profits which could be shared with employees. However, 
the extent to which profits and concentration are related has been the subject of 
empirical debate. Early work by Stigler (1963) and Hart (1968) found no direct 
positive link between the two, although Bain (1956) found a significant effect when 
CR8 was over 70% but not when it was below this figure. Work on a survey of 
industrial groups also supports a positive link between profit rates and levels of 
concentration (Nickell and Metcalf, 1977). If higher profits and concentration are 
positively related, we would expect, following the argument of earlier sections that 
workers would increase their demands on the grounds of fairness and, if mergers 
widen the ’orbits of comparison’ for workers, the greater number of comparative 
groups might mean employers would be more likely to concede these increases. 
Work by Hart and Clarke (1979) broadly confirms this. Using an approach based on 
bilateral monopoly where wages would be expected to be higher than in competitive 
industries they found evidence that higher monopoly profits are absorbed by higher 
wages. This view is of course consistent with the presence of X-inefficiency in 
monopolistic organisations, allowing them some flexibility in acceding to worker 
demands.
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The argument of earlier sections suggests there is another possible route from 
concentration to strike activity which stresses the likelihood of stoppages arising as 
changes occur in concentration through mergers and divestment. Such changes can 
be expected to challenge established patterns of behaviour and ’dominant workplace 
values’ (Peters 1978, Waddington 1987) particularly in the acquired plants or those 
about to be sold off or closed. We would suggest that the prelude to such changes 
and the transitional phase during which changes are taking place and new values and 
behaviour patterns established are likely to be marked by a greater willingness to 
resort to industrial action. Their ability to do so as, we have stressed throughout, is 
dependent upon the resources of organisation and specifically shop steward 
organisation available to them.
The fact that an industry is highly concentrated does not necessarily mean that it faces 
little competition, as measures of import penetration testify. In the employer attitudes 
section, broad changes in organisation in the 1960’s (from U-form to M-form) were 
noted. These changes have also been accompanied by significant alterations within 
management (Purcell and Sisson, 1983), so that in many companies despite industrial 
concentration, the importance of X-inefficiency and thus the scope for acceding to pay 
demands may be less than is commonly assumed or has become less throughout the 
post-war period in many industries.
Finally, consideration needs to be given to the relationship between plant size and 
strike activity. In general, the evidence suggests a significant positive relationship 
between the two (Prais 1976, Smith et al. 1978, Shorey 1977, Edwards 1980, Brown 
et al. 1981, Daniel and Millward 1983). The Department of Employment study in 
particular (Smith et al. 1978) emphasised the concentration of strikes in plants with 
more than 500 workers. However, the fact that plant size and strike activity are 
related tells us little about the nature of that relationship. Shorey (1977) has provided 
a rationale for this which emphasises the following factors. First, the bureaucracy 
associated with large plants, with long chains of command and communications 
problems (also Edwards 1980). Second, the large number of workers employed on 
similar tasks provides a platform for the emergence of collective grievances. Third,
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the nature of the technology and production system and the use of specific forms of 
payments system and, fourth, the greater number of separate jobs and the tendency 
towards multi-unionism. Recent work suggests the latter may be a particularly 
important factor (Metcalf et al., 1993). Shorey argues further that conflict will be 
more likely in larger plants and, because of the interdependence of work in such 
plants, will be more costly when it occurs. This suggests that the bargaining power 
of workers is considerably enhanced in such plants because of their strategic position 
within the production flow and that managers have a significant incentive to improve 
their labour relations function and internal control systems and/or reduce plant size. 
Interestingly, in view of the discussion of changes in industrial organisation above, 
whilst Shorey found a positive relationship between strike activity and plant size, he 
found a negative relationship between firm size and industrial conflict.
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VIII
MANAGERIAL INITIATIVES
The role of management and managerial initiatives in influencing the conduct of 
industrial relations has been stressed by writers from a variety of theoretical 
perspectives and in the 1970’s received increased attention as a result of renewed 
interest in the labour process and latterly management strategies. The ensuing debate 
surrounding the latter emphasised the role of management in structuring the process 
by which labour power is translated into effort and the ways in which the form of the 
labour process can have implications for the nature of conflict which may arise 
(Edwards and Scullion 1982, and discussion in Introduction). In the earlier section 
we stressed the more specific role of managerial initiatives as a factor in explaining 
strike patterns which characterises the approach of Durcan, McCarthy and Redman 
(1983). Whilst accepting the importance for strike activity of the nature of labour 
management relations embodied in the specific form of the labour process the focus 
here is upon the role of managerial initiatives generally for strike activity (accepting 
that the nature of the labour process and how this is perceived by workers will affect 
the way managerial actions generally are perceived).
Despite their concern with managerial initiatives, DMR do not clarify their exact 
form. They are taken here to refer mainly to decisions taken unilaterally by 
managements in areas which directly affect the conduct of industrial relations within 
organisations. Such a definition presents at least two problems. First, it is not 
obvious which areas within an organisation are jointly determined and which 
unilaterally by management and second, in common with other elements of the 
theoretical model, the definition locates these initiatives at a company or plant level 
(although encompassing the initatives of employers associations at the industry level) 
whereas in the operational model these are examined at the industry level. In 
addition, the significance of these initiatives is likely to be most important where 
managers introduce changes in areas which have previously been the subject of joint 
determination between managers and trade unions, for example the changes to 
working practices in the car industry in the late 1970’s and early 1980’s (Willman
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1984, Marsden et al. 1985), or more generally where these changes interrupt and 
threaten to undermine accepted established patterns of working.
Accepting these points, the main focus of mangerial intiatives in this study are those 
concerning payments systems, bargaining structures, the methods employed to cope 
with fluctuations in product and labour market conditions and in particular the 
methods adopted by managers to achieve reductions in manpower. Such a set of 
factors can be criticised for being too restrictive. In particular, changes in the 
workforce composition, and establishment size could jusifiably be included in this 
section. We have chosen to place them in other sections on the grounds that other 
influences, market size, nature of the product, competitive pressures etc, significantly 
constrain managerial action in these areas. However, we would stress the importance 
of this factor; broader economy-wide factors will affect all firms, but how managers 
react to or anticipate these changes will significantly affect the likelihood of strikes 
taking place. Furthermore, the dividing line between managerial initiatives and other 
factors is an artificial one, in practice managers have a significant influence on the 
shape of a wide range of variables beyond those we have described as mangerially 
initiated.
This issue of managerial responses and more broadly, strategies developed in the area 
of labour management as a result of product and labour market changes is a central 
element within our explanation of long run changes in strike totals and particularly 
in non-pay stoppages. Our account of long run movements in strike totals emphasises 
managerial responses to product market change particularly where these generate 
contradictions or disarticulations in the industrial circuit of capital.
The issue of management strategy as opposed to management initiatives is also 
important. The latter implies a largely reactive role for management whereas the 
former suggests a planned, proactive stance in the management of labour. There is 
a strong case for arguing that in a number of industries a more planned, systematic 
approach to industrial relations is evident from the mid 1970s (after the DMR study 
period) and consideration needs to be given to this, even if the strategies pursued
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differ at an operational level from their original intentions (Edwards and Heery, 
1989).
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IX
LONG-TERM MOVEMENTS IN STRIKE ACTIVITY
In the Introduction, a number of approaches to the examination of strike activity was 
identified emphasising their origins within specific disciplinary areas. An alternative 
formulation would have been to distinguish them on the basis of cross-sectional as 
opposed to time-series analysis and, within the latter, on their concern with year-on- 
year variations or on longer term movements in strike activity.
Those accounts which have been concerned with broader movements in strike activity 
have been almost exclusively concerned with aggregate strike patterns rather than with 
movements at the industry level. Those studies with an aggregate or international 
focus have emphasised the particular role of political factors although debate 
continues around the exact nature of these influences. In institutionalist accounts, 
such as DMR (1983) it is the role of government via incomes policies, legislation and 
state sponsored conciliation and arbitration which is seen as accounting for the main 
variations in strike volumes over time. In contrast, the work of Shorter and Tilly 
(1974) emphasises the association between peaks of strike activity and political crises 
and that at such times strike activity is overtly political in its aims and focus. Other 
political approaches such as Korpi and Shalev (1979) see links between working class 
strength and the political arena so that the election of social democratic governments 
is associated with a decline in strike activity as class interests are pursued in the 
political as opposed to the industrial sphere. This would predict a ’withering away’ 
of the strike but one significantly different from that advocated by Ross and Hartman 
(1961) where stress is placed upon trade union support for Labour parties and the 
institutionalisation of conflict through collective bargaining as the basis for declining 
strike activity. At the general level, the role of political factors can also be seen in 
the work of Hibbs (1974) and Cronin (1979).
Whilst political factors are clearly important at an aggregate level, their possible 
influence at a more micro level has been relatively neglected (cf Pencavel 1969, DMR 
1983) and obscures the fact that even at the aggregate level, political factors may be
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mediating the impact of broader factors. Evidence for this can be found in the work 
of Screpanti (1987) where waves of strike activity are seen to occur at similar periods 
in time in different countries suggesting that factors specific to a country (such as 
political changes) are inadequate in accounting for these broader movements.
In terms of movements in the aggregate pattern, a number of writers have stressed 
the role of international factors, such as movements in world trade and passages into 
qualitatively different phases of economic development. The latter has been 
emphasised by Cronin (1979), Gordon, Edwards and Reich (1982) and by Screpanti 
(1987). In these approaches the role of political factors assumes that of responses to 
deeper seated economic changes and that whilst governments can and do respond in 
different ways to these broader factors which may exacerbate or militate against overt 
conflict it is these broader changes which are the critical precipitating condition. To 
illustrate this point, the period from 1968-1973 was one of hightened levels of strike 
activity in most West European economies (Crouch and Pizzomo 1978) although the 
magnitude differed between countries. The factors contributing to the ’strike wave’ 
are generally cited as a slowdown in world trade from the mid 1960’s clashing with 
workers expectations of continued prosperity leading to a gap which the lack of 
’headroom’ previously provided by economic growth was unable to satisfy. The 
impact of these factors was strengthened further by attempts at wage restraint and 
restrictive legislation (at least in the UK) and heightened grievances. In the UK 
other factors, the spread of shop steward organisation and the weaknesses of 
regulatory mechanisms together with organisational responses to the changing 
environmental contexts served to further increase the likelihood of conflict arising.
These factors taken together suggest that like, year-on-year variations, broader 
movements in aggregate strike activity have complex roots and cannot be reduced to 
the impact of one or two variables. In addition whilst these factors are likely to exert 
an impact at the industry level their influence will be mediated by an additional set 
of factors (e.g specific market contexts, management strategies and initiatives, 
bargaining structures, payments systems etc) and that broader strike movements at 
this level will be affected by influences more specific to these industries and to how
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these are acted upon by managers and the extent to which these actions undermine 
workforce values and expectations.
THE INDUSTRIAL CIRCUIT OF CAPITAL
In the Introduction we suggested that work by Kelly (1982, 1985) offered a useful 
framework for analysing the role of product and labour market factors in emphasising 
the need to examine the full circuit of capital. His work, carried out in the context 
of job design argued that the significant factor leading to the adoption of such 
techniques was disarticulations and contradictions within the circuit of capital so that 
major changes in product and labour markets may not be accompanied by changes in 
the labour process. For Kelly, it is these contradictions which are the motors of 
change, suggesting a more direct relationship between market changes and labour 
process changes. This analysis has the merit of recognising the significance for 
managers of realising profit rather than merely being concerned with control and the 
extraction of surplus value. Thus, if the realisation of profit in product markets is 
easily obtainable, firms may be less concerned with the labour process and, in 
keeping with the argument of earlier sections, will be better able to meet demands 
that do arise. Significantly however, the contradictions within the circuit, imply that 
even when realisation becomes more difficult firms may not respond immediately. 
As Hobsbawm (1964) has stressed in respect of the nineteenth century in Britain.
It was safer, if less efficient, to stick to the old ways, unless 
the pressure of profit margins, increased competition, the 
demands of labour or other inescapable factors forced a 
change. But the period of major economic upheaval after the 
Napoleonic wars and the crisis of 1873 subjected employers to 
just this kind of pressure.
For Hobsbawm, it was the changes in the late nineteenth century in Britain and the 
emergence of a crisis of profitability which created the conditions for an ’efficiency 
movement’ in reorganising production. Likewise, for Kelly (1985) it is these 
contradictions, in this case a crisis of profitability, which necessitated changes in the 
sphere of production. This analysis can be adapted to offer an explanation for 
’potential conflict points’ when increased resort to strike action can be anticipated.
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Indeed, elements of such an approach infuse the account of stoppages in the motor 
industry in the 1960’s offered by DMR, where an increasingly competitive product 
market led to structural reorganisation which accentuated problems within a largely 
unchanged labour process. A similar explanation might also fit the industry, and 
specifically BL and Ford, from the mid 1970’s to the early 1980’s where attempts to 
reorganise production and reassert managerial control confronted established 
workplace values and behaviour and precipitated widespread conflict (Willman 1984).
The approaches offered by Edwards and Scullion and Kelly are not mutually exclusive 
but the latter emphasises the point that whilst the labour process may be the most 
significant locale for examining conflict behaviour, on occasions market pressures will 
impact so severely as to force changes in the production sphere. In particular, when 
the contradictions between exchange relations and production relations have become 
of sufficient severity. Thus, the impact of markets varies over time, becoming most 
significant when competitive pressures endanger profitability or survival, increasing 
the pressures on managers to reorganise production and the labour process.
This approach suggests that there is likely to be a time lag between market changes 
and changes in the production sphere, and that this will vary over time and among 
individual firms and industries. Similarly, in many of these firms and industries it 
will be the cumulative effect of such changes which will force managers to reorganise 
production. Those industries that have traditionally faced limited competition would 
be expected to adjust more slowly to market changes than those in more competitive 
markets. Further, that when these changes impact on established worker attitudes and 
where effective means of organisation exist, conflict is more likely to arise.
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LONG-TERM MOVEMENTS IN STRIKE ACTIVITY AT THE INDUSTRY 
LEVEL: SOME HYPOTHESES
The earlier discussion suggests an important role in movements in aggregate strike 
volumes for political factors, often in response to deeper changes in the world and 
national economies. These factors are also liable to have a significant impact at the 
industry level, particularly where industries are most open to competitive pressures 
and/or the influence of government policies. In addition at the industry level broader 
movements in strike numbers would be expected to be affected by the level at which 
collective bargaining is conducted, and the nature of payments systems together with 
any changes in these. However, the last two are essentially managerially initiated 
changes in response to issues specific to particular industries and organisations within 
them. For example they may be responses to external competitive changes or to 
changes in the nature of technology or the product itself. The argument of this 
section is that the critical factor behind longer term movements in strike dimensions 
at the industry level is changes in product market conditions and competition which, 
in turn, give rise to a range of managerially initiated changes. Taking as our starting 
point the work of Cronin (1979), he has argued that:
Strike propensity will vary with the extent to which particular 
phases of capitalist evolution impinge upon the day-to-day 
working of different industries. How central an industry is to 
the economy and how subject it is to market vagaries and 
imperatives should determine how prone it is to industrial 
conflict (p. 158).
This suggests that at different times associated with different competitive pressures 
there are particular leading sectors in an economy which would be associated with the 
highest levels of industrial conflict. With the qualification that this would depend 
upon the social cohesiveness of groups in the industry and the extent to which such 
groups are exposed to the pressures of competition. This last point is significant as 
it implies that there would be, ceteris paribus, a positive correlation between strike 
activity and exposure to market forces.
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Thus for Cronin, given attitudes favourable to striking and effective organisation, the 
critical factor in heightened levels of strikes is the ‘opening up’ of a sector to 
competitive forces. It is therefore associated with a particular stage in an industry’s 
development, specifically its exposure to greater international competition.
Although Cronin does not specify this, it is at such times (or after a time-lag) that 
management would be expected to attempt to introduce changes to deal with the 
altered circumstances. Although such changes could be effected in a way that affects 
short-term strike activity it is likely that broad phases in industrial development and 
evolution would encourage attempts at more fundamental and structural change which 
would be associated with heightened levels of strike activity.
In terms of the development of industries the argument here is that industries will be 
most prone to periods of increased volumes of strike activity at, or some time after, 
the turning points from growth into stagnation and from stagnation into decline as it 
would be at such times that major pressures for change would be most apparent. This 
is based on a number of assumptions. First, that the key change is in product 
markets, reflecting declining demand and/or increased competition and would have 
its impact upon profitability and precipitate a search by managements for 
improvements in efficiency and cost savings. Second, that fundamental changes 
would be more likely to be introduced as the product market situation would be likely 
to contrast with a relatively unchanged labour process and possibly labour market 
position. In other words at such times contradictions within the industrial circuit of 
capital would be most obvious and severe. Given the severity of problems at such 
times it is also more likely that some if not all of the changes would be the result of 
unilateral management action rather than jointly determined. Third, that in the event 
of a relatively unchanged labour process and product market stagnation or decline, 
labour’s share of value added would be expected to rise and increase the likelihood 
of managerial initiatives to cut labour costs through redundancies, efficiency 
packages, plant closures and restructuring, together with less freedom in pay 
negotiations to satisfy workforce demands. Following Rees (1952), this also suggests 
a greater likelihood of conflict as a result of different perceptions of the future. At
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the end of a period of steady growth, managers would be expected to see the impact 
of change more immediately, through falling sales and fewer orders, workers, in light 
of tangible evidence to the contrary, might perceive continued expansion into the 
future so that at such times the gulf between the two would be at its greatest. It also 
suggests that increasing strike activity would tend to affect both pay and non-pay 
stoppages, particularly the latter as managements attempt to change elements of the 
labour process. It would also suggest an increase in other dimensions of strike 
activity, particularly workers involved and days lost as the changes would affect most 
of the industry and would be likely to challenge established custom and practice and 
working patterns.
These developments take place within a broader context of international and national 
factors, particularly those relating to product market competition but the critical issue 
for strike activity at the industry level is their intensity, the ways in which they are 
acted upon by managements and the extent to which these conflict with or undermine 
established patterns of working. In summary, although all industries experience 
changes in their competitive situation and can be seen to develop through qualitatively 
different phases they do not all experience heightened conflict levels at or soon after 
movements from one phase to another. Those that do experience waves of strikes at 
such times do so as a result of the managerial responses to the changes, which clash 
with and potentially undermine or overturn established attitudes, working practices 
and union organisation.
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SECTION II 
THE OPERATIONAL MODEL
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THE OPERATIONAL MODEL
The theoretical model developed in the previous chapter stressed the role of attitudes 
and factors which would affect the ability and willingness of workers and employers 
to engage in or resist strike action. It identified specific factors relevant to an 
understanding of why strikes occur and postulated a clear causal mechanism from 
background influences or ’triggers’ (Kelly and Nicholson 1980) through structural 
factors to attitudes and thence to strike action (or peaceful resolution). It is therefore 
a process model of strikes and although has been developed with the explicit focus 
on the industry and company levels is sufficiently flexible to be applied at different 
levels of aggregation (the level at which bargaining takes place largely determining 
where conflict occurs). Before outlining the operational model in detail 
consideration needs to be given to some specific problems encountered in 
operationalising the theoretical model.
This study aims to present an analysis of strike patterns in four key industry groups 
for the post-war period, (these industries are described in detail in the following 
sections) with the objective of using results from these industries to provide an 
explanation of strike patterns at the aggregate economy-wide level. It therefore relies 
on official data on the main dimensions of stoppages as well as for data on the main 
variables employed in the study. The deficiencies of official data, particularly on 
strikes are legion (Shalev 1978, Edwards 1983, DMR 1983) and will not be repeated 
here. Suffice it to say that the problems are most acute with the series for strike 
numbers, and even here if the concern is with trends over time these deficiencies 
(principally under-recording) are likely to remain similar over time. One further 
problem specific to the present work needs to be considered. As a result of 
substantial data limitations two of the main elements in the theoretical model cannot 
be measured precisely. With the union capacity variable, no longitudinal data exist 
on shop steward numbers at the industry level. With the bargaining structure 
variable, limited data are available up to 1968 and from then on only intermittently 
until the present day. These data limitations affect a number of other variables but 
the defects are less significant than with the two areas outlined above.
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The two figures overleaf illustrate the operational model employed in the empirical 
work. The first figure mirrors that in the introduction to the theoretical model and 
the second attempts to provide a more comprehensive breakdown of the ways in 
which industry and economy-wide factors impact upon the components of worker and 
employer/managerial attitudes identified in the model. The figures identify the main 
variables to be employed in the operational model. In what follows these variables 
are developed in more detail beginning with aggregate/economy-wide factors. 
Throughout this chapter we refer back to the theoretical model to provide a rationale 
for the inclusion of particular variables and to link the specific operational variables 
with elements within the earlier model.
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Despite the frequent inclusion of this variable in empirical work on strike activity (see 
Introduction) its association with the latter is difficult to predict and has produced 
some conflicting empirical results (Edwards 1981, DMR 1983). From the employees 
perspective low unemployment, ceteris paribus, can be expected to increase 
bargaining power. In terms of the theoretical model employees would be expected 
to enjoy greater job security and find it easier to move jobs. They might be more 
willing to press for higher wages in their existing jobs because of the reduced 
possibility of redundancy and because plentiful job opportunities exist elsewhere in 
the event of redundancy. In addition, for potential strikers part-time job opportunities 
are more likely to be available and employees more able to sustain a strike during 
periods of high demand (’prosperity’) and low unemployment than in periods of 
recession (Smith et al. 1978). Therefore, for workers the costs of action are reduced 
in periods of low unemployment. It is also likely that such periods affect worker 
attitudes to the extent that strikes become more effective and acceptable means of 
achieving their objectives (Goldthorpe 1978, see Cronin 1979 for evidence of the 
reverse effect on attitudes of high unemployment). Although this may be the result 
of an associated increase in profitability which would tend to increase the willingness 
of workers to resort to strike action. Periods of high employment also appear to be 
associated with rising earnings which would tend to reduce the possibility of strike 
action but also with a narrowing of differentials (see Reder 1958, Routh 1984 and 
evidence for the widening of differentials in periods of high unemployment) which 
would be expected to increase it.
For employers, the arguments remain unclear. Traditionally it has been argued that 
in periods of low unemployment, employers strike costs would be expected to be 
high. They would be expected to face full order books and enjoy relatively high 
profitability and consequently be more willing to concede to wage demands rather
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than incur strike losses which would involve the loss of profits and possible market 
share. Further, that periods of high employment and demand would make it easier 
for employers to pass on increased costs to consumers, whereas high unemployment 
would, if associated with slack demand, make it cheaper for employers to endure a 
strike if the alternative were the expensive stockpiling of goods.
Overall, the evidence on the impact of the level of unemployment on strike activity 
is unclear. Whilst low unemployment may make workers more willing to resort to 
strike action it also makes employers more willing to concede to worker demands 
(and if associated with higher profits, more able) as the costs of conceding in periods 
of high demand might be less than those of enduring a strike.
The impact on other dimensions of strike activity is also ambiguous. A priori, 
unemployment is unlikely to have an impact on workers involved, although in periods 
of high employment and high product demand bargaining may tend to be more 
decentralised and any stoppages consequently small and short. In contrast, such 
periods would tend to mean employer willingness to settle prior to a strike and in the 
event of a strike arising to settle quickly so that stoppages would be relatively short 
and days lost small. Ceteris paribus, high unemployment would tend to be associated 
with longer and more protracted stoppages and a rise in days lost.
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RATE OF CHANGE OF PRICE INFLATION (% CHANGE IN RPI PER 
ANNUM) LAGGED ONE YEAR
When prices are rising, ceteris paribus, workers can be expected to try and maintain 
real wages/eamings if they do not suffer from money illusion (Shorey 1977). 
Further, the faster the increase in the cost of living, as measured by an increasing rate 
of change of prices; the more likely are workers to undertake strike action in order 
to maintain and improve real wages/eamings. Two reasons can be advanced for this. 
First, the faster prices are rising cet par. the faster real earnings are being eroded and 
the more likely workers will be to engage in some form of industrial action in order 
to maintain or improve real earnings. Second, in inflationary periods the frequency 
of pay bargaining is likely to increase which may tend to increase other dimensions 
of stoppage activity.
The effects on employers are more difficult to assess, depending upon the source of 
the increase in prices. If product prices are increasing ceteris paribus, this will mean 
increased profitability in the short-run and enhance the ability of employers to meet 
employee demands, thereby reducing the likelihood of strike action. However, if 
prices are rising because of increases in input costs then prices have increased to 
alleviate a squeeze on profits. In this case, worker demands for increases in pay are 
likely to meet with resistance if profits are already under pressure and suggests that 
stoppages that arise will be longer and more protracted leading to a higher number 
of days lost.
Overall, in the ‘demand-side’ view with higher profits we should expect employers 
to be less likely to resist worker demands for increased money earnings to compensate 
for increased prices. But in the ’cost-push’ case we should expect them to resist if 
pay increases place additional pressures upon profit margins. Thus the effects on 
strike action are difficult to predict depending upon the cause of the increase in retail 
prices.
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RATE OF CHANGE OF MALE AVERAGE GROSS WEEKLY EARNINGS 
(AGWE) LAGGED ONE YEAR
RATE OF CHANGE OF MALE AVERAGE GROSS WEEKLY REAL 
EARNINGS LAGGED ONE YEAR
The rate of change of money earnings has been included as an explanatory variable 
in a number of studies of strike activity including those by Shorey (1974, 1977), 
Knight (1972) and by DMR (1983). The two earlier studies found a negative 
relationship between the rate of change of money earnings and the number of strikes 
when the variable was lagged but DMR found no significant relationship between the 
two. According to Knight (1972), periods of low increases in money earnings are 
likely to be followed by periods of substantially increased strike activity on the 
assumption that low increases in money earnings violate worker perceptions of 
acceptable increases and thus worker expectations. However, the inclusion of such 
a variable in isolation from price changes assumes that money illusion exists on the 
part of workers, an untenable position in the long-run (although not in the short-run, 
workers may seek to gain increases in nominal earnings where a company has made 
substantial profits. Here, the motivation for increases in money earnings comes from 
considerations of equity and fairness rather than any appreciation of price changes).
Likewise, for the firm it is realistic to assume that employers are concerned with pay 
in relation to prices, the impact of pay on total costs (and the associated issue of pay 
and productivity) and the size of the total wage bill (see arguments in theoretical 
section above). The suggestion that there should exist a negative relationship between 
changes in money earnings and strikes would seem to be justified only (1) in the 
short-run and (2) if the changes in money earnings also represent an additional real 
cost to the employer increasing the size of the wage bill to the extent of entailing 
reduced profits and/or increased prices.
In the case of changes in real earnings, it has been argued that if strike action is 
dependent upon the attitudes/aggressiveness of the parties involved in the bargaining 
process then ceteris paribus, strike action is less likely the more rapid the growth of
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real wages in the recent past (Turner et al. 1972). On the argument of the earlier 
theoretical section, if earnings expectations are violated, this may make workers more 
willing to engage in some form of industrial action. Conversely, for employers, 
lower increases in real earnings are more acceptable as they involve a smaller impact 
on costs and are thus more likely to resist increases in real earnings growth ceteris 
paribus.
However, as the previous chapter suggested, employers may be less interested in the 
growth of real earnings per se and more with the size of the total wage bill, and with 
aggregate labour costs. They may be willing to concede increases in real earnings 
if these can be offset against redundancies or higher productivity. The effect upon 
strike activity becomes uncertain depending upon worker responses to such a 
trade-off. If no such trade-off exists it can be argued that increases in real earnings 
- lagged - will ceteris paribus, be negatively associated with stoppage frequency 
(Pencavel 1970, Hunter 1973).
RATE OF CHANGE OF LABOUR PRODUCTIVITY
In the theoretical section attention was drawn to the work of Behrend and Baldamus 
and the notion that the wage-effort exchange was central to the implicit employment 
contract (Shorey 1977, Watson 1980). From this it can be argued that if increasing 
productivity is associated with an intensification of effort then, ceteris paribus, with 
a worsening of the effort bargain for workers, resort to strike action is more likely. 
However, Shorey (1977) who specifically separates the level of effort from increases 
in productivity in his conflictual model of pay stoppages argues that because increases 
in productivity improve the long-run profitability of an enterprise/establishment, cet 
par. firms are able to increase their offers to workers without jeopardising their 
market position. It is therefore assumed that employers will normally share the 
benefits of productivity improvements with workers partly as an incentive to 
encourage them to even higher productivity gains.
Overall, employees, whose effort bargain may have worsened as a result of more 
intensive effort might be more likely to undertake strike action. But for employers,
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higher productivity will enhance their ability to raise wage offers to meet increased 
worker demands making strike action less likely. However, given the argument of 
the theoretical section one should distinguish, as Shorey does between effort and 
productivity and focus upon the former given worker concerns with the relationship 
between effort and reward, although data availablility on effort prior to 1970 makes 
this difficult. A further consideration is the extent to which employers share or are 
able to share the benefits of higher productivity with their employess as opposed to 
their customers.
Three further issues remain. First, there is the difficulty of identifying the extent to 
which productivity gains are the result of increased effort and co-operation on the part 
of workers rather than as a consequence of an increased capital/labour ratio. Second, 
with the encouragement of productivity agreements in the 1960’s and flex-agreements 
in the 1980’s whether productivity gains were the stimulus to or the consequence of 
higher pay awards. Third, that rises in productivity are frequently linked to incentive 
payment systems, and certain forms of these (e.g piecework) are often associated with 
increasing levels of strike activity (but see Edwards, 1988).
PROFITS: RATIO OF GROSS TRADING PROFITS TO TOTAL
COMPENSATION.
LEVEL OF REAL PROFIT.
In the theoretical model the level of profits was seen as a central ingredient in 
influencing worker attitudes and perceptions of fair treatment and the underlying 
factor affecting employer attitudes. The earlier argument suggested that high profit 
levels can be expected ceteris paribus, to lead to pressure for higher wage demands 
on the grounds that employees should benefit from the prosperity of the organisation. 
It was further suggested that high profit levels might affect the form of strikes, the 
inability of union leaders to control their members increasing the possibility of 
unofficial action.
In addition, high profit levels are frequently used as a basis by unions when 
formulating their pay demands and can be expected to raise the latter. For
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employers, high or rising profits may mean full order books and consequently could 
make them more willing to concede to such demands rather then incur a strike 
involving lost profits and markets. Overall, whilst high profits would be expected to 
increase demands for higher wages they would also be expected to increase the ability 
of employers to meet such demands with the result that the association between 
profits and strike activity is unclear.
As a proxy for the state of demand and employers ability to meet worker demands, 
the level of profits may have considerable advantages over measures such as 
unemployment, particularly from the employers’ perspective. For employers, and for 
many individuals in work, profits may be a more immediate indicator of the state of 
a company than other measures, particularly if employees utilise restrictive 
comparisons as we suggested earlier and if unemployment does not have a significant 
impact on them. In addition, evidence suggests that in periods of high unemployment 
employers may act as if unemployment were significantly lower than official figures 
suggest. They effectively exclude certain categories of the unemployed from their 
considerations or only consider them as ’peripheral workers’, not in competition with 
their established, and relatively protected ’core’ workers (Atkinson and Meager 
1986).
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XI
THE ROLE OF THE STATE
INCOMES POLICIES
Normally included as a dummy variable in a number of studies of strike activity 
although its relationship with the latter is problematic for a number of reasons. First, 
there is evidence that incomes policies may have a differential impact on the 
components of strike activity (Davies 1979), reducing those over pay and increasing 
those over non-pay issues. Second, the relationship between incomes policies and 
strikes may change over the life of a policy, having a significant depressing effect in 
the early years (as in 1976 under the Social Contract) but creating a build-up of 
grievances which frequently lead to the abandonment of policies (as in 1978/79). 
Third, there is a problem on occasions of identifying when a policy is a policy and 
when it is not, for example cash limits in the public sector are not, but they may 
operate in very similar ways. A final and related point is that there are different 
forms of policy ranging from moral suasion to freezes and statutory controls
Taken together these factors suggest that it is very difficult to operationalise the 
incomes policy variable. Many studies have utlised a simple ’on-off’ dummy variable 
but this is subject to all of the difficulties outlined above. As Smith et al (1978) 
suggest, ideally what is required is some sort of qualitative index which would 
alleviate some of these problems. The approach of Davies (1979) in distinguishing 
between ’hard’ and ’soft’ policy periods is one attempt to do this although it is 
vulnerable to criticisms of subjectivity.
In this study Davies’ distinction is employed although the dummy variable separates 
between ’hard’ policy and ’policy-off’ periods. Such a distinction neglects the 
degeneration of policies when grievances build up but it permits a test of the 
association between strikes and a specific period of policy.
The association between strikes and the incomes policies variable included here is
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again unclear and may depend upon the government in power and the acceptability 
of the policy. Where there is general support policies would be expected to reduce 
strike numbers but where they are unpopular they would be expected to be associated 
with a greater number of stoppages, workers involved and days lost as the general 
nature of policies would be expected to affect a large number of employees.
ARBITRATION AND CONCILIATION CASES SETTLED1 
For Durcan et al (1983), this variable is included on the grounds that:
a) Government withdrew from involvement in conciliation in the 1950’s which 
was associated with a rise in strike activity.
b) Workers increasingly questioned the impartiality of conciliation machinery 
which led to a decline in its use.
Overall, the rationale here is that greater government involvement in dispute 
resolution through e.g AC AS should reduce the number of potential disputes and 
strikes below the levels at which they would otherwise have been. Although 
included, it was decided that because of the establishment of AC AS, the DMR 
propositions were less applicable to the later period and so limited tests were 
undertaken on these variables.
1 Investigations on these variables revealed their close association with strike 
numbers (see also Lowry, 1990) and also a strong positive relationship to aggregate 
trade union membership. The association with the latter is particularly marked and 
made testing the arbitration and conciliation variables in isolation from trade 
union measures particularly difficult. It is clear however, that AC AS has helped to 
reduce strike activity below the level it would otherwise have been and seems to 
have had a major influence during periods of incomes policies.
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LEGISLATION AND JUDICIAL DECISIONS: 1984 TRADE UNION ACT
A dummy variable included to measure the effects of Industrial Relations and Labour 
Market legislation, with the potential for affecting strike activity. Broadly this 
includes any legislation likely to affect worker and/or employer attitudes.
For workers, legislation which enhances job rights and security (employment 
protection) can be expected to reduce the willingness to resort to strike action. 
Likewise, legislation (and judicial decisions) which affects organisational resources 
(trade unions) will influence the ability of workers to undertake strike action so that 
whilst laws designed to reduce the ability of unions to engage in forms of secondary 
strike action may reduce such action. If grievances remain these may manifest 
themselves in different forms of industrial action.
The effect on employers of such legislation is unclear, it can be assumed that they 
would be more inclined to favour and use any laws if their use imposes few costs 
upon them, i.e that such legislation is perceived as being cost-effective from the 
employers perspective (note the increased use of the ‘labour injunction’ since 1984 
testifying to it as a relatively cheap and effective means of dealing with particular 
disputes and malpractices). Furthermore, following Poole et al. (1982) support for 
such legislation would also seem to depend upon the extent to which it affects 
management control. Laws which restrict such control and/or entail greater openness 
and provision of information are likely to be resented and induce a hardening of 
attitudes amongst managers.
Overall, the effect on strike action is unclear, but laws which undermine workers 
rights and expectations whilst increasing the willingness to engage in some form of 
action at the same time make them more vulnerable to employer actions. However, 
one possible effect may be for workers to attempt to push for rights removed by 
government to be reinstated or improved upon by employers. Thus one effect of a 
worsening of individual employee rights could be an increase in industrial action over 
non-pay issues.
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In the empirical work, the impact of legislation is confined to the period after the 
introduction of the 1984 Trade Union Act. This piece of legislation was chosen 
because one of its direct concerns was industrial action. In view of this it would be 
expected to reduce strike action by reducing the number of unofficial and 
unconstitutional disputes and by using ballot results in support of strike action during 
negotiations to put pressure on employers to concede on issues or face a strike. 
However, this would depend upon employers willingness to use the legislation or 
employee perceptions that employers would be willing to use it (It is likely following 
Poole et al. (1982) that legislation which enhances managerial control would be 
welcomed and evidence from Poole and Mansfield (1993) shows clear support from 
managers for the labour legislation passed in the 1980s (but see McCarthy, 1992, 
Hougham, 1992)). Where these conditions hold, the 1984 Legislation would be 
expected to reduce the likelihood of strikes arising although it might tend to make 
those that do arise more intractable.
LEVEL OF AND CHANGES IN INTEREST RATES
The main impact of this variable would be expected to fall on employers although a 
feed through to HP and mortgage rates would be expected to affect workers and 
particular industries. Changes in interest rates are known to have a significant impact 
on firms costs as well as in adding to business uncertainty. An increase in interest 
rates, cet par, will tend to increase costs if firms have overdraft or loan facilities and 
may increase the likelihood of ‘distress borrowing’. A further effect will be the 
tendency for firms to postpone or curtail investment in fixed plant and equipment. 
This would be expected to reduce profits and limit the ability of firms to meet any 
increased demands that might arise form workers.
The extent to which interest rates are likely to be associated with increasing strike 
activity will depend upon the responses of workers, who may be more willing to 
participate in pay disputes if mortgage/HP payments increase and reduce disposable 
income, and employers, if their costs increase significantly as a result.
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LABOUR GOVERNMENT IN POWER
A variable employed by both Pencavel (1970) and Cronin (1979) as an explicitly 
political factor affecting stoppages, although its association with the latter, as Cronin 
has suggested is unpredictable. Workers may react to a Labour government in a 
number of ways, possibly pressing for larger demands when a friendly regime is in 
office, reasoning that concessions might be more forthcoming from such a regime. 
Alternatively, workers might moderate their demands to prevent embarrassment of 
their representatives in the party whilst it is in office.
In contrast, employer responses will depend upon their perceptions of how such a 
government would affect future profitability, which is unclear. However, following 
Poole et al. (1982) it is likely that employer attitudes could harden if they believe that 
this would lead to their independence and control being undermined.
NATIONALISATION
A dummy variable included to identify the impact of the early years of state 
ownership on an industry. The association with strike activity would depend upon 
the attitudes of the parties involved to nationalisation. Given traditional trade union 
support for public ownership and the belief that common ownership would be of 
benefit to working people union support for it would be expected to reduce strike 
activity. For the public corporation, where the attitudes of key individuals and the 
government of the day is sympathetic to nationalisation this too would serve to 
dampen down strike activity.
However, given that nationalisation has been associated with greater centralisation of 
industrial relations institutions and procedures particularly pay bargaining this may 
also reduce the frequency of strike action. In addition it may lead to bigger disputes 
in terms of workers involved as bargaining groups increase in size.
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XII
STRUCTURAL FACTORS
INDUSTRIAL STRUCTURE
CHANGES IN ESTABLISHMENT SIZE (% ESTABLISHMENTS EMPLOYING 
500+ EMPS)
Plant size was examined in some detail in the section outlining the theoretical model. 
Following Shorey (1977) and Prais (1978) it was argued that strikes are more likely 
to occur in large plants rather than small because the former are more bureaucratic, 
have more problems with communication (Edwards 1979) and, by employing a large 
number of workers on similar tasks, provide a platform for multi unionism and the 
emergence of collective grievances. Shorey also highlights other factors commonly 
associated with large plants such as certain types of technology, payments systems, 
the number of separate jobs and the tendency towards multi-unionism.
Empirical evidence confirms the positive association between plant size and strike 
activity (Shorey 1977, Edwards 1979, Prais 1978, Brown et al. 1981) with a 
particularly strong relationship when a plant employs over 500 people (Smith et al. 
1978). However, in addition to the factors identified by Shorey, plant size is 
significantly related to other factors known to be associated with strike activity. In 
particular, various measures of trade union organisation and strength such as shop 
stewards, full time shop stewards, Joint shop steward committees and the presence 
of personnel/industrial relations specialists have all been found to be associated with 
plant size (Brown et al. 1981) so that plant size may be picking up the effects of these 
factors (Edwards 1979).
Notwithstanding these points, the positive association of plant size and strike activity 
in cross-sectional analyses suggests that over time, the more of an industry’s 
employees working in large establishments ceteris paribus, the larger the number of 
stoppages. We would also expect plant size to be positively associated with other 
dimensions of strikes, (workers involved and working days lost) where large plant 
size is associated with company or plant bargaining and formal procedures.
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THE LEVEL OF INDUSTRIAL CONCENTRATION
In the theoretical model changes in industrial concentration in the post-war period 
were documented and an attempt was made to develop a theoretical link between 
industrial concentration and strike activity. On the assumption that concentration 
would be associated with monopoly profits it was postulated that this would lead the 
to demands by workers for improvements in pay and conditions (Smith et al. 1978) 
on the grounds of fairness. However, it was further suggested that greater monopoly 
power would, ceteris paribus, give producers more freedom to pass on cost increases 
to consumers and empirical evidence was cited showing that workers appeared to 
share in the benefits of higher profits (Hart and Clarke 1979). In summary, where 
industrial concentration is associated with above average profits firms are able, 
through lack of competition, and/or X-inefficiency, to pay above average wages and 
appear to do so.
In terms of the effect on strike activity, increased profits would be expected to 
increase pay demands but that as a result of their profit position firms ability to meet 
these demands is increased, making the possibility of strikes less likely. In the earlier 
theoretical section it was also suggested that high levels of industrial concentration 
need not imply an absence of competition as considerable competition may exist in 
the form of imports. Where such competition exists, the extent of X-inefficiency will 
be reduced as will the scope companies have in being able to pass on cost increases 
to consumers. In this case, even where companies are still making above average 
profits (at least in the short term), their ability to share these with their workforce 
declines and the likelihood of strike action increases. The net effect on strike activity 
is therefore unclear, critically depending upon the ability (and willingness) of 
employers to share any benefits of monopoly profits as may arise.
122
BARGAINING STRUCTURE
THE LEVEL AND FORM OF COLLECTIVE BARGAINING (Percentage of 
establishments in an industry stating the main level at which collective bargaining 
occurs, or where most recent pay award made) AND CHANGES IN.
In view of the importance of bargaining structure within ’institutionalist’ accounts of 
strike activity considerable space was devoted to this in the theoretical model 
contrasting some of the earlier writings in this tradition with the work of Clegg 
(1976) and latterly DMR (1983) and with writers outside of the tradition who, like 
DMR are more sceptical of the beneficial claims made for institutional reform.
Following the earlier coverage it is possible to discern two broad schools of thought 
within recent ’institutionalist’ writings on the effects of institutional changes on strike 
patterns and activity. Although both schools would probably agree on the link 
between the level of collective bargaining and a number of dimensions of stoppages 
including size (workers involved), length (working days lost) and status (whether 
official or unofficial). Disagreement centres upon the effect of bargaining levels on 
the frequency of bargaining and thus on the number of stoppages, and the effect of 
changes in bargaining levels on stoppages. The optimistic school within 
’institutionalist’ writings associated with Donovan, Clegg, Turner et al. and latterly 
Willman (1984) suggests that shopfloor bargaining will be associated with a large 
number of disputes, unofficial, unconstitutional short and small, because of the 
frequency with which bargaining can take place and the attendant potential for strikes 
to occur. The optimists’ focus on reform of collective bargaining institutions, with 
an emphasis on plant and company bargaining is part of a greater formalisation of 
bargaining involving a reduction in the frequency of negotiations whilst accepting 
that larger and longer stoppages may result (see earlier discussion of Clegg 1976).
The revisionist approach of DMR suggests that although bargaining changes could 
affect incidence and form it is possible that unless attempts are made to address the 
underlying causes of conflict (eg substantive issues) the benefits of reforms could be 
very limited (ie in that in the long run the incidence could remain unchanged).
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Of additional interest is the impact of changes in bargaining form and level on the 
main dimensions of strike activity. Following, Goldthorpe (1974) such changes 
would be likely to be associated with increased conflict, particularly when these 
changes impacted upon established behaviour patterns and/or undermined expectations 
or perceptions of fairness. In addition changes might be associated with a period of 
rising expectations (Batstone 1984) which also might make containing conflict more 
difficult.
Overall the discussion suggests that the level of bargaining is extremely important in 
determining the size and length of stoppages and may have an influence on the 
frequency with which stoppages occur, although its impact will be mediated by factors 
such as the relationships between the actors in negotiations.
PROCEDURAL REFORM: OPERATION OF PROCEDURE AGREEMENTS
A dummy variable included to assess the impact of procedural change and the 
operation of new procedures. The main focus is upon the operation of disputes 
procedures such as that in shipbuilding after 1967 and in engineering after 1976.
The association with strike activity would be expected to depend upon the 
acceptability of the changes and the extent to which they were mutually agreed rather 
than imposed (as with the 1922 procedure agreement in engineering). A priori, more 
effective procedures, mutually agreed would tend to reduce stoppage numbers 
although those that did arise would be expected to be longer as it would imply the 
issues surrounding them would be more difficult to resolve.
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xm
ORGANISATIONAL FACTORS
CHANGES IN TRADE UNION MEMBERSHIP AT INDUSTRY LEVEL 
LEVEL OF AND CHANGES IN TRADE UNION DENSITY AT THE 
INDUSTRY LEVEL
These variables are commonly employed in time series work on strike activity (for 
example, Pencavel, 1970, Cronin 1979) but are not utilised by DMR. They are 
included here as alternative proxies for the effectiveness/growth of trade union 
organisation, particularly shop steward organisation. Cronin has stressed the 
importance of trade union growth as an important factor in its own right in affecting 
strike activity rather than as a proxy for shop steward organisation. He highlighted 
the point that large increases in trade union membership and density appear to occur 
just prior to or coincide with waves of strike activity. In the present study the two 
variables are included on these grounds, that union growth is an important factor in 
affecting strike action and as a proxy (albeit with deficiencies) for the growth of shop 
steward organisation.
It should be stressed that the impact of increases in industry trade union 
membership/density on strike activity would appear to be most important in situations 
of centralised bargaining and where effective shop steward organisation develops 
concurrently or is already in place. This is so because although increases in union 
membership enhance union resources (including finance at the National level) and the 
ability to undertake strike action at all levels, individual plants may be little affected 
by these broader changes in membership with the result that the main dimensions of 
strike activity are relatively unaffected. However, where bargaining is centralised, 
an increase in membership could be expected to be associated with an increase in the 
size and length of stoppages.
However, on the assumption that increases in membership enhance the resources of 
the union and the confidence of the union leadership to press for improvements in pay 
and conditions, it can be expected that the union would be more willing to advocate
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strike action in pursuit of these (particularly if workers have joined unions to pursue 
their grievances more effectively as the argument above suggests). Employers, on 
the other hand, can be expected to be more aware of union strength and more willing 
to settle prior to a strike. The overall effect on strike activity of the two variables 
considered here is therefore uncertain but, ceteris paribus, any effect would be 
expected to be most important where bargaining is centralised. In addition the 
increased resources of the union nationally and the level of bargaining where the 
impact of growth would be most significant might be expected to lead to an increase 
in the proportion of stoppages which are official.
A further point is that high levels of union density in conjunction with centralised 
bargaining would tend to be associated with more workers involved and days lost than 
under decentralised bargaining. Although, the critical influence is the level of 
bargaining rather than the level of union density.
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XIV
INDUSTRY/COMPANY/PLANT LEVELS
PRODUCT AND LABOUR MARKET VARIABLES
As the theoretical model has suggested, product and labour market variables are 
assumed to have an impact upon strike activity both directly, by affecting attitudes 
and organisation, and indirectly as a consequence of managerial responses to changes 
in product and labour markets. In the first part of this section consideration is given 
to the direct impact of these factors.
THE LEVEL OF OUTPUT AND RATE OF CHANGE.
THE LEVEL OF PRODUCT DEMAND AND RATE OF CHANGE
These variables are included as a proxy for changing product demand and competitive 
conditions within an industry. In the theoretical section it was argued that a sustained 
period of output growth would, ceteris paribus, mean employers having a greater 
ability to meet any worker demands that may arise. This would be because of a 
strengthening of product demand, cost advantage and/or a weakening of the 
competitive position facing the industry. This ability to meet such demands would, 
however, depend upon the overall level of output as well as its rate of change.
For workers, rising output growth and product demand, particularly if accompanied 
by rising profits would be expected to lead to demands for increased compensation 
but, with employers better able to meet such demands the effect on strike activity 
would depend on the strength of the demands relative to employers willingness to 
make concessions (see theoretical model and discussion of profits and strike activity 
above). Net, the rate of change of output ceteris paribus, would not be expected to 
have a significant impact on strike activity but the model would suggest that 
fluctuations and the cyclical behaviour of output could have an effect on the 
likelihood of strikes developing in a particular industry, the rationale for this is 
developed below.
In the Introduction it was stressed that a central element within many economic
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analyses of strike activity has been to view them as the result of market imperfections 
or as analogous to accidents (Hirsch and Addison 1985). The likelihood of such 
mistakes or accidents occuring is increased in periods of uncertainty or at peaks of 
short-term cycles (see Rees 1952) where the extent to which asymmetric information 
exists between employers and employees would be expected to be at its greatest. The 
result might be to increase the probability of differing interpretations of the future to 
develop among the two groups (Mayhew 1979). Such an explanation would fit with 
the view of DMR that a critical factor in accounting for the nature of the industrial 
relations climate in the coal industry was fluctuations in output. Similarly, it would 
provide a rationale for strikes in the car industry documented by Turner et al. where 
product market variations led to marked fluctuations in earnings.
The problems with using output as a explanatory variable rest upon the fact that it is 
not exogeneous with respect to strikes particularly dimensions such as working days 
lost. Measures of product demand, are also likely to be affected by strike activity 
(see Introduction) but the link is not as direct. Consequently, where the data are 
available use is made of measures of customer demand in the empirical work rather 
than the output measure.
PROFITS: LEVEL OF REAL PROFIT.
Rationale as for the aggregate variable in Aggregate/Economy-Wide section above.
LEVEL OF IMPORT PENETRATION (AND CHANGES IN)
This variable is included as an indicator of the degree of competition in an industry 
and changing competitive pressures within an industry. Again, its relationship to 
strike activity will depend largely upon the nature of firms responses to the level of 
and changes in, the level of import penetration. This is so because, whilst import 
penetration affects a central element within employer attitudes there is no direct 
impact upon worker attitudes. For employers, increasing competititon and/or the loss 
of market share that may result from increases in import penetration will reduce the 
ability of firms to meet any demands that may arise from workers and may increase 
the likelihood of their introducing measures to increase efficiency and reduce costs.
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Thus, if the ceteris paribus, assumptions are relaxed, growing competitive pressures 
can be expected to precipitate employer responses of stricter cost control and/or 
redundancies. Workers may be more willing to resort to strike action as a result of 
the worsening of the wage/effort bargain or because job/security is threatened or 
because their ability to extract concessions from employers is reduced, undermining 
their expectations. Against this, a threat to job security may make workers more 
malleable and willing to accept such measures as their bargaining power is reduced.
In summary, we would not expect an association between import penetration cet par. 
and strike activity. Rather, that the critical factor is the way in which managers 
choose to respond to the changing competitive pressures that increases in import 
penetration imply.
THE LEVEL OF STOCKS
This variable has a dual purpose in the study; first as an alternative indicator of the 
state of product demand, and second as an element within a broader management 
strategy. However, like output it suffers from the fact that the level of stocks is not 
exogeneous with respect to strike activity.
In the first formulation, fluctuations in product demand would be expected to be 
reflected in low levels of stocks with low demand entailing cutbacks in production and 
a build-up of unsold stocks. Whereas high demand would tend to be associated with 
full order books and a low level of stocks. Consequently, the costs of industrial 
action in periods of low demand will fall disproportionately upon workers as firms 
use stocks of goods to meet customer demand. Conversely in periods of high demand 
and low stocks, strike costs would fall most heavily on employers.
As an element within a management strategy, operating with a high level of stocks 
has a number of distinct advantages for employers. Stocks are necessary to provide 
a degree of flexibility in order to meet fluctuations in customer demand and to 
maintain goodwill in the event of shortfalls in production. They also significantly 
reduce the costs of industrial action to an organisation, assuming the action is
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short-term. Against this must be set the additional costs of maintaining a permanently 
high level of stocks which, like the necessity for maintaining such stock levels will 
be likely to vary between industries and firms. In terms of strike activity, the 
maintenance of stock levels can be expected to reduce the incidence of stoppages as 
the costs of such action on workers may be of such a magnitude that the strike 
weapon is viewed as counter-productive. Workers with a deeply held grievance may 
resort to other forms of industrial action in an attempt to diminish stock levels as a 
prelude to strike action but overall, we would expect a negative association with strike 
activity if this is the motive behind maintaining higher than average stock levels.
Overall, the preceding argument suggests that low levels of stocks will reduce the 
costs of strike action for workers and make it easier for them to enforce a grievance 
via strike action. However, if low stocks are a reflection of high demand and 
increasing profits, firms will be better able to meet demands from workers and make 
strike action less likely (relaxing the ceteris paribus assumptions). Net, the overall 
association between the level of stocks and strike action is indeterminate.
* The above discussion has implicitly focused upon stocks of outputs rather than 
inputs and a brief note on the latter is necessary before proceeding further. Although 
the threat of strike action amongst suppliers has a significant effect on a firm’s 
decision to hold large stocks of components and raw materials or to multi-source 
materials it is unlikely to have a significant impact on primary industrial action. 
Thus, whilst a firm’s actions in stockpiling materials could increase its vulnerability 
to secondary industrial action and increases its own costs; by ensuring the availability 
of components it makes continuity of production (earnings and job security) more 
likely. Whilst an increase in stocks of materials and components is unlikely to impact 
directly on worker attitudes the effects of such an increase would be expected to 
reduce the possibility of strike action.
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INDUSTRY AVERAGE GROSS WEEKLY EARNINGS AS A PERCENTAGE 
OF AGWE OF ALL WORKERS: MALE MANUALS
CHANGES IN THE RATIO OF AGWE OF SELECTED OCCUPATIONAL 
GROUPS
A central element within the theoretical model was the importance to workers of 
notions of fairness and in particular, fairness in relation to other workers. It is 
generally accepted that comparisons with other groups strongly influence workers as 
they formulate their current wage demands (Shorey 1977) on the grounds that wages 
are indicators of status and that comparability is central to fair treatment. However, 
a major argument of the section on worker attitudes was that whilst comparability is 
important to workers the reference groups used for comparison are highly restricted 
(Runciman 1966, Daniel 1975). Empirical support for this view comes from Brown 
and Sisson (1975) who found that in their study of the engineering industry that 
comparisons in wage bargaining were frequently made with reference to internal 
comparisons rather than with other industries. This would suggest that in general an 
examination of changes in industry AGWE relative to all workers would not be a 
significant determinant of strike activity, as the earnings of workers overall are not 
a comparative reference group for the majority of workers. In contrast, the ratio 
measure might yield more significant results depending upon the choice of selected 
occupational groups. Closely comparable groups within the same industry would 
allow a clearer test of Runciman’s view that most people’s lives are governed by the 
resentment of narrow inequalities and the preservation of small differentials.
The implications for strike activity are that the faster the rate of growth of earnings 
of the comparative group in the recent past relative to those in the group under study, 
the higher will be workers current demands. Whether this will lead to an increase 
in strike activity will depend upon the action of employers. Shorey (1977) has argued 
that employers may concede at least a restoration of differentials, in so far as this 
makes it easier to reach compromise settlements and because it may be in the interests 
of a firm to follow the lead of other firms in wage settlements. Overall, therefore,
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the link with strikes is uncertain.
In practice, the likelihood of strikes developing will be dependent upon the reasons 
for the erosion of differentials, if they have eroded through worsening economic 
circumstances then strike action may be unavoidable, particularly as wage differentials 
appear to widen between occupations in periods of recession (Reder 1952).
AVERAGE NUMBER UNEMPLOYED IN INDUSTRY AND CHANGES IN:
This variable is included as an indicator of job security and changing labour demand. 
The variable may, like the aggregate variable, be indeterminate with respect to strike 
activity although Smith et al. (1978), following Pencavel (1970) suggest that 
industries where unemployment remains low will be those in which workers enjoy a 
significant amount of bargaining power which may, if employers do not respond by 
offering improved terms and conditions lead to a greater likelihood of resort to strike 
action.
LEVEL OF AND CHANGES IN THE INDUSTRY WAGE BILL/REAL WAGE 
BILL AND WAGE BILL PER UNIT OF OUTPUT.
The theoretical model suggested that firms may be concerned with the size of their 
wage bill rather than with increases in wages or earnings per head. As a 
consequence, firms may be willing to concede increases in pay if this is traded off 
against redundancies. For firms, an increase in the size of the wage bill can be 
expected to lead to pressure to reduce labour through natural wastage or redundancies 
(following DMR, the method of securing reductions can be expected to be a critical 
factor in determining the likelihood of strike action). If redundancies are the 
preferred option, these would be expected to affect worker attitudes, undermining job 
security and making strike action more likely. This effect will further depend upon 
trade union(s) responses and the nature of the trade-off between wage increases and 
redundancies perceived by the trade union(s) (Crouch, 1982).
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XV
MANAGERIAL INITIATIVES
The brief coverage of managerial initiatives in the theoretical model identified a 
number of areas which would be expected to have an impact upon on strike activity. 
These were the nature of the payments system in operation, a common ingredient in 
‘institutionalist’ work (see Clegg 1976, 1979), the extent of overtime and short-time 
working and changes in these together with changes in employment, specifically the 
methods adopted by management in achieving reductions in manpower. The rationale 
for including these and their expected relationship with strike activity is examined 
below.
PAYMENT SYSTEMS: NATURE OF, AND CHANGES IN.
PERCENTAGE OF WORKERS ON PAYMENT BY RESULTS (PBR), AND 
CHANGES IN.
The nature of, and changes to payment systems are included as a factor likely to 
increase the possibility of strike activity taking place. The nature of payments 
systems is dealt with below but the issue of changes to systems, by directly affecting 
pay and earnings opportunities as well as bargaining and work control opportunities 
might significantly affect strike incidence. The particular concern here, is changes 
from payments-by-results schemes to measured daywork. Such changes would tend 
to lead to reduced bargaining opportunities over pay and reduce earnings fluctuations, 
but may lead to rising grievances over reduced earnings possibilities and over reduced 
workforce influence over pay issues.
The second factor is included as a proxy for fluctuations in earnings and as an 
indicator of bargaining opportunities. This last factor is particularly important; work 
carried out by the National Board for Prices and Incomes (NBPI 1968) found that 
piecework/PBR gives rise to more disputes because more bargaining situations exist 
and thus more opportunities for potential disagreement and conflict. However, there 
is a danger in equating piecework with other PBR schemes. If reform of a payments 
sytem takes place involving a move from timerates or piecework to other forms of 
PBR (including group-based schemes), unless worker perceptions of fairness, job
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security or earnings have been undermined it is doubtful whether an association with 
strike activity would exist although the change itself might precipitate conflict.
Overall the possible impact on strike activity seems to derive from two sources. 
First, that if PBR schemes increase the opportunites for bargaining then the potential 
for strikes would increase and second, the change in payments systems or numbers 
on such schemes would, by affecting earnings be expected to have an impact on strike 
numbers. In the latter case much will depend upon on the extent of the change in 
numbers affected and in earnings. A qualification to these points would be that by 
keeping pay high, PBR schemes reduce the possibility of strikes occurring and that, 
as noted above, more recent plant-wide and group-based schemes reduce the number 
of bargaining situations and therefore the potential number of disputes.
PERCENTAGE OF AVERAGE GROSS WEEKLY EARNINGS (AGWE) FROM 
PBR AND CHANGES IN.
Where workers receive a large proportion of their total pay from PBR schemes, a 
change which reduces the bonus component would, by affecting earnings and notions 
of fairness, be likely to precipitate action on the part of workers. From the 
employers perspective the size of the bonus component might be part of a broader 
strategy. Some companies might increase the bonus element, but reduce basic pay, 
to reduce the likelihood of industrial action short of a strike (Willman 1984, for an 
account of such a strategy at BL cars) but may increase the potential for strikes. In 
particular, in a bonus scheme where bonus earnings form a large prorportion of total 
earnings it is easier for workers to restore earnings lost during a short stoppage.
Overall, high earnings from PBR would tend to lead to a low level of ‘cut-price’ 
industrial action, but because of the potential for making up earnings after a dispute 
produce an environment where strikes are the most cost-effective means of achieving 
improvements in pay and conditions. Similarly, changes in earnings as a result of 
fluctuations in the PBR component would be expected to increase the potential for 
disputes, through uncertainty and earnings instability (Turner at al. 1967).
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THE NUMBER, AND CHANGES IN THE NUMBER WORKING OVERTIME 
AND AVERAGE HOURS OF OVERTIME WORKED
The rationale for these variables is that, particularly in the case of changes, they 
generate a climate of uncertainty and are associated with variations in earnings. In 
addition, with the short-time variable there is an association with threats to job 
security (as with severe cutbacks in overtime).
In terms of the relationships between the two variables and strike activity. In the case 
of overtime, where earnings are falling because of cuts in overtime, workers may 
respond with demands for increased basic pay to compensate for the loss of earnings 
or moderate demands if job security is threatened. Employers can be expected to 
resist increases in basic pay per se because of the possible impact on costs. This is 
particularly likely if (relaxing the cet par assumptions) cuts in overtime are introduced 
against a background of falling demand, such a fall in demand may make employers 
more determined to resist demands from their employees and increase the likelihood 
of a strike. In such a situation a strike may not impose great costs on an organisation 
as goods produced might be expensively stockpiled rather than sold so that a strike 
might produce a net gain for the employer (see Willman 1984). (It should also be 
stressed here that for employees, strikes are likely to be more cost-effective when 
overtime earnings are high as earnings lost during a dispute can be made up relatively 
easily after a dispute is over).
TECHNOLOGY: TYPE, AND % CHANGE IN SPREAD OF TECHNOLOGY.
The nature of technology has long been considered a factor in explaining differences 
in strike propensity between industries (Blauner, 1964, Ingham, 1974), although 
concerns about technological determinism and the fact that strike activity does differ 
markedly between plants in the same industry using identical technology has tended 
to reduce the emphasis placed upon this factor (Clegg 1979). The main concern here 
is with changes in technology as measured by changes in the spread of technology 
within an industry.
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The argument is that the rate of change is an indicator of changes in work 
organisation, the nature of work and the labour process. Technological change is 
likely to change the nature of work relations, authority relations and custom and 
practice. Such changes would be expected to challenge and disturb established 
working patterns and be likely to generate gievances. In practice, the extent to which 
such changes are likely to result in strike activity will depend upon the context in 
which they are introduced, the strength of union organisation and the way the changes 
are introduced.
MANAGERIAL INITIATIVES (2)
THE CIRCUIT OF CAPITAL VARIABLE
A central element within our theoretical model was the proposition that the likelihood 
of stoppages arising might best be viewed within an approach which encompassed the 
full circuit of capital and contradictions within this circuit (see above and Kelly 1982, 
1985). The argument advanced within that section suggested that where major 
contradictions arose within the circuit managers were more likely to perceive the need 
for change e.g to effect changes in the labour process to cope with changed product 
market conditions. As our discussion of other variables suggests, these changes 
would not necessarily produce stoppages but for a number of reasons might be 
expected to make stoppages more likely. First, changes may tend to produce greater 
uncertainty among workers, particularly if job security and earnings are threatened. 
Second, the possibility of strikes occurring would be increased if changes threaten to 
disrupt traditional ’indulgency patterns’ or aim at combatting problems of ‘X - 
inefficiency’ within organisations. In this context, Daniel’s (1987) study of technical 
change is instructive, revealing that change affecting the organisation of work 
encounters substantially more resistance from workers than does technical change. 
Daniel suggests that this may be due to the fact that the latter is frequently associated 
with increased earnings and enhanced job security for many workers. In terms of the 
theoretical model, it can be argued further that organisational change may be more 
likely to impact directly on the determinants of worker attitudes, particularly job 
security, earnings and the relationship between wages and effort. This represents a
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third point; that change may affect a number of components of worker attitudes and, 
where this occurs in terms of worsening those elements, increases the likelihood of 
resort to strike action.
To retain the elements of the theoretical model, the circuit of capital variable 
employed here is an amalgam of three interdependent factors within the circuit. One 
denoting product market conditions, a second the labour market and the third, the 
labour/production process. The diagram overleaf represents the circuit and the choice 
of variables available.
As economic theory suggests, these three elements are interrelated, changes in 
product markets will feed into earnings and productivity.
PRODUCT MARKET LABOUR MARKET
Gross profits to Change in Industry AGWE
Total compensation Level of Industry U
Import Penetration Change in Real Earnings
LABOUR PROCESS
Change in Labour Productivity
Real Wage Bill 
Real Wage Bill per Unit of Output
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However, the speed with which changes in product markets feed into the other 
elements is unlikely to be instantaneous. First, many industries do not conform to 
a perfectly competitive model, at least in the short to medium term and in the absence 
of competitive pressures, severe contradictions within the circuit may have to appear 
before organisations initiate change (an assumption of the circuit of capital variable 
is therefore that a degree of imperfect competition exists). Second, significant 
obstacles to change may prevent rapid adjustment such as resistance from trade unions 
and from within management. Third, real world lack of information may prevent an 
accurate assessment of the situation facing an organisation and lead it to adopt a ’wait 
and see’ approach before initiating change. Finally, other barriers to change in the 
form of organisational structure and culture may lead to delays in adjustment.
LABOUR’S SHARE IN VALUE ADDED: The contribution of labour to the value 
added by industry.
Recent work focussing upon enterprise calculation has laid particular stress on the 
role of value added in affecting organisational behaviour. It is included to capture 
in a single variable the extent of contradictions within the circuit of capital and 
particularly between product markets and the labour process. In UK manufacturing, 
labour typically accounts for over 60% of value added (Neale and Haslam 1989), 
greatly in excess of that found in other countries such as Japan and is a reflection of 
the relatively high labour intensiveness of much of UK manufacturing. The 
significance of this for strike activity is that a high share of value added accounted 
for by labour makes control of labour costs and efficient utilisation of paramount 
concern where product markets are or become more competitive.
In an industry with a high share of value added contributed by labour, product market 
decline or greater competition will lead to attempts to raise productivity, improve 
labour utilisation generally and/or closures and redundancies. What is critical for the 
impact on strike activity is the extent of the changes, how they are introduced and 
how these conflict with workplace values and workforce attitudes and expectations 
together with the strength of union organisation. Where the changes involve 
widespread changes which conflict with established workplace values and where union
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organisation is strong the likelihood of strike action is increased. Furthermore, action 
that does develop is likely to be prolonged, reflected in a heightened level of days 
lost.
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XVI
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
The research undertaken for this study concentrated on two specific methods. The 
first; econometric analysis using Department of Employment strike data for the period 
since the Second World War at aggregate and industry levels. The data related 
normally to strike numbers deflated by employment and to adjusted figures for days 
lost and workers involved. Where it was deemed appropriate separate equations were 
run for pay and non-pay disputes and for sub-periods. A full discussion of the 
techniques used and the tests employed for significance and autocorrelation are 
described below. The second research method used in the study was that of a limited 
number of semi-structured interviews, these were conducted initially to provide a 
check on the validity of the econometric work and to provide qualitative data which 
could illuminate more recent strike experience in the industries studied.
(1) ECONOMETRIC WORK
Many studies of strike activity and particularly those of economists, make use of 
techniques of multiple regression to ascertain the existence of a relationship between 
a dependent variable (e.g the number of stoppages in a given period) and a number 
of independent, explanatory variables. The equation reproduced below was run by 
Pencavel (1969) to account for variations in the dependent variable - the number of 
Strikes outside of coal-mining - by using seven independent variables. The value of 
these variables, the regression coefficient, shows the importance of each in respect 
of the number of strikes so that an increase of 1 % point in the rate of unemployment 
(Ut) is associated with a fall of around 41 strikes per quarter in Pencavel’s equation.
S = -147.88 +74.93N1 +38.0N2 +7.01N3 -41.29U +1.87D -42.46RM +5.5T 
(1.68) (4.99) (2.67) (0.48) (2.89) (2.6) (4.89) (15.29)
SEE = 41.9 
R2 = 0.869 
D.W = 1.36
Where: N l, N2, N3 are seasonal dummies. U; is the rate of aggregate unemployment 
in the current period. D; the ratio of profits to total compensation. Rt-1; the rate of 
change of real wages lagged six quarters. T; a time trend.
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Similarly, a rise in real wages, six quarters previously (Rt-1) in the same equationis 
associated with a fall of around 42 strikes per quarter. The figures in brackets denote 
t statistics which indicate the significance of each variable employed. In general, 
values of t greater than 2 imply that the variable is significant. In equation (a) all the 
explanatory variables with the exception of the third seasonal variable N3 can be seen 
to be significant.
The three other measures used by Pencavel are indicators of the general significance 
and explanatory power of the overall equation. The Standard Estimate of Error 
(SEE) gives an indication of the significance of the equation, the lower is this figure 
the better for the overall significance. The R2 figure is the coefficient of 
determination and gives an indication of the explanatory power of the equation and 
varies in value from 0 to 1. The higher is R2 the greater the explanatory power of 
the equation, so that in equation (a) the variables employed account for around 87 % 
of the variation in the dependent variable. The last measure, D.W, is the 
Durbin-Watson statistic particularly important in time-series work and draws attention 
to the existence or otherwise of autocorrelation between residuals. Residuals are 
differences between observed values of the dependent variable and values predicted 
by the equation. The D.W statistic indicates whether there is a pattern in the 
dependent variable which is unexplained by the variables already in the equation. Put 
another way the Durbin-Watson statistic indicates whether or not critical variables 
have been omitted from the equation. The statistic takes a value between 0 and 4, 
with 2 being the ideal value indicating no autocorrelation. In econometric work in 
the field of strikes, a value of between 1.4 and 2 is used to indicate a lack of any 
significant autocorrelative problems, values between 1.1 and 1.4 inconclusive and 
values below 1.1 as indicating problems of autocorrelation (see Cronin 1979: p.77). 
A further measure used in some econometric studies is the F statistic, which indicates 
the extent to which the independent variables are significant explanators of variations 
in the dependent variable. In general, the higher the value of this the better, but 
values of over 4 or 5 can be assumed to indicate overall significance.
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(2) SEMI-STRUCTURED INTERVIEWS
The research conducted for the four industry chapters concentrated mainly on 
statistical data particularly that of the econometric work outlined above. In addition, 
these chapters drew upon some limited qualitative data provided through the use of 
a small number of semi-structured interviews. For steel, shipbuilding and motor 
vehicles two interviews each were carried out, and in coal-mining four interviews.
The main aims of the interviews were first, to provide a means of checking the 
accuracy of specific historical data on changes in these industries. Second, to obtain 
additional information on changes in industrial relations for the 1980s and 1990s to 
supplement secondary data sources. Third, that given the importance of the role of 
organisation in our account of strikes, a particular aim was to obtain information on 
trade union perceptions of change and management initiatives in the 1980s particularly 
which is the reason for the predominant union emphasis in the interviews. Finally, 
the interviews were also used as a means to obtaining access to documents that were 
unobtainable through other sources. The minutes of the Shipbuilding Industry 
Committee from the CSEU is an illustration of this point, as the privatisation of 
British Shipbuilders meant that such information was no longer available centrally 
from that source.
The interviews all followed a similar format with a preliminary introduction to the 
study and more detailed open questions relating to developments in the 
industries/organisations in the 1980s. On the basis of the responses, interviewees 
were probed further on specific issues relating to the changes. In some cases, notably 
coal-mining, these led to discussion of specific areas and pits and strike propensities 
over time. Where possible, the information obtained was checked with that of other 
respondents, and published data where available. These were followed up by 
questions which concentrated on eliciting information on trade union responses to the 
changes experienced in the 1980s, as relatively little information was available on 
these in contrast to information on management strategies. Where direct reference 
is made to interview material in the text, this is marked with an asterix, e.g Ferry (*)
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AGGREGATE STRIKE ACTIVITY: THE ROLE OF THE
MACRO-ENVIRONMENT
The previous discussion and our own theoretical model have identified the role of 
broad environmental influences on strike activity, particularly their incidence and 
length. Following DMR it was decided initially to focus specifically on the role of 
environmental influences on strikes at the aggregate level to try and assess empirically 
their relative importance in the post-war period. This decision was also influenced 
by our wish to test further three of the most influential analyses of aggregate stoppage 
activity in the UK. In our earlier discussion of approaches to studying strike activity 
(see Introduction) the explanations offered by economists and those adopting a 
political-historical approach were reviewed and within these, the works of Pencavel 
(1970), Shorey (1977) and Cronin (1979) given particular attention. Surprisingly, in 
terms of their influence, there have been few attempts to apply their work to later 
historical periods or to extend them beyond their original time periods. Whilst this 
omission is understandable in Cronin’s case, as his analysis covers approximately 90 
years, it is less clear in the case of Pencavel and Shorey. Our intention is therefore 
to seek to remedy this situation, to test the underlying stability of the models and to 
examine their relevance and applicability to later time periods. The first section 
concentrates upon the contribution of the two economic approaches to the analysis of 
strike activity beginning with a re-consideration of Pencavel’s seminal work.
The pattern of strike activity in the post-war period is outlined in the tables and the 
figure overleaf. The tables have been arranged according to the periodisation 
suggested by DMR (1983) and subsequently extended by Hyman (1984). They serve 
as a general backcloth against which the review of three major studies are set.
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Table 1 NET STRIKE TOTALS
YEARS Av Num 
St. pa
Av Num 
Wkrs inv
Average
WDL
Average
size
Days lost 
pw
1946-52 625 228.4 1318 365 5.8
1953-59 608 551.2 3407 907 6.2
1960-68 1451 1189.3 2872 820 2.4
1969-73 2723 1446.5 9881 531 6.8
1974-76 2182 910 6100 417 6.7
1977-79 2119 2202 16195 1039 7.4
1980-84 1052 1102 5670 1048 5.1
1985-90 653 616 2792 943 4.1
Table 2 GROSS STRIKE TOTALS
Years Av No 
St pa
Av No 
WI
Av
WDL
Av Size %
Strikes 
< 3 
days
Days 
lost p w
1946-52 1698 443 1888 261 77.1 4.3
1953-59 2340 787 3950 336 81.1 5.0
1960-68 2372 1316 3188 554 71.0 2.4
1969-73 2924 1571 12497 537 53.6 8.0
1974-76 2413 1032 8015 428 43.4 7.8
1977-79 2453 2272 16340 926 41.8 7.2
1980-84 1340 1280 10372 955 8.1
1985-90 851 702 3850 852 5.5
Source: Years to 1973 Durcan, McCarthy and Redman (1983).
1974-Hyman (1984) and DE Gazette annual data on stoppages. 
Average size = average number of workers involved
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PENCAVEL
Pencavel’s work derived from the theoretical model and empirical work of 
Ashenfelter and Johnson (1969) for the USA and was an attempt to test it in the 
British context. Operationally, the model examines the probability of a strike 
occuring in a given bargaining unit which is seen to be dependent upon profits, some 
minimum acceptable wage increase, the state of the labour market, seasonal factors 
and a time trend. Pencavel proceeded to test the model at the aggregate level and on 
four separate industries using quarterly data from the first quarter of 1950 to the 
second quarter of 1967 with the dependent variable as the number of stoppages 
beginning in each quarter in all industries except coal-mining. The results of his 
empirical work at the aggregate level are given below with our equations for 1967-87 
and 1947-87 set alongside.
The three equations reported by Pencavel give considerable support to the Ashenfelter 
and Johnson model with all variables apart from the third seasonal dummy and the 
two political variables significant. However, as was noted in the Introduction, the 
results may be affected by the years chosen for study and attempts to apply 
econometric models to periods other than that chosen by Pencavel have been less 
successful. In an attempt to check this we ran Pencavel’s equations (b) and (c) using 
annual data for the period 1967-87, the results for (c) are shown below as equation
(d). Note that the wage and price terms were lagged one year rather than the six 
quarters used by Pencavel. Given the relatively small number of observations and 
fewer degrees of freedom the results must be interpreted with caution.
In a number of important respects equation (d) performs well. Its overall explanatory 
power is high, the F statistic suggests the variables are significant determinants of 
variations in the number of stoppages and the D.W statistic confirms the absence of 
significant autocorrelation. However, of the independent variables employed only the 
unemployment and wage terms are significant with unemployment exerting a strong 
negative influence upon stoppage numbers. In contrast to the results obtained by 
Pencavel the Time trend is insignificant and with a small coefficient.
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Note:
In the following equations the variables used are as follows:
N l, N2, N3 are seasonal dummy variables
U; the aggregate rate of unemployment in the current period.
D; the ratio of profits to total compensation.
Rt-1; the rate of change of real wages lagged six quarters (Pencavel), one year in 
equations (d) and (e).
Wt-1; the rate of change of money wages lagged six quarters.
Pt-1; the rate of change of retail prices lagged.
T; a time trend. YP; Incomes policy dummy variable.
LG; Labour government dummy variable.
SEE; the standard error of estimate. F; the F test of overall 
significance. R2; the coefficient of determination.
D.W; the Durbin-Watson statistic.
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4STRIKE ACTIVITY: AGGREGATE RESULTS
Variable Equations
PENCAVEL 1967-87 1947-87
(e)(a) (b) (c) (d)
Constant - 147.88 - 74.46 - 142.25 3502.3
(1.68) (0.72) (1.47)
Nl + 74.93 + 70.55 + 75.56
(4.99) (4.6) (4.91)
N2 + 38.0 + 38.45 + 37.99
(2.67) (2.7) (2.64)
N3 + 7.01 + 5.44 + 6.71
(0.48) (0.37) (0.46)
U - 41.29 - 38.73 -50.19 - 203.6
(2.89) (2.42) (2.95) (3.08)
D + 1.87 + 1.27 + 1.97 - 7.16
(2.6) (1.49) (2.35) (0.12)
Rt-1 - 42.46 - 52.52 -68.0 -65.5
(4.89) (3.84) (2.3) (2.37)
Wt-1 -44.2
(3.89)
Pt-1 + 39.34
(4.34)
T + 5.5 + 5.24 + 5.71 + 15.04
(15.28) (13.1) (13.28) (0.3)
YP - 10.27 -257.1
(0.56) (1.04)
LG - 11.10
(0.54)
SEE 41.9 41.9 42.3
SDE 428.6
F 10.1
R2 0.869 0.873 0.971 0.81
D.W 1.36 1.35 1.41 1.49
188.65
(4.38)
-40.2
(0.5)
+ 78.37 
(5.57) 
-44.15 
(0 .2)
V 360.57 
(2 .0)
477.0
13.2
0.69
0.91
The figures in brackets are t values.
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Equation (d) suggests that for the period 1967-1987 it is the unemployment term 
which is giving the equation its overall explanatory power and significance with a rise 
of one percentage point in the unemployment rate being associated with a decline of 
around 200 strikes a year. Given the fact that Pencavel used non-mining strikes per 
quarter as his dependent variable and the present study uses non-mining strikes per 
year this result is almost identical to that obtained by Pencavel for the earlier period 
in terms of the significance of the variable and the strength and sign of the 
coefficient. The strength and significance of the lagged real wage term is however 
considerably reduced in the later period and although the only other significant 
variable in equation (d) its influence on the overall significance and explanatory 
power on the equation appears to have diminished. In view of this contrast with 
Pencavel’s results it was decided to re-run the equation (d) without the time trend.
The omission of the time trend made little difference to the overall explanatory power 
of the equation and actually increased its overall significance. In contrast with the 
period 1950-67, the time trend did little to enhance the explanatory power or 
significance of the equation after 1967. To provide additional support for this view 
equation (c) was run using annual data for the period 1946-66. With the inclusion 
of the time trend the equation accounted for 81% of the variation in the number of 
stoppages, without it, this figure fell to 50%. Furthermore, the F test fell to a level 
where it was only just significant and the D.W statistic fell from 1.43 to 1.134. Of 
greater importance was the fact that the removal of the time trend changed the signs 
on the coefficients of the unemployment, profits and incomes policy variables. 
Similar results to these were also reported by DMR in their econometric work using 
annual data (DMR 1983: p. 233-234). Whilst these differences may be the result of 
using annual rather than quarterly data coupled with a slightly different time period 
this would not account for the very low D.W statistic, although Pencavel’s high figure 
may be the result of using seasonal dummies.
Overall, these results suggest problems with the underlying stability of the model 
tested by Pencavel, although the results for equation (d) imply a continuing and 
significant role for broad economic factors in explanations of strike activity. Given
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the apparent importance of economic factors over relatively short periods of time in 
influencing the numbers of stoppages it was decided to run the three Pencavel 
equations for the entire post-war period from 1946-87 to examine the validity of his 
model for a longer time period and to test for the significance of his economic 
variables over such time periods. Only equation (c) is reproduced here as equation
(e) above.
Comparing the results with those from Pencavel’s original equations shows that the 
time trend remains an important and significant explanatory variable although it is 
unclear what it is acting as a proxy for in the longer time period and its significance 
is considerable less than that found in Pencavel’s original work. Although with the 
time trend removed only the profits variable remained significant, the signs on the 
unemployment and incomes policy variables change and the R2 fell to 0.42. It would 
seem likely in view of the strong downward trend in strike numbers since the early 
1970s that the significant positive coefficient on this variable is heavily influenced by 
the upward trend in the earlier period, a view supported by the lack of significance 
of the variable for the period 1967-1987 (equation (d) above). The importance of 
this term should not be underrestimated, it is indicating that there were on average 
an additional 78 strikes a year for each year of the period studied. Thus, the trend 
term implies that there would be 780 more strikes in 1960 than in 1950 and over 
2000 more in 1980 than in 1950. The unemployment term, and in the absence of 
the time trend, the profits variable remain important explanatory factors in accounting 
for variations in the number of stoppages (although in the case of profits, the sign on 
the coefficient is the opposite of that found in Pencavel’s work suggesting that high 
profits are associated with fewer strikes, so that employers apparently share the 
benefits of high profits with their employees). The strength of the influence of the 
unemployment term, as measured by the value of the coefficient, is comparable to 
that found in Pencavel’s work and in equation (d) for the later period, although its 
overall significance is higher than that in the original Pencavel equations. It is clear 
from equation (e) that it is the unemployment and trend terms which together drive 
the equation and give it its explanatory power The Labour government variable in 
equation (e) is also significant (cf Pencavel) and exerts a strong positive influence on
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stoppages, suggesting a major impact in the late 1960s and between 1974 and 1979. 
However, even with the time trend included, there is a problem of omitted variables 
for the extended period and the explanatory power of the equations falls markedly 
when tested over the longer time period. The best result (equation (e)) obtained with 
the inclusion of the two political variables gives an equation which accounts for 69% 
of the variation in the number of stoppages compared with 87% in the original 
equation. Given the tendency for equations using annual data to give higher values 
of R2 than those using quarterly data the differences in explanatory power probably 
exceed those given here.
The lack of significance of the profits, wage, price and incomes policy variables in 
the revised equations together with the reduction in overall explanatory power and 
omitted variables would seem to support the contention of those who remain sceptical 
of the ability of economic models to account for anything other than strike incidence 
over relatively short periods of time. To test this view further we re-examined the 
work carried of Shorey (1977) and subjected it to further testing before considering 
some refinements of our own to these economic approaches.
SHOREY
Shorey’s work attempted to account for the probability of a bargaining unit 
experiencing a strike, utilising a framework which postulated a conflictual relationship 
between employers and employees. In common with other economic models it 
assumed all strikes were concerned directly or indirectly with wages with the 
dependent variable as all strikes outside of mining. Shorey developed an operational 
model with eleven variables, including two seasonal dummies and tested it using 
quarterly data from the first quarter of 1950 to the second quarter of 1967, the 
identical period to that examined by Pencavel. The equation which produced the best 
results for his period included six variables and is reproduced in equation (f) overleaf.
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AGGREGATE STRIKE ACTIVITY: SHOREY REVISITED 
Variable SHOREY 1967-87 1946-87
(f) (g) (h)
Constant - 291.7 2308.6 250.2
(5.2)
Y1 + 81.8
(7.3)
#/P + 158.1 -7.3 - 0.019
(5.4) (2.02) (0.013)
Wt-1 - 18.2 - 45.45 - 31.79
(2.3) (1.18) (1.4)
Pt-1 + 12.9 + 16.96 + 20.09
(1.8) (0.47) (0.8)
Pt + 1.2 + 7.6 - 3.38
(2.2) (0.19) (0.15)
Snomt- 1 + 0.48 + 0.57 + 0.917
(5.3) (2.73) (9.2)
SEE 36.3
SDE 523.6 411.56
F 7.0 23.49
R2 0.89 0.70 0.77
Y1 =: Seasonal dummy signifying the first quarter of the year
#/Pt = Real Profits in current period
Wt-1 == Change in money wages lagged
Pt-1 = Change in prices lagged
Pt = Change in prices in current period 
Snomt-1 = Strikes outside of mining lagged
Figures in brackets are t statistics, Shorey gives no indication of D.W statistic but it 
is assumed to be satisfactory.
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Despite the fact that two dummy variables and those measuring changes in the wage 
bill, the level of unemployment, changes in money profits and productivity are 
omitted because of their lack of significance the results seem to support Shorey’s view 
that ’economic factors are important in explaining strike causation’. To test this 
further we ran his equation on the period 1967-87 using annual data. The results are 
presented in equation (g) but with our earlier proviso that the limited number of 
observations mean the results must be treated with caution.
Compared with Shorey’s original equation only real profits and the lagged dependent 
variable remain significant, and the sign on the coefficient of the former is the 
opposite of that in his original equation. Furthermore, the lagged dependent variable 
needs to be interpreted carefully. Shorey includes it as an index of external militancy 
and lags it one quarter, in (g) and (h) it is lagged one year and is used by other 
writers to indicate the extent to which strikes have their own dynamic (see Cronin 
1979). Irrespective of how it is used; including a lagged dependent variable as an 
explanatory factor may seriously bias the Durbin-Watson statistic (Koutsoyiannis 
1977) and without Snomt-1 in equation (g), the D.W statistic falls to 1.19 and the R2 
to 0.55. In addition, the lagged dependent variable may be acting as a proxy for 
some other lagged independent variable and that the latter should be included in place 
of Snomt-1 (as Shorey 1977, concedes in his work). However, an argument for 
including the lagged strikes variable can be made in the context of our own ’open 
systems’ model of strike activity. The role of feedback into the broader environment 
and the attitudes of the parties may be measured more effectively by the use of this 
variable rather than some alternative measure. The ambiguity associated with it and 
its interpretation does suggest caution in its use and this, coupled to the results of its 
inclusion in the revised Cronin equations (see below) led us to discard it in our own 
work.
Equation (h) shows the results of Shorey’s original equation run for the period 
1946-87 using annual data. In this revised equation only the lagged dependent 
variable is a strong and significant determinant of strikes in the current period and 
suggests that an additional ten strikes in the preceding period will produce, cet. par,
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a further nine strikes in the current period. According to Shorey’s theoretical position 
this offers strong support for the view that current strike levels are significantly 
influenced by strikes in the recent past and for Cronin’s view that strikes come in 
waves. Just how much influence the lagged dependent variable exerts on the overall 
equation is indicated by the effect of removing it. If Snomt-1 is excluded, only Pt 
is significant, F falls to 2.5 (!), R2 to 0.21 and D.W to 0.43 suggesting that Snomt-1 
is exerting a major influence upon the overall significance and explanatory power of 
the equation. Given the strength of the coefficient on this variable and its significance 
for the extended period as compared with 1967-1987 suggests that its impact fell 
mainly on the period of Shorey’s study and raises additional concerns about his 
results.
The results for the extended period therefore urge caution in accepting Shorey’s claim 
about the importance of broad economic factors in strike causation at least over 
relatively long periods of time. None of the variables apart from the lagged 
dependent variable is significant and other than the wage variable the remainder do 
not even approach significance. Indeed, as we noted above, in the revised equation 
the overall significance, explanatory power and apparent lack of omitted variables are 
the result of the inclusion of one variable. Moreover, a variable which is ambiguous 
in terms of its interpretation and which may be telling us very little about the factors 
affecting strike activity.
In defence of Shorey’s work, the overall results may be partly a consequence of using 
annual rather than quarterly data. However, we incline more to the view that an 
equation in which over half of the explanatory power and well over half the total 
significance is provided by a variable whose validity and interpretation is a matter of 
some debate suggests that the underlying model or at least its operational form offers 
an account of strike activity which is at best inadequate and at worst highly 
misleading.
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CRONIN
The analysis of broad macro-influences on aggregate strike activity has concentrated 
mainly on macro-economic factors with little consideration of the influence of 
political and organisational variables. Given the role assigned to these in our 
theoretical model it was decided to use the work of Cronin (1979) as a focal point in 
examining their influence in association with economic factors on aggregate strike 
activity.
Arguing for the value of a long-run historical model of various dimensions of 
stoppages encompassing economic, organisational and political variables Cronin used 
various combinations of nineteen variables to account for variations in these 
dimensions. Of particular interest to the present study is the equation he fitted to data 
for the period 1946-74 using strikes outside mining and quarrying as his dependent 
variable. In contrast to Pencavel and Shorey, Cronin used Beta or standardised 
coefficients of the predictor variable. Beta coefficients, unlike the regression 
coefficients used above (which give an amount in units by which the value of the 
dependent variable changes in response to a change of one unit in the predictor 
variable) refer to the amount in standard deviations by which the value of the 
dependent variable changes in response to a change of one standard deviation in the 
predictor variable. Thus, although we have used regression coefficients rather than 
Beta coefficients in our analyses the overall results we have obtained can be compared 
directly with those of Cronin although the coefficients on each variable differ. 
Cronin ran equations using a combination of variables with annual data for the period 
1946-74, overall results for the two most successful of which are reproduced overleaf.
e) Snom = f(GDP, Rt, TUG, Snomt-1); SEE = 250.6, R2 =0.93, D.W = 1.62
f) Snom = f(GDP, TUG, Snomt-1, RL, CG); SEE = 261, R2 = 0.93, D.W 1.51 
Where:
GDP = Gross Domestic Product, as an indicator of economic prosperity
Rt = Real Wage changes in current period
TUG = Trade Union growth
Snomt-1 = Strikes, non-mining lagged one year
RL = Repressive Legislation
CG = Conservative government in Power
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AGGREGATE STRIKE ACTIVITY: CRONIN REVISITED 1946-1987 
Variable (i) (j) (k)
Constant - 132.9 - 380.29
GDP + 6.82 + 11.3
(1.76) (2.3)
TUG + 65.7 + 38.1
(2.79) (1.53)
Rt - 45.9
(2.27)
Wt
U
Snomt-1 + 0.76 + 0.728
(7.95) (7.34)
RL - 420.28
(1.9)
CG + 5.4
(0.037)
SDE 371.97 380.29
F 37.7 28.77
R2 0.80 0.80
D.W 1.7 1.62
- 836.3
+ 29.8 
(4.24)
+ 57.4 
(2.9)
- 32.4 
(2.77)
- 105.9 
(3.58)
+ 0.59 
(4.9)
320.46
43.4
0.86
1.88
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Owing to his choice of Beta coefficients we do not know how many of Cronin’s 
variables were significant but it is assumed that most if not all met standard tests of 
significance. Furthermore, Cronin utilised variables far broader and less precise than 
those conventionally employed by economists and care needs to be taken over their 
interpretation.
In common with the treatment of Pencavel and Shorey’s work the two Cronin 
equations were re-run for the extended period 1946-87. Of these it is equation (j) 
which comes closest to operationalising Cronin’s theoretical model and although the 
repressive legislation variable approaches significance the performance of these 
political variables over the longer period is not encouraging. Equation (i) continues 
to perform well over the extended period with three of the four variables significant, 
and together accounting for 80% of the variation in the number of stoppages (net). 
The F test suggests the four variables are highly significant determinants of variations 
in stoppages and the Durbin-Watson statistic indicates no problems of autocorrelation. 
The two equations were then re-run with the lagged dependent variable omitted. In 
equation (i) this raised the significance and the value of the coefficients of GDP and 
TUG but rendered the change in real wages (Rt) insignificant. In equation (j) the 
same occurred but with RL and CG remaining insignificant and with the sign on the 
coefficient of CG changing. However, the major impact fell upon the overall tests 
of significance and determination. In both equations the F value fell by over 
two-thirds, the R2 to 0.47 and 0.50 respectively and, of most concern, lowered the 
D.W statistic to 0.34 and 0.32 suggesting a major problem of omitted variables. It 
would appear that the lagged dependent variable again exerts a considerable influence 
in Cronin’s equations for the period 1946-87 and as with Shorey its effect is probably 
concentrated in the period to 1974. It is likely to be biasing the results he obtains by 
depressing the value of the coefficients on the other explanatory variables, by acting 
as a substitute for other lagged variables and by artificially raising the value of the 
Durbin-Watson statistic.
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Examining equations (i) and (j) in more detail reveals the driving force of the lagged 
strikes term in both equations. Whilst the prosperity variable only achieves 
significance when run separately from the real wages term. Conversely the trade 
union growth variable achieves significance when run with the earnings term but not 
with the political variables. Furthermore, it is not clear what the real wages term is 
saying. Cronin includes it as an expectations term but accepts that it could also be 
viewed as another measure of prosperity. The fact that GDP is insignificant when 
run alongside the wages term suggests that it might be better viewed as a prosperity 
measure. In which case it is presumably saying that the higher the increase in real 
wages the less likely are workers to engage in strike activity for the foreseeable 
future. Alternatively it could be saying that settlements giving high real earnings, are 
associated with fewer strikes suggesting the ability of firms to ’buy off’ industrial 
conflict.
After re-running Cronin’s original equations it was decided to test further a number 
of combinations of his variables over the period 1946-87 to gauge their significance 
and explanatory power. The best results obtained are described in equation (k) 
above. This suggests that a combination of broad economic and organisational factors 
together account for the major part of the variation in aggregate strike incidence in 
the UK for the post-war period to 1987 although it is the combination of the broadest 
and theoretically most imprecise variables, GDP and Snomt-1, which appear to give 
the equation its significance and explanatory power. The problems associated with 
the latter variable have already been discussed in detail, suffice it to say that it may 
be telling us very little about stoppages and variations in these. Similarly GDP, the 
’prosperity variable’ indicates the cyclical pattern to stoppages and the association 
between strikes and rising living standards (the use of an index of industrial 
production in place of GDP produced comparable results and was also highly 
significant). However, it is subject to a number of different interpretations and it is 
again doubtful how far the results inform our understanding of strike activity. In 
terms of our own theoretical model, whilst general prosperity is likely to be important 
it is the immediate effects of this, for example through output and earnings variations 
at industry (and more importantly), company and workplace level that are likely to
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have the greatest impact on stoppage activity.
Running equations for the period 1946-67 using a combination of Cronin variables 
did highlight the importance of political factors, notably the operation of incomes 
policies, but this does not appear to hold for the extended period although this may 
be the result of a limited number of observations available.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
The analysis of macro-variables using the works of Pencavel and Shorey has provided 
useful insights into the role of economic factors in particular in influencing aggregate 
strike activity. At the beginning of this section it was stressed that the few attempts 
that had been made to apply economic approaches to time periods outside of those 
used by Pencavel and Shorey, or had tried to apply them to longer time periods, had 
not met with the same success. The revised work undertaken in this section would 
support this view but with important qualifications.
In general the results obtained for the Pencavel and Shorey analyses when extended 
for the longer period 1946-1987 are mixed but suggest that their underlying models 
(at least their operational forms) may be mis-specified and inappropriate for the entire 
post-war period. However, the Pencavel equations perform consistently better than 
Shorey’s and the results of the empirical work undertaken using the Pencavel 
operational model confirms the continuing and consistently strong negative influence 
of unemployment on variations in strike activity, and the strong positive influence of 
the time trend, although the latter is not significant for the period 1967-1987. 
However, despite the influence of these terms the remaining variables (excepting the 
Labour government in the long period and the lagged wage variables in the period 
1967-1987) do not perform well, failing to achieve significance. Overall, whilst the 
equations account for over two-thirds of the variation in stoppages this is considerably 
below the explanatory power of his original equations and, more seriously in the 
longer period there is a major problem of omitted variables.
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In contrast, the extended Shorey equation has a higher explanatory power and no 
apparent problem with omitted variables but this result is achieved entirely as a result 
of the inclusion as an explanatory factor of the lagged dependent variable with none 
of his other variables achieving significance (except the real profits variable for 
1967-1987). Overall, it is the trend term in the case of Pencavel and the lagged 
dependent variable in the case of Shorey which save the equations from complete 
obscurity and insignificance over the longer time period. Although in Pencavel’s case 
the time trend fails to conceal the major problem of omitted variables its influence in 
conjunction with that of unemployment does explain much of the variation in stoppage 
numbers. For Shorey’s model the problems would appear to be more acute and taken 
together support the view that accounts of stoppage activity at the aggregate level 
which rely almost exclusively upon economic factors offer an incomplete explanation 
of the complexity of influences on strikes. This is not to argue that broad economic 
factors are unimportant, indeed our theoretical model places considerable stress upon 
them, but that they are for the most part, background variables operating more 
significantly in the short than long term.
Overall the extended Cronin equations and those using a combination of the variables 
he employed generally perform well. The explanatory power is high and the overall 
significance together with the absence of omitted variables suggests Cronin is correct 
in identifying the factors he has as important determinants of stoppage activity. 
Furthermore, the results give broad support to the argument that strikes need to be 
analysed from a multidisciplinary perspective which gives considerable support to the 
general theoretical framework developed above. However, in spite of the impressive 
results obtained there are considerable weaknesses in Cronin’s work which are thrown 
into sharper focus when his equations are extended beyond 1974. First, and most 
important is the significance and strength of the coefficient on the lagged dependent 
variable which, as with Shorey, considerably affects the overall explanatory power 
and Durbin-Watson value. The fact that it is not clear what this is measuring nor 
how the results are to be interpreted casts a shadow over its inclusion in the 
equations. Second, the importance of the prosperity variables, particularly GDP but 
also the wage terms when used in conjunction with GDP. The breadth of the GDP
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variable appears to swamp the effects of some of the other factors and, other than 
saying that strikes are associated with increasing prosperity it is doubtful how far the 
variable’s inclusion aids our understanding of strike activity. Third, and finally there 
is the poor performance of the political variables employed by Cronin with only 
repressive legislation in equation (j) approaching significance. As with the economic 
approaches discussed above our general conclusion is that whilst many of the factors 
identified by Cronin are undoubtably important determinants of strike activity and 
perform considerably better over the longer time period than the variables employed 
by Pencavel and Shorey they would benefit from being examined at lower levels of 
aggregation where there impact can be assessed in specific market and institutional 
contexts.
In Cronin’s defence it should be stressed that in contrast to Pencavel, Shorey and 
other economic explanations of strike activity his variables are employed to account 
for dimensions of stoppages in addition to mere numbers. Although not tested here, 
DMR (1983) have shown equations employing economic variables alone offer poor 
explanations for days lost and workers involved although certain economic variables, 
the rate of unemployment and earnings (normally lagged) appear to be important and 
consistently significant explanatory factors.
It is a central argument of the present work that in order to better understand the 
determinants of strike activity we need to locate the level of analysis at lower levels 
of aggregation in order to assess the role and influence of local market and 
institutional factors. In the next chapter the focus shifts to the broad industry level, 
examining metals and engineering, and construction. The first part of which is 
concerned with testing further Pencavel’s industry equations over the longer time 
period, the second part develops, tests and evaluates a set of equations derived from 
the theoretical model constructed in the second section.
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STRIKE ACTIVITY AT INDUSTRY LEVELS 
A PRELIMINARY TEST OF THE THEORETICAL MODEL
A major part of Pencavel’s (1970) study was the application of his operational model 
to specific industries for the period 1957 to 1967, again using quarterly data. The 
operational model at the industry level differed in three respects from that used in his 
aggregate equations. First, the profits term was omitted because of the lack of data, 
second, the real wages (and money wage and price) variable related to the industry 
rather than to the economy as a whole and an additional variable, the industry 
unemployment rate, included alongside the aggregate rate.
The Pencavel procedure has important implications for this work. Running equations 
using a combination of industry and economy wide variables permits a greater insight 
into the determinants of strike incidence at the industry level and allows a more 
considered assessment of the role of macro variables in strike numbers than is 
possible with aggregate data. Furthermore, one of the four industries examined by 
Pencavel, the broad metals sector (metals, engineering, shipbuilding and vehicles) is 
of particular interest to our study and would seem to merit further examination. In 
view of this it was decided to re-run the Pencavel equations for two of his industries, 
the metals sector and, because of its importance in net strike totals, construction. 
Following this, our own model is introduced and preliminary tests undertaken on 
metals, engineering and shipbuilding; construction and engineering. Owing to 
deficiencies in data, the equations for construction run from 1949-82 whilst those for 
the broad metals sector run from 1948-82. Both series end in 1982 as this is the last 
year for which industry unemployment data is available. The practice of the previous 
sections followed here, with the original Pencavel results for the second quarter of 
1957 to the second quarter of 1967 are presented alongside the results of our own 
work for the period to 1982. The strike patterns for metals, engineering, construction 
and metals nes are shown in the figures 5 and 6 overleaf.
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STRIKE ACTIVITY IN CONSTRUCTION AND METALS,
ENGINEERING AND SHIPBUILDING: PENCAVEL REVISITED 
Variable Equation
CONSTRUCTION MES
(a) (b) (c) (d)
Constant 8.01 130.18 - 66.77 222.7
Nl
(0.44) 
+ 21.11
(1.33) 
+ 49.02
N2
(3.22) 
+ 3.16
(3.43) 
+  38.47
N3
(0.6) 
+ 2.54
(2.72) 
- 10.61
Ut
(0.47)
-6.14 -47.15
(0.7) 
- 15.01 - 350.3
Ui
(0.59) 
- 1.93
(3.38) 
+ 4.99
(0.6)
-20.13
(3.77) 
+ 191.79
Rt-1
(0.82)
-5.65
(0.72)
-4.69
(1.47) 
+ 2.26
(0.32) 
- 3.38
T
(1.8) 
+ 0.88
(1.43) 
+ 10.05
(0.23) 
+ 4.16
(0.32) 
+ 60.49
YP
(3.26) 
+ 15.47
(5.44) 
+ 22.6
(5.7) 
- 8.2
(8.18) 
+ 57.36
LG
(2.6) 
- 26.64
(1.06) 
- 11.67
(0.52) 
- 9.36
(0.59) 
+ 74.76
(3.22) (0.56) (0.43) (0.8)
SEE 11.88 31.81
SDE 50.13 237.6
F 10.89 14.5
R2 0.651 0.708 0.775 0.756
D.W 1.68 1.02 1.64 1.07
Notes:Equations (a) and (c) are the original Pencavel equations run with quarterly data for the period 
1957-1967.
Equations (b) and (d) are run using annual data for the period 1949-1982.
N l, N2, N3; are seasonal dummies.
Ut, Ui; aggregate unemployment and industry unemployment.
Rt-1; rate of change of real earnings in construction lagged 1 year.
T; time trend, YP; dummy incomes policy variable, LG; labour government.
MEANS and STANDARD DEVIATIONS: Ut: 3.329 and 2.68. Ui: 2.59 and 2.71. Rt-1: 1.7 and 
4.03.T: 17.5 and 9.81.
YP here refers to years 1948, 1949, 1961, 1966-69, 1972, 1973 and 1976-78.
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Comparing the two Pencavel equations reveals that in both, the constant term, third 
seasonal dummy, aggregate and industry unemployment rates and the lagged real 
wage variable are all insignificant and that the political variables are only significant 
for construction. In the case of metals and engineering, Pencavel showed that an 
equation containing just the time trend and the seasonal dummies accounted for 69% 
of the variation in the dependent variable so the five additional variables employed 
in equation (c) are together accounting for less than 9% of the variation in stoppages.
Comparison of (a) and (b) reveals some interesting differences. First, for the 
extended time period the aggregate unemployment term is significant and exerts a 
strong negative effect on stoppage numbers. Given the results for the earlier period 
the strength and significance of this variable must be the result of the period after 
1967 which would tally with the trend increase in aggregate unemployment from the 
second half of 1966. Second, the two political variables fail to achieve significance 
although the strength of the coefficient on the incomes policy variable for the 
extended time period is higher than that in the original Pencavel equation. In the 
extended period it again appears that the driving force is the combination of the 
aggregate unemployment and time trend terms, giving the equation its overall 
significance and explanatory power.
Comparing (c) with (d) also highlights some interesting contrasts. As was noted 
above, the original equation (c) relied very heavily upon the time trend and two 
seasonal dummies for its explanatory power and lack of specified variables. Equation
(d) is more broadly based although the time trend is still significant and exerts a 
considerably stronger influence than in the earlier equation (see below). It is 
supported by the aggregate unemployment term which exerts a strong influence on 
stoppage numbers.
Examination of (b) and (d) reveals that the aggregate unemployment term is 
significant and exerts a strong negative influence upon stoppages, whilst the industry 
unemployment term has a positive association with stoppages and is not significant 
for either industry. The time trend is significant in both equations, with a dominating
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effect in metals and engineering. Indeed the size of the trend term for this sector 
indicates that, cet. par, there would be 2100 more stoppages in the last year of the 
study than in the first (cf 350 in the case of construction). The strength and 
significance of the time trend for metals and engineering would appear to be most 
relevant for the period up to the early 1970’s, a probable explanation for it being the 
growth in the number of shop stewards and the associated spread of workplace 
bargaining increasing the number of bargaining opportunities and thereby the 
possibilities of stoppages occurring. Pencavel suggests this explanation in his account 
of the growth of aggregate strike activity, supported by the work of Turner et al. 
(1967) and the report of the Donovan Commission (1968). In Cronin’s terms, the 
decline of the ’post-depression mentality’ made workers more confident, less 
deferential (see Goldthorpe 1977) and (possibly) more assertive. The full effect of 
the contribution the time trend to the two equations is realised when the term is 
removed from the equations.
With the time trend removed in (b) the R2 falls to 0.39, D.W to 0.67 and the F 
statistic to 3.54, the only significant variables being the two unemployment terms. 
The effect of the removal of T in equation (d) is even more dramatic with none of the 
remaining variables significant. Furthermore, the F value falls to 1.23, suggesting 
the variables are not significant determinants of stoppages in the metals sector, the 
R2 to 0.175 and D.W to 0.57. As with Pencavel’s original equations it is clear that 
the time trend is accounting for a substantial part of the explanatory power and 
overall significance of both industry equations.
Unfortunately the continued dominance of the time trend does not permit us to assess 
clearly the impact of the aggregate and industry variables employed by Pencavel. 
However, there is little doubt from the empirical evidence that aggregate (and 
possibly industry) unemployment is an important determinant of stoppage incidence 
at the industry level. Further tests combining the aggregate unemployment rate with 
a broad economic activity variable (GDP) suggested an additional influence on 
industry stoppage activity.
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In order to further test the robustness and significance of the Pencavel equations it 
was decided to run a selection of equations derived from the theoretical model 
developed in the earlier chapters. The equations (e) and (f) reproduced below are the 
most successful of those tested and combine economic, political and organisational 
variables at both the macro and the broad industry levels. The variables tested were 
as follows:
Macro-Economic
Ut = aggregate rate of unemployment in the UK 
Pt-1 = Rate of change of prices lagged one year 
Political
YP = Incomes policy in operation (dummy variable = 1 or 0)
LG = Labour government in power.
RL = Repressive legislation, impact of 1971 Ind. Relations Act and 1980 E.A.
Broad Industry Level
Product and Labour Market Factors
Ui = Industry unemployment rate
Rt-1 = Rate of change of real gross weekly earnings lagged one year
Et-1 = rate of change of average gross weekly earnings for a given
industry (adult males) lagged one year 
Y = Index of Industry output
Y. = Rate of change of industry output
#/P = Index of real profit
Ei/Em = Index of AGWE in engineering relative to AGWE in manufacturing 
IMP = Index of import penetration: imports as % of home consumption + exports
Organisational
TUG = Rate of change in trade union membership for industry 
TUD = Level of trade union density for industry 
DP = 1976 Disputes Procedure in engineering
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Combinations of these variables were run to assess their influence on the number of 
stoppages in the broad metals sector, that is metals, engineering, shipbuilding, 
vehicles and metals nes for the period 1948 to 1982. Overall, with the exception of 
the profits terms and the incomes policy variable (which appears on the basis of 
earlier equations to be significant up to the late 1960s) the equations perform 
extremely well and give considerable support to the underlying theoretical model. 
Particularly notable is the importance of the two trade union variables, both 
significant and both exerting a positive influence on stoppage numbers. The 
combination overall, of industry and aggregate variables seems to work well 
indicating the relevance of both in accounting for stoppages at the industry level.
A further result consistent with the model was the fact that the relative earnings 
variable was insignificant, supporting the view that if workers are concerned with 
relative pay, as seems likely, they are more concerned with immediate comparisons 
not with earnings in manufacturing as a whole. The results relating to unemployment 
are more ambiguous. As with the revised Pencavel equations the aggregate 
unemployment term exerts a strong and significant downward pressure on stoppage 
numbers, however the industry unemployment variable appears to operate strongly 
and significantly in the opposite direction. To anticipate an argument in respect of 
engineering, the industry unemployment variable needs to be treated with care as its 
effects are frequently perverse, with little explanatory power and when included, 
biasing the coefficients of the other variables.
The remaining variables ’explained’ 79% of the variation in the number of stoppages 
and the D.W statistic fell to 1.45 suggesting the slight possibility of autocorrelation. 
Overall, it would seem that the driving force in these equations is provided by the 
unemployment terms (but with qualifications regarding the industry measure noted 
above) in conjunction with organisational and expectations/prosperity factors. 
Together these results give support to much of the underlying theoretical model and 
point to a number of important determinants of stoppages at the broad industry level 
which are taken further in subsequent chapters.
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STRIKE ACTIVITY IN METALS, ENGINEERING AND SHIPBUILDING
1948-1982
Variable Equations
(e) (f)
Constant - 1381.1 - 1618.3
U -420.9 -423.1
(5.23) (5.64)
Ui + 384.36 + 387.14
(5.15) (5.59)
Y + 10.37 + 10.4
(7.22) (7.81)
Et-1 - 17.58
(2.07)
YP + 75.6
(1.27)
TUG + 31.6 +  31.73
(3.37) (3.59)
TUD + 17.55 +  23.6
(2.38) (2.96)
SDE 166.7 154.75
F 40.95 34.9
R2 0.876 0.9
D.W 1.62 1.795
Notes: Variables as in equations above.
MEAN and STANDARD DEVIATIONS:
U: 3.289 and 2.65.
Ui: 2.59 and 2.71.
Y: 136.64 and 33.44.
Et-1: 8.73 and 4.84.
TUG: 0.29 and 5.43.
TUD: 59.83 and 9.4.
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INFLUENCES ON THE NUMBER OF WORKERS INVOLVED AND 
WORKING DAYS LOST AT THE INDUSTRY LEVEL
The final consideration of this section on stoppage activity at the broad industry level 
is to examine the role of the variables outlined above as having an influence on strike 
numbers on other dimensions of stoppages, specifically workers involved and working 
days lost. This is particularly important in respect of the metals and engineering 
sector which accounts for over two-thirds of workers involved in stoppages outside 
of coal-mining for the period 1946-87 and for 55% of net working days lost. Factors 
identified as having an influence on these dimensions of stoppages in metals and 
engineering can be expected to be considerably affecting the aggregate net totals.
Before presenting the results it should be stressed that the underlying theoretical 
model would emphasise the important role of institutional factors in accounting for 
variations in numbers of workers involved in particular. In particular, the level at 
which collective bargaining takes place would be expected to exert a considerable 
influence on the numbers taking part in strike action. Writers such as Clegg (1979) 
would also expect factors such as procedural reform to exert a considerable influence 
on the numbers of working days lost (as well as workers involved) on the grounds 
that reform of procedures would be expected to resolve the majority of issues arising 
in dispute so that only intractable problems would surface as stoppages.
However, other factors such as unemployment might be expected to also influence the 
length of stoppages and the number of working days lost. The general point is then 
that we would not expect economic factors to exert a significant influence upon the 
workers involved series (but would expect an influence on working days lost), 
although organisational factors (by influencing the resources available to support 
strike action) and political factors might be expected to have some effect on the two 
series. The critical influence, particularly on workers involved would be expected 
to be institutional factors with procedural reform expected, following Clegg’s analysis 
to influence both series.
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METALS, ENGINEERING AND SHIPBUILDING WORKERS INVOLVED 
AND WORKING DAYS LOST (ADJUSTED FOR EMPLOYMENT) 
Variable Equations
Workers Involved Working Days Lost
(g) (h)
- 18595.3
+ 1416.3 
(1.19)
+ 121.5 
(1.56)
Constant - 1259.4
Ut
Ui - 39.4
(0.18)
Y + 25.5
(1.37)
Et-1 + 768.6
(1.56)
Pt -55.3
(0.8)
Pt-1
YP
RL - 1010.1
(1.06)
CG
EY
TUG - 90.26
(0.93)
Smest-1 + 0.19
(0.14)
SDE 1664.6
F 0.87
R2 0.184
D.W 2.4
- 517.2 
(0.96) 
-513.9 
(0.8)
- 5208.3 
(0.97) 
+ 4588.8 
(1.29) 
4- 2801.0 
(0.78) 
+ 150.6 
(0.32)
8642.7
2.75
0.459
1.32
Notes
Equation (a), dependent variable; workers involved per 10000 employees 
Equation (b), dep. variable; days lost per 10000 employees.
MEANS and STANDARD DEVIATIONS: Ut: 3.289 and 2.65. Ui: 2.59 and 2.71. 
4.84. Pt: 7.17 and 5.42. Pt-1: 6.94 and 5.53. TUG: 0.29 and 5.43.
Et-1: 8.73 and
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In general, the equations for both workers involved and days lost performed poorly. 
In one equation the lagged strikes variable was removed and a time trend inserted in 
its place but its overall effect (cf stoppage numbers) was limited, raising the R2 to 
0.22 but with the F test still showing that the variables employed were not significant 
determinants of workers involved in metals and engineering.
These results suggest that neither economic nor political factors are important or 
significant determinants of workers involved in the broad metals sector. All the 
variables are insignificant and the F tests and coefficient of determination together 
indicate overall insignificance and poor explanatory power. Furthermore, because 
of the influence this sector exerts on the aggregate net totals it is likely that these 
factors have little influence at the aggregate level (but cf. Cronin 1979). The results 
suggest that the numbers of workers involved in stoppages are the result of chance 
factors or that the results provide support for the role of institutional factors in 
accounting for variations in workers involved, at least for this sector.
Before considering the working days lost series it should be noted that the number of 
workers involved and working days lost for engineering are subject to a number of 
disturbances through prolonged industry-wide stoppages, notably in 1953, 1957, 1962 
and 1979. When considering variations in these dimensions at the aggregate level 
some studies have chosen to omit these engineering stoppages on the grounds that 
they bias the overall series (see DMR 1983). Whatever the appropriateness of this 
view for the aggregate series it does not seem valid for an examination of the 
industry. Nonetheless, the inclusion of such disputes where the numbers of workers 
involved is so obviously affected by the level at which collective bargaining takes 
place and could be over-playing the importance of institutional factors for the period 
as a whole.
The series for working days lost in the metals and engineering sector again uses 
working days lost per 10000 employees as the dependent variable. As with the 
workers involved series the results are very disappointing with only the industry 
output variable approaching significance and then only in equation (h).
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These results, although an improvement on those for workers involved, suggest that 
the economic and political variables are again poor at offering explanations for 
variations in working days lost in metals and engineering, although the level of output 
again has a positive association with days lost. The results of the output variable for 
both series suggest that high output levels, or more broadly, periods of prosperity are 
associated with bigger and more protracted stoppages which would seem to conflict 
with the view that longer stoppages in particular are associated with downturns as 
employers harden their resolve in the face of declining demand whilst worker 
expectations remain high (Rees 1952, Edwards 1982). The results may be the result 
of using annual data and the significant factor may be that longer and larger stoppages 
are characteristic of periods when the gap between worker and employer expectations 
is greatest such as at the peaks of economic cycles (Rees 1952, Mayhew 1979), a 
hypothesis which would be easier to test using quarterly data.
Overall, in the equations, over half of the variation in the dependent variable remains 
unexplained and the F tests show that the variables are significant determinants of 
working days lost in only two of the equations run. Other equations were run with 
trade union growth as an explanatory variable but it was never found to exert a major 
influence on working days lost and never approached significance.
CONSTRUCTION
In the two equations below the industry variables including the two trade union 
measures all relate to construction, and the dependent variable is stoppages in 
construction per 100000 workers. The period of the study is 1949-1982.
Given the nature of the construction industry these results illustrate both the strength 
of the model and also its weaknesses, at least when applied at this level of 
aggregation. The industry structure is complex, characterised by a relatively small 
number of very large concerns surrounded by a enormous number of medium-sized 
and predominantly small organisations, frequently self-employed operators, and 
sub-contractors (Hillebrandt 1988). The size of the small firm segment coupled with 
the casual nature of much of employment in the industry accounts for the relatively
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low level of density in construction and suggests that strike activity is likely to be 
concentrated in that segment, namely the largest firms, where union organisation is 
most developed. This point needs to be borne in mind when analysing the results and 
suggests similar caution is required when interpreting the results of other large, 
heterogeneous sectors such as engineering below.
The results are generally encouraging for the underlying model although the negative 
coefficient on trade union density is somewhat perverse. The overall measures 
suggest that the variables employed are significant determinants of variations in 
stoppages and that together, they account for over 80% of that variation. However, 
there are some interesting results obtained for construction which need to be 
discussed. First, neither the level of industry output nor its rate of change approaches 
significance in any equation and it was decided to substitute GDP on the grounds that 
construction was a sector heavily influenced by economic activity in the rest of the 
economy. Although GDP approached significance in some equations and was found 
to be significant in tests on the Pencavel model it was consistently insignificant 
despite performing better than the industry output series.
Overall, the time trend performed better than any of the output measures which 
accounts for its inclusion in equation (i). Second, the industry unemployment term 
although enhancing the significance of the aggregate variable when included with it 
was always insignificant. Third, in contrast to results in most of the other industries, 
the lagged nominal earnings and level of real profits approached significance at the 
10% level, with the latter significant in the absence of the earnings term. Finally, 
it is the only one of the industries examined for which two political variables were 
significant when run together in the same equation. Given the importance of 
government contracts for parts of the industry and the role of industry agreements 
these results are understandable although the negative coefficient on the Labour 
government term is surprising unless it is perceived that Labour governments will 
provide more work for construction than Conservative governments, and a wish ‘not 
to rock the boat’ when labour is in office is an explanation of that result.
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STRIKE ACTIVITY IN CONSTRUCTION: 1949-1982
Variable Equations
(i) (i)
Constant 41.17 46.82
U - 1.6 - 2.23
(3.35) (4.46)
GDP + 0.378
(1.85)
T + 0.83
(1.5)
Et-1 - 0.21
(1.85)
#/P - 0.06 - 0.007
(1.89) (2.94)
TUD - 0.95 - 0.78
(2.9) (2.3)
TUG + 0.84 + 0.69
(3.92) (3.66)
LG -2.38
(2.13)
YP + 3 .48
(2.8)
SDE 2.83 2.55
F 18.67 20.73
R2 0.806 0.848
D.W 1.76 1.89
Notes:
Sources as above with addition of GDP Index from Annual Abstract of Statistics.
MEANS and STANDARD DEVIATIONS: U: 5.329 and 2.68. GDP: 20.15 and 20.75. T: 17.5 and 
9.81. Et-1: 9.706 and 6.388. #/P: 161.46 and 73.369. TUD: 37.132 and 5.095. TUG: -0.9 and 
3.209.
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The one area of concern is the negative coefficient on the trade union density 
variable. Given the nature of the construction industry trade union organisation is 
concentrated in the largest firms and when it spreads to other firms it is likely, in an 
industry where trade unionism has not been well established nor encouraged, to be 
fragile so that a decline in trade union density may be reflecting a decline in areas 
where trade union organisation is already fragile. For example a rise in 
unemployment may lower trade union density by disproportionately affecting those 
’weak’ areas of union organisation but the threat of unemployment may be met by a 
greater resort to strike activity in those areas where union organisation is 
well-established and ’strong’.
ENGINEERING
Engineering is defined here as comprising those industries covered by Standard 
Industry Orders VII, VIII, and IX (1968, or VI in 1958 SIC) and themselves covering 
Minimum List Headings 33 - 36, namely mechanical, instrument and electrical 
engineering (or non-electrical and electrical engineering using the 1948 and 1958 
SIC). Together, these industries employed around 1.6 million people in 1950, rising 
to 2.3 million in 1969 before falling to below 1.5 million in 1982 and are all covered 
either directly or indirectly by national negotiating machinery regulating negotiations 
between the EEF and CSEU.
The equations run employed a combination of variables with stoppages per 100,000 
employees as the dependent variable. The positive results from the analyses were the 
consistently good results for the organisational variables (TUD, TUG). These were 
shown to be strong, significant and positive influences on stoppage activity and 
together with the two unemployment terms and the level of output accounted for the 
bulk of the variation in the dependent variable. Indeed, the combination of the 
unemployment terms, the level of output and trade union growth accounted for over 
88% of the variation in stoppage numbers in engineering. Taking these results and 
those of equations (k) and (1) together suggests that it is these four variables which 
are ’driving’ the equations and accounting for the bulk of their explanatory power.
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Equations (k) and (1) below both combine aggregate and industry level variables 
together with organisational factors at the broad industry level. It is clear that the 
major contributing factors to variations in strike activity are aggregate and industry 
unemployment, the level of output and the trade union variables with the 
unemployment terms exerting the greatest influence. Overall, these variables are 
consistently significant although the lagged nominal earnings term and the rate of 
change of output employed alongside them in equation (b) remain insignificant. The 
Variables employed in the two equations account for over 90% of the variation in 
stoppages, the Durbin- Watson statistic indicates an absence of autocorrelation and 
the F test shows that the independent variables are together, significant determinants 
of variations in strike activity in engineering.
Closer examination of the results however, does suggest some caution about their 
interpretation. First, whilst the coefficients on the two unemployment terms are very 
similar in strength, they are opposite in sign (as in the previous section). The 
aggregate term having a strong negative effect on the number of stoppages (a 
percentage point rise in the unemployment rate producing a fall of 10 stoppages per 
100000 workers) whereas the industry unemployment rate has a strong positive effect 
with a percentage point rise in the rate producing an increase in stoppages of about 
11 per 100000 workers.
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STRIKE ACTIVITY IN ENGINEERING 1950-1982
Variable Equations
(k) (1) (m) (n) (o)*
Constant - 33.65 -32.19 -14.96 - 12.96 - 1743.9
U - 10.0 - 10.6 - 0.69 + 65.46
(5.76) (6.07) (0.84) (2.6)
Ui + 10.78 + 11.4
(5.67) (5.97)
P - 19.64
(3.59)
Yi + 0.16 + 0.164+0.194 + 0.164 + 25.2
(6.04) (6.18) (4.97) (4.23) (2.5)
Y. - 0.27
(1.46)
IP - 53.18
(2.4)
Et-1 - 0.258 -0.315 -0.24
(1.49) (1.81) (0.95)
TUG + 0.61 + 0.74 + 0.29 + 0.52
(3.16) (3.54) (1.06) (1.9)
TUD + 0.57 + 0.5 + 0.003 + 9.4
(2.23) (2.29) (0.009) (1.07)
DP -392.4
(3.37)
RL -163.3
(2.84)
SDE 3.26 3.187 4.78 4.74 81.77
F 41.38 37.33 20.1 49.7 16.97
R2 0.905 0.913 0.79 0.77 0.89
D.W 1.986 2.03 1.14 1.15 1.97
Notes:
U; aggregate unemployment, percentage unemployed.
Ui; industry unemployment, percentage unemployed. P; rate of change of retail prices
Y; level of output (industry). Y.; rate of change of industry output
Et-1; rate of change of industry money earnings in previous year
TUG; trade union growth in metals and engineering
TUD; trade union density in metals and engineering
IP; level of import penetration. RL; dummy, impact of 1984 T.U Act.
DP; dummy variable , impact of 1976 disputes procedure.
MEANS and STANDARD DEVIATIONS: (1950-82). U: 3.382 and 2.7. Ui: 2.482 and 2.27. Yi: 
162.85 and 49.25. Y.: 2.78 and 4.392. TUG: 0.362 and 5.562. TUD: 60.19 and 9.559.
(1966-87). U: 6.782 and 4.4. P: 9.132 and 5.68. Yi: 102.41 and 8.508. IP: 20.25 and 5.27.
TUD: 66.68 and 7.07.
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The concerns about the impact of the industry unemployment variable led to the use 
of stepwise regression analysis to obtain a more detailed examination of its effect. 
When run on its own the coefficient was marginally above zero and was insignificant, 
and contrasting the results for (k) and (1) with those of (m) and (n) revealed that 
significance multicollinearity existed with its inclusion seriously biasing the 
coefficients and significance of the aggregate unemployment, trade union growth and 
density terms. Equations (m) and (n) constructed using stepwise regression indicates 
that the main driving force is actually the output term rather than unemployment. 
Indeed, as equation (n) shows over three-quarters of the variation in strike numbers 
is accounted for by the level of output and trade union growth. The serious 
weaknesses of the industry unemployment variable need to be borne in mind for the 
remainder of this study, it is consequently used only with serious qualifications in the 
industry chapters.
Although the level of output is consistently significant and has a positive influence on 
stoppage numbers, it is included as a prosperity measure, combining the trend in 
output with a cyclical component and may be saying little other than that strikes 
increase with increasing prosperity and affluence. In contrast, the rate of change of 
output fails to achieve significance when included as an explanatory factor and, as a 
comparison of equations (k) and (1) reveals its inclusion marginally raises the D.W 
statistic and the coefficient of determination but actually lowers the F value. The 
negative sign on the coefficient of the rate of change variable implies that an increase 
in output is likely to reduce strike activity. As we argued in the theoretical model, 
increases in output may be associated with rising earnings through bonuses and 
greater overtime, increased profits and with a more optimistic economic climate 
generally. Together these are likely to meet worker expectations and permit 
employers to more easily satisfy such expectations. However, from the perspective 
of the underlying model it again stresses the need to focus upon how changes in 
output etc are brought about.
The two organisational variables show a significant and positive relationship to strike 
activity in equations (k) and (1). The level of trade union density is an important
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influence, with each percentage point change in density being associated with a 
change of 0.5 stoppages per 100000 workers (in the case of engineering in the 1960s, 
approximately 10 strikes for each percentage point change). However, more 
important and significant is the change in trade union membership, with each 
percentage point change being associated with a positive change of up to 0.74 strikes 
per 100000 workers (about 15 strikes a year for each percentage point change in the 
1960s), supporting the association between rapid trade union growth and strikes. A 
qualification to these results is that both variables appear to be affected by the 
inclusion of the level of output term. In the case of trade union density, its strength 
and significance falls considerably when run alongside the level of output and 
becomes insignificant when run with the unemployment terms, the level of output and 
trade union growth suggesting that in equation (k) it is the lagged earnings term that 
gives trade union density its significance. Overall there is a problem of 
multicollinearity between the two terms, a not surprising conclusion. Finally, the 
inclusion of the output term significantly raises the significance and explanatory 
power of the trade union growth variable, although it remains consistently significant 
in all equations.
In contrast, a number of equations included political variables, dummy variables 
denoting incomes policy or the presence of a Labour government, but in no case were 
these significant, neither were variables employed to measure managerial initiatives. 
This should not be taken as evidence that such variables are unimportant in 
accounting for variation in stoppages, although the results for political factors are 
disappointing, particularly in light of the importance of government contracts within 
electrical engineering, this may highlight the need to use a more specific variable, 
such as changes in government defence expenditure rather than the general variables 
tested here. Likewise for managerial initiatives, given the complexity and variety of 
response of managers to environmental changes, the requirement is to examine these 
in more detail than is attempted here.
Another surprising result was the lack of significance of the lagged earnings term for 
engineering and for many of the other industries examined, although it does approach
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significance in equation (1). This result may be due to the heterogeneity of the 
industries examined and the variety of earnings associated with them. It should also 
be stressed that the nominal earnings variable performed consistently better than real 
earnings, so that whilst the results suggest that the larger the increase in earnings in 
the previous period the less the likelihood of stoppages in the current period they also 
suggest that workers in engineering (and other sectors) have, for much of the 
post-war period, suffered from money illusion.
One final point concerns equation (o) run for the period 1966-1987. In (o), the 
dependent variable is not adjusted for employment but again the results obtained offer 
considerable support to the underlying model. It appears that for the later period both 
aggregate unemployment and price inflation are significant determinants of stoppage 
activity (although the former has a positive coefficient when employed alongside the 
import penetration variable) but more importantly, the terms measuring import 
penetration, the impact of repressive legislation and the introduction and operation of 
the revised disputes procedure in 1976 are all significant determinants of variations 
in the stoppage totals. These factors are explored more fully in the more 
disaggregated work in later chapters.
SUMMARY
In this chapter we have introduced our operational model developed in the first 
section and applied this to stoppage incidence in the broad sector of metals and 
engineering, construction and the engineering industry suggest. The empirical tests 
show that the combination of macro and industry - wide variables accounted for a 
large part of the variation in the number of strikes with the variables consistently 
significant and with the absence of any severe problems of autocorrelation. The same 
combination of variables when applied to account for variations in the two other main 
dimensions of stoppages was considerably less successful. Although the results 
confirm the need to look elsewhere for explanations of variations in the two series the 
extent to which the economic and political variables were unimportant was surprising 
particularly in view of work undertaken by others suggesting their importance at the 
aggregate level, at least until 1974 (Cronin 1979, DMR 1983).
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Before proceeding to the detailed industry studies a number of general points emerge 
from this chapter which should be stressed. In the broad metals sector and 
engineering, the main explanatory power comes from the output term, normally in 
conjunction with one of the trade union variables. The contribution of the macro- 
economic variables is mixed, but the evidence from engineering is that these became 
more important in the latter half of the period (see also Edwards 1983). The role of 
institutional factors gains some support from the 1976 disputes procedure in 
engineering although this may be an atypical result which needs to be seen in a 
broader context. Finally, the role of government initiatives receives some support 
from construction and engineering, with incomes policy, a Labour government and 
repressive legislation all having an impact at certain times.
The remainder of the study is devoted to a detailed examination of strike activity in 
four industries. Metals, and particularly iron and steel; shipbuilding and marine 
engineering, motor vehicles and coal-mining. The rationale for choosing these 
particular industries requires some explanation. First, that together they made a 
major contribution to the main dimensions of strike activity in the post-war period so 
that, as well as providing a deeper understanding of the mechanics at work in strikes 
they would illuminate developments at the aggregate level. Second, all were 
significantly affected by the activities of governments to varying degrees over the 
period and would permit a more detailed examination of the influence of government 
on strike patterns. Third, detailed examination of these industries would, provide a 
particularly rich source of data with which to test the long-run approach to strike 
activity and to enable further analysis of the short-term variations. Fourth, that they 
provide an opportunity to compare the experiences of high strike and relatively low 
strike industries. Metals, and to an extent motor vehicles, were not notably strike 
prone at least until the late 1950s and the experiences of these could shed much light 
on the factors contributing to increased strike propensity. Finally, the inclusion of 
motor vehicles and coal-mining permits a review and extension of the DMR work as 
well as an opportunity to test the validity of their findings over a longer time period. 
Coal-mining (along with shipbuilding) provides a particularly rigorous test of the 
model developed here. As other studies have found (e.g Pencavel 1970), equations
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that have performed well for aggregate net strike activity (net of coal-mining), other 
industries or manufacturing generally have often proved incapable of accounting for 
much of the variation in coal-mining stoppages. The decision to include this industry 
permits an examination of ‘why coal might be different’, and a more thorough test 
of the model.
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SECTION IV 
STRIKE ACTIVITY IN SELECTED INDUSTRIES
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STRIKE ACTIVITY AND CHANGING INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS 
AN ANALYSIS OF THE UK METALS SECTOR 1948-1988
Metals and Iron and Steel
This chapter aims to examine and offer some explanations for, changing strike 
activity in the iron and steel industry and specifically that within the British Steel 
Corporation from re-nationalisation to privatisation. However, it is necessary to see 
the emergence of BSC within the broader context of the metals sector generally and 
to permit a longer time frame in which to test the underlying models. The chapter 
is therefore divided into two sections, the first concentrates upon strike activity in 
metals from 1948-1988, the second focusses upon BSC analysing year to year 
variations and broader movements in the strike series.
In brief, metal manufacture includes the manufacture of iron and steel, iron and steel 
tubes and non-ferrous metals and the manufacture of sheets and tinplate. The sector 
is characterised by significant employment concentration. Estimates for the 1970s 
suggested that the average employment size of establishment in iron and steel was 
over two and a half times that of the average for manufacturing as a whole and that 
70% of the industry’s output was concentrated in the five largest establishments. 
What is also evident from the table is the shift towards smaller plants in the 1980s as 
very large establishments were closed down in the recession of the early 1980s.
The size of plant is due much to the importance of economies of scale in the industry 
(Siberston 1958, Pratten 1976, Cockerill 1979, Pryke 1981) which has also 
contributed significantly to high levels of industrial concentration. On the basis of 
Hannah and Kay’s (1977) estimates, the ten firm concentration ratio in metals rose 
from 58.7% to 74.3% between 1957 and 1969. More significantly evidence on the 
five firm concentration ration shows a growth from 38.2% in 1958 to 42.1 % in 1963 
(Hart and Clarke 1980) and to 64% in 1972, although this figure is inflated as a result 
of the creation of BSC.
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TABLE 1:
PERCENTAGE OF INDUSTRY WORKFORCE EMPLOYED IN PLANTS 
WITH OVER 500 EMPLOYEES
1948 1958 1968 1970 1978 1987
64.5 66.5 67.3 71.8 67.0 54.8
(261) (232) (210) (188) (N/A)+ (50)
Figures in brackets denote the number of establishments accounting for the percentage 
of employees.
+In 1978, 55.8% of the industry’s workforce employed in ests with over 1000 
employees (Purcell and Sisson 1983).
(Source: Historical Abstract of the Census of Production; Business Monitor: Summary 
tables 1989)
In addition to their importance in employment terms the metal handling industries are 
significant in their contribution to the economy in respect of output and investment. 
Iron and Steel alone accounted for 5% of manufacturing output and 12% of 
investment in manufacturing in the 1970s (Cockerill 1979, 1980) and this ignores the 
critical role the metals sector plays in providing basic materials for many other 
industries. One consequence of this is that the demand for the sector’s output is very 
sensitive to the rate of growth of GDP and steel in particular exhibits strong cyclical 
fluctuations characteristic of capital goods industries subject to an accelerator effect 
(Cockerill 1979).
The pivotal role that these industries have played in the economy has particular 
relevance for the study of strike activity. In their study covering the period 
1946-1973, Durcan, McCarthy and Redman (1983) assessed the relative strike 
proneness of a number of industries. On average, the number of strikes per year in
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metals was 99.6, putting it fourth out of all industries for strike frequency, for 
workers involved as a percentage of employees the figure was 9.6, and for working 
days lost per 1000 employees it was 411.7, putting it sixth out of all industries. 
Metals therefore seems to fit into Cronin’s (1979) category of an industry with a 
relatively high strike propensity. Cronin argued that workers most prone to strike are 
to be found in industries which are highly unionised, unusually susceptible to 
economic fluctuations, with a marked proclivity to the use of piece-work and, with 
a central role in the economic life of the nation. In metals, unionisation has remained 
consistently high throughout the period (see below), the industry is very susceptible 
to economic fluctuations and in the early 1960s nearly 60% of workers were on some 
form of payment-by-results scheme (British Labour Statistics: Historical Abstract 
1886-1968). Furthermore, in providing essential materials for many other key 
industries e.g motor vehicles it would seem to satisfy the last element in his schema.
Industrial Relations in the Metals Sector
In discussing industrial relations within metals it is important to distinguish between 
the iron and steel industries and the other elements within the metals sector and, 
within the iron and steel industry, between (until recently) the public and private 
sectors of this industry. This said, the industries have important elements in 
common, in particular their traditionally high levels of trade union membership and 
density (Brown et al. 1981), the dominance of the ISTC and sophisticated local trade 
union organisation and as well as in the relatively early development of procedures 
for resolving disputes, arbitration and localised collective bargaining. Consequently 
the description of the industry’s industrial relations here is confined to that in iron and 
steel.
The iron and steel Industry has, through its employment size and the fact that it is an 
important source of supply for other parts of the industry (BSC also provided much 
of crude steel for the private steel sector) exerted a considerable influence on the 
character of industrial relations and the strike propensity of the sector as a whole. It 
is therefore appropriate to briefly discuss the development and nature of industrial 
relations within iron and steel before progressing further.
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Prior to the industry’s re-nationalisation in 1967 iron and steel had a highly developed 
and sophisticated system of industrial relations. The main trade union, the ISTC was 
formed in 1917 as a confederation of five separate unions and this was mirrored on 
the employers side by the ISTEA, a powerful, if not entirely cohesive group 
representing employer interests (Bamber 1986). As early as the 1870s Boards of 
Arbitration and Conciliation had been established in the North (1869) and the 
Midlands, and out of these grew the Joint Wages Boards which became firmly 
established at all levels in the industry by the early twentieth century. Underlying 
these initiatives was a strongly held belief in a mutuality of interests and a joint 
acceptance of conciliation and constitutional procedures which in turn encouraged 
employers to grant 100% trade union recognition (Docherty 1983).
The ISTC saw itself and was seen by employers as being a moderate and 
accommodating union, advocating co-operation with employers and viewing industry 
as a joint enterprise (Docherty 1983). Morgan (1983) has desribed it more as a 
‘company union’ achieving co-operation by being ’one of the most authoritarian 
(unions) in Britain’ with a highly fragmented and conservative membership base. 
Support for which comes from Vaizey (1974) who argued that in the 1930s it was a 
relatively passive union (Vaizey 1974) dominated by well-paid senior men in the 
industry and, as such reflected the elitism within the industry, a consequence of the 
institutionalised seniority system, particularly in Steel. According to Docherty this 
system produced an ’orientation and commitment to the job which has shaped the 
attitudes of steel workers unions’ in particular to militate against solidarity action 
amongst steel workers. Crucially, this impact on attitudes has been reinforced by 
other employer policies, particularly the explicit paternalism of many of the private 
steel companies, with successive generations of families employed and with attractive 
fringe benefits including the expectation of long-term job security (Bamber 1986, 
Docherty 1983). Overall, employers appear to have seen the ISTC in Bain’s terms 
as ‘wedded and educated into responsibility’ which may have explained their 
willingness to concede recognition and negotiating rights.
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The moderation of the ISTC continued into the 1950s and 1960s with a disciplined 
and directive leadership at national level and a high degree of self-determination at 
local level (Hartley et al. 1983). However, at local level, it was workplace branches 
and local officials which had this autonomy in the absence of both district committees 
and a shop steward system. Despite the moderation of the ISTC in its relations with 
employers the industry experienced considerable inter-union conflict involving the 
ISTC, (29 inter-union disputes between 1969 and 1981 within BSC alone; TUC 
Annual Report 1982) particularly over national recognition for white-collar unions in 
1967 and over managerial unionism in 1972/3.
With the re-nationalisation of the industry in 1967, the 14 private companies which 
came together to form BSC agreed to recognise and negotiate with 23 separate trade 
unions with ISTC as the main union involved. One effect of this was to change the 
locus of collective bargaining, traditionally a very localised activity, and where, prior 
to the formation of BSC, no comprehensive national negotiations had taken place. 
After 1967, negotiation of non-pay issues took place through BSC and the TUC Steel 
Committee (representing all the recognised unions), whilst in pay negotiations each 
recognised trade union negotiated separately with BSC, although in 1978, the ISTC 
pay negotiations for different grades of worker were combined. Manning levels, 
productivity schemes, tonnage bonuses etc were all negotiated at local level albeit 
within the framework provided by a national agreement. One effect of the 
re-nationalisation was therefore to produce what Bamber (1986) describes as two 
systems of industrial relations, but where, in contrast to engineering in the 1960s, 
both sytems were highly formal and with the considerable involvement of union 
branches and local officials and managers who had to implement agreements made 
centrally.
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TABLE 2
STRIKE ACTIVITY IN METALS 1948-1985
Year Strikes per 100000 Workers Involved per 10000 WDL per 1000
1948 18.87 741.6 1001.5
1949 10.1 228.1 84.2
1950 8.3 169.8 96.0
1951 7.8 123.8 52.8
1952 5.54 118.0 55.4
1953 6.2 1559.5 188.1
1954 6.77 173.1 86.5
1955 7.7 148.9 42.0
1956 7.58 346.1 399.4
1957 7.4 1014.5 752.7
1958 6.18 160.6 61.75
1959 7.67 534.9 120.6
1960 11.0 259.3 79.4
1961 12.32 600.2 481.3
1962 14.77 4865.8 634.2
1963 11.49 405.4 179.1
1964 19.28 433.9 562.4
1965 20.57 626.6 340.6
1966 14.6 369.2 175.0
1967 23.32 811.1 322.7
1968 25.14 3271.3 721.4
1969 37.6 1469.8 974.2
1970 55.1 1352.0 1049.5
1971 26.22 1131.3 606.9
1972 41.08 1685.7 1273.0
1973 40.35 1872.6 996.1
1974 45.17 1932.9 1759.4
1975 29.74 1277.4 708.6
1976 30.49 1108.7 693.0
1977 36.97 1147.1
1978 32.68 1039.2 784.3
1979 30.04 912.3 883.4
1980 12.31 4511.2 21539.0
1981 11.66 276.2 178.0
1982 8.88 1623.2 224.9
1983 7.36 333.3 307.4
1984 4.94 85.4 44.9
1985 5.86 123.9 135.1
Source: Strike series; DE Gazette, Employment Gazette.
Employment series: British Labour Statistics. Historical 
Abstract 1886-1968, Employment Gazette.
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Strike Activity in Metals: 1948-1985
The general trends in strike activity revealed in Table 2 show a significant increase 
in stoppage frequency from 1960, further rises in 1964 and 1965 and then averaging 
36.7 stoppages per 100000 between 1967 and 1974 and 32.0 per 100000 for each 
year between 1975 and 1979. This compares with 7.1 per 100000 on average for each 
year in the 1950s. The figures for workers involved show a similar trend although 
these are disguised by national stoppages in 1948, 1953, 1957, 1962 and 1968.
Although there appears to be a slight increase in the average size of stoppage in the 
1960s (excluding national stoppages the average is 325 workers) compared with the 
1950s (where the figure is 294) much of this increase is a result of the generally small 
size of stoppage in the period up to 1956. In the 1970s the average size of stoppage 
involved 370 workers but a noticeable decline in average size is discernible after 
1975. For each year between 1968 and 1978 around 15.7% of the industry’s 
workforce participated in strike action, with 45% doing so in the 13 week steel strike 
in 1980. In contrast the working days lost series does not appear to exhibit the same 
tendencies although a clear cyclical pattern seems to exist with peaks in the series 
occurring in 1948, 1957, 1962, 1970, 1974, and 1980. Whilst these frequently 
correspond to national stoppages it is probable that their timing has much to do with 
responses to cyclical fluctuations affecting the industry. In steel, these cycles appear 
to operate through peak and trough approximately every five years (Cockerill 1979).
To permit a more detailed analysis of the trends in strike numbers a number of 
equations was run with strikes per 100000 in metals as the dependent variable. With 
the exception of equation a’, which covers the period 1948-1969, the equations were 
run for the period 1948-1982 as this is the last year for which industry unemployment 
data is available.
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STRIKES IN METALS 1948-1982: RESULTS
Variable Mean St Dev. Regression Coefficients
a a’ b c
Constant - 102.4 - 138.9 - 107.2 - 57.2
Aggregate
Unemployment
3.29 2.65 - 11.53 
(4.05)
- 11.8 
(4.07)
- 11.86 
(3.99)
Industry U. 3.43 4.24 + 6.0 
(3.75)
+ 5.87 
(3.55)
+ 5.33 
(3.16)
Output Index 105.03 12.09 + 0.29 
(2.63)
+0.19
(2.69)
+ 0.237 
(2.09)
TUG 0.291 5.425 + 0.82 
(2.1)
+ 0.67 
(1.72)
+ 0.98 
(2.54)
TUD 59.84 9.37 + 1.78 
(6.7)
+2.45
(3.31)
+ 2.02 
(6.49)
+ 1.4 
(4.03)
Inflation rate 7.168 5.425 - 0.386 
(1.117)
Time trend 18 10.1 + 0.61 
(2.4)
LG +4.23
(1.85)
+5.56
(2.33)
YP + 5.69 
(2.34)
+ 5.5 
(2.23)
SDE
F
R2
D.W
6.32
20.96
0.818
1.586
2.72
55.5
0.90
1.78
6.34
18.03
0.824
1.69
6.43
20.1
0.811
1.69
Note: a’ covers the period 1948-1969.
Figures in parentheses are t statistics, values of 2 and over indicate the variable 
concerned is significant. SDE is the standard deviation of error and indicates overall 
significance, the lower the figure the better for the significance. The F statistic 
indicates the extent to which the independent variables are significant explanators of 
variations in the dependent variable. Values over 4 or 5 indicate overall significance. 
R2 is the coefficient of determination and gives an indication of the equation’s overall 
explanatory power. D.W is the Durbin Watson statistic and measures the existence 
of autocorrelation between residuals, values between 1.4 and 2 indicate the absence 
of serious autocorrelative problems.
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The four equations employ variables corresponding to the main areas of the 
theoretical model although they ignore the role of management in acting upon or 
anticipating the factors identified. Overall they perform well, with only two 
variables, trade union growth and price inflation in equation (b) failing to achieve 
significance. The lack of significance of the trade union growth term in (b) but not 
equations (a) and (c) suggests a possible problem of multicollinearity between it and 
the price term. The ‘driving force’ in the equations appears to be the aggregate 
unemployment term although the level of trade union organisation supports the strong 
influence of unemployment. However, for the period to 1969 it is the level of output 
combined with the trade union density term which appear to be the main influences, 
accounting for almost 87% of the variation in stoppage numbers. Unemployment, 
when included in equations for the shorter period was not significant and had a 
positive coefficient.
The importance of the density term is explicable given that, in contrast to much of 
engineering, the industry experienced very high density levels which pre-date the 
period of our analysis (Docherty 1983). It also helps to account for the fact that the 
trade union growth variable only just achieves significance in equations (a) and (c) 
and interestingly is insignificant in results up to 1969.
Examining the results in detail shows that the aggregate unemployment term exerts 
a strong downward pressure on stoppage numbers, with a rise of one percentage point 
in aggregate unemployment producing a fall of between 11 and 12 stoppages per 
100000 workers, although the results for 1948-1969 suggest that its impact is 
concentrated in the period after 1969. The results for industry unemployment in 
contrast are misleading, when run separately the term had a negative coefficient, so 
that the strength of the coefficient together with its sign are largely a consequence 
of being run alongside the aggregate term (see discussion above).
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Returning to the equations themselves, the underlying model receives additional 
support from the significance of the two political variables, Incomes policy and the 
existence of a Labour government. Both exerting a positive influence on stoppage 
numbers of a similar magnitude, between 5 and 6 stoppages per 100000 workers. 
This suggests that for the mid 1960s, the incomes policy in operation at the time 
caused between 30 and 36 additional stoppages. However, the two variables are only 
significant when employed separately suggesting a high degree of multicollinearity, 
which presents difficulties in interpreting the results. Given the importance of the 
Steel industry within the sector and the fact that it had a close relationship with 
successive governments for much of the period, political variables would be expected 
to exert an influence. What is more difficult is disentangling the effects of each 
factor. The fact that Labour twice nationalised the industry and was in office for nine 
of the last sixteen years of the study after steel was re-nationalised would suggest this 
would be of most importance. The closer state/industry links implied by public 
ownership would also have permitted greater government influence and pressure on 
negotiators (Winchester 1983) particularly during periods of wage restraint and these, 
coupled with more recent developments in the form of cash limits would suggest the 
incomes policy term might be picking up the effects of public ownership generally. 
Support for this view comes from a number of sources which stress the complexity 
of government relations with public corporations and the variety of forms of 
intervention or interference in their affairs can take (Cockerill 1979, Pryke 1981, 
Winchester 1983, Femer 1988).
In the equations the level of output is a positive and significant influence on 
stoppages, stressing the importance of prosperity and economic affluence in affecting 
stoppages. Although equation (a) was run with a time trend inserted (equation (c)) 
replacing the output variable, we would place more emphasis on the former term 
given the cyclical nature of the industry and its reflection in the output measure. 
Turning to the organisational variables, their importance and particularly that of trade 
union density has already been highlighted. As was noted above, trade union 
organisation was well-established before the Second World War and the figures 
employed in the equation undoubtably underestimate the true density level particularly
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if the 1978 figures of 94% for manual workers and 62% for non manuals discovered 
by Brown (1981) are indicative of the earlier period.
Summary
The evidence presented above confirms the role of a mix of factors in accounting for 
variations in strike activity and the advantages of adopting a multi-disciplinary 
approach in analysing stoppages. Strike numbers in metals are mainly affected by 
the level of aggregate unemployment and possibly local labour market factors - 
although the evidence for industry unemployment is inconclusive - operating in 
conjunction with product market factors (notably, the level of output), organisational 
factors (trade union growth and density) and political influences (incomes policies, 
periods of a Labour government).
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STRIKE ACTIVITY IN IRON AND STEEL
Before examining the interaction between strike dimensions and the changing 
economic fortunes of the iron and steel industry it is necessary to set out the main 
pattern of strike activity in iron and steel during the period of steel nationalisation. 
Because of the inadequacies of data the various strike measures used relate to the 
whole iron and steel sector (private and public) together with the manufacture of steel 
tubes and castings (1). After 1982 figures relate to metal processing and manufacture.
The pattern of stoppage incidence in iron and steel reveals a clear upward trend to 
1970, a second, but lower peak in 1974 in common with strike activity elsewhere 
followed by a decline and then rise to 1977 and then a trend decline with sharp falls 
in 1980 and again in 1986. The workers involved series shows that for the entire 
period from 1968 to 1980 at least 11% of the workforce in iron and steel were 
involved in disputes in any one year with peaks in 1968, 1973, 1979, 1980 and 1982. 
Similarly, the working days lost series increased in the late 1960s and early 1970s 
together with the average length of strike, falls in the mid 1970s with a generally 
increasing trend towards the end of the decade.
It was decided to subject the three strike measures to econometric analysis taking 
advantage of more disaggregated data to see if our earlier results were supported and 
to further test for the reliability and robustness of the underlying model. All three 
measures were tested against a maximum of eight variables for the period 1967-87 
which were; the rate of aggregate unemployment, the level of output in iron and steel, 
the share of imports in iron and steel, the level of real profit in BSC, the rate of 
change of prices lagged one year, the rate of change of earnings in metals lagged one 
year and three dummy variables for incomes policy, the period of Labour government 
and the impact of the 1984 Trade Union Act. The qualifications about the results 
given the small number of observations remains.
(l)Statistics kindly provided by BSC only record hours lost per employee through 
industrial action and have been omitted from the analysis. However, they confirm the 
domination of BSC in the days lost series.
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STRIKE ACTIVITY: IRON AND STEEL 1967-1987
YEAR STOPPAGES PER 100000 WI PER 10000 WDL PER 1000 AS AL
1967 23.45 858.4 34.3 366 4
1968 23.93 2675 64.1 1118 2.4
1969 31.8 1548 96.4 408 6.2
1970 56.03 1408 98.9 251 7.0
1971 27.96 1376.8 74.4 492 5.4
1972 41.79 1892 146.7 453 7.8
1973 41.9 2465 118.0 588 4.8
1974 45.5 1974 151.1 434 7.7
1975 31.26 1487 76.1 476 5.1
1976 34.15 1297 76.1 380 5.9
1977 35.69 1132 160.0 317 14.1
1978 32.78 1117 80.4 341 7.2
1979 27.1 2055 156.1 758 7.6
1980 13.16 6240 3002.4 4729 48.3
1981 10.5 311 17.1 296 5.5
1982 13.96 3734 45.2 2676 1.2
1983 15.14 686 63.3 453 9.2
1984 10.42 180 9.5 173 5.3
1985 12.4 263 28.7 212 10.9
1986 3.98 219 62.7 550 28.6
1987 4.31 142 6.8 329 4.8
Figures: Employment Gazette (1968-1988 inclusive)
AS: The average size of stoppage in numbers involved, dividing workers involved by 
the number of stoppages.
AL: The average length of stoppages in days, dividing working days lost by the 
number of workers involved.
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A number of general features of the results stand out clearly. In all equations the 
level of output is a strong and significant determinant of variations in the three 
measures. The rate of unemployment also appears to exert a strong influence on 
working days lost and workers involved, and, in the absence of the output term, on 
the number of stoppages. The four equations all perform well in terms of statistical 
significance and explanatory power and, with the exception of workers involved do 
not exhibit signs of autocorrelation. However, in none of the equations were the level 
of profit, lagged price inflation or level of import penetration significant. In the case 
of import penetration this may be due to the strength of the output term as it clearly 
had an impact upon management perceptions of the industry and in BSC’s initiatives 
from the mid 1970s, whilst the insignificance of the profit variable is possibly the 
result of the ’insulation’ of the industry and its link with government and government 
policy, as in the early 1970s where massive investment and finance was agreed in 
spite of losses incurred at the time. Furthermore, the losses in steel can be seen as 
having an impact after a significant time especially when exogeneous pressures in the 
form of declining output, over-capacity and government policy effectively forced a 
change of policy.
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ECONOMETRIC RESULTS: IRON AND STEEL 1967-1987 
VARIABLE MEAN ST. DEV REGRESSION COEFFICIENTS
a a’ b c d
AggU - 1.24 -234.7 -255.1 -542.97
(1.62) (4.8) (5.29) (4.47)
Output + 1.34 +2.01 -204.5 -231.7 -385.9
(2.0) (2.19) (3.6) (4.16) (2.75)
TUACT -10.56
(1.77)
Real Profit +0.49
(1.01)
Et-1 + 0.63 +0.70
(2.1) (2.18)
Labour Government -513.5 544.0 -1176.6
(2.14) (2.3) (2.0)
Constant -0.05 -21.69 +6225.9 7014.2 13697.4
SDE 7.49 7.09 374.2 369.46 930.28
F 18.8 21.6 13.8 11.0 9.72
R2 0.77 0.79 0.71 0.73 0.63
D.W 2.29 2.68 2.07 1.98 2.59
Note: Equations (a, a’) dependent variable is stoppages per 100000 workers. 
Equations (b) and (c) dep. variable is working days lost per 1000 workers. 
Equation (d) dependent variable is workers involved per 10000 workers.
MEANS and STANDARD DEVIATIONS: U: 7.529 and 5.03. Output: 20.338 and 4.926. Real 
Profit: -158.72 and 248.8. Et-1: 11.243 and 5.75.
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In equation (a) the output and lagged money earnings variable both exert a strong and 
significant upward pressure on stoppage numbers reinforcing the role of product and 
labour market factors on strikes. Although money earnings was not significant in the 
earlier equations for metals the importance of earnings on stoppages in steel has been 
stressed by others (Eldridge 1968, Bowen et al.1976) although they emphasised the 
importance of relative earnings across industries (steel workers relative pay fell 
significantly during the 1970s) and between occupational groups (see below). The 
narrower industry focus may explain the differences between these results but it is 
also likely to be the result of the time period chosen, given the inflation rates, the 
erosion of money earnings and buid up of expectations in inflationary periods. The 
lack of significance of the unemployment term may also be the result of the level of 
aggregation, a more appropriate measure might be the level of local or regional 
unemployment in steel communities. Finally, note should be made of the Trade 
Union Act dummy variable which approached significance on the basis of only a 
small number of observations. Taken in conjunction with the results for engineering, 
the legislation appears to have had an important depressive affect upon stoppage 
numbers.
Equations (b) and (c) indicate a very strong and significant relationship between 
unemployment, output, the existence of a Labour government and the number of 
working days lost with all the variables exerting a negative impact upon days lost. 
Taking the output term first, it is clear that a high level of output might tend to be 
associated with shorter stoppages as high demand provides the means to meet worker 
demands, similarly falling demand if perceived by employers as the prelude to 
recession would encourage them to ‘sit out* a dispute and possibly avoid expensive 
stockpiling of goods. The negative impact of the Labour government term may be 
explained by the wish of such an administration to avoid prolonged disputes in a vital 
sector of the economy and as Upham (1990) has argued Labour governments certainly 
put pressure on the Corporation to raise pay demands where they saw the threat of 
conflict as a distinct possibility. However, what is also clear is that this result is 
likely to be significantly affected by the existence of the 1980 strike in the first full 
year of the Thatcher administration. Finally, the unemployment term is shown to
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reduce quite sharply the number of working days lost. Until recently the conventional 
wisdom was that in periods of recession strikes tended to increase in length and 
become more protracted (see argument on output above). The table above shows that 
steel strikes did have a tendency to lengthen from 1982 to 1986 whilst numbers 
involved fell reflecting the decentralisation of the Corporation’s activities after 1980. 
In addition, there were also short but large demonstration stoppages over 
redundancies (e.g 1982). In steel it is likely that the unemployment term operated in 
conjunction with major changes effected within the Corporation after 1980 to reduce 
the number of working days lost. Alternatively it can be argued that it is the nature 
of the product market rather than the labour market which is critical here. This 
argument rests on showing that steel faced a very tight product market in the early 
to mid 1980s and it was this which forced concessions in spite of the level of 
unemployment, but that the unemployment term in the equations is picking up this 
effect. Given the state of union strength and workforce resistance in steel in the 
1980s coupled with the fact that a number of these stoppages were token makes this 
explanation unlikely. However, what clearly does take place in the 1980s in steel and 
elsewhere is a reduction in pay disputes and the impact of unemployment is probably 
falling on these disputes which in metals in the 1970s normally accounted for over 
two-thirds of days lost.
In equation (d) the same three variables, as with WDL are strong and significant 
determinants of workers involved, with all again exerting a depressing effect on the 
series. The output term again suggests that in periods of rising output the numbers 
involved is likely to reduce, this can be linked to bargaining strucutures and the 
tendency for an increase in local bargaining where, in the case of steel, production 
workers in particular have proved adept at gaining concessions. If fragmented 
bargaining is more likely then sectional disputes are likely to be more frequent in 
periods of high and/or rising demand and these are likely to be small and short. 
Similarly for the reasons detailed above a Labour government is likely to want to 
reduce the political and economic embarrassment of a steel dispute involving large 
numbers of workers not least because of traditional, if in practice fairly tenuous links 
via the ’Triple Alliance’ with coal miners and railway workers. Finally, the
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unemployment term shows a strong negative effect operating on workers involved 
whilst the rationale for this is again unclear it is likely and confirmed by further work 
(see below) that it is operating upon pay disputes in particular which have 
traditionally accounted for the bulk of workers involved.
In order to investigate these results further separate equations were run for pay and 
non-pay disputes for the period 1969-1990 using variables representing a similar 
combination of influences. The movements in the stoppage totals are detailed in the 
figure overleaf. The results of the econometric work are contained in the table 
overleaf. For pay stoppages aggregate unemployment remained significant but the 
results were dominated by product market factors (either the level of output of the 
level of UK steel consumption) and by the impact of the 1984 Trade Union Act. 
However, the major decline in pay strikes is after 1979 (as in other industries) and 
suggests that product market factors need to be seen alongside more general 
influences such as rising aggregate unemployment as well as the consequences of the 
1980 strike. Again, the impact of the legislation may be linked to the collapse of the 
miners strike given the historical links between steel workers and miners.
The evidence for non-pay stoppages confirms the impact of the 1984 legislation and 
that of unemployment in reducing stoppage numbers although the qualifications about 
the former apply again. The results for working days lost and workers involved are 
less encouraging and only achieved any significance for pay stoppages. For workers 
involved, trade union density, output and aggregate unemployment were at or near 
significance and for days lost, aggregate unemployment and output approached 
significance but for both equations the variables never accounted for more than 41 % 
of the movement in the dependent variable. Two probable reasons for this are the 
prevalence of national bargaining in the industry for most of the period and the 
increasing size of plant (in terms of employment). It is significant that workers 
involved and days lost in disputes (adjusted for employment) increased markedly after 
1967 and remained at significantly higher levels until the early 1980s.
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STRIKE ACTIVITY IN IRON AND STEEL 1969-1990
PAY NON-■PAY
M SD (a) (b) (c) (d)
Constant - 39.5 - 36.7 14.7 - 10.57
AggU -0.62
(3.01)
Steel
Consumption + 0.61 + 0.23
(1.84) (1.33)
Output + 0.58
(2.9)
Leg - 15.4 - 9.12 -4.43 - 5.14
(2.66) (2.29) (1.51) (2.5)
SDE 6.21 6.05 3.55 3.13
F 32.25 34.57 16.08 23.5
R2 0.77 0.78 0.63 0.71
DW 1.75 2.21 1.6 1.69
Notes:
Aggregate Unemployment: source as above 
Steel consumption: source; Annual Abstract of Statistics 
Output: Iron and Steel from Annual Abstract of Statistics 
Leg: Dummy variable for impact of 1984 Trade Union Act
MEANS and STANDARD DEVIATIONS: U: 8.24 and 4.7. Steel Consumption: Output: 20.338 and 
4. 926.
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Circuit of Capital, Managerial Initiatives and Strike Activity
The empirical results from the econometric work give support to the view that broad 
environmental factors together with product market, labour market and organisational 
variables are significant determinants of variations in stoppage numbers in metals. 
However, the underlying model lays stress upon the responses of managers and 
workers to these broader influences and their associated implications for Industrial 
relations and industrial conflict. These responses are therefore the critical variables 
between the pressure on the parties from environmental factors and the emergence or 
otherwise of strike action.
The issue of industrial growth and development and contradictions within the 
industrial circuit of capital have been discussed in the earlier theoretical section of this 
work but some of the main points are worth repeating. In debates surrounding the 
labour process it has been argued that the incidence and form of conflict arising may 
owe much to the nature of that process and the extent of worker control within 
individual plants and organisations (Edwards and Scullion 1982). However, the 
emphasis on control of the labour process whilst important, tends to neglect or 
underplay the role of broader factors which affect the realisation of profit such as 
product market conditions in particular (Kelly, 1982, 1985). The argument for an 
appreciation of the changes taking place in the full circuit of capital rather than just 
the labour process rests on the belief that product and labour market conditions may 
not, for the most part be severe enough to warrant management responses to change 
the labour process, so that the latter assumes a degree of autonomy from these other 
elements in the circuit (Edwards and Scullion 1982). However at certain times the 
combination of product, labour market and labour process conditions may diverge to 
such an extent that managements are forced to initiate changes to ensure greater 
compatability between elements of the circuit. The consequences for strike activity 
depend critically upon the nature of these initiatives and the extent of worker control 
and resistance.
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Changes in the Elements of the Industrial Circuit of Capital 
Product Market
The tables 3 and 4 together give a clear indication of the changing product market 
position of the metals sector. Allen (1971) has argued that until 1956/57 the 
consumption of steel rose considerably faster than that for industrial production as a 
whole due much to the expansion of the consumer goods industries, particularly cars, 
and that the industry flourished with output of metals around 36% higher in 1957 than 
1948. However, he suggested that 1957 represented a watershed for the industry. 
Certainly steel was largely free from imports in the 1950s, due much to agreements 
with competitors (Docherty 1983) and after 1957 conditions in both internal and 
international markets were transformed as foreign competition intensified (Allen 
1971). This is reflected in Britain’s declining share of world trade, down from 7.5% 
in 1955 to 5.2% in 1966, and in steel, where profits declined from £400 milllions in 
1957/58 to £200 millions in 1962/63 (although in metals overall profits continued to 
increase until 1960).
In the 1960s output of the metals sector remained fairly static whilst real profits stood 
at around their 1960 figure at the end of the decade. This relatively poor 
performance was due much to the fortunes of the iron and steel industry which, in the 
financial year 1967/68 returned a profit of less than £60 millions with losses incurred 
at both Llanwem and Ravenscraig in the late 1960s (Pryke 1981). The steel 
industry’s underlying problems began to be exposed more fully in the late 1960s and, 
despite cyclical peaks in 1969/70 and 1973/74 the problems for the industry 
intensified after 1974 when a major collapse in product markets took place.
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TABLE 3
CIRCUIT OF CAPITAL: SELECTED VARIABLES:METALS
Year Output P/Q IMP RE IndU RWB/Q LP L/VA
1948 100 100 - 100 1.3 100 100 -
1949 100.5 99 - 102.7 1.04 103.7 99.7 -
1950 105.6 113 - 103.4 0.96 102.1 103.4 -
1951 112.0 86.7 - 105.6 0.8 100.4 108.1 -
1952 115.3 63.1 - 106.0 0.97 102.3 109.4 -
1953 112.6 49.3 ■ - 104.7 2.1 92.8 112.4 -
1954 120.2 64.5 - 105.7 1.1 88.5 119.7 -
1955 130.3 118.5 - 113.0 1.0 100.6 120.9 -
1956 132.3 125.4 - 118.3 0.6 107.1 121.1 -
1957 136.2 139.5 - 121.3 0.7 106.6 124.7 -
1958 121.5 127.7 - 129.9 1.8 126.1 110.1 -
1959 126.9 154.9 - 118.8 3.0 113.1 113.8 -
1960 147.2 182.4 - 127.8 0.9 120.4 123.5 -
1961 138.6 150.3 - 134.4 1.2 129.6 123.9 -
1962 131.0 124.5 - 132.3 2.5 119.7 124.3 -
1963 137.0 128.1 - 130.4 2.5 112.7 129.2 -
1964 137.6 134.2 - 135.7 1.0 129.4 123.1 -
1965 143.6 136.9 - 143.1 0.8 130.8 128.5 -
1966 135.2 106.8 - 148.4 1.1 128.2 136.0 -
1967 127.3 68.5 - 144.9 3.2 119.8 135.0 -
1968 135.0 74.2 18 147.4 2.3 111.0 145.6 74.0
1969 139.2 86.2 - 152.5 1.9 112.6 149.4 -
1970 138.2 90.3 19 157.8 2.4 119.9 146.7 74.6
1971 126.3 85.4 19 168.2 4.1 123.7 142.7 79.9
1972 125.5 84.0 18 161.8 4.6 103.5 152.2 78.3
1973 137.5 96.2 21 182.3 2.6 107.2 166.2 76.0
1974 150.0 108.2 24 193.8 2.2 100.3 184.8 74.4
1975 131.0 84.7 23 197.7 3.6 114.2 163.5 83.7
1976 135.0 79.2 24 190.8 5.4 94.5 178.9 83.3
1977 134.7 70.4 24 190.8 4.8 94.6 181.1 82.0
1978 134.6 60.8 24 181.3 5.7 84.4 186.0 89.2
1979 123.8 42.0 25 189.6 5.5 91.9 175.0 111.9
1980 95.9 35.6 36 192.5 8.3 98.5 149.7 112.2
1981 101.7 33.0 30 185.6 18.3 60.7 188.2 108.8
1982 98.9 34.2 34 181.6 19.8 - 199.4 110.6
1983 100.5 - 36 - - - 206.8 82.7
1984 100.1 - 43 - - - 213.8 81.9
1985 107.0 - 45 - - - 228.6 74.7
NOTE: All variables relate to metals sector as a whole. P/Q: Index of real profit, IMP: Import penetration, 
imports as a percentage of home market + exports, RE: Real earnings, IndU: Percentage of industry 
workforce unemployed. RWB/Q: Real wage bill per unit of output, LP: Labour productivity, LSVA: 
Labour’s share of value added. Source: Output and labour productivity indices from Annual Abstract of 
Statistics. Earnings from Employment Gazette and British Labour Statistics: Historical Abstract.
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TABLE 4
IRON AND STEEL: PRODUCT MARKET, LABOUR MARKET AND LABOUR 
PROCESS INDICATORS
YEAR S WI WDL Y IMP RP EARN!
1967 23.45 858 34.3 24.3 7.0 -10.7 4.2
1968 23.93 2675 64.1 26.3 9.1 -21.7 8.9
1969 31.8 1548 96.4 26.8 6.4 3.1 8.9
1970 56.03 1408 98.9 28.3 5.5 -4.2 12.9
1971 27.96 1376 74.4 24.1 9.1 -49.8 5.6
1972 41.79 1892 146.7 25.3 12.0 -5.4 19.9
1973 41.9 2465 118.0 26.6 13.0 3.6 15.5
1974 45.5 1974 151.1 22.3 16.7 62.8 18.0
1975 31.26 1487 76.1 20.1 19.1 -160.7 20.7
1976 34.15 1297 76.1 22.3 19.5 -112.6 16.6
1977 35.69 1132 160.0 20.4 20.3 -300.4 10.8
1978 32.78 1117 80.4 20.3 19.7 -314.5 12.9
1979 27.1 2055 156.1 21.5 23.4 -427.8 13.3
1980 13.16 6240 3002.4 11.3 27.2 -522.5 14.4
1981 10.5 311 17.1 15.6 24.6 -479.3 9.7
1982 13.96 3734 45.2 13.7 25.3 -710.9 11.1
1983 15.14 686 63.3 15.0 24.9 -390.5 0.8
1984 10.42 180 9.5 15.1 24.3 -334.0 18.8
1985 12.4 263 28.7 15.7 26.0 -65.6 7.0
1986 3.98 219 62.7 14.7 27.1 136.6 4.6
1987 4.31 142 6.8 17.4 28.2 339.0 3.5(est.)
Sources:
S: Strikes per 100000 employees; Employment Gazette (1968-1988) 
WI: Workers Involved per 10000 employees; EG (1968-1988) 
WDL: Working Days Lost per 1000 employees; EG (1968-1988) 
Output: Steel output in million tonnes; Annual Abstract of Statistics 
IMP: Import Penetration % of home market; Annual Abstract 
RP: Real Profit in £ millions; BSC figures adjusted for calendar 
years and deflated by retail price index 
Earnings: Annual change in average nominal earnings; NES.
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The impact on profits was even more dramatic. In the metals sector the level of real 
profit peaked in 1960 but with a favourable performance between 1955 and 1965 and 
a mild improvement in 1974 at the last peak demand year. In the late 1960s and the 
period after 1974 the sector experienced low or declining real profits. In steel, the 
government view in the early 1970s was that the market was such that BSC ’could 
not help making profit’ (Dol: quoted in Abromeit 1986). The Corporation made a 
profit of £70 millions after tax in 1974/75 but this turned to a loss the following year, 
losses continued uninterrupted into the late 1980s with total losses of £443 millions 
in 1977/78, £548 millions in 1979/80, £668 millions in 1980/81 and £869 millions 
in 1982/83 (Abromeit 1986).
The profits position of BSC after 1974 is returned to below but a few general points 
are necessary here. First, they were partly the result of a downturn in world demand 
and increased competition coupled with BSC having already embarked on an 
expansionary programme of long term investment leaving it with excess capacity (see 
below). Second, they were a consequence of increasing labour costs reflected in a 
dramatic increase in labour’s share of value added in the second half of the decade. 
This latter point is considered in greater depth later but is critical in influencing the 
nature of BSC’s responses after 1978.
Further support for the product market collapse in Steel is evidenced by the increase 
in import penetration, particularly after 1971 (see Table 4 above). Cockerill (1979) 
has shown that for steel alone the share of imports in the home market rose from 5 % 
to more than 20% between 1970 and 1977 and that this disguised even greater 
penetration in the markets for sheet and plate steel. As Table 4 shows, this continued 
into the 1980s with a recent estimate putting BSC’s share of the home market at 46% 
in 1982 (down from 52% in 1981), (Abromeit 1986). In the 1970s one major 
consequence of this collapse was chronic over-capacity within the industry with many 
plants operating at less than two-thirds of capacity (1976). Indeed, Port Talbot, 
Llanwem and Lackenby operated at only 75% capacity in 1973, a period of high 
demand (Pryke 1981). By 1975 BSC was operating at below 60% capacity, a figure 
it remained at for the rest of the decade (Pryke 1981).
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Labour Market
Statistics for industry unemployment reveal a period of very strong labour demand 
throughout the 1950s and notwithstanding greater fluctuations in the early 1960s 
remained below 3% until 1967 (reflecting national trends). In the early 1970s it 
began to increase and averaged between 5 and 6% of the workforce in the period 
1975 to 1980 when it accelerated further reaching over 18% in 1981 and 1982, the 
last year for which data were available. Alongside the trends in unemployment, real 
earnings in metals increased by over 3% per year until the early 1960s, and over 6% 
per year between 1967 and 1975 significantly outstripping the growth in productivity, 
before falling slightly in the latter half of the decade.
One aspect of earnings disguised by this industry focus is the trend in inter-industry 
earnings. Docherty (1983) notes that whilst steel workers were in the top three of the 
manual workers league table of earnings in the early 1950s, by the late 1970s they 
had fallen to about thirteenth position. Thus we have a group of workers who 
experienced a steadily worsening labour market position. In the 1950s with tight 
product and labour markets earnings remained high in both absolute and relative 
terms with little prospect of unemployment. By the 1970s this position underwent 
considerable change as product markets deteriorated, the labour market for those in 
the industry slackened and employment security undermined.
From the perspective of management there is little evidence that it encountered 
problems in recruiting skilled labour or those willing to be trained via apprenticeships 
in the 1950s and 1960s. Rather, that by the 1970s problems were perceived more in 
terms of ’over-manning’ and the reflection of this in the contraction in employment 
and the significant increases in unemployment after 1979. The contraction of 
employment in BSC was at first gradual, 15% between 1970 and 1975, 13% between 
1975 and 1978 and then rapid, with 50000 jobs lost from 1978 to 1980 and a further 
76000 from 1980 to 1985. In 1980, the Corporation employed 119000 fewer people 
than in 1970, a fall of 45.9%. By 1985 the workforce had been reduced by a further 
65% so that from giving employment to 259000 in 1970, by 1985 it could only offer 
work to 64000 (Bamber 1986).
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In the 1980’s management requirements emphasised a greater concern with flexibility, 
multi-skilling and the breaking down of traditional craft and seniority lines as well as 
reliance on the external market for sub-contractors, temporary workers and those on 
fixed term contracts (Fevre 1989, Blyton 1992).
Labour Process
Prior to the re-nationalisation of the industry in 1967 the system of work organisation 
in steel was one in which the interests of owner and labourer converged to a 
significant extent. Bowen et al (1976) suggested that the system allowed both sides 
to pursue their separate objectives with least resistance. The organisation of work 
offered a relatively high discretionary content to individuals and a degree of social 
advancement within the ranks of manual work, the development of jointly negotiated 
wage payment systems, determination of tonnage rates and relatively high earnings 
to maintain labour co-operation with employers and ensure production without 
disruption. Whilst this description is generally accepted it does disguise the fact that 
within the industry significant social divisions existed between production and craft 
workers, based upon skill, training, trade union membership and access to seniority 
lines reinforced by pay determination. Indeed after nationalisation BSC saw a clear 
need for a long term labour policy based upon increasing productivity and reducing 
the anomalies of the wages structure (see section on management strategy below). 
This productivity programme lasted from 1968 to 1974 and, together with the 
advances in technology, pursuit of economies of scale and rationalisation of some of 
the Corporation’s activities produced significant changes in the nature of the labour 
process in steel.
In Tables 3 and 4 the level of productivity is used as a measure of the effectiveness 
of managerial control of the labour process and the intensity of effort. Given the 
capital intensity of these industries there are obvious weaknesses in using this variable 
which is further complicated by changes in the number of administrative, technical 
and clerical staff. Pryke (1981) and Upham (1980) note that in Steel much of the 
decline in employment in the industry was the result of cuts in production staff 
following the replacement of open hearth furnaces by BOS (basic oxygen steelmaking)
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in the period 1968 to 1980 with non-manual staff increasing from 25% of total 
employment to 33% in 1985 (Bamber 1986). These points notwithstanding, 
productivity in metals rose by 25% between 1948 and 1957, by 4.7% per annum 
from 1958-1974 and in 1979 stood 75% higher than in 1948. However, in steel there 
was concern expressed about productivity levels relative to those of foreign 
competition particularly in the 1970s. According to Cockerill (1980) the ’major cause 
of low productivity was the chronic degree of over-manning’ (also the view of BSC, 
see MMC Report 1988) and the lack of efficient labour utlisation (Pryke 1981). 
Pryke states that absence of work within BSC in 1978/79 averaged 26 days per 
manual worker per year, with a figure of 30 for Scotland. Similarly Kelly (1984) in 
a study of Corby noted that on average 14 days a year per worker were lost through 
absence (with absence and sickness combined accounting for 21 days per worker per 
year) and with turnover in the early 1970s standing at 20% per year. This suggests 
some support for Pryke’s view that managers and workers at BSC had low 
expectations and lacked commitment and the perceived need in the late 1970s to 
increase efficiency and improve what was seen as poor labour utilisation. The 
productivity advances within BSC in the 1980s although exaggerated by the use of 
contract staff illustrate the extent to which this has been achieved.
In terms of advances in productivity it is important to stress that the 1960s and 1970s 
in steel were marked by significant changes in the nature of production and in 
associated work practices as the BOS system replaced open hearth furnaces. The shift 
to BOS and the greater application of technology in steel production changed the 
nature of work significantly and the break up of the traditional seniority system within 
the industry and is associated with the most strike-prone period in the industry’s 
history. The scale of some of these changes is evident from the increasing size of 
blastfurnace. According to Allen (1971) the average blastfurnace in 1948 produced 
79000 tons annually rising to 263000 tons in 1965, by the late 1970s the largest 
furnaces were capable of producing 3.5 million tons a year (Cockerill 1980).
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One further way in which the problems of these industries can be seen and which 
permits an appreciation of the interaction between the main elements in the circuit is 
by examining changes in labour’s share of value added. The figures apply to metals 
generally but given the state of BSC it is probable that the figures are if anything an 
understatement of the corporation’s position. The figures reveal a general increase 
of over 20% from the late 1960s to 1978 and then to a level of over 100% between 
1979 and 1982, signifying that for every £100 of value added to the product labour 
was contributing between £100 and £120. Thus, a major consequence of the product 
market collapse allied to less than expected productivity increases and the 
maintenance of previous manpower levels were products that were selling at prices 
well below the costs incurred in producing them.
Overall, the position faced by the steel industry indicates a fluctuating but generally 
expanding product market until the mid 1970s when the recession in the world steel 
market plunged BSC into a major crisis. Committed to a major expansion 
programme after 1973 (see below) and with a continually rising real wage bill which 
productivity gains only just managed to keep pace with and with a continual increase 
in the share of value added accounted by labour it is clear that by 1975 a 
contradiction within the circuit of capital was emerging within steel. A rapidly 
declining product market and attendant over-capacity co-existed with a relatively 
unchanged labour market and many of the established ways of working. Those areas 
where inroads were made into the labour process, for example at the plants with new 
technology, were frequently associated with pay disputes and production and manning 
problems (Pryke 1981). In this last respect the 1970s marked changes to the nature 
of working in BSC which challenged traditional attitudes and expectations of a 
workforce who in many instances had spent the bulk of their lives in the industry. 
What is also clear is that a considerable degree of resistance was present, not merely 
in terms of stoppage activity (see below) but also through informal conflict 
(absenteeism etc).
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Managerial Initiatives, Worker Responses and Industrial Conflict
BSC Strategy
There is general agreement that BSC inherited an industry with considerable 
weaknesses. It was seen as technically backward, with a growth rate and rate of 
investment behind those of its competitors, with labour costs higher than the 
competition and with slower increases in productivity. Together these made for what 
Cockerill and Silberston (1974) described as ‘sluggish performance’. Indeed, in its 
evidence to the Monopolies and Mergers Commission in 1986 BSC expressed the 
view that it had inherited a situation of ‘inbuilt overmanning, high standard manning 
levels and unduly restrictive working practices’ (MMC 1988 p. 106). Notwithstanding 
the benefits of hindsight in this statement there was little doubt that much of the 
existing capacity was in small-scale and obsolescent plant, frequently under-utilised 
and in need of rationalisation and modernisation (Cockerill 1980).
This view also seems to have been held, albeit belatedly, by the private steel 
companies which, in order to try and pre-empt nationalisation commissioned their 
own report into the industry. The Benson report, as it became known, recommended 
the closure of 65% of existing steelworks over the period 1965-75. Whilst the report 
was largely ignored (although reappearing in a different guise under BSC’s 
subsequent 10 year development strategy in the early 1970s) it has been argued that 
its findings were sufficient to challenge and undermine feelings of employment 
security of those employed in the industry and possibly contributed to the increasing 
number of stoppages in the late 1960s.
The Heritage Strategy
Undoubtably, BSC saw a need to proceed with rationalisation of the industry and to 
reduce unit costs. A move in the direction of the first objective came with 
re-organisation of the Corporation in 1968 and again in 1970 (the latter into divisions 
acting as profit centres). A further objective was that of investment in new 
technology and the shift to basic oxygen steelmaking. BSC opted for the 
concentration of large hot metal based plants using BOS as opposed to the open hearth
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process, located at, or near coastal sites. In 1964, 20% of steel was produced by 
means of BOS, by the late 1960s, 25%, with a major investment programme in 
1967-9 to convert Port Talbot and Lackenby in 1968, and Appleby Frodingham in 
1969. Similar changes were also introduced at Llanwem and Ravenscraig so that by 
1971 BOS plants had been installed at each of the five coastal plants. The aim of 
increasing productivity was also to be effected through the National Productivity 
Programme introduced in 1968 and which was to be a vehicle to reform industrial 
relations procedures and behaviour (Kelly 1985). Separate national agreements were 
concluded in 1969 and 1970 to ensure the reform of collective bargaining and wage 
structures at the establishment level.
In introducing the National Productivity Programme the Corporation was particularly 
concerned with developing a long term plan for labour management which would 
reduce the anomalies of the existing wages structure and standardise working 
conditions across production, service and maintenance grades of manuals in the 
industry. It was concerned with introducing a more equitable structure together 
with uniform time conditions, a new Guaranteed Work Agreement, re-deployment 
payments and industry-wide payments schemes as well as participation in joint job 
evaluation (Bowen et al. 1976). The existing structure had long been a source of 
concern to groups within steel. As Bowen et al. (1976) have argued, the technical 
and social organisation of steelwork had offered advantages to those workers with 
influence to negotiate increases in wage earnings consistent with increases in the 
technical capacity of steelmaking. Production workers, particularly those in ISTC 
were the main beneficiaries as they were able and willing to exploit the opportunities 
which arose but the stable relationships between steelmakers and production 
steelworkers were at the expense of unstable relationships with maintenance craftsmen 
and blastfumacemen. As Clegg (1979) has shown the inter-occupational differences 
in strike propensity in steel originated from competitive wage bargaining between 
craft and production workers at plant level. In the late 1960s and early 1970s the 
changes in technology in steel reduced the importance of production grades and 
increased that of craftsmen (particularly maintenance) leaving the latter increasingly 
dissatisfied with the wages structure (Eldridge 1968).
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Overall, the objective of the Heritage Plan was to raise profitability (Bryer et al. 
1982) with the coastal heritage plants as a key element in achieving this together with 
the partial closures of old plant. Between 1967 and 1972, 32000 jobs were lost 
through plant closures and in 1971/72 alone 54 seperate sections of works or plants 
were closed (Bryer et al. 1982).
The period of the late 1960s was one of intense industrial conflict. Kelly (1984) 
notes that strike frequency in Steel rose from an average of 128 per year between 
1964 and 1970 to 148 per year in 1971-3 and at Ravenscraig alone he estimated an 
average of 22 stoppages a year between 1967 and 1970, roughly one every 2Vi 
weeks, suggesting they were seen as an accepted and legitimate means of achieving 
results. Similarly at Corby, 127000 working days were lost through stoppages in 
1970 alone, an average of 10 days per employee. Corby also experienced major 
stoppages in 1967 and 1968 (DE Gazette) and at Port Talbot large scale disputes 
occurred in the late 1960s and in 1971. Indeed in 1969 a seven-week unofficial strike 
by blastfiimacemen at Port Talbot prompted the establishment of a Commission of 
Inquiry but illustrated the growing dissatisfaction within this group about relative 
status and earnings (Bowen et al. 1976). Other BSC sites to experience large scale 
stoppages in the period to 1973 were Shotton, Bilston, all Scotland (over white-collar 
recognition) in 1968, Llanelli (Swansea) (1967 and again in 1972) and in 1971 
blastfumacemen undertook a national stoppage in pursuit of a 35% pay increase. 
Similar conflicts occurred at Scunthorpe (1972, 1973) and Llanwem (1973). It is 
significant that the strike activity in this period is concentrated upon those sites that 
were the major recipients of new technology and the shift to BOS production where 
the attendant disturbances to the established pay and seniority system were greatest.
The Ten Year Development Plan
The period 1971-3 is also marked by the emergence of a new strategy within the 
Corporation. The Ten Year Development Plan envisaged an expansion in steel 
consumption, and proposed an increase in liquid steel capacity of 36-38 million tons 
to match this together with reductions in employment at around 20 steelworks. The 
plan was finally ratified by the Conservative government in 1973 and was to achieve
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the objective of making BSC fully competitive in international cost terms to obtain 
fullest benefits of scale (Bryer et al. 1982). The Plan consolidated the process enacted 
under the Heritage Plan to concentrate production at a small number of large 
integrated steelworks in order to reap economies of scale and reflected the model of 
japanese steelmaking which carried considerable influence within the Corporation at 
the time. The main works would be at Port Talbot, Llanwem, Ravenscraig, 
Scunthorpe, and Teeside. The rationalisation of plants was to reduce the number of 
smaller steelworks and particularly those operating with open hearth processes. A 
measure of the extent to which the planned reductions conflicted with established 
workplace attitudes is given by the calling of an emergency conference by the ISTC 
in 1973 and a policy from the TUC Steel Committee to secure alternative jobs for 
those workers made redundant and to offer its help to individual steelworks to fight 
closures. Action Committees were established in response to the plan at Ebbw Vale, 
East Moors and Shotton (with only the latter enlisting the Steel Committee’s 
assistance), and the resort to large scale strike action at both Ebbw Vale and Shotton 
in 1973 (DE Gazette 1974).
The Ten Year Development Plan created industrial relations difficulties in two main 
areas. The proposed closure of a number of smaller plants brought immediate 
resistance from the areas affected and it was a conscious policy of the TUC Steel 
Committee to encourage local action committees where redundancies were threatened. 
The second area, continuing from the Heritage Plan was that of new technology and 
the change to working arrangements and pay brought about by continuous process 
working, the transition to BOS plants and the Productivity Programme. It is in the 
context of these issues that continued stoppages took place at Llanwem, Port Talbot 
and Scunthorpe over pay and pay differentials. At Llanwem there were thirty 
separate disputes between May 1973 and May 1974, the two largest by craft workers 
including a seven week dispute by boilermakers which led to the establishment of a 
Committee of Inquiry into the state of industrial relations in the plant.
The gap between the Development Plan’s forecasts and actual demand widened 
dramatically in the mid 1970s and the Corporation, although still committed to the
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expansionist plan but apparently unable to achieve its closure programme sought to 
make a more concerted attack upon ‘inbuilt overmanning’ (Upham 1980). With the 
change in government in 1974 a Review of the closure programme was conducted by 
Lord Beswick, the Beswick Reports were published in February 1975 and, although 
altering the time horizon for closures, broadly accepted the original BSC proposals. 
Following this, BSC announced its intention to cut 20000 jobs as a result of adopting 
the Beswick recommendations with the immediate closure of Clyde Iron, Hartlepool, 
East Moors and Ebbw Vale (the latter prompting a major dispute) together with the 
suspension of the Guaranteed Work Agreement, a protection against slack periods 
which enabled workers to be paid where no work was available. The last element 
particularly incensed the unions and they managed to reach agreement through the 
TUC Steel Committee on voluntary redundancies, flexibility and weekend working 
(the latter a major area of contention in South Wales where disputes totalling over 
26000 working days took place a month before the BSC and steel unions agreement) 
as well as ensuring that the GWA would remain the subject of local agreement.
In January 1976 BSC and the ISTC signed a ‘joint statement on the reduction in 
employment costs and improvements in labour productivity’ which agreed to raise 
productivity through increased production and de-manning (Sirs 1985). The BSC 
strategy had effectively become one of seeking labour economies (Upham 1980) and, 
at least in principle the ISTC accepted the inevitability of closures. In 1974 the 
Corporation signed Work Measured Incentive Schemes (WMIS) with craftsmen in the 
industry which was followed in 1976 with a deal with production workers but, even 
accepting the problems of using man hours per ton to measure productivity, little 
progress appears to have been made. The 1976 joint statement was greeted in Wales 
with another outbreak of strike activity, which over the economy measures alone 
totalled 133300 working days lost. Although BSC has consistently argued that the 
1976 agreement achieved little, Upham (1980) argues that in the three year period 
following the deal employment fell, output rose and absenteeism declined. However, 
he goes on to point out that by mid-1977 BSC had been almost entirely unsuccessful 
in its closure strategy. This position was reversed suddenly in the latter part of 1977 
when the local unions at Clyde Iron concluded a plant deal with local BSC
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management which gave them enhanced redundancy pay in return for job losses. 
Only a few weeks later the TUC Steel Committee negotiated a slightly better deal at 
Hartlepool. Closures at East Moors, Ebbw Vale and Shelton followed in the first half 
of 1978 all with improved redundancy packages.
In the period 1977-1979 with the industry’s competitive position worsening eight 
smaller works (part of Beswick review) were closed down with 12000 jobs lost all 
with successively enhanced severance payments. This also had the effect of bringing 
open hearth steelmaking to an end everywhere except Shotton.
Although it has been argued that the Ten Year Development Plan was effectively 
abandoned by the Civil Service in 1976 (Abromeit 1986) the formal rupture came in 
1978 with the publication of the White Paper The Road To Viability. There is 
considerable evidence that 1978 was a critical year in management perceptions of the 
state of BSC and the realisation of the magnitude of the crisis affecting the industry 
(Taylor 1982). The White Paper in acknowledging the problems outlined the 
commitment to rationalising the industry in light of the serious product market 
collapse and the perceived need to match capacity and demand, a situation made 
worse by the investment made earlier in the Plan’s life so that much of this was 
completed in the period 1977-79 adding to the problems of overcapacity. Neither was 
this new investment achieved without significant local difficulties. Frequent problems 
arose over manning levels and pay differentials with 320800 working days lost in 
1977 at Port Talbot alone over a dispute concerning pay and differentials.
If the 1978 White Paper marked a response to a considerably worsening product 
market situation this is reflected in both the content of proposed closures and the 
manner in which they were introduced. In the latter case the unions had, since the 
early 1970s been concerned with the lack of prior discussion over changes having to 
respond to announcements made by the Corporation (as with the Ten Year 
Development Plan). The evidence suggests that this situation worsened considerably, 
Sirs in the preface to the ISTC pamphlet New Deal For Steel (1980) stated that
224
(The) blank refusal of BSC to discuss their plans with the 
unions prior to taking decisions has been the cause of much bad 
feeling not only between top management and national union 
officials but between Corporation senior managers and local 
workforces (p.4).
In terms of content, BSC had managed to close Shelton in the absence of a national 
agreement and then announced the closure of Bilston, not included in the original 
Beswick plans. The ISTC threatened a national strike over the issue and although the 
decision was rescinded, the plant was partially closed in 1979 and total closure 
announced in 1980. Despite the Corporation’s delay in achieving the closure of 
Bilston it still managed to effectively end steelmaking at Glengamock by the end of 
1978. In late 1979, the Corporation produced its own document The Return to 
Viability where it proposed the closure of one of the main integrated sites, the closure 
of Shotton and much of Corby, electric arc steelmaking at Hallside and the run down 
of operations at Consett. In late 1979 it announced the closure of Shotton, Corby, 
Consett, Cleveland and Hallside and cutbacks at Scunthorpe, Llanwem and Port 
Talbot. In February 1979 BSC had already announced its wish to review iron and 
steel making at Corby but the decision to close Corby provoked an immediate 
response from the workforce and the unions culminating in a one day strike in the 
Autumn by the town. Unlike Shotton and the Beswick plants Corby produced steel 
by the BOS method and is indicative of the change in thinking within the Corporation 
given the product market position.
A further significant factor was the change in government. Although Labour had 
placed the Corporation under increasingly tight cash limits (Bryer et al. 1982) the 
incoming government endorsed BSC’s intention to reach break-even point by the end 
of the 1979/80 financial year. A further constraint was the view that BSC was 
effectively bankrupt and that pay increases would have to be self-financing. This lay 
behind the Corporation’s original offer to the unions in December 1979 to consolidate 
a pay settlement made under Phase II of the Labour government’s incomes policy and 
to permit up to 10% to flow in quarterly payments arising from proposed local bonus 
schemes (Upham 1980). The response was a 13 week national stoppage in 1980,
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which, although nominally over pay was also about the massive closure programme. 
Since 1980 major disputes in Steel have along with disputes generally, declined 
markedly and where they have occurred as in 1982 they have been in response to 
redundancies and closure plans.
Strike Activity in the 1970s: An Overview
The experience of strike activity throughout the decade relects the importance of local 
trade union action. The importance of local action within steel is critical to 
explaining features of the strike pattern in the industry. Given the nature of industrial 
relations and the importance of local trade union organisation it is not surprising that 
most stoppages are also localised, frequently affecting one steelworks or sections 
within it. Pay disputes in particular are of this type and, given the ISTC position for 
much of the 1970s, also disputes surrounding closures. In support of this position the 
formation of action committees in plants identified for closure in the early 1970s were 
also subsequently sites of industrial action (e.g Ebbw Vale) and strong local union 
organisation was also critical in the strike record of Llanwem in the mid 1970s. The 
concentration of new investment at the main integrated plants and the disturbance to 
traditional differentials and seniority was a source of frequent disputes particularly in 
the Welsh steelworks. In contrast, the focus on closures and the local action these 
provoked became more important in the second half of the decade. The absence of 
national stoppages over this issue is largely a consequence of the fact that they 
affected specific plants in this period and the absence of a national campaign against 
them by the ISTC and the other unions. The culmination in a national stoppage in 
1980 over pay is the result of a combination of factors. The precarious state of the 
industry evidenced particularly by the increasing share of labour in value added made 
closures and massive redundancies an inevitable response and one which would affect 
much of the industry rather than a few plants. The tightening of external cash limits 
by the government was also important and made it virtually impossible to offer any 
pay increase. The fact that it was a national dispute is also a consequence of the fact 
that pay bargaining was centralised and a dispute was likely to affect the entire 
industry and finally,the worsening relations nationally between BSC and the ISTC in 
particular. The latter point is important, there seems little doubt that the period after
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1978 marks an era of growing estrangement between the Corporation and the major 
unions, particularly ISTC as the Beswick changes were superseded by the Return to 
Viability and the expressed intentions of the Corporation in 1979. The gap between 
the two sides was seen most clearly in the ISTC’s New Deal For Steel published 
shortly after the 1980 strike and where the gulf between it and BSC appeared 
unbridgeable. This gulf seems to have persisted until 1983 as the steel unions, in 
disarray after the national strike confronted a determined and invigorated management 
concerned with reasserting control and effectively curtailed significant areas of 
involvement for the unions, although local resistance over redundancies has persisted 
as in 1982
BSC Strategy After 1980
In the Monopolies and Mergers Commission Report on the Corporation published in 
1988 BSC declared that its overriding objectives in the 1980s had been to stem 
’massive losses’, break-even on trading account, to achieve ’financial self-sufficiency’ 
and reach ’full viability’. Many of the structural changes deemed necessary to 
achieve these were in place by the end of 1980 most of which are associated in some 
way with the ‘slimline’ policy as a critical element within the Corporation’s survival 
plan.
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Slimline
The ’Slimline’ policy was introduced in 1979 as an element in the Corporation’s 
survival plan and although ostensibly concerned with manpower reductions was a 
comprehensive package of measures designed to improve manpower utilisation. 
These measures are as follows:
a) Plant closures
b) Reductions in output
c) Use of contractors
d) Changes in organisation
e) Introduction of labour saving technology
f) More stringent manning criteria
g) Changes in working practices
h) New productivity incentives
i) Privatisation
All of these to varying degrees have been implemented across the Corporation. Since 
1980 there have been closures at Workington, Normandy Park (both iron 
blastfurnaces), Barrow (1983), Craigneuk (1984), Tinsley Park (1985), Aldvale and 
Templeboro (1986) (all steel furnaces) and at Hartlepool. However, more significant 
(in terms of numbers) have been cutbacks at all the major plants. Indeed ’Slimline’ 
was first applied at Llanwem and Port Talbot in 1980 where the workforces were 
reduced by about 50% in the 1980/81 financial year (MMC 1988). Figures cited by 
Fevre (1989) show actual manning at Port Talbot declining from 12584 at the end of 
September 1979 to 11259 at end June 1980 and to 6636 by the end of the year. 
Further cutbacks brought the totals to 4746 by the end of 1985. These reductions 
mask the fact that much of the work previously undertaken by BSC employees has 
now been contracted out, with contractors frequently employing ex-BSC workers.
The arrival of Ian MacGregor as Chairman in 1980 ushered in a number of important 
organisational changes within BSC. In October the Corporation’s structure was 
redesigned into a series of individual businesses with clear financial objectives each 
acting as a profit centre. The emphasis being placed upon decentralisation and
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delegation, simplifying the chain of command and increasing individual managers 
responsibility for results. A further change, the OPERA 1 programme was 
introduced to facilitate reductions in head office personnel, and in 1982, OPERA 2 
launched with the aim of improving the organisational effectiveness of large integrated 
steelworks.
The Local Bonus Schemes
The re-organisation of the Corporation in 1980 together with the introduction of the 
LBS can be seen as major initiatives towards the decentralisation of bargaining within 
BSC. Indeed, BSC have placed considerable emphasis on them, not just in ’radically 
changing pay bargaining’ (MMC 1988 p. 103) but as the main vehicle for securing 
co-operation with manpower changes and other performance improvements (Blyton 
1992). They have been used to gain acceptance of plant closures, increased use of 
contractors, changes in organisation and working practices, new manning levels, 
flexibility and efficiency improvements. Indicative of the state of union disarray after 
the strike and the comprehensiveness of BSC’s victory is given by the fact that in the 
first three months after the strike, works LBS arrangements had been concluded in 
respect of 99% of the Corporation’s workforce (MMC 1988). In 1979 the 
Corporation argued that in order to reduce manning and increase flexibility it was 
necessary to establish a direct link between pay and performance at local level, with 
pay improvements conditional upon prior achievement of agreed performance targets. 
The local bonus scheme operating at works level and independently of the 
departmental group bonus was the mechanism to achieve this. Since 1981/82 its 
contribution to manual earnings has increased from 3% to over 9% in 1985/86 (MMC 
1988).
These initiatives taken together represent a significant reassertion of management 
control. It is now the case that a number of issues previously the subject of joint 
control are now determined largely by management. This re-establishment of 
managerial prerogative has necessarily entailed considerable changes to the nature of 
the labour process in steel, which arguably was BSC’s prime objective in the 1980s, 
and to the frontier of control between management and labour.
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These initiatives must also be seen within a broader context. The Government 
tightened up borrowing targets for the Corporation considerably after 1981/82, 
particularly from 82/83 to 84/85 and again in 86/87 and a price collapse on mainland 
Europe in the Summer of 1982 seriously hampered recovery in 1982/83. However, 
these financial constraints were increasingly reflected in the Corporation’s plans 
throughout the 1980s particularly after 1981/82 where emphasis is placed on reducing 
loss after interest and reducing external cash requirements although the broad 
objectives of the 1980 Recovery Plan, increasing exports and market share, reducing 
manpower and increasing capacity utilisation remain.
CONCLUSIONS
With hindsight it is difficult to argue with Allen’s view that 1957 was a critical year 
for the steel industry. However, it is equally clear that this was only faintly 
perceived at the time. Indeed concern with the industry’s position seems only to have 
been acknowledged, and then only by some, after the publication of the Benson 
Report in 1967, and more importantly by most only in 1978. Furthermore, the 
managerial conservatism of the 1950s remained largely hidden until the 1960s, at 
which point Official circles began to acknowledge that the industry was suffering 
from lack of investment leaving it technically backward, that growth rates were 
behind those of competitors and that labour costs were higher and productivity growth 
lower than those of steel’s competitors. Nationalisation was seen as providing a much 
needed opportunity to rationalise and modernise.
The extent to which nationalisation aided the modernisation and rationalisation of the 
industry is an issue dealt with elsewhere (Pryke 1981, Abromeit 1986, Heal 1974) but 
the role of successive governments in influencing strategic direction and actions as 
well as more operational decisions critically affected its performance and industrial 
relations. This lends support to the view that it is government control per se (or at 
least the form of control dominant in public corporations in Britain) rather than the 
operation of incomes policies or the particular government in power which is critical. 
This is not to discount the role of incomes policies which seem to have had a clear 
influence on the number of pay stoppages in the late 1970s but that a focus on this
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ignores the multi-faceted nature of government influence. These political 
contingencies operated in 1972 when the Heath government held down steel prices 
as part of its anti-inflation policy. Similarly, the closure programme after 1975 was 
affected by government action or inaction. As Upham (1990) has argued, the 
incoming Labour government changed the timescale for redundancies and that 
throughout their period in office Labour ministers were an unseen presence at national 
pay bargaining sessions and played a role in raising management pay offers closer to 
union demands. It should also be stressed that after 1978 there were government 
representatives on the main board of the Corporation. The strikes in South Wales 
which greeted BSC’s announcement of job losses ultimately forced it to retreat from 
the programme, albeit temporarily as it failed to secure government backing for its 
intended programme (Docherty 1983). By 1979, the industry’s position had 
weakened further and the Corporation found a willing ally in government to help push 
through its revised closure programme.
The role of the Thatcher government in relation to the British Steel has parallels with 
Femer’s (1988) work on British Rail. BSC had a major rationalisation programme 
as an element on a possible agenda for some time but to be implemented it required 
political backing. In the 1980s the ‘commercial logic’ became the motive force, 
placed at the top of the agenda, effectively activated by the incoming government, and 
with the requirement to further the ’public interest’ subsequently removed from its 
objectives under the 1981 Iron and Steel Act, BSC was free to operate largely 
unencumbered by social objectives. Furthermore, by 1979 the contradictions within 
the circuit of capital had become so severe that it was easier for both BSC and the 
government to argue that alternatives were unavailable. However, it would be wrong 
to read too much into the change of government. Whilst Morgan is correct to argue 
that:
The government’s initial refusal to extend BSC’s own external 
financing limits togther with its imposition of an impossible 
break-even target for 1980/81 represents the most stringent 
cash limits ever imposed on a nationalised industry in Britain.
(Morgan 1983: Quoted in Fevre 1989)
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Stringent cash limits had been introduced by the previous Labour administration and 
BSC’s ‘Radical Review’, although not deemed radical enough by the incoming 
Conservative government proposed substantial cuts in the industry. What does seem 
clear is that a reassessment was taking place within the Corporation in the late 1970’s 
and it was to a view of a future Corporation which had a greater chance of political 
backing under the new administration than under the old.
The difficulties in achieving Corporation objectives need also to be seen in the context 
of worker resistance; particularly to the closure programme and the uncertainty within 
the industry associated with changing work practices and the erosion of employment 
security. It is significant that BSC’s perception of ISTC’s power led it temporarily 
to withdraw its closure notice for Bilston in 1978 after the union had threatened a 
national stoppage over the issue, which stresses the critical role of perceptions of 
power and attitudes of the parties in industrial relations (Waddington 1987). Since 
1980, the levels of organised conflict in steel and metals overall have declined rapidly 
illustrating that long and major conflict where success is achieved by management 
may well be followed by a period of relative industrial peace as one set of dominant 
workplace values is replaced by another (see Waddington 1987). To what extent this 
has occurred within BSC or, if it has to what extent these values are linked to the 
importance of the market and the Corporation’s viablility is debatable but it is clear 
that the labour process in the industry has been transformed (see productivity 
performance, especially at Ravenscraig in the mid 1980s) with the workforce and 
steel industry unions apparently powerless or unwilling in many instances to 
significantly influence outcomes.
Overall, the application of a circuit of capital approach together with our broader 
systems perspective would seem to have considerable value in accounting for the 
pattern of strike activity in Steel and highlights, as the analysis would suggest, the 
critical role played by management strategy and trade union and worker responses to 
these circumstances. Of particular importance is the fact that the strategy adopted by 
the Corporation and Conservative government in 1973 was extremely risky, 
depending as it did upon assumptions of a rapidly expanding market and resulting
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economies of scale. The enormous capital requirements and financial outlay involved 
in the Plan imposed an immense burden after 1975 when the product market declined 
sharply. This commitment, with its associated level of fixed costs and escalating 
interest burden left BSC with no real alternative after 1975 other than to make 
cutbacks in the one area of variable costs which contributed to value-added, namely 
labour. Thus, the combination of its planning and the worsening market position 
made the attack on labour costs inevitable. The vigour with which this was pursued 
intensified as the pressure from governments to meet ever tighter borrowing limits 
became more acute.
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STRIKE ACTIVITY AND CHANGING INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS 
SHIPBUILDING AND MARINE ENGINEERING
(1) INTRODUCTION
The shipbuilding and marine engineering industry permits a number of issues central 
to this study to be examined in depth. It has assumed an importance in studies of 
strikes as a classically strike prone industry in the same genre as coal-mining and the 
docks although such studies have tended to focus upon inter-industry strike activity 
rather than strike activity over time (Kerr and Siegal 1954, Cameron 1964). 
Furthermore, such explanations offered for the industry’s strike record have tended 
to emphasise the significance of management and worker attitudes (Geddes 1966, CIR 
1971, Barnett 1986) and the role of trade union structure and organisation (Cameron 
1964). Indeed the system of industrial relations has frequently been attacked as a 
major factor in the industry’s declining fortunes being variously described as ’guerilla 
warfare’ (McGoldrick 1983) or, simply as a ’jungle’ (Ferry*). The industry’s 
performance generally and its industrial relations in particular have also been the 
focus of increasing political concern throughout the period with state financial 
assistance in the early 1960s, investigations initiated by state agencies leading to 
reports in 1966 (Geddes, which gave rise to the Shipbuilding Industry Act), 1971 
(CIR and Hill Samuel) and 1972 (Booz-Allan), with ever increasing amounts of 
financial support going to a few particularly ailing companies, culminating in 
nationalisation in 1977.
Background
To appreciate the post-war performance of the shipbuilding industry and its associated 
pattern of industrial relations and strike activity it is necessary to briefly describe how 
the position in the late 1940s had emerged.
In the late nineteenth century ship construction moved increasingly towards iron and 
steel and away from wood which in turn required changes in both the human and 
technical aspects of building and led to the emergence of groups of workers with 
specialist craft skills working on specific aspects of ship construction. The late
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nineteenth century also witnessed the development of a clear skill differentiation and 
hierarchy in the industry (McGoldrick 1983) and a further distinction between those 
deemed to be skilled (normally the steel trades) and those unskilled (e.g outfitters). 
As ships became more sophisticated in the early part of this century these crafts 
proliferated, with each skill defending its comer of the production process with ’the 
tenacity of a medieval power defending his rights within the village common field’ 
(Barnett 1986: 109). The same author concluded that one consequence of the early 
development of shipbuilding was that a welter of different craft unions emerged with 
a destructive effect on productivity as a result of the rigid demarcations between 
them. Overall, he argued that
Britain entered the Second World War....with a shipbuilding 
industry that was a rusting, patially dismantled and partly 
unmanned hulk of essentially Victorian technology: and on the 
whole, no less rusting were its management and workforce and 
their operational methods (1986: 112)
However, as Reid (1991) has stressed, the role of employers in retaining a 
commitment to the general features of craft production was critical, despite their 
condemnation of union restrictive practices. Rather, the latter were a direct result of 
employer wishes to give work to groups of workers with high levels of manual skills 
and their failure to develop an adequate system of supervision or incentive payments. 
Contemporary accounts identify these and other concerns well. The Barlow 
Committee Report of 1942, whilst airing anxieties over the general complacency in 
the industry, slackness of work and general reluctance to work overtime, also pointed 
to the legacy of the unemployment of the 1930s (60% between 1932 and 1933 
McGoldrick 1983) and the loss of skilled men to the industry. The subsequent 
technical survey by Bentham severely criticised the quality of management in the 
shipyards and the tendency to build an enormous variety of ships in each yard (a 
criticism made over twenty years later by Geddes) frequently with outdated machinery 
and equipment. The survey also pointed to inadequate planning in the yards 
symptomatic of a high degree of institutional inertia captured in Lithgow’s description 
of the industry’s ’worship of the status quo’ (quoted in Barnett 1986). The extent of
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concern in government circles led via the Shipyard Development Committee to a 
major capital investment programme so that the industry benefitted from much new 
machinery even if ’the technical and psychological shortcomings were still intact’ 
producing a ’fossilisation of inefficiency’ (Barnett 1986).
To a great extent these problems appear to have continued into the post-war period 
and provide an important backcloth against which the post-war experience must be 
seen. Shipbuilding has and continues to be male dominated with a very high 
percentage of workers designated as skilled (approximately two-thirds for most of the 
period) based around clearly defined crafts represented by a large number of separate 
and organisationally strong trade unions. Within these crafts the so-called 
’black-squads’ (steel-working trades) have been the most powerful and amongst the 
most willing to protect their position and status in the industry. The division of 
labour which produced this plethora of crafts has proved extremely resistant to 
change, demonstrating a high degree of rigidity and formalisation (Brown et al. 1972) 
as well as reflecting considerable distrust between yard managers and workers 
(Geddes 1966, Lorenz 1991) and giving rise to a narrow sectionalism amongst 
workers in the industry (CIR 1971).
One legacy of these historical factors has been that shipbuilding has remained a craft 
industry (Brown and Brannen 1970) when counterparts in other countries were 
adopting modem methods of technology (Barnett 1986). This was due much to 
management choice given the concerns over the adequacy of available technology 
(especially in the inter-war period) and the fluctuations in product demand which 
characterised the industry (Reid 1991) and led it to the view that productivity 
improvements would come through people rather than new investment. Consequently 
the industry responded slowly to technical developments particularly those of 
pre-fabrication and unit assembly.
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Attitudes and Industrial relations
Work by Brannen and Brown (1970) in the late 1960s suggested that the shipbuilding 
industry exhibited a number of important social characteristics which profoundly 
influenced the nature of worker attitudes and responses to management. They 
identified seven factors they believed were critical; the occupational diversity within 
the industry with up to 20 different trades involved in production, the elaborate 
socialisation of new workers via apprenticeships of up to five years for entry into 
skilled trades, and the fact that trade unions frequently operated pre or post entry 
closed shops from which they derived considerable power and control over critical 
aspects of the work situation were all seen as particularly important (by the end of the 
19th Century, 17 unions organised the majority of skilled workers and the closed shop 
operated in the major yards (Lorenz 1991). They also stressed the market situation 
experienced by firms, operating in internationally competitive markets subject to 
significant short term fluctuations, the market situation of shipyard workers as 
different numbers in different trades were required at separate stages in the production 
process and finally, they emphasised the considerable degree of worker control and 
autonomy which existed in many shipyards and the apparent lack of alienation from 
work of those engaged in the industry. In a subsequent study the authors argued that 
these factors produced workers with their own sense of identity which influenced how 
they perceived and related to factors such as management policy (Brown et al. 1972). 
This appeared to be particularly true for the boilermakers who exhibited a strong 
sense of identity, with shared norms and values and with a deep commitment to the 
industry seeking improvements in it by attempting to change it rather than by leaving 
it (Brown et al. 1972). Indeed, for some groups within the boilermakers work 
opportunities outside the industry were often limited, increasing the incentive to 
improve conditions within it.
For much of the post-war period the boilermakers dominated industrial relations. In 
addition to being more numerous than other groups in the industry they occupied a 
strategic position in the process of ship construction, maintaining an effective 
pre-entry closed shop together with apprenticeships and were willing and able to take 
industrial action against management with union support in competition with other
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occupational groups (Brown et al. 1972). In addition they were numerically the most 
important group within the Shipbuilding Industry Committee of the CSEU. Not only 
did the boilermakers achieve results vis a vis other groups but within this group there 
was a considerable hierarchy reflected in earnings, with production welders being 
particularly successful. Overall, Brown et al. suggested that;
The pattern of industrial relations is seen as the consequences, 
intended and unintended of different groups pursuing strategies 
which appeared most appropriate to their changing situations.
This extreme pursuit of sectional interests at local level meant that in the 1960s 
shipbuilding represented ’almost a paradigm case of the informal system of industrial 
relations identified by the Donovan Commission’ (McGoldrick 1983: 213) and indeed
remained the key characteristic of the conduct of industrial 
relations until the late 1970s’. (McGoldrick 1983: 204).
Formally, industrial relations involved national agreements negotiated between the 
Confederation of Shipbuilding and Engineering Unions (CSEU) representing the main 
unions (over eleven in the 1960s) and the Shipbuilding Employers Federation (SRNA 
from the mid 1960s) covering wages and other general conditions. However 
procedures covering disputes dating from 1913 with subsequent amendments in 1943, 
and the 1912 demarcation agreement negotiated by the CSEU and SEF were not 
signed by the boilermakers unions. Despite changes made to the nature of national 
agreements in the 1950s and 1960s (see below) it was local bargaining which was 
most important with no principle on the timing and pursuit of claims. Indeed in the 
1950s and 1960s some wage claims were being pursued at national, district and yard 
levels simultaneously (McGoldrick 1983). The position of national agreements in the 
industry is indicated by the Geddes view that the power of the CSEU was ’more 
moral than constitutional’ (1966: para 354).
The predominance of local bargaining and the success of the boilermakers within that 
was largely a consequence of payments systems within shipbuilding. For much of the
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period around 80% of those employed were on some form of payment by results 
system. Those employed on hull construction work including boilermakers were 
traditionally on piecework whilst outfitters were on time-work systems. Boilermakers 
were therefore the main initiators of bargaining over wages at local level because the 
system of payment provided the opportunities for bargaining which were duly 
exploited. This had two very important consequences, first local bargaining helped 
to produce a myriad of pay rates and allowances for certain groups and jobs all 
offering the potential for conflict if they were infringed and second, conflicts which 
arose did so at yard and district level, were frequently short and unofficial and were 
mainly concerned with wages (Cameron 1964, on strikes in the North East 
shipbuilding industry between 1949 and 1959).
Management it seems was willing to tolerate this system but an important distinction 
needs to be made between the role of the employers association and yard 
management. As we detail below, the SEF seems to have been acutely aware of the 
parlous state of the industry by the late 1950s and attempted to initiate changes to 
tackle the perceived weaknesses in the industrial relations sphere. In contrast 
management in the yards appears to have acquiesced in maintaining the ’traditional’ 
division of labour leaving much of the major initiatives in the industrial relations 
arena to the association. The perceived inadequacies of yard management in the 
wartime period have already been noted but a similar story emerges from the P.E.P 
study conducted in the early 1960s (P.E.P 1965) and noted earlier where traditional 
industries, including shipbuilding were seen as those with a preponderance of 
’sleepers’ reacting to situations rather than adopting a more ’thrusting’ pro-active 
approach to managing. This view also characterises the work of Aldcroft (1964) who 
emphasised the degree of managerial conservatism within the industry, although 
recent work (Lorenz 1991) has suggested that this conservatism, whilst prevalent had 
some basis in rationality given the inter-war experiences of most shipbuilders.
239
2) SHIPBUILDING AND MARINE ENGINEERING: THE STRIKE 
RECORD
Table 1 documents the main dimensions of stoppages for the period 1948-1982. The 
first point to make is that they do not conform to the pattern in the rest of engineering 
or indeed most other industries. In the 1950s shipbuilding and marine engineering 
was the most strike-prone industry in the UK outside of coal-mining with stoppages 
typically small, local and unofficial* (Cameron 1964, Geddes 1966, CIR 1971). 
Significant peaks in strike numbers occurred in 1951, 1955 and 1958 with a general 
trend increase after 1953, but it is the period from 1964 to 1975 which experiences 
the major phase of strike activity with correspondingly high levels of workers 
involved between 1968 and 1974 and working days lost between 1970 and 1975. 
These phases do reflect strike trends elsewhere but the peaks are different; 1968 for 
stoppage numbers and workers involved and 1972 for days lost with 4.2 days lost for 
every employee. It is also noticeable that the days lost series increased after 1952 
and particularly between 1956 and 1962 due much to the predominance of certain 
forms of non-pay stoppage such as demarcation which tended to be longer than 
disputes over pay (Cameron 1964).
An alternative approach to examining these statistics is to divide them according to 
the periodization employed by DMR (1983) with two additional phases representing 
the period up to nationalization and the years following nationalization up to and 
including 1982. These are detailed in Table 2 overleaf.
This periodization does not conform exactly to the phases of high/medium/low strike 
incidence in the industry but does illustrate variations and movements in the overall 
series. The high working days lost figures for the 1953-59 period is due much to two 
national stoppages in 1953 and 1957 although days lost did increase after 1956. 
Finally, table 3 breaks down the strike dimensions by cause and adjusts the figures 
by employment. Detailed industry data on strikes by cause were only published from 
1959 and so the table covers the period from 1959-82.
*Defined as disputes arising without official trade union backing
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TABLE 1
STRIKE ACTIVITY IN SHIPBUILDING AND MARINE ENGINEERING
1948-1982
YEAR STRIKES WORKERS INVOLVED DAYS LOST
1948 78 20200 237000
1949 57 14000 250000
1950 45 10800 53000
1951 103 14600 73000
1952 61 13500 87000
1953 52 143100 206000
1954 63 16100 521000
1955 94 16100 122000
1956 78 49100 324000
1957 74 188500 2328000
1958 97 22100 336000
1959 85 24100 324000
1960 74 40300 387000
1961 91 64200 388000
1962 78 322800 465000
1963 66 15300 103000
1964 91 64200 388000
1965 129 29300 165000
1966 84 8400 31000
1967 96 24500 153000
1968 134 51700 356000
1969 89 50200 192000
1970 121 40200 410000
1971 83 40500 563000
1972 64 53800 796000
1973 67 26700 268000
1974 87 57000 693000
1975 63 34100 509000
1976 40 22100 62000
1977 43 18500 163000
1978 44 17900 163000
1979 42 49200 301000
1980 27 13600 194000
1981 28 60800 230000
1982 30 80900 124000
Source: Employment Gazette 1951-1983
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TABLE 2
STRIKE ACTIVITY IN SELECTED PERIODS: AVERAGE ANNUAL DATA
YEARS NUMBER OF 
STRIKES PER YEAR
WDL PER ’000 
WORKERS
1949-1952 66.5 273
1953-1959 77.6 1929
1960-1968 93.7 1061
1969-1973 84.8 2299
1974-1977 58.3 1921
1978-1982 34.2 1037
Source: DMR for years 1949-1973, Employment Gazette for 1974-1982
From Table 3 it is clear that strikes over pay were frequent between 1964 and 1974 
with similar trends occurring for non-pay disputes but the workers involved series for 
pay and non-pay tend to diverge. Workers involved in pay disputes reach their 
highest levels in 1962 and between 1968 and 1974 (particularly 1968-1970) but in 
non-pay disputes their is much more variation although the tendency is for them to 
fall from the late 1960s to 1978 and to increase thereafter. Finally, the high levels 
of days lost in the period 1970-1975 is almost entirely attributable to pay disputes 
with days lost in non-pay disputes showing no clear phases but maintaining very low 
levels between 1970 and 1976.
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TABLE 3
STRIKE ACTIVITY BY CAUSE
PAY STOPPAGES NON-PAY STOPPAGES
YEAR S WI* WBL+ S WI* WDL+
1959 12.05 1.27 1.17 17.2 3.86 9.99
1960 14.7 11.44 13.1 11.84 1.0 0.75
1961 21.26 4.06 10.44 13.29 18.07 4.4
1962 14.78 121.8 14.5 16.37 4.07 3.99
1963 16.98 1.65 3.4 13.02 2.95 1.16
1964 24.1 6.2 4.4 18.05 2.73 2.64
1965 39.87 6.65 4.7 12.25 4.12 2.84
1966 20.13 1.31 0.66 19.20 1.83 0.8
1967 29.32 4.86 2.93 16.83 6.25 4.42
1968 44.07 18.9 7.09 23.81 5.17 12.3
1969 26.71 13.96 4.33 18.15 6.6 4.03
1970 45.73 10.9 19.09 15.07 4.92 1.5
1971 26.48 8.1 27.46 22.61 4.67 1.77
1972 21.82 19.56 41.84 12.47 2.63 0.75
1973 15.51 5.67 13.69 20.32 3.53 1.55
1974 31.3 16.68 37.18 15.65 2.97 2.05
1975 19.02 5.92 23.48 15.22 3.04 1.47
1976 8.1 4.92 2.27 13.52 1.68 1.14
1977 11.43 2.57 3.14 13.14 2.17 6.11
1978 16.57 8.8 6.1 8.57 1.43 3.2
1979 13.64 18.47 14.66 10.23 9.49 2.44
1980 10.22 4.57 8.79 8.18 4.7 4.43
1981 6.35 2.4 4.79 13.38 40.45 11.42
1982 9.6 50.99 5.62 12.57 8.79 3.55
Source: Employment Gazette 1960-83 for strike data and employment. 
S is strikes per 100000 employees.
WI* is workers involved per 10000 employees.
WDL+ is working days lost per 1000 employees.
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(3) STRIKE ACTIVITY IN SHIPBUILDING AND MARINE 
ENGINEERING: EMPIRICAL RESULTS.
In this section the results of econometric work undertaken on stoppage activity in the 
period 1950-80 and for 1959-82 are detailed. In the analysis of the period 1959-82 
it was decided to dispense with the trade union variables and the time trend employed 
in the longer period analysis. In the case of the trade union variable the Bain and 
Price series was used, which applied to metals and engineering as a whole and did 
not reflect the consistently higher levels of trade union density prevailing in 
shipbuilding and marine engineering for the entire period of the study. The inclusion 
of a time trend raises problems of interpretation and arguably does little to enhance 
understanding of the determinants of stoppages (Mayhew 1979).
A range of variables was tested in the equations but political factors were again found 
to be insignificant and both the industry unemployment rate and the level of output 
failed to achieve significance. Overall, both equations performed poorly for time 
series studies and the best results, obtained with the addition of a time trend were 
achieved at the expense of the other variables, with only the rate of change of output 
remaining significant. However, even with the time trend included the coefficient of 
determination rose to 0.68, and the F value to 8.5, both considerably below the 
results obtained for the other industries in the sector.
Although a lower value for the coefficient of determination could be expected for the 
the industry, the results obtained and the poor performance of the mix of variables 
is very striking. The structure of trade unionism and strike causes attributed to this 
are obviously an important factor in the results but these results are also symptomatic 
of a relatively closed industrial relations system, insulated for much of the period 
from the wider environment characterised by the predominance of adversarial 
relations between management and unions and between unions.
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STRIKE ACTIVITY: SHIPBUILDING AND MARINE ENGINEERING
1950-1980
Variable Equations
(a) (b)
Constant 62.0 12.9
U - 2.57 - 8.7
(2.18) (3.7)
Y. + 1.5
(2.56)
Y/N - 0.83
(1.56)
TUD + 0.985
(2.36)
#/P -0.28 -0.197
(4.97) (3.76)
SDE 9.2 9.29
F 7.55 9.35
R2 0.537 0.509
D.W 2.07 1.724
Notes:U; aggregate unemployment, percentage unemployed: Employment Gazette. 
Y. rate of change of output, calculated from Annual Abstract of Statistics.
Y/N; rate of change of labour productivity in industry. Output from Annual Abstract 
divided by employment from Employment Gazette. TUD; trade union density, Bain 
and Price (1980)#/P; level of real profit in industry.
MEANS and STANDARD DEVIATIONS for variables are as follows: U, 2.832 and 1.66. Y. -0.944 
and 5.68, Y/N, 1.362 and 5.5. TUD, 59.57 and 9.532. #/P, 63.46 and 34.625.
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An encouraging result is the performance of the rate of change of output and the level 
of real profits. The significance of the rate of change of output, rather than its level, 
is the consequence of the nature of work within shipbuilding. It is characterised by 
a predominance of one-off, bulk contracts and a lack of orders would have a very 
severe impact on the amount of work available. The positive coefficient on the 
variable implies that new orders create rising expectations and greater confidence and 
these may give rise to more ambitious demands for pay etc. Such a situation is likely 
to increase the possibility of strike action, if employers believe that orders will reduce 
in the future thus making them unwilling to concede to trade union demands. 
Furthermore, by highlighting the fluctuations in output it focuses attention upon the 
employment and earnings insecurity in the industry, and may explain why short-term 
thinking appears to have dominated decision-making in the industry (P.E.P 1965) so 
that a form of ‘rational’ economic opportunism prevails (Lorenz, 1991).
The real profits variable appears as the most significant of the variables employed and 
is negatively related to stoppage activity. As with the aggregate results this suggests 
that employers share the benefits of profitability with their employees and, given the 
market power apparently possessed by the industry for at least part of the post-war 
period, their ability to share such profits was considerable. In addition, when the 
relative uncompetitiveness of the industry was exposed in the 1960s and 1970s and 
profits began to fall sharply, strike activity did not respond accordingly, again 
indicative of the prevalence of attitudes fashioned out of the deeply entrenched 
traditions within the industry. Finally, accepting the qualifications made above, trade 
union density is again significant and appears to exert a strong positive influence on 
stoppage numbers. Given the consistently high levels of density within the industry 
in the post-war period the failure of the trade union growth variable, to achieve 
significance is understandable.
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1959-1982 
Pay Stoppages
The results described in the table below represent those from the equations which 
accounted for the most variation in the dependent variable. All the equations used 
included a combination of aggregate, labour market and product market variables 
together with dummies to identify the effect of procedural changes in the industry. 
The best of these accounted for around 70% of the variation in pay stoppages. The 
qualification about the results in view of the limited number of observations should 
again be noted.
The aggregate unemployment term (though not industry unemployment) was 
consistently significant in the equations and exerted a strong negative impact on the 
number of disputes. Similarly the dummy variable for the years 1967-70 was 
significant in equation (2) and was included to take account of the post-Geddes 
rationalisation of the industry and the impact of productivity agreements being 
negotiated at the time (see below). The rate of change of output was also significant 
(equation (2)) at least in the absence of the disputes procedure dummy, with the real 
profit variable approaching significance in the same equation. In contrast, the real 
and nominal earnings variables were insignificant in all equations, a finding which is 
discussed more fully below. Overall, aggregate and local product market variables, 
together with the effect of internal reorganisation account for a large part of the 
variations in pay stoppages with industry specific labour market conditions exerting 
a limited influence (cf Parkinson 1960, Cameron 1964). However, it is the 
contention here is that changes in internal pay relativities were critical influences upon 
strike activity at certain points and that the external labour market exerted a 
significant impact on the conduct of industrial relations through its impact on worker 
attitudes. This is developed further in the second part of the chapter. The record of 
pay and non-pay strikes in the industry from 1959-1982 is detailed in the figure 
overleaf.
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PAY STOPPAGES -h— NON-PAY STOPPAGES
STOPPAGES: 1959-1982
Pay Stoppages per 100000 Non-Pay Stopps p 100000
Variable 1 2 M SD 3 4 5
Constant 31.8 31.6 15.58 15.15 16.3
U -2.09 - 1.52 4.04 2.89 + 0.55 + 0.55
(2.26) (2.8) (1.47) (1.47)
Y. + 0.64 + 0.73 - 2.84 4.52+  0.16 + 0.17
(1.63) (2.1) (1.0) (1.07)
#/P -0.12 -0.01 42.7 25.6
(1.59) (1.67)
67-70 + 8.87 + 10.35
(1.89) (2-35)
Pt-1 8.1 6.09 -0.27 -0.29 -0.15
(1.62) (1.83) (1.05)
DP + 4.6 + 6.66 + 7.78 + 7.48
(1.17) (3.05) (4.14) (2.34)
DA -5.06 - 5.46 -5.84
(2.14) (2.34) (1.76)
NAT + 4.4 + 3.55
(0.55) (1.0)
SDE 6.78 6.68 2.83 2.83 2.92
F 7.13 10.66 5.55 6.68 5.03
R2 0.715 0.69 0.61 0.58 0.58
D.W 2.6 2.5 3.1 3.0 2.9
With U = aggregate unemployment;
Y ., the rate of change of industry output;
#/P, the level of real profit;
67-70, a dummy variable for the years 1967-70;
DP and DA, dummy variables to represent the introduction of the 1967 Disputes 
procedure and 1969 Demarcation Agreement respectively;
Pt-1, price inflation lagged one year;
NAT, a dummy variable to account for Nationalisation and a new disputes procedure 
operative in a full year from 1978).
Figures in brackets are t statistics.
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The results for aggregate unemployment would appear to confirm the view that 
general movements in demand have a direct impact on the willingness of groups to 
engage in industrial action. However, it is not clear why an industry with such an 
apparently ’closed system’ of industrial relations should be so affected by changes in 
aggregate unemployment particularly as its impact on non-pay stoppages is so limited 
(see below). Furthermore, it has remained a strong contention that whilst certain 
groups such as boilermakers had limited job opportunities and would seek to try and 
change conditions within the industry other groups could find work relatively easily 
(Parkinson 1960, Cameron 1964, Brown and Brannen 1970). This would suggest that 
any fall in aggregate demand as reflected in a rise in aggregate unemployment would 
be more likely to affect these latter groups rather than boilermakers and that in any 
event the critical variable might be changes in the rate of unemployment within a 
particular locality rather than aggregate unemployment.
The results for the dummy variable 1967-70 are particularly interesting, though care 
is needed in their interpretation. Whilst strike activity was increasing elsewhere, in 
shipbuilding and marine engineering a number of industry specific changes were 
occurring in the wake of Geddes and the 1962 National Pay and Conditions 
Agreement which suggest a direct impact on the industry’s industrial relations. 
Following the Geddes recommendations, new shipyard groupings were formed 
involving closures and the merger of yards with very different management 
structures, traditions and industrial relations practices. It is likely that one effect of 
these changes was to ’widen the orbits of comparison’ for workers in the industry by 
allowing exposure to a variety of different work practices, payment systems and 
general pay and conditions prevailing in the different yards. The impact of the new 
disputes procedure in 1967 may also have exerted an impact on pay stoppages (but 
see discussion below) and it is interesting that in equation (1) the 1967-70 dummy is 
insignificant when run alongside the disputes procedure variable. Finally, the period 
1967-70 is also characterised by increasing state suppport and initiatives to aid the 
industry and specific companies in particular and may have engendered the view 
amongst workers that ’strikes pay’.
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The results for the rate of change of output confirm those for the longer period and 
would be expected in an industry characterised by ’one-off’ large scale projects where 
cancellations or lack of orders would have a very significant impact on those working 
in it. The profits variable, significant in the longer period, does not achieve 
significance for the period after 1959 implying that it is in the period up to 1959 
when the impact of profits is important for pay stoppages. It is notable that this 
earlier period is one of profitablility for the industry and supports the view that in 
the ’boom years’ managers were prepared to share profits with their employees. 
However, the background to the 1957 national dispute suggests that this applied until 
employers perceived that prosperity would not last (Clegg and Adams 1957). After 
this point the association between profits and strike activity remains but, in an era of 
largely declining profits, it fails to achieve significance. In addition it is likely that 
the impact of the profits variable was ’swamped’ by other changes taking place after 
the turn of the decade which lessened its impact for employees.
Non-Pay Stoppages
For non-pay stoppages a combination of nine variables comprising aggregate, product, 
labour market and procedural dummies were used to account for variations in the 
dependent variable, the equations are detailed in the table above as equations (3), (4) 
and (5).
The first point to note about the results is that the equations have less explanatory 
power than those for pay stoppages with the equations cited accounting for around 
60% of the variation in stoppages. However, an important finding is that the two 
dummy variables (disputes procedure and demarcation agreement) are consistently 
significant with the lagged price inflation term as the other variable approaching 
significance in the equations.
The price inflation result in equation (4) implies that low rates of inflation are 
associated with a higher number of non-pay stoppages. Whilst this is a plausible 
result it assumes that pay becomes less of an issue in periods of low inflation (or that 
there are fewer pay stoppages at such times, but price inflation does not appear to be
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associated with more strikes over pay in the industry. Indeed pay and non-pay strikes 
are positively correlated in shipbuilding for the period). The result may also suggest 
that in periods of low or high inflation workers can secure what are deemed to be 
appropriate pay increases without recourse to strike action although the evidence 
suggests that the major periods of pay stoppages have coincided with high and rising 
inflation. Assuming that what appears to matter more to workers in pay disputes and 
especially periods of inflation is relative pay the finding that high inflation reduces 
concern over non-pay issues whilst low inflation increases such concern may not be 
surprising. In an environment of high inflation it would be expected that a traditional 
concern with pay relativities might be relaxed in order to push for rises to maintain 
high nominal earnings increases just to preserve living standards. At such times 
workers would be expected to devote more time and resources to the maintenance of 
living standards rather than pursue non-pay issues with any degree of conviction. 
Conversely, in periods of low inflation the ability to extract concessions on pay may 
be relatively easy without resort to strike action and may tend to focus attention on 
the pursuit of non-pay issues.
In contrast to pay stoppages, the aggregate unemployment term (as well as the 
industry unemployment variable) remained insignificant in all equations although the 
coefficient was positive. The latter point is important as it suggests that the effect of 
unemployment strengthened the resistance to the undermining of job security, 
particularly as such periods are frequently associated with attempts by management 
to change working practices, and it is probable that unemployment may exert a 
significant impact on certain forms of non-pay stoppage such as demarcation (see 
Parkinson 1960, Cameron 1964).
The results for the two dummy variables imply that the 1967 disputes procedure 
increased the number of non-pay disputes whilst the 1969 demarcation agreement 
reduced the number. However, there are difficulties in interpreting these results. 
The impact of the disputes procedure seems to have been to raise disputes generally 
in the industry (cf CIR 1971) and it is significant that after Nationalisation a new 
procedure was introduced. Evidence suggests that the procedure was often delayed
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by managers and adherence to it rather piecemeal in some yards (Ferry*, McGoldrick 
1983). Nonetheless its introduction at a time of substantial change in the industry 
needs to be borne in mind and the results may be picking up the effects of these. 
Indeed it may be that the number of disputes would have been even greater in the 
absence of such procedures (Blanchflower and Cubbin 1986). In the case of the 
demarcation agreement it should be remembered that this was introduced at the time 
of the full integration of the various components of the Amalgamated Society of 
Boilermakers and it is likely (see CIR 1971) that this had an impact on the reduction 
of disputes over demarcation. The 1969 agreement therefore appears to have had an 
impact on reducing stoppages but it is difficult to isolate its precise effect given the 
changes in union structure.
Overall, variations in the number of non-pay stoppages appear to be significantly 
affected by procedural changes, with aggregate, product and labour market factors 
exerting a relatively minor influence, although disputes over demarcation appear to 
be associated with changes in local unemployment (Parkinson 1960, Cameron 1964). 
This contrasts with pay stoppages where aggregate and local product market factors 
appear to be more important determinants of stoppage numbers. Furthermore, the 
fact that local product and labour market factors appear not to be important 
determinants of non-pay stoppages and the fact that 40% of the variation in such 
stoppages remain unexplained by the variables employed suggest that factors internal 
to the industry are of critical importance. These would include changes in trade 
union structure and organisation and the changing nature of the labour process. It is 
significant that non-pay disputes were high in the late 1950s and from 1966-73 when 
employer attempts to reduce employment, and in the latter period, reorganise and 
rationalise were at their peak. The resurgence of such disputes in the period after 
nationalisation can also be linked to greater job insecurity through actual and 
threatened redundancies.
253
Strike Activity: Workers Involved and Working Days Lost
In order to test for the impact of the variables on the other main dimensions of 
stoppages equations were run for workers involved and days lost adjusted for 
employment for both pay and non-pay disputes. In the case of workers involved, for 
pay stoppages none of the variables employed was significant and even when run with 
eight variables (U, Ui, Y., Et-1, Pt-1, #/P, DP and the 1967-70 dummy) these only 
accounted for 24% of the variation in workers involved. However, for non-pay 
stoppages three variables were consistently significant and accounted for 45 % of the 
variation in the dependent variable. The results are documented in the table overleaf 
in equation (1). The aggregate unemployment term exerted a strong positive 
influence on workers involved presumably because unemployment changes have a 
general effect on workers (although affecting them disproportionately) and as a proxy 
for the general state of demand can be assumed to influence management in resisting 
concessions. Also, in periods of high unemployment management can be expected 
to try and push through changes as pressure to cut costs is greater but also because 
the bargaining power of workers can be expected to have been weakened.
The lagged earnings term, implying that rising earnings in the previous year increase 
the days lost in the current year can be interpreted as satisfaction with one area of a 
job leads to a focus on other areas. For management an increase in earnings in one 
period may increase their willingness to try and cut costs via e.g redundancies and 
manning requirements in the following period particularly if pay increases are 
associated with an increasing wage bill as was the case in shipbuilding (see table 
below). The result on the lagged price term also points to lower inflation or falling 
inflation in one period increasing the willingness of those to try and secure greater 
improvements in other areas and is consistent with the result for non-pay stoppages. 
Taken together these terms could imply that increases in real earnings in a previous 
year increase days lost in non-pay disputes in a subsequent year a view which is 
consistent with the satisfaction argument and the management resistance view. In 
contrast to these results it must be stressed that neither the dummy variable for the 
demarcation agreement nor that for the 1967 disputes procedure were significant.
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Equation (2) for working days lost in pay disputes shows that together the five 
variables accounted for 59% of the variation in days lost. An important finding from 
the results is again the strength of the procedural variables with the impact of the 
1967 disputes procedure and that of nationalisation/new disputes procedure being to 
significantly increase the number of days lost. In the case of the latter variable it 
should also be borne in mind that changes in the structure of collective bargaining 
were also taking place with moves by British Shipbuilders towards company 
bargaining in the late 1970s which would be expected to contribute to an increase in 
the size of disputes (Clegg 1976, 1979). The procedural results can be interpreted 
in terms of the fact that there may be a tendency for procedural reform to lead to a 
resolution of a number of issues which might previously have become disputes (but 
see above) and for the more intractable items to lead to conflict which, by their nature 
would be more difficult to resolve (Edwards 1983).
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STRIKE ACTIVITY: 1959-1982
EQUATIONS:RESULTS FOR WORKERS INVOLVED AND DAYS LOST
WORKERS INVOLVED WORKING DAYS LOST
NON-PAY PAY NON-PAY
Variable Mean SD (1) (2) (3)
Constant 2.68 9.09 2.25
U 4.04 2.89 3.27
(3.85)
0.61
(1.8)
Et-1 8.717 6.816 0.67
(2.28)
0.56
(1.8)
Pt-1 8.1 6.09 - 1.33 
(2.65)
- 1.66 
(3.27)
67-70 - 14.8 
(2.84)
DP 22.9
(4.44)
8.5
(3.19)
DA - 10.8 
(4.0)
NAT 16.14
(2.47)
8.3
(2.36)
SDE 8.12 2.53
F 5.09 4.78
R2 0.45 0.59 0.50
D.W 2.58 2.2
Sources: As above.
Et-i; percentage change in average gross weekly earnings lagged one year. 
Employment Gazette.
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Turning to other results from equation (2), the 1967-70 dummy clearly operates to 
reduce the number of days lost in pay disputes. It would seem that the increase in 
pay disputes which arose in this period from rationalisation and productivity deals did 
not generally result in an increase in days lost and that rather, these disputes were 
resolved relatively quickly. From a management perspective it still appears to have 
been easier to concede quickly in the event of a strike over pay. In the new 
groupings, such disputes by involving a greater number of workers would have been 
more costly and in the context of wanting to effect change as quickly and as 
painlessly as possible the willingness to ’give in’ in the face of a stoppage was 
significant. Although the 67-70 dummy is not significant for workers involved the 
evidence in table 3 shows a clear increase in workers involved in pay disputes in this 
period.
Finally, the lagged earnings term (which approaches significance) and the lagged 
price term require some explanation. The result for earnings suggests that increases 
in nominal earnings in the previous year are likely to increase days lost in the 
subsequent year whilst low/falling inflation in the previous year will tend to increase 
days lost in the next year. The earnings term might be explained by reference to the 
fact that if management concedes significant increases in one year they will be more 
resistant to such increases the next and more prolonged disputes might result. On 
prices high price inflation in one period appears to reduce days lost in the next, this 
result is surprising particularly bearing in mind the experience of high days lost in 
pay disputes in the industry in the early 1970s where high inflation appears to have 
contributed to disturbing differentials and ‘leapfrogging’ pay claims (see below). The 
result might be a consequence of what was happening in the 1950s and 1960s when 
real earnings were being maintained and, at least in the 1950s, profits were still being 
earned. Low or falling inflation in one year might have led to an increase in business 
confidence in the future and have increased management willingness to concede pay 
increases without recourse to protracted stoppages.
257
The results for days lost in non-pay stoppages have a relatively low explanatory 
power although with the addition of the nationalisation/disputes procedure variable 
this is improved and equation (3) overall accounts for around half of the variation in 
days lost. However, the inclusion of the nationalisation term reduces the power of 
the unemployment variable which falls to an insignificant level suggesting that whilst 
the dummy variable does contribute to days lost through corporate bargaining and the 
new disputes procedure it may also be affected by the steep rise in unemployment 
after 1979 given that the unemployment term suggested a strong upward influence on 
days lost. Certainly increasing concern over redundancy in the industry in the late 
1970s led to a number of prolonged disputes (e.g at Robb Caledon in 1981). It is 
likely that the fear of unemployment coupled with management insistence on 
redundancies led to lengthy disputes but that these were compounded by bargaining 
and procedural changes which tended to make such stoppages larger (but see above) 
and lengthier.
ECONOMETRIC RESULTS: Summary and Conclusions
In terms of pay stoppages, changes in aggregate unemployment significantly affect 
both the number and duration of such disputes as does the industry’s internal 
reorganisation of the late 1960s. changes in product market conditions also exert a 
significant influence upon the number of disputes, reflecting the cyclical nature of 
disputes in the industry and its impact on those who work in it. However it is 
procedural changes which appear to have a key influence upon days lost, although in 
the case of nationalisation this may be due to changes in the structure of collective 
bargaining with moves towards company bargaining in the late 1970s under the newly 
constituted British Shipbuilders.
For non-pay disputes procedural variables exert the major influence on both the 
number and days lost series with aggregate economic and industry labour market 
variables influencing the workers involved series. The results for both pay and 
non-pay disputes give considerable support to the underlying theoretical model in 
arguing for a combination of variables including economic, political and procedural 
in accounting for movements in stoppage dimensions. More specifically the results
258
give credence to an ‘institutionalist’ or ‘refined institutionalist’ account of strike 
activity such as that developed by DMR (1983). Procedural variables are important 
influences on both the number and the days lost in stoppages (especially those aside 
from pay), but as DMR show their effect is not necessarily to reduce stoppage 
numbers or to increase days lost (cf Clegg 1979). The effect of the 1969 
demarcation agreement was to depress the main dimensions of non-pay stoppages 
(although this needs to be seen alongside associated changes in trade union 
organisation which almost certainly contributed to a decline in such disputes). In 
contrast, the results for the 1967 disputes procedure for both the number of workers 
and days lost in pay and non-pay disputes was to increase them. Although in the 
absence of these procedures the volume of strike activity might have been even 
greater. The reasons for the apparent increase appear to lie in the way the agreement 
was implemented in certain yards, the fact that it was introduced at a time of 
widespread change in the industry and when a number of substantive issues were 
under discussion and unresolved. This last point would support the view of DMR 
(1983) that procedural reform is unlikely to meet with success where substantive 
issues are still unresolved. This is consistent with the view that the groundswell of 
feeling about pay and pay relativities was such that it could not be contained under 
the revised procedural arrangements even if such procedures did reduce overt conflict 
to a level below that which would have otherwise existed.
Although the absence of data prevented an examination of the direct impact of trade 
union influence and collective bargaining structures it is clear that trade union 
structure and organisation in conjunction with highly decentralised bargaining have 
played a key role in the industry’s strike proneness and in changes in strike frequency 
over time (Geddes 1966, CIR 1971). In particular, the changes that took place within 
the ranks of the boilermakers in terms of the increasing significance of welders 
contributed to greater strike propensity in the 1950s and 1960s both in terms of pay 
and non-pay stoppages. Similarly the inter-union changes following the 
amalgamations in the 1960s are argued to have had an impact on reducing non-pay 
stoppages in the late 1960s and early 1970s (CIR 1971, Booz-Allan 1972).
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Together, the factors identified above are seen as having a major influence upon 
short-term movements in strike dimensions with political and procedural variables 
exerting an additionally longer-term impact. However, with the exception of the 
1967-70 dummy, the econometric analysis largely fails to account for periods of 
heightened conflict which persist for a number of years in the industry. In order to 
examine these periods in more detail the final part of this paper analyses these periods 
in terms of employer and State responses to industrial change and contradictions in 
the circuit of capital facing the industry.
(4) STRIKE ACTIVITY, INDUSTRIAL CHANGE AND THE CIRCUIT OF 
CAPITAL 1950-1980
The previous section detailed a number of influences upon short and long-term 
variations in strike activity emphasising in particular the role of local and aggregate 
economic factors together with procedural changes. Th circuit of capital approach 
attempts to uncover initiatives by both employers and the state to resolve 
contradictions in the industrial circuit in order to account for longer term movements 
in strike totals. The approach examines movements in and interactions between the 
three elements of the circuit, product market, labour market and labour process and 
critically the ways in which contradictions which emerged between these were dealt 
with by the parties involved.
The table overleaf relates changes in the main dimensions of strike activity to 
movements in the elements comprising the circuit of capital. In operationalising the 
circuit the following variables have been used; the level of output to indicate the 
product market position, the real wage bill and real wage bill per unit of output to 
denote the labour process and the level of industry unemployment and changes in 
employment to capture the labour market situation. In addition use has been made of 
labour’s share in value added to give an indication of the combination of the three 
sets of influences.
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TABLE 4
STRIKE ACTIVITY AND THE INDUSTRIAL CIRCUIT OF CAPITAL
YEAR S WI Y NP WB/P WB/P/Y VA Ui
1950 16.98 93.5 23.6 141.1 150.9 5.3
1951 38.48 96.2 18.9 136.7 142.1 3.5
1952 23.03 99.2 21.0 143.3 144.5 3.1
1953 18.94 105.1 25.2 147.9 140.7 3.4
1954 23.35 100.0 24.7 150.5 150.5 3.5
1955 34.28 108.5 28.2 158.4 146.0 2.3
1956 27.67 117.4 26.9 162.6 138.5 1.7
1957 26.44 107.9 28.0 168.2 155.9 4.2
1958 36.10 108.8 24.1 160.6 147.6 4.4
1959 29.27 5.13101.8 20.0 153.3 150.6 5.5
1960 26.54 12.44 92.3 11.9 151.8 164.5 4.6
1961 34.55 22.13 93.2 11.5 152.0 163.1 4.9
1962 31.15 125.87 94.2 3.7 143.2 152.0 4.5
1963 29.5 4.60 84.2 0.0 130.6 155.1 85.5 10.1
1964 42.15 8.93 81.5 0.9 134.4 164.9 - 5.9
1965 59.12 10.77 80.5 3.3 142.0 176.4 - 3.3
1966 39.33 3.14 80.4 0.8 143.9 179.0 - 2.7
1967 46.15 11.11 80.9 3.9 142.6 176.3 - 4.2
1968 67.88 24.07 82.7 5.2 139.6 168.8 76.5 5.1
1969 44.86 20.56 82.5 9.2 141.4 171.4 - 4.2
1970 60.8 15.82 87.0 6.7 150.6 173.1 81.8 5.4
1971 43.09 12.77 84.0 7.3 155.5 185.1 81.7 4.9
1972 34.29 22.19 79.9 9.1 154.8 193.7 76.1 6.3
1973 35.83 9.20 82.7 9.4 161.3 195.0 104.0 4.4
1974 46.95 19.65 86.0 1.8 170.5 198.3 110.6 3.5
1975 34.24 8.96 86.1 - 15.5 176.1 204.5 102.3 3.8
1976 21.62 6.60 84.0 0.1 174.5 207.7 97.2 4.6
1977 24.57 4.74 81.3 35.5 156.5 192.5 87.3 4.0
1978 25.14 10.23 75.2 2.2 170.6 226.9110.7 4.9
1979 23.87 28.96 67.9 - 22.2 153.4 225.9 83.2 5.6
1980 18.40 9.27 60.2 - 8.9 139.1 231.1 89.0 8.2
Sources: S,strikes per 100000 employees; WI, workers involved per 10000 employees; WDL, working 
days lost per 1000 employees; Employment Gazette various issues.
Y; Index of level of output, Annual Abstract of Statistics.
NP;Real Net Profit, in £ millions: profit figures from CSO Blue book National Income and Accounts, 
deflated by RPI, Annual Abstract of Statistics using 1959 as base year
Index of Real Wage Bill and Real Wage Bill per unit of output, wages and salaries from CSO Blue 
Book National Income and Accounts deflated by RPI, Annual Abstract of Statistics.
Data on earnings and employment from Employmet Gazette, data on prices from Annual Abstract of 
Statistics.
VA, Labour share of value added; CSO Blue Book National Income and Accounts. Wages and Salaries 
divided by industry contribution to GDP at factor cost.Industry Unemployment data and changes in 
employment in thousands; Employment Gazette.
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A number of clear trends are discernible from the table although the critical issue for 
the circuit of capital approach and its relationship to strike activity is how these trends 
and contradictions within the circuit were acted upon by the parties involved and it 
is this issue which forms the basis of the remainder of the paper. However, a 
number of general points will be made here. First, the background to the strike 
experience of the post-war period is a steadily worsening product market position 
evidenced by a severe decline in output in the late 1950s and early 1960s and again 
after the oil crisis of the 1970s, which is reinforced by the UK industry’s falling share 
of world trade and reflected in the collapse in profitability after 1957. Second, 
changes in the real wage bill reveal a significant decline after 1956 but an increase 
after 1963, and the fact that this increase was not generally matched by productivity 
improvements particularly after 1968. This would support the view that such labour 
process changes as occurred were slight in terms of raising productivity (e.g via 
greater flexibility and interchangeability) and controlling labour costs and that it was 
the persistance of a particular division of labour which hampered attempts to raise 
productivity (McGoldrick 1983). This said, the combination of these product and 
labour process issues, would appear to have eased somewhat towards the end of the 
1960s as labour’s share of value added declined with the reduction in employment of 
over 105000 between 1958 and 1969, and profits rose after 1966. Third, in terms 
of the labour market a number of forces appeared to operate. One factor not revealed 
in the figures was that in the late 1950s and early 1960s employers had difficulty 
recruiting certain skilled workers (McGoldrick 1983) a problem compounded by the 
maintenance of strict manning ratios by the boilermakers. In addition, whilst 
unemployment remained low for much of the period up to the late 1970s the shedding 
of significant amounts of labour in the period 1957-63 and again in 1966-69 
heightened tensions and increased feelings of insecurity amongst workers (Cameron 
1964).
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Overall, crises within the industry in the sense of tensions between the product market 
and the labour process in particular can be inferred from the trends in profitability, 
labour’s share in value added and the real wage bill per unit of output. Taken 
together these suggest these tensions and contradictions were most acute between 1959 
and 1967/68, from 1972 until nationalisation, and for most of the period between 
nationalisation and 1987/88. The last two periods being marked by continued losses, 
rising total wage bill per unit of output and labour’s contribution to value added 
frequently exceeding 100%.(*)
THE 1950s
The industry’s strike record in this decade was described in the early part of this 
chapter but a number of important points will be highlighted here. First, the peak 
years for stoppages were 1951, 1955 and 1958 and for workers involved 1953 and 
1957 when two national stoppages occurred. The peak year for days lost was also 
1957 but it is clear that days lost increased significantly after 1953 remaining at high 
levels up to and including 1962. The significance of the national disputes may also 
lie in the fact that employers saw them as a cost to the industry as a whole rather than 
to them individually (Clegg and Adams 1957). Second, the trend towards increasing 
strike activity in the second half of the decade is evidenced from the table overleaf 
and becomes most marked after 1957 in terms of stoppage numbers and days lost.
(*) After 1982 figures for shipbuilding and marine engineering can be inferred from 
the ‘other transport equipment’ category of the SIC established under the 1980 
revisions. In this labour share was over 100% in 1982, 1983, 1986, 1987 and 1988.
STRIKE ACTIVITY 1950-1959
DIMENSIONS 1950-1954 1955-1959
STRIKES 64.8 p.a. 85.6 p.a.
WORKERS
INVOLVED
35620 p.a. 516640 p.a.
(27850 excl. 1957)
WORKING DAYS 
LOST
188000 p.a. 746800 p.a.
(276500 excl. 1957)
(Source: Employment Gazette)
For much of the 1950s the industry benefitted from the general post-war boom despite 
the fall in share of world trade from fractionally under 40% in 1950 to 24% in 1954 
and 21 % in 1956. The boom is reflected in the fact that the industry faced long order 
books, for three years ahead as late as 1957 (McGoldrick 1983) and continued 
profitability until 1957/58. Evidence from the econometric studies suggested that 
companies were prepared to share this profitability with their workforces (but see 
discussion above) but the levels of strike activity remained high (relative to other 
industries) prior to the problems of competitiveness which manifested themselves in 
the late 1950s and the slump which affected the industry between 1958 and 1963. 
Much of this strike activity was localised and short with the boilermakers playing a 
critical role (McGoldrick 1983). Throughout the decade they sought to consolidate 
piecework earnings into district rates with welders, rapidly expanding in numbers at 
the expense of riveters, at the forefront of these disputes. Under the 1950 national 
agreement the increases agreed only applied to those on base rates but local 
negotiations ensured that the bulk of the workforce retained their differentials. It is 
significant that in the 1950s wage drift became an increasingly important issue for the 
industry (Clegg and Adams 1957). The boilermakers claims were frequently backed 
by industrial action forcing settlements made in one district to be accepted in others.
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The econometric work accounts for part of this increasing incidence and volume of 
strike activity in the late 1950s in terms of declining profitability but output was 
declining and aggregate unemployment relatively stable which together would have 
been expected to have reduced stoppages. What seems to be critical to the increasing 
volume of stoppages is the perception amongst employers of a worsening product 
market position against a relatively unchanged labour process and shortages of skilled 
labour and their responses to these.
In terms of the labour process, by the end of the decade employers had become 
increasingly concerned about what they saw as a lack of flexibility and 
interchangeability associated with demarcation in the industry, and the issue of 
‘restrictive practices’ became a paramount concern to them. It should be noted that, 
as before the War, UK shipbuilders built an enormous variety of different ships with 
very little standardisation and this contributed to the complexity of payments systems 
and allowances as well as to managements concerns about flexibility. As McGoldrick 
argued in terms similar to those of Hobsbawn (1964) ‘the organisation of the industry 
had not been seriously questioned until the post-war boom in Britain began to peter 
out in the mid to late 1950s’ (1983 p.210). The employers responses included 
redundancies and, via the Shipbuilding Employers Federation the establishment of a 
sub-committee in 1958/59 to investigate the use of shipyard labour. This resulted in 
a new national agreement in 1962.
Whilst the general approach amongst employers seems to have been to leave the 
division of labour well alone in the boom periods, after 1957 employers in some areas 
cut back on employment and tried to address issues of flexibility which in turn 
appears to have heightened feelings of insecurity amongst workers and provoked a 
number of demarcation disputes (Cameron 1964). Overall, greater insecurity appears 
to have been experienced in the late 1950s and 1960s amongst a workforce many of 
whom had experience of the 1930s in the industry. Between 1957 and 1963 the 
industry shed over 85000 jobs, a reduction of nearly 30% with almost 28000 jobs lost 
in a single year 1962/63. This contraction was a direct response both to the recession 
which hit the industry after 1958 but also to the contradictions which had emerged
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within the circuit of capital. The erosion of market share and collapse of profitability 
together with the perceived need to deal with low productivity and a labour process 
which gave considerable control to specific groups of workers. The introduction of 
labour-saving equipment and production methods did take place in the late 50s and 
early 1960s as ship construction moved towards pre-fabrication and unit assembly but 
the cost of this in terms of increased conflict was considerable.
The 1950s is characterised by a general increase in the main dimensions of stoppage 
activity culminating in a prolonged period of conflict through the recession period of 
1957-1962. The earlier econometric work permits only a limited insight into the 
reasons behind this increase and the contention here is that the increases in the latter 
part of the decade are the product both of short term demand decline and the 
emergence of significant contradictions within the industrial circuit of capital. The 
fact that management initiatives to resolve these resulted in a rise in the main 
dimensions of strikes (numbers, workers involved and days lost) is a consequence of 
workforce traditions and particularly concerns over job security and erosion of 
traditional demarcations, a particularly sensitive issue in an industry where the age 
profile of the workforce was considerably higher even in the 1960s than in many 
others (Geddes 1966, Booz-Allan 1972). An additional, but significant factor is the 
fact that during the decade significant changes in personnel occurred within both the 
CSEU and the SEF with the emergence of new leaders less affected by the depression 
of the inter-war period (Clegg and Adams 1957).
The 1960s
The Shipbuilding industry in the 1960s is marked by a number of changes which set 
it apart from the preceding decade. As we have seen it began in the midst of a very 
severe world recession with the UK industry suffering disproportionately. The depth 
of this recession prompted the beginnings of what became extensive state intervention 
and support for the industry. Developing from a ’pump-priming’ role with grants in 
the early part of the decade through reconstruction and the Shipbuilding Industry Act 
(1967) to massive investment in a few ailing companies at the decade’s end (Hogwood 
1979). Furthermore, as Thomas (1983) has argued, demand linkages changed from
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the mid 1960s with the close relationships between shipbuilders and owners in the 
merchant sector becoming looser with owners increasingly looking abroad as their 
requirements changed to those which the UK builders could not fulfill. A further 
change was that the deliberations of the SEF sub-committee came to fruition in the 
form of the 1962 Plan and the commitment to deal with the issues of demarcation and 
working practices contained within it profoundly influenced industrial relations for the 
remainder of the decade. Lastly, following the recommendations of the Geddes 
Report (1966) a significant reorganisation of the industry took place leaving it 
dominated by a few organisations. In the early 1970s Swan Hunter accounted for 
30% of the total workforce of merchant shipbuilders and Vickers for 47% of the 
workforce in the warship yards (Booz-Allan 1972).
In this section the focus is largely upon the period after 1962 and draws heavily on 
the reports produced by Geddes (1966) and by the Commission for Industrial 
Relations (1971). In the previous section the attempts by the SEF to examine the 
issues of demarcation were noted and in 1962 these discussions culminated in a plan 
which aimed to establish a formal disputes and demarcation procedure, to set up a 
division of the workforce into three groups as opposed to the multiplicity of trades 
that then existed and to encourage a greater flexibility of craftwork including a new 
training system to replace apprenticeships. These changes were tied to a national pay 
deal and provoked a national stoppage but did set an agenda for the negotiation of the 
division of labour in changed circumstances (McGoldrick 1983). Demarcation had 
remained a major concern in the late 1950s and 1960s and provoked a number of 
disputes. In 1959, reflecting the contraction of the industry, almost 60% of the 
disputes in the industry were over non-pay issues and the most prolonged of these 
were over demarcation with lengthy demarcation disputes occurring in 1961 and 1962 
and again in 1968.
Following the plan’s introduction in 1962 there followed a series of negotiations with 
trade unions representing the three groups of workers at district and local levels and 
led to Relaxation of Working Practices Agreements (ROWPs). The ROWP 
agreements allowed greater flexibility between trades especially within the
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boilermakers, and interchangeability with ancillary workers. In the scheme 
introduced at Fairfields the scope of negotiations over changes in working practices 
was also defined (Alexander and Jenkins 1970). This form of productivity bargaining 
developed significantly after 1965 with most taking place following the 1965 National 
Wages and Conditions Agreement where improvements in pay and working conditions 
were seen as being conditional upon increased productivity. Most companies had 
introduced such schemes by 1971 (CIR 1971, para 270) which substantially extended 
areas of joint determination in the industry.
Changes after 1966 were dramatic in other areas particularly those relating to the 
structural reorganisation of the industry but it is important to set these and that of 
productivity bargaining against the industrial relations climate prevailing at the time. 
Geddes (1966) stressed the significant lack of trust which appeared to exist in the 
industry between both sides and that whilst the union structure contributed to poor 
industrial relations this was seen as being exacerbated by deep feelings of insecurity, 
suspicion and low trust. The report emphasised the need to change attitudes to effect 
change in the industry so that although there was a clear need to remove the wasteful 
use of labour the sine qua non for this was an improvement in industrial relations 
(1966, para 396). Geddes stressed the important role management had in this process 
not least as union perceptions were of an industry dominated by ‘hire and fire’ 
attitudes on the part of employers with strikes frequently the only way of securing 
speed and serious attention to a grievance (para 396). The report saw one important 
vehicle for improving industrial relations as the establishment of joint consultative 
committees, subsequently introduced at national level and at yard levels but with few 
established at district level (CIR 1971). However, it is doubtful whether they had a 
significant effect in improving industrial relations. Of more lasting significance were 
the proposals outlined by Geddes for the reorganisation of the industry and the 
increasing role of the State as the crisis within the industry became more acute.
In the earlier section a dummy variable was employed for the period 1967-1970 
exerting a strong upward influence on the number of pay stoppages and on days lost. 
It was stressed that the late 1960s witnessed major changes in industrial relations and
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structure through reorganisation of the industry which created a few relatively large 
groupings bringing together yards with different management structures, different 
industrial relations practices and custom and practice and a variety of payments 
systems and allowances. The managements in the new groupings therefore had to 
integrate company yards into a single management structure. Some companies 
attempted to counter the traditional sectionalism in the industry via unitary 
negotiations (Vosper Thomeycroft and Swan Hunter) and in general the reorganisation 
seems to have encouraged moves towards company bargaining. The reorganisation 
effected by 1969, though substantial, only loosely followed the criteria laid down by 
Geddes (Thomas 1983) and seems to have contributed significantly to the increase in 
stoppage activity in the latter part of the decade.
Earlier it was stressed that the changes brought about by reorganisation created larger 
groupings and widened the ‘orbits of comparison’ for workers. A factor of 
considerable importance in an industry with payments sytems which generated a 
plethora of allowances and informal arrangements. However, the reorganisation also
entailed a number of closures and the industry cut back employment by 13000
between 1967 and 1969. As Geddes remarked;
the past is very much alive in the minds of the workers in the 
industry....(and)....has created a deep feeling of insecurity 
which is at the root of most of the demarcation disputes and 
practices in the industry’ (1966; para 365)
The attempt to ‘buy-out’ many of these practices via productivity bargaining 
re-kindled old fears and disturbed pay differentials established over many years. The 
changes created turbulence in an industry where change had for the reasons discussed 
by Geddes, been traditionally resisted and contributed to the generation of grievances 
and bargaining points which were not easily contained within the existing industrial 
relations framework. As the econometric results show, the introduction of a new 
disputes procedure in 1967 proved incapable of containing the explosion of grievances 
which the changes brought forth and may indeed have served to exacerbate the 
conflict both in terms of the incidence and cost of disputes.
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It would appear from the earlier work that the economic variables in particular fail 
to account for much of the variation in stoppage activity in the decade nor for the 
significant increase in volume at the decade’s end although they provide an 
explanation for the increase in days lost. However the procedural and organisational 
dummies employed in the equations to proxy changes at the end of the decade do 
seem to be more important influences. The changes and developments post-Geddes 
must be seen as attempts by employers and the State (which had formalised 
intervention through the SI A in 1967) to further address what had by then become a 
chronic situation for the industry. The product market collapse had continued, 
evidenced by falling output and profitability and a continually falling share of world 
trade and the overall problem of an inability to produce what was required or to do 
so competitively. The labour market situation, with problems of recruiting particular 
groups of skilled workers and with increasing employment insecurity for others 
remained and these two sets of market pressure led to concern with the labour 
process. Although employers had attempted to address the issue of the industry’s 
division of labour and the issues of flexibility and interchangeability since the late 
1950s the craft hierarchy remained deeply entrenched with little mobility and with the 
continued pursuit of sectional interests (CIR 1971). The real wage bill continued to 
increase (particularly with respect to output) as profitability fell and the effectiveness 
of closed shops in particular through the control of labour supply via apprenticeships 
remained into the 1970s. Thus, employer and state supported initiatives in the form 
of ROWP and reorganisation need to be seen against this broader context of 
substantial divergence between elements in the circuit of capital particularly a product 
market collapse and a relatively unchanged labour process. The state also had other 
concerns which stemmed from the regional concentration of the industry (Hogwood 
1979) a factor which became increasingly important at the end of the decade with aid 
to UCS and to Harland and Woolf.
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The 1970s
The product market problems which had deepened in the 1960s continued into the 
1970s although there was a revival in profitability in the early 1970s. The industry 
was slow to adopt new production techniques, particuarly block construction so that 
those large ships produced in UK yards were considerably more expensive than those 
produced by foreign competitors (Thomas 1983). Furthermore, the inflation of the 
late 1960s and early 1970s created difficulties for the industry as many companies had 
taken on fixed price contracts.
The problems of the industry were experienced in their most acute form at UCS and 
Harland and Woolf which became the main recipients of an increasing amount of state 
assistance. State aid in 1969 had been dominated by problems at both yards and both 
continued in 1970 and 1971. UCS experienced a major strike in mid 1970 and again 
in June 1971 before the UCS ‘work-in’ commenced in July 1971. Although the 
difficulties experienced at UCS dominated political concerns in shipbuilding, 
throughout the early 1970s aid went to both Harland and Woolf and Cammell Laird 
with the former brought into public ownership in 1975. The Court Line affair also 
brought the shipbuilders Sunderland and Appledore into public ownership in 1974. 
In that same year a Labour government committed to the nationalisation of the 
industry was elected into office and, despite a difficult passage, the industry was 
brought into public ownership in 1977. Between 1972 and 1978 the state provided 
over £201 millions in grants and subsidies to British shipyards (Taylor 1982).
In terms of stoppage activity it is the first half of the decade which experienced the 
major period of unrest as the table overleaf illustrates.
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STRIKE ACTIVITY IN THE 1970s: AVERAGE ANNUAL DATA
1970-1974 1975-1979
STRIKES 84.6 p.a. 44.4 p.a.
WORKERS INVOLVED 
PER 10000
15.92 p.a. 10.7 p.a.
WORKING DAYS LOST 
PER 10000
29.32 p.a. 14.43 p.a.
Source: Employment Gazette
Strike activity in the early period is significant in a number of respects. Strikes over 
pay remained at a similar level to those of the second half of the 1960s but continued 
the trends begun in 1968 of involving an increasing number of workers, the average 
size of strike (in terms of workers involved) between 1970 and 1974 being over three 
times larger than that of the period 1963-67. In addition, pay stoppages lasted longer 
with days lost reaching a peak in 1972. On average pay stoppages lasted 5 days 
between 1965 and 1969, between 1970 and 1974 they lasted nearly 24. Although not 
supported by the earlier work it is likely that these trends are linked to inflation and 
the general state of the industry. The dispute in 1972 for a basic increase of £4 per 
week cost the industry a quarter of a million days lost and reflected the problems of 
inflation and the industry’s inability to meet union demands. In general, the period 
to nationalisation is marked by a number of major disputes over pay and pay parity 
particularly at Vickers Barrow in 1972,1974 (when over 200000 days were lost), and 
1976, at Cammell Laird in Birkenhead from 1974-1978 and at Sunderland and Swan 
Hunter on Tyneside. It is significant that as inflation declined in the late 1970s these 
issues became less important, although relative pay between yards remained a 
significant cause of friction and disputes at certain yards (e.g Scott Lithgow; Kelly, 
1988). In contrast, non-pay stoppages declined but as a percentage of those in 
employment their overall tendency was to stabilise, whilst there was no significant 
increase in their size or length. This may be due to the fact that non-pay issues 
remained localised whereas pay frequently became determined at company or district
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level and away from local regulation. Although national disputes were rare there was 
also a tendency for pay disputes to be official, in contrast to the traditions of the 
industry but in common with what was happening in other industries (DMR 1983). 
The table below illustrates some of the changes taking place in bargaining structure 
at the time.
BARGAINING STRUCTURE (ADULT MEN)
1968 1973 1978 1985
National only - 23.0 14.5 45.6
National + 
supp.
86.6 70.4 67.2 32.7
Company/
Local
- 1.7 10.3 8.6
No
agreement
13.4 4.9 8.0 13.1
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Source: New Earnings Survey: figures relate to the percentage of workers covered.
These figures give an indication of broad changes but their terminology is confusing. 
In 1968 whilst national and supplementary negotiations formally applied to the 
majority of employees it was the local supplements which were most important. By 
1973 this had changed as local bargaining was significantly curtailed in a number of 
companies a trend continued until after 1979 when national negotiations in the form 
of British Shipbuilders negotiating with its employees dominated the bargaining 
structure.
These changes are likely to have had an impact on the form of disputes in the 
industry particularly with a reduction in local bargaining and an apparent increase in 
the significance of national agreements for some companies. A factor behind this 
could also have been the development from 1969 of long term wage agreements 
between the SRNA (the re-named SEF) and the CSEU lasting until 1978 and with
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bargaining increasingly concentrated at district level. This may also account for the 
increasing number of company only agreements between 1973 and 1978. However, 
given the parlous state of the industry it is not surprising that disputes which arose 
were long and protracted and despite the increasing profitability of the early period, 
the real wage bill per unit of output also rose. The problems were further 
exacerbated by the slump which hit the industry after 1973.
The 1970s represents an almost archetypal crisis within an industry. Failure to 
increase productivity and contain wages meant declining profits and increasing labour 
share of value added from 1973 to 1975. The government response, given the 
regional concentration of the industry was to bring the industry under public 
ownership in 1977 a move designed to placate the unions and which contributed 
significantly to altering the strike pattern in the industry. The fall in strike activity 
in the second half of the decade can be attributed to the interaction of a number of 
factors. The low figure for 1976, in common with that in other industries is due in 
part to the effectiveness of the Labour government’s incomes policy and the TUC 
commitment to it (Hyman 1984) but the maintenance of these levels until 1979 seems 
to be attributable to the impact of nationalisation. This represented a significant 
success for the unions and particularly the ASB which had long campaigned for it and 
there appears to be tangible evidence of a change in worker attitudes from one of 
sectionalism to one of generalised concern for the future of the industry as a whole 
(McGoldrick 1983). The CSEU line of ’responsibility’ seemed to have struck a chord 
amongst workers in the industry (Ferry*). The decline in pay stoppages after 1979 
is probably also linked to the fact that from March 1979 one central bargaining unit 
replaced the 168 separate units which had previously existed (Kelly 1988). However, 
the decline after 1978 was also the result of the general increase in unemployment 
evidenced by the fact that the pattern of stoppages reflected what was taking place 
elsewhere, namely a significant decline in pay stoppages but a maintenance of the 
level of non-pay stoppages together with an increase in their average size with 
redundancies becoming the main focus of concern. More generally it seems that 
economic factors, in particular unemployment and a rapid fall in output exerted a 
more significant impact on the main dimensions of stoppages in this latter period than
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before although as Edwards (1982) has argued this may be because bargaining 
arrangements had changed and as a result the impact of economic factors on 
stoppages changed with it.
BRITISH SHIPBUILDERS: 1977-1987 (*)
From the late 1970s industrial relations in the industry was again dominated by the 
issue of manning levels and pay structure (McGoldrick 1983) although the years 
immediately following nationalisation were marked by relative industrial peace despite 
problems at specific yards. The new Board at BS was staffed by individuals (Griffin 
as Chairman, Famingham as Industrial Relations Director) who had long experience 
in the public sector, were committed to public ownership and had considerable union 
support, even if some yards, such as Vickers remained hostile to public ownership. 
In terms of the ’professionalisation of industrial relations’, the wish to have an 
industrial relations specialist in every yard, together with the formalisation and 
rationalisation of the myriad of allowances at yard level, and the reduction in the 
number of separate bargaining units necessary for effecting corporate bargaining, the 
period was a considerable success.
However, the developments took place against a background of falling output, an 
increasing share of value added taken by labour, static productivity and mounting 
financial losses as the table overleaf illustrates.
(*) This section draws heavily on material from BS; Annual Reports and 
Employment News, and upon minutes of the Shipbuilding Negotiating 
Committee kindly made available by the CSEU.
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BRITISH SHIPBUILDERS: MAIN INDICATORS OF PERFORMANCE 
1977-1987
Year Mkt Share Output New Orders Profit/Loss Emp(*) ID
1977 4 100.0 100.0 104.5 24 87.3 0.75
1978 4 63.3 54.7 -63.6 0.76
1979 4 45.5 80.3 -95.0 22.4 80.3 1.3
1980 4 42.6 93.4 -58.6 18.0 70.1 0.98
1981 2 60.2 115.1 -25.2 16.6 67.8 0.73
1982 3 48.2 49.4 - 88.6 16.0 66.1 0.55
1983 2 26.1 36.8 148.6 14.2 62.2 1.08
1984 2 15.2 19.8 127.0 11.1 48.6
1985 1 14.2 38.6 -53.0 10.1 40.8
1986 1 16.4 27.1 148.0 7.6 10.0
1987 2 12.3 20.2 - 37.0(+) 6.9 7.0
Notes and Sources
Market Share: percentage share of world tonnage output, from British Shipbuilders 
Business Development Statistics Service.
Output and New Orders: Indices created from data provided by British Shipbuilders 
Business Development Statistics Service.
Profit/Loss: Trading profit/loss in £ millions for calendar years calculated from 
financial year figures, British Shipbuilders Annual Reports to 1983. Figures 1984-87 
from Shipbuilding Negotiating Committee minutes readjusted for calendar years. 
Employment (*): Numbers employed in thousands for merchant shipping (first 
column) and for Total BS (second column). Figures from BS Employment Statistics 
October 1985 and December 1988.
ID, Industrial Disputes, percentage of normal hours worked or lost, 1977-79 estimates 
based on DE figures and numbers employed, 1980-83 from Kelly (1988) adjusted for 
calendar years.
(+ ) 1987 losses for first three months of year.
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The table illustrates the magnitude of the problems facing BS, with output falling after 
nationalisation only surpassing its 1977 level in 1981 and declining thereafter, with 
1987 output 12% of that in 1977 and new orders only 20% of the 1977 level. The 
losses in every year are the consequence of this decline allied to a rising real wage 
bill per unit of output (despite rising productivity in the early 1980s) but the figures 
disguise the fact that the major problems lay with the merchant shipping areas rather 
than the warship yards which remained profitable. In the financial year 1984/85 the 
corporation made losses of £25 millions, but in merchant shipping the figure was £59 
millions. Furthermore, it has been suggested that losses were concentrated on a small 
number of yards with Scott Lithgow contributing £140.5 million to the £278.4 million 
lost by BS between 1982/83 and 1983/84 (Kelly 1988).
Strike patterns within the industry under nationalisation altered significantly after 
1979. In the late 1970s the main concerns remained manning levels and the pay 
structure (McGoldrick 1983) with major disputes at Aberdeen and Clydebank in 1979 
over pay but the centralising of pay determination in March 1979 and the reduction 
in the number of separate bargaining units together with rising unemployment 
contributed to declining number of pay stoppages after this date. Non-pay disputes 
remained at a high level after 1979 focussing upon cutbacks and redundancies 
especially after 1980 as well as issues of flexibility, and these disputes were generally 
specific to particular yards and companies. This pattern of stoppages was clearly 
affected by the response of British Shipbuilders to the problems outlined above and 
it is significant that 1983-1986 was marked by some particularly acrimonious disputes 
in the industry as relations between the BS Board and the unions deteriorated.
To examine the changes introduced by BS since 1977 we have drawn upon the 
classification of restructuring into economic, labour process and technological 
developed by Leman and Winterton (1991). This is then used to account for some of 
the shifts in strike patterns throughout the decade.
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Economic Restructuring
In late 1979, the BS Corporate Plan identified the need for a significant restructuring 
of the industry, with closures and job losses affecting some 10000 employees. Later 
that year the CSEU successfully negotiated with BS a ’programme for the orderly 
transition to handle the crisis in the yards affected by cutbacks’ (the ’Blackpool 
Agreement’) in return for no compulsory redundancies. Of the 18200 redundancies 
effected between 1977 and March 1981 over 5000 were the result of this agreement 
which was particularly important at Govan, Sunderland, Cammell Laird and Scott 
Lithgow. In addition in 1978, BS and the unions negotiated the Shipbuilding Industry 
Redundancy Scheme with very favourable payments and help with training and 
re-training and this also eased contraction at this time. However, the impetus for 
further restructuring gathered momentum in late 1980 and early 1981 under a new BS 
chairman (Atkinson) with closures announced at Doxfords, Haverton Hill, Burntisland 
and Robb Caledon. Although industrial relations remained relatively good until 
1983/84 (Ferry*) when Day succeeded Atkinson and it became clear that the 
government would privatise the industry, a stronger management line was evident by 
1981. Earlier that year BS stressed that there was no money for pay increases unless 
matched by productivity and identified the need for compulsory redundancies. Given 
the CSEU commitment on this issue threats of compulsory redundancies at Robb 
Caledon provoked a national overtime ban, and at Robb Caledon one-day strikes from 
September and a ‘sit-in’. The dispute continued into 1982 but it indicated a 
worsening of relations within the industry, evidenced by Atkinson’s remark at a 
meeting with union national officers that he ’could handle trade union problems better 
than (they)’ (SNC Minute 1628).
With Day’s succession as BS Chairman in 1983 further closures were announced at 
Goole, Henry Robb and Clellands in 1984 as were the privatisation of the naval yards 
and the sale of Scott Lithgow (to Trafalgar House), the latter having experienced 
considerable industrial relations problems in the early 1980s with limited control over 
industrial relations and the maintenance of long established practices (Kelly 1988). 
Significantly, Scott Lithgow experienced disputes in 1981/82 costing it over four 
times that of BS as a whole at a time when it appointed its first personnel director in
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Autumn 1981 and corporate personnel policies began to be introduced (Kelly 1988). 
In 1985, cutbacks were announced at Austin and Pickersgill, Vosper Thomeycroft, 
Cammell Laird, Appledore and Swan Hunter. At Swan Hunter the threatened closure 
of the Hebbum docks and the imposition of a new disciplinary code provoked a seven 
week dispute and at Austin and Pickersgill the issue of compulsory redundancies 
provoked a strike in November and one at nearby Sunderland Shipbuilders. The 
run-down continued through 1986 with the closure of Smith’s Dock and the sale of 
Swan Hunter and into 1987 and 1988 with the closure of North-East Shipbuilders and 
further sell-offs towards full privatisation. It is notable that at North-East 
Shipbuilders the announcement of closure led to a dramatic increase in absenteeism, 
to over 22% in the last three months of 1988. Similar increases also occurred at Swan 
Hunter in mid 1985 against a background of mounting redundancies.
In addition to closure and redundancies which were inevitable given the state of the 
industry and the amount of value added contributed by labour, the industry also 
introduced a series of initiatives to raise productivity. Those relating to flexibility are 
dealt with below but in 1979, as part of the ‘wages and conditions restructuring’, 
self-financing productivity schemes were introduced, and operated locally. Although 
contributing to increasing productivity (especially up to 1982) they were a constant 
source of tension, provoking a major dispute at Vickers Barrow in 1980.
Labour Process Restructuring
The inheritance of well-entrenched practices and established hierarchies with 
enormous variations in pay scales and allowances between individual yards was 
gradually dealt with in phases under ‘wages and conditions restructuring’ begun in 
1979 linked to the establishment of corporate bargaining, and completed in 1986 with 
agreements on harmonisation. In terms of labour utilisation BS introduced its 
National Productivity Proposals in 1983, involving greater flexibility, multi-skilling 
and interchangeability. Although effectively an enabling agreement, signed in March 
1984, local agreements were made in a number of yards. Given the craft traditions 
in the industry there were a series of inter-union disputes in 1985 particularly 
involving AUEW(TASS). There is evidence (SNC minutes) of increased use by BS
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of temporary workers and those on fixed term contracts by 1983, and in 1986 there 
was a major dispute at Austin and Pickersgill over the use of sub-contractors. 
However, by the mid 1980s BS had embraced a number of key elements of 
flexibility, making greater use of peripheral workers and those external to the 
corporation allied to a more functionally flexible but declining core workforce with 
financial flexibility provided by the bonus component of the self-financing 
productivity schemes. Similar developments were taking place, as we have seen at 
British Steel and at British Coal although only after major conflicts permitted a more 
concerted management offensive.
Technological Restructuring
Compared with economic and labour process restructuring, the historical preference 
for skilled labour and the overriding concern with reducing labour and labour costs, 
developments in this area have been more modest. The changes that have occurred 
have been in the area of design and the use of CAD, an issue which had its main 
impact on those in the AUEW(TASS) and may lie behind disputes at Govan in 1985. 
However, compared with coal the impact on production appears to have been limited, 
although its impact was acknowledged as increasing in importance by 1986.
Management responses to the crisis within BS can be divided into a number of 
phases. The first, from 1977-79 was one of close co-operation between the Board and 
the CSEU involving the latter closely in a number of initiatives culminating in the 
first stage of the ‘wages and conditions agreement’ in March 1979, and the 
‘Blackpool agreement’ later that year. The period 1980-83 can be seen as the first 
phase of restructuring under a new Chairman, employment fell by 14000 and new 
initiatives were developed in the areas of flexibility. However, by 1983 losses 
remained high and productivity low as new orders dried up and output fell. The 
final period, 1983-1988 is one of further restructuring and privatisation, initially 
under Day’s Chairmanship. The association of these phases with strike activity 
requires discussion. From 1977-79 disputes remained high, particularly over pay but 
considerably below the levels experienced from 1965-75, and given the changes to 
allowances and pay bargaining, considerably less than what might have been
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expected. Due much to the degree of mutual regard and shared commitment to public 
ownership of senior members of the Board and the CSEU. From 1980-83 days lost 
in disputes declined but this is largely the result of the decline of pay stoppages under 
corporate bargaining and the period witnessed some major stoppages over closure and 
closure threats particularly where compulsory redundancies were involved, as at Robb 
Caledon. It is the period after 1983 and particularly from 1983-1986 which witnessed 
a number of prolonged disputes over closure, against a backgound of privatisation and 
limited alternative job opportunities as at Yarrow, Swan Hunter and Govan in 1985 
and at Austin and Pickersgill in 1985 and 1986.
The fact that Shipbuilding did not experience a major confrontation in the way that 
coal, steel and parts of the motor industry did is due much to the relationship between 
the Board and the CSEU in the early years of public ownership (Ferry*) and the fact 
that, as the Robb Caledon dispute showed, the unions could still manage to marshall 
significant resources in defence of an issue they, and their members were strongly 
committed to. Thus management’s continued attempts to seek agreement on issues, 
particularly closures. By 1983, the closure and sell-off programme was accelerated 
with the expressed aim to return the industry to the private sector. The failure to 
mount effective opposition nationally to privatisation and closures had much to do 
with the initial sale of the profitable shipbuilding yards and to the generally depressed 
state of many shipbuilding areas as well as to the continuation of the Shipbuilding 
Industry Redundancy Scheme. Local action remained important particularly where 
alternative job opportunities were scarce or where management attempted to impose 
changes seen as undesirable or inequitous (as at Swan Hunter in 1985).
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CONCLUSIONS
By 1977 state and employer initiatives to deal with the industry’s problems culminated 
in nationalisation. For the state this represented an attempt to meet a number of 
conflicting concerns including union hostility to incomes policy, regional 
unemployment in the event of the industry’s collapse as well as resolving 
contradictions in the circuit of capital. In the context of the circuit of capital they 
indicate a concern with the industry’s failure to deal with these problems through (in 
the labour process) raising productivity and efficiency via new techniques, reducing 
manning levels and increasing flexibility and in the product market field through 
reliance upon grants and subsidies.
Prior to nationalisation the main responses of employers and the state were 
concentrated in particular periods. For employers, the attempt to reduce costs and 
restore profitability against a backcloth of recession dominated their initiatives 
between 1958 and 1962 and contributed significantly to increased strike activity. This 
was followed by attempts to introduce ROWP agreements which gathered pace after 
the 1965 National Wages and Conditions Agreement and the post-Geddes 
reorganisation of the industry. The period after Geddes and the Shipbuilding Industry 
Act 1967 which enacted much of the Geddes recommendations saw changes to 
bargaining and payments systems as well as increasing state support (e.g to UCS and 
Harland and Woolf). The fact that the decade from 1965 to 1975 was marked by 
such an increased volume of strike activity owed much to the way in which these 
attempts to resolve the perceived inadequacies in the labour process represented for 
workers an attempt to undermine their established position in the industry and their 
expectations of their jobs and the industry (see Brown and Brannen 1970 above).
The decline in overt conflict from 1975 to 1978 can be attributed to a number of 
factors. The trade union acceptance of incomes policy in 1976 had a significant 
impact on strikes in most industries but in shipbuilding the commitment to 
nationalisation by the CSEU and particularly the leaders of the boilermakers seems 
to have been important. The resurgence of strike activity in the early 1980s (1979
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figures are the result of the series of one day national stoppages in engineering in 
pursuit of a 35 hour week) was partly the result of changes in personnel at senior 
levels within BS and the tougher management line which resulted. At the time of 
nationalisation the company was staffed by individuals sympathetic to public 
ownership and with trade unionists on the main board (Ferry*) with the trade unions 
prepared to comply with management concern over manning as the ’Blackpool 
Agreement’ testifies, but this clearly changed in the early 1980s as the privatisation 
of the industry was raised at an early stage in the life of the incoming Conservative 
administration.
The case of shipbuilding and marine engineering illustrates the complexity of 
influences on strike patterns. The problems of the industry, the nature of work in it 
and the attempts by both employers and the state to initiate change are all critical but 
need to be set alongside workforce traditions and their reflection in union structure 
together with the attitudes of workers and managers generally. Given these important 
conditions the attempts to account for short-term variations in strike activity using 
econometric analyses produced significant results with aggregate unemployment, 
output changes and procedural intiatives having a consistent influence. However, a 
major influence in the late 1960s was the role of broader changes in the industry 
initiated by employers and the state. These changes were largely the result of 
attempts to address the problems affecting the industry consistent with the view that 
contradictions within the industrial circuit of capital had become such that intervention 
became necessary. The fact that these interventions were frequently associated with 
heightened conflict is due much to the fact that the experience of those working in the 
industry led them to be highly resistant to change and conscious of the insecurity of 
their employment (see Barnett 1986). Additionally , as with the case of steel, the 
nature of enterprise calculation in an industry with high fixed costs and a number of 
’one-off projects was likely to restrict managers to looking to labour in their search 
for cost savings and together these sets of factors ensured that conflict (and given its 
history, strikes in particular) was likely to be inevitable.
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STRIKE ACTIVITY AND CHANGING INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS
MOTOR VEHICLES
OVERVIEW
The motor vehicles industry from the end of the Second World War to the early 
1970s established itself as a key sector of UK manufacturing, directly employing over 
half a million employees by 1973, and substantially more indirectly (Dunnett 1979). 
In 1975 the CPRS estimated that it was responsible for around 11% of industrial 
output, and between 1956 and 1966 for 27% of the growth in industrial output 
(Armstrong 1967). Furthermore, it contributed significantly to the UK’s balance of 
payments and to capital investment but at the same time emerged as the most strike 
prone industry within manufacturing.
This Chapter has a number of aims. The first is to identify the major factors 
contributing to the emergence of increasing strike activity from the mid 1950s 
onwards. Second to examine the particular role played by shop steward organisation 
and governments in increasing strike activity and third, to extend the work of DMR 
(1983) beyond 1973 to examine strike patterns in the wake first, of the 1973/74 oil 
crisis and second, the reassertion of management authority and control in the 1980s.
The findings suggest that in the post war period to 1990 explanations for variations 
in the number of stoppages need to appreciate the relationships between four sets of 
factors. Changes in product and labour markets, management responses to these and 
the development of union capacity through the spread of shop steward organisation. 
The statistical work emphasises the role of product market changes (especially with 
respect to pay stoppages) with changes in product demand (as measured by the 
number of new car registrations) accounting for almost two-thirds of the variation in 
stoppage numbers from 1949-1982. Similarly the rise in stoppage activity from the 
late 1950s is association with the spread of shop steward organisation and union 
density, coupled with the nature of management responses and product market 
decline. The decline in strike activity in the 1980s can be interpreted using the same 
set of factors, with particular emphasis on the waning influence and power of shop 
steward organisation in a number of companies.
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We suggest that the findings generally support those of DMR but with important 
qualifications. First, as Willman (1984, 1985, 1986) has argued, the role of 
institutional changes in the case of BL seems to have changed both the nature and 
incidence of stoppages and that this occurred without a significant change in 
substantive terms and conditions relative to those in other companies. This implies 
that the conclusions of Turner et al. (1967) have a greater permanence than DMR 
suggest and that institutional changes have potentially more significance in reducing 
strike activity than they and more radical writers would acknowledge. This argument 
can be taken too far and such institutional changes cannot be divorced from the 
broader environmental pressures (as Willman tends to do) such as the rise in 
unemployment in the early 1980s which contributed to a general decline in stoppage 
activity in the UK and particularly that of pay stoppages.
The second important qualification relates to the role of government which again 
exerts a more pervasive influence upon strike activity than is suggested by DMR. 
Directly, the government had an influence though incomes policy and legislation (e.g 
strike ballots under the 1984 Trade Union Act which forced a proposed strike at BL 
in November of that year to be halted) but its indirect impact has arguably been more 
significant. Tolliday (1985) and Dunnett (1979) have both illustrated the unforeseen 
consequences of government policy on industrial relations in the industry. Certainly 
the use of the industry for demand management purposes significantly contributed to 
product market fluctuations and lack of investment but with a significant impact on 
industrial structure. The formation of BLMC and its subsequent nationalisation and 
privatisation, the financial support to Chrysler and the opening up of the UK industry 
to direct Japanese investment have all to varying degrees affected the nature of 
industrial relations in the industry.
Thirdly, from the late 1960s to the early 1980s it is our contention that events in the 
industry can usefully be seen in the context of management attempts to grapple with 
product market changes and major contradictions within the industrial circuit of 
capital, particularly severe at BL and Chrysler. Between 1969 and 1977 management 
attempts to resolve these contradictions led them to exert more control over payments
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systems and reduce shop steward influence over pay. These led to resentments over 
inequities in reward and over curbs on steward influence and the period is marked by 
numerous disputes over differentials and pay rates at BL and Chrysler in particular. 
From 1978 to 1984 management responses again varied but were primarily focussed 
upon the reform of working practices and (at BL and Chyrsler) pay bargaining. The 
more direct attacks on working practices and shopfloor control largely account for the 
persistance of non-pay disputes throughout the 1980s.
The Period From 1946-1973 Revisited
The period 1946-1973 spawned a number of important studies of strike activity in 
motor vehicles and before highlighting changes in a number of key variables pertinent 
to our analysis of strikes we provide a review of the main accounts of strike activity 
for this period. We begin by a consideration of the work of Turner et al. and the 
subsequent work of Willman detailing changes since 1973.
The explanations advanced by Turner et al. and by Willman are based largely upon 
disaggregated studies of individual companies and plants and reach broadly similar 
conclusions. The two studies focus upon factors internal to organisations and the 
industry in accounting for strike activity although the respective authors would argue 
that their conclusions have more general application. For Turner at al. the high 
levels of strike activity were explained by changing worker expectations encountering 
an institutional blockage, a problem seen as common to organisations covered by the 
1922 Engineering Procedure. This ‘institutional obsolescence’ as it was termed, 
represented the failure of the institutions of collective bargaining to adjust to issues 
important to the workforce, a view influential in the deliberations of the Donovan 
Commission (1968) and in the work of Flanders and Fox (1969). Although the 
influence of other factors was stressed, particularly the irregularity of employment 
and instability of earnings, reflecting product and labour market pressures, the impact 
of multi-unionism and technological change, these were seen as secondary to these 
major influences.
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The change in worker expectations, reflected in a concern over fair wages and job 
rights parallels our own perspective but the emphasis upon procedures, whilst 
important, tends to play down the role of changes external to organisations. Given 
the period in which the study was undertaken this is understandable; as Lewchuk 
(1982) has argued:
As long as the sellers market continued the British producers 
were able to avoid reconciling their deteriorating cost position.
When the market position collapsed in the mid 1960s they were 
forced to consider switching to a Ford style direct control 
strategy (1982: pl49).
However, a similar criticism can be levelled at Willman’s work where the clear 
contention is that at BL Cars management
reformed the structure of collective bargaining and scope in 
such a way as to re-establish central control over wage 
determination and management control over work allocation
(1984: p9)
And that in so doing the reforms ’eradicated old forms of conflict typical in the past’ 
(i.e small, sectional stoppages) and ’reduced BL’s share of industrial conflict in the 
industry’, so that adequate procedures and bargaining institutions can be expected to 
reduce conflict levels as well as their form. This contention is examined in more 
detail below but it should be remembered that the period in question (1977-1980) was 
one of intense competition in a shrinking UK market with BL experiencing a dramatic 
reduction in its share of that market reflected in mounting losses. The collapse in 
strike activity, particularly over pay, in the early 1980s has not been unique to the 
motor industry and would suggest that factors external to the industry and 
organisations within it have been exerting a critical influence upon the strike patterns.
The analysis of DMR concentrated on strike activity over a 25 year period to 1973 
and examined the industry as a whole. They concluded that the high levels of strike 
activity were the result of the hardening of product markets and the loss of 
international competition rather than a reliance upon short-term instability 
characteristic of Turner’s study. They were critical of Turner’s focus upon
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‘institutional obsolescence’ arguing that it was only valid if the institutions prevented 
management and unions from coming to terms with the industrial relations 
implications of changes in product markets. Given that DMR cover the period to 
1973 they can be criticised for having ’an eye on future events’ (Willman 1985) but 
their analysis highlights the role of long term decline due to increased competition as 
a factor in increasing strike activity, a view supported by the findings from our 
econometric work (see below), and largely neglected by Willman.
Before attempting a re-assessment of these studies in the light of our own analysis it 
is necessary to examine changes in a number of key variables throughout the period. 
It begins with a consideration of changes in industrial structure.
(1) Industrial Structure
By the end of the second world war the UK car industry comprised 32 firms, with 
six; Austin, Morris, Ford, Vauxhall, Rootes and Standard dominating the market both 
in the UK and the rest of the world. With the merger of Austin and Morris to form 
British Motor Holdings in 1952 and the absorption by Ley land of Standard in 1961 
and latterly Jaguar, the degree of industrial concentration increased further. In 1968, 
under the auspices of the Government funded Industrial Reorganisation Corporation, 
BLMC was formed out of a merger between Ley land and BMH. In 1969 the ailing 
Rootes company was taken over by the American owned Chrysler corporation. By 
1975, Ford, Vauxhall, BL and Chrysler accounted for 99.5% of UK car production 
(Hyman and Elgar 1981) and in addition to this greater industrial concentration, 
employment became concentrated into larger units. In 1951, 27.5% of the industry’s 
workforce worked in establishments with 5000 or more employees and by 1972 this 
had risen to 51.3%, much of the change occurring in the period after 1968 (DMR 
1983).
The change in establishment size is particularly important given the well documented 
associations between it and strike activity (Edwards 1981, Shorey 1978). The factor 
has additional importance in motor vehicles because of the detailed division of labour 
and interdependence between groups of workers. Such interdependence undoubtably
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increased in the post-war period and contributed to lay-offs and ’downtime’ which in 
turn exacerbated instability and fluctuations in earnings.
(2) Product and Labour Market Factors
For much of the period until the mid 1950s, UK car firms faced a sellers market with 
UK manufacturers accounting for 55% of world car exports (Friedman 1977), with 
70% of output produced for export (Ackrill 1987) and with an expanding home 
market. The home market grew substantially in the 1950s with output of 0.5 million 
in 1950 rising to 1.8 million in 1960. However, as Dunnett (1979) has shown the 
home market in the post-war period was particularly susceptible to the vagaries of 
government policy so that from 1951-1955, aided by expansionary policies the home 
market grew on average by 38% per year, but credit tightening in response to Balance 
of Payments weaknesses in 1955 led to a significant decline between 1956 and 1958 
until HP restrictions were again lifted (Dunnett 1979). There then followed a period 
of expansion until 1960 when credit restrictions were re-introduced, these were 
relaxed from 1962-64 and then a further brake on demand occurred from 1965-69 
followed by further expansion after 1970. The diagram below outlines the 
fluctuations in product demand. These changes, exacerbated and often caused by 
governments (Dunnett 1979), took place against and contributed to the UK industry’s 
declining competitive position. The UK’s share of world car exports fell to 29% in 
1957 and to 17% in 1966 (Friedman 1977) and it therefore had to rely upon an 
increasingly volatile home market for its success. Not surprisingly companies were 
affected to varying degrees, in general they remained profitable throughout the 1950s 
although Standard, Vauxhall and Rootes experienced problems in the late 1950s and 
BMH distributed much of its declining profits in dividends (Lewchuk 1982). Rootes 
suffered losses from 1962 to 1970 (Dunnett 1979), and Ford and Vauxhall declining 
profits from 1965 to 1967. In 1956, Ford made an average of £45 profit per vehicle 
and BMH, £35 per vehicle. By 1961, Ford had increased this to £53 whilst BMC’s 
profit per vehicle had dropped to £6.50 (Rhys 1971).
The expansion of the industry meant an increase in employment opportunities for 
semi-skilled workers, with relatively high pay albeit with considerable underlying
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employment and earnings instability. Unemployment in the industry was consistently 
below the national average (DMR 1983), as were absenteeism and labour turnover, 
these last two possibly being a consequence of significant shopfloor control over 
aspects of the work situation (Hyman and Elgar 1981).
Given the fluctuations in product demand it is not surprising that these had a major 
impact upon the work situation and upon particular groups of workers. Although the 
industry made use of lay-offs and redundancies at particular times such as 1956, 1966 
and 1967, and 1971 and 1972 in general product market changes were met by 
adjustments in hours worked (DMR 1983). In particular this occurred through 
numbers on short-time and more frequently through varying the hours of those on 
overtime, a group who comprised around 40% of operatives in the 1960s (DMR
1983). This significantly contributed to the instability of earnings of those on 
overtime, and with piecework as the main payment system for many workers 
variations in product demand meant often considerable fluctuations in earnings for 
workers paid by the piece. Furthermore, because of the specific division of labour 
within the larger car plants, shortages of parts and strikes in component 
manufacturers or shops within the car plants frequently involved periodic lay-offs or 
stoppages which again contributed to variability in earnings and employment 
instability, factors identified by a number of writers as having a critical influence 
upon strike activity (Turner et al. 1967, DMR 1983, Willman 1985).
(3) Management, Union organisation and Industrial Relations
In the inter-war period the car industry was characterised by ’hire and fire’ practices 
(Dunnett 1979) and by a considerable hostility amongst the major manufacturers 
towards trade unionism to the extent that it was seen at the time as an industry which 
was practically impossible to organise (Hyman and Elgar 1981). Ford worked to 
prevent union organisation at its Manchester factory (Littler 1982) and sought in the 
1930s to avoid shopfloor bargaining at Dagenham (Lewchuk 1982) by pursuing a 
direct control strategy, retaining managerial prerogatives and paying day wages 
(Tolliday 1991), a strategy also followed by Vauxhall. Austin also adopted a strong 
anti-union stance which continued well into the post-war period, as did Morris at
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Cowley but in these companies there existed a system of management control which 
relied upon piecework and a relatively loose control over labour (cf USA; Lewchuk 
1982). This latter strategy, of piecework and loose control was followed to varying 
degrees by other companies (most notably the Coventry manufacturers) in the era of 
rising demand and weak trade unions (Lewchuk 1982).
The position of the Coventry manufacturers
At the end of the Second World War, Vauxhall and Ford had granted union 
recognition (in 1943 and 1944 respectively; Friedman 1977) but both had union 
density estimated at below 25 %. At Morris without recognition union density stood 
at 30% and at Austin it was around 50% (Tolliday 1985). In contrast the smaller 
manufacturers, particularly in Coventry, had much higher levels of unionisation and 
systems of labour control which gave considerable autonomy to the shopfloor. By 
1945, Standard had already granted a closed shop and shop steward organisation had 
gained considerable strength by the 1950s (Melman 1954) due much to the system of 
control which meant stewards performed quasi-managerial functions and permitted 
them to negotiate collective piece-rates on behalf of the gangs they led (Zeitlin 
1980). It is notable that the number of supervisors at Standard was much lower than 
at other car firms so that stewards effectively filled a vacuum in the management 
hierarchy. In Lewchuk’s view the approach adopted by Standard was ‘to push the 
inter-war strategy to its limit’ (Lewchuk 1982) through the use of high basic wages 
and piecework allied to a gang system in production. The average wage at Standard 
in the late 1940s was 65% above the industry level and although the lead was 
followed by other Coventry firms, the earnings differential of Coventry engineering 
workers was 35-40% above the rest of the industry between 1957 and 1966 (Friedman 
1977). The gang system was also emulated by other Coventry engineering firms but 
it was arguably most developed at Standard. At the Canley plant there were 15 
gangs operating in the 1950s with between 50 and 500 workers in each (Hyman and 
Elgar 1981).
At Rootes and Jaguar, similar policies were adopted. Although Rootes did not 
formally recognise unions until 1950, shopfloor organisation became quickly
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established and exercised a high level of control over the booking in of work and pace 
and loading levels of the track. The extent of this control is revealed in the view that 
by 1960 the Ryton plant had become virtually a ‘self governing republic’ with 
considerable inter-union feuding (Thoms and Donnelly 1985). In contrast, at Jaguar 
the gangs which operated were small in size and limited in authority with 
management having more control over manning levels etc. Union structure may have 
contributed to this, being described as too disparate for effective organisation (Clack 
1967).
A further important factor in Coventry was the existence, since 1940, of the 
’Coventry Toolroom Agreement’ whereby skilled timeworkers received the average 
earnings of pieceworkers in all Coventry plants plus a fixed differential. By 
publishing a league table of average piecework earnings it intensified demands from 
lower grades of workers and led to ’leapfrogging’ pay claims (Zeitlin 1980). By the 
1960s this had spread to plants in other districts seeking parity with Coventry plants 
within BL and at Ford.
In the 1950s and 1960s the system of workplace organisation in Coventry produced 
harmonious labour relations although carrying with it the problem of wage cost 
inflation (Thoms and Donnelly 1985) but it is clear that the system began to come 
under strain from the mid 1950s. Until 1954 disputes at Rootes and Standard were 
no worse than those at other companies, and those that did occur were generally short 
(Thoms and Donnelly 1985). However in the late 1950s Standard became one of the 
most strike prone of car firms (Friedman 1977) with the system of labour control 
unable to accommodate to a depressed market situation and requirements for lay-offs 
(Lewchuk 1982). Similarly at Jaguar, relative industrial peace prevailed until the late 
1950s when the introduction of a new model led to changes in work patterns and job 
specifications and provoked strike action, as did the attempted introduction of new 
piecerates in 1961.
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The Other Major Manufacturers
At Austin, Morris, Ford and Vauxhall shopfloor organisation was never as significant 
as in the Coventry firms, and with the exception of Vauxhall where it appears never 
to have been strong (Tolliday 1985), was powerful during specific periods in the 
1960s. The operation of piecework or related bonus systems at Austin and Morris 
provided the potential for a degree of shopfloor control but it is increasingly accepted 
that the consolidation of shopfloor organisation occured only in the late 1950s and 
early 1960s (Tolliday and Zeitlin 1986). After the formation of BMC in 1952, 
management does not appear to have exercised significant control of the workplace 
with considerable informal bargaining taking place and with the prevalence of an 
’indulgency pattern’ characterised by management leniency, often using high wages 
to keep unions out of plants (Tolliday and Zeitlin 1986).
As Jefferys (1988) has shown, despite a significant steward presence at Austin by the 
end of the war (170 stewards in 1946) they were rarely consulted by management. 
Austin’s anti-unionism continued into the 1950s when the reassertion of management 
prerogatives frequently coincided with periods of falling sales and declining market 
share. At Longbridge, union density appears to have been closely linked to 
movements in product demand with notable increases in the period 1953-55 as 
demand rose but was dented with the dismissal of 15% of the workforce in 1956 
following a downturn in demand. Strike action followed the announcement of 
dismissals and it is clear that in the second half of the decade shopfloor organisation 
became more firmly established with first line supervisors making concessions in the 
face of as many as two to three strikes per week (Jefferys 1988). It is therefore 
likely that the instability of employment and earnings in the industry (Turner et al. 
1967)) were of particular magnitude and significance at Austin given the ways in 
which they were acted upon by management.
At BMC generally, the events of 1956/57 have been seen as a critical turning point 
in shopfloor relations as union organisation became firmly established against waning 
management resistance (Lewchuk 1982). By the early 1960s, 100% unionisation had 
been achieved at Longbridge and Cowley, a dramatic transformation at the latter since
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1956 when union density was estimated at only 25% (Tolliday 1985, cf Jefferys 
(1988) who argues that 100% unionisation was only achieved at Longbridge in 1968).
At Ford and Vauxhall the operation of day-wage systems permitted greater 
management control of the shopfloor. Although Ford recognised unions in 1944 it 
adopted a strategy of dealing exclusively with national officials who were involved 
in negotiations on pay grading and day rates as well as general pay rates and 
conditions. This fact notwithstanding it has been argued that Ford’s policy of tight 
management control within plants led to battles over job control which were more 
ferocious at Dagenham in the 1950s and Halewood in the 1960s than elsewhere 
(Beynon 1973). Despite increasing market share (also at Vauxhall) and increasing 
profitability in the 1950s and 1960s the pressures at Dagenham to ‘speed up’ 
production and raise productivity to match Cologne standards contributed to 
significantly higher levels of conflict in the 1960s particularly after the company’s 
acquisition of the Briggs body plant with its much higher degree of unionisation and 
shopfloor control. Between 1959 and 1962 against a background of re-tooling and 
new work standards there were 59 strikes and 114 overtime bans at Dagenham 
(Friedman and Meredeen 1980). In 1960, 100000 ’man-hours’ were lost in strikes at 
Dagenham, 184000 in 1961 and 400000 in 1962 (Beynon 1973), the long campaign 
to bring Briggs into line with the rest of Ford culminated in the sacking of three core 
members of the stewards committee in 1962 and fourteen other stewards. According 
to Friedman and Meredeen this marked the virtual disappearance of significant 
shopfloor organisation at Dagenham for the remainder of the decade. In the 
following year only 3400 ’man-hours’ were lost at the plant through strike action. 
In contrast between 1958 and 1963 the Halewood plant experienced the development 
of shop steward organisation and significant conflicts in 1963, indicative of the 
growing militancy in the plant throughout the 1960s (Beynon 1973). It was not until 
after the strike activity of 1968-73 that Ford finally shifted from its position of 
exclusive dealings with national officials (Starkey and McKinlay 1989).
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Strike Activity: Some Explanations
As DMR (1983) have shown, stoppages in the motor vehicles industry increased 
tenfold between 1946 and 1973, workers involved ninefold and days lost sevenfold. 
They also showed that strike activity exhibited a clear seasonal variation with peaks 
and troughs related to production requirements. However, as a number of writers 
have pointed out, the industry was relatively strike free until the late 1950s (Turner 
et al. 1967, DMR 1983, Edwards 1983) and an adequate account of strike activity 
must account for this change.
A number of explanations can be offered for this transformation in strike propensity. 
First, that after nearly a decade of expansion in home demand the industry 
experienced a cyclical downturn, (see also metals and shipbuilding) provoked in part 
by government responses to an ailing balance of payments position. In contrast to the 
industry’s normal policy of varying hours worked to cope with demand changes, 
managements responded by lay-offs, thereby exacerbating insecurity and instability 
in employment.
Second, that the critical development was the spread of unionisation and particularly 
the emergence of developed shop steward organisation outside the already strong 
organisation in the Coventry firms. The recession and the management responses to 
it may have provided the grievances but these needed a vehicle to allow them to be 
expressed and that came with shop steward organisation.
Third, that in BMC and the Coventry firms steward organisation and increasing strike 
activity were further stimulated by the prevailing payment systems. Piecework 
provided the basis for bargaining opportunities as piecework rates were negotiated and 
re-negotiated. Furthermore, the piecework system contributed to strike activity 
through variations in earnings (Turner et al. 1967) and through creating perceived 
anomalies in pay which acted to stimulate sectional claims and ‘leapfrogging’.
Of further significance is the fact that the focus of strike activity appears to change 
throughout the 1950s. For much of the decade, most disputes were over union
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recognition, wage rises, closed shops and dismissal issues, but between 1959 and 
1964/65 they were mainly over hours and conditions of work, wage structures and 
workloads. This supports the evidence that most of the difficulties in gaining 
recognition and effective organisation had largely been overcome by the late 1950s 
and thereafter strikes became increasingly focussed upon issues of equity and control.
The case of motor vehicles illustrates the critical importance of effective shop steward 
organisation as a necessary condition in the emergence of strike activity, although as 
the Standard case shows strong shop steward organisation does not necessarily mean 
more strikes. Through such organisation came attempts at greater control of the work 
situation, achieved more easily at plants where piecework predominated. Overall, 
we see no reason to dissent from the view of Turner et al. (1967) that in such 
contexts worker expectations were changing and that the management responses to the 
product market changes of the late 1950s clashed with these expectations and 
contributed to the increased numbers of stoppages. More significantly these strikes 
achieved tangible results, so that by the 1960s car workers had learned that strikes 
frequently paid. In the next section we subject strikes to further examination through 
econometric analysis of the main measures of stoppage activity.
Strike Activity: 1949-1973, DMR Revisited.
Before detailing the results from our econometric analysis a cautionary note is 
required. As the Donovan Commission noted in the late 1960s, the ‘strike problem’ 
as it identified it was one of an increasing number of small, short, unofficial and 
unconstitional stoppages which frequently did not enter the official statistics. Given 
the Commission’s focus upon metals and engineering (Turner 1969) the official 
statistics, which severely understate the true extent of strike numbers, are likely to 
have even greater deficiencies when applied to these sectors. These data inadequacies 
do not apply to the same extent to the series for workers involved and days lost in 
stoppages.
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Before considering strike activity for the long period to 1990, it was decided to run 
equations on the 1949-73 period studied by DMR. First, to provide a test of some 
of their conclusions by means of econometric analysis and second, to assess 
specifically the strength of the constructed trade union series. The equations run for 
1949-73 are detailed in the table overleaf, but the results were dominated by the 
strength of the trade union density variable. Equation (a) illustrates the importance 
of the variable, where it alone accounted for 88% of the variation in the number of 
stoppages per 100,000 employees. In equation (b) it was run alongside the level of 
import penetration with both significant and exerting a strong upward influence on 
stoppage numbers. The rationale for the positive coefficient on the import penetration 
term for this period is not clear and it is likely that it is picking up the effect of other 
factors. However, the result may be a consequence of managerial responses to rising 
import penetration from the late 1960s onwards, and the resistance from workers that 
this engendered.
In equation (c), the number of new car registrations was substituted for TUD and 
Import penetration and was found to exert a strong and significant upward influence 
on stoppage numbers. However, when run in conjunction with trade union density 
it was insignificant, the impact of the latter swamping that of other variables (with the 
exception of import penetration). These results were confirmed through the use of 
stepwise regression analysis where the constructed trade union series dominated the 
impact of other variables. These results would seem to offer considerable support to 
the role of the spread of union and particularly shop steward organisation in the 
growing strike propensity of the industry particularly in the period after 1957.
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STRIKE ACTIVITY: 1949-1973 ECONOMETRIC RESULTS
Variable Equation
(a)
Equation
(b)
Equation
(c)
Constant - 66.34 - 42.99 + 0.28
TUD + 1.19 
(4.1)
+ 0.81 
(6.67)
IMP + 1.12 
(3.94)
NCR + 0.38 
(2.69)
SDE 6.4 5.0 9.13
F 170.8 147.1 73.2
R2 0.88 0.93 0.76
D.W 1.13 1.08 0.82
Sources:TUD: A constructed trade union density series using company data at 
selected time periods from Turner et al. (1967), Seglow and Wallace, (1984), Thoms 
and Donnelly, (1985), Tolliday and Zeitlin (1986).
IMP: Index of import penetration, from Dunnett (1979) and Annual Abstract of 
Statistics. Imports as a percentage of home demand + exports.
NCR: New Car Registrations, from Annual Abstract of Statistics.
MEANS and STANDARD DEVIATIONS
TUD: 78.54 and 14.09.
IMP: 6.228 and 6.03 
NCR: 70.64 and 40.637.
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STRIKE ACTIVITY IN MOTOR VEHICLES: ECONOMETRIC RESULTS
Variable Mean St Dev 1 2  3 4
Constant -92.2 3.96 3.54 - 63.37
AggU 5.16 4.65 - 12.8 
(2.87)
0.29
(0.25)
NCR 105.9 57.67 0.39
(6.0)
0.37
(2.44)
0.285
(1.94)
REL 115.8 8.55 0.87
(2.3)
Pt-1 6.73 5.1 0.5
(1.64)
0.49
(1.05)
-0.84
d.94]
TUAct - 16.83 
(2.13)
Ui 2.4 4.15 4.76
(2.68)
TUD 84.9 13.62 1.2
(4.09)
IMP 20.61 19.13 1.0
(1.9)
0.592
(1.14)
Y/N 0.82
(0.15)
YP 6.7
(1.64)
SDE
F
R2
D.W
9.05
14.38
0.76
0.97
12.15
9.42
0.567
1.44
10.69
23.16
0.646
1.56
8.87
58.6
0.75
1.83
Note: Equation (1) for period 1949-1982, Equations (2), (3), (4) cover the period 1949-1990.
Agg U, Percentage average aggregate unemployment; NCR, Number of new car registrations; REL, 
average nominal earnings in motor vehicles relative to all industries; Pt-1, change in retail prices 
lagged one year; Ui, Average industry unemployment (percentage); IMP, level of import penetration; 
Y/N, Rate of change of output per person; TUACT, a dummy variable to capture impact of the 1984 
Act; TUD, the constructed trade union density series.
MEAN and STANDARD DEVIATION: Figures above refer to 1949-1990, those for 1949-1982 are 
as follows; AggU: 3.33 and 2.68, NCR: 85.61 and 43.58, Pt-1, 7.0 and 5.57 and IMP: 13.73 and 
14.24.
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Strike Activity: 1949-1990
The best results for the period 1949-1982 are shown in equation (1). The product 
market variable NCR, (the number of new car registrations) dominated all equations 
run for this period (apart from when included alongside the constructed trade union 
density series) and alone accounted for over two-thirds of the variation in the number 
of stoppages. It also had a perverse impact on the percentage unemployed (aggregate 
unemployment), which run separately had a positive association with strike numbers 
but when run in conjunction with NCR had a negative association. The results for 
aggregate unemployment in equation (1) therefore need to be treated with extreme 
caution. For different reasons, the results for relative earnings (average nominal 
earnings in motor vehicles as a percentage of average nominal earnings in all 
industries) must also be treated with care. They imply that rises in relative earnings 
cause an increase in strike numbers but it is more likely that strikes are contributing 
to the rise in real earnings and so the direction of causation is from strikes to relative 
earnings rather than the reverse. Finally, the industry unemployment variable, not 
affected in terms of sign by the inclusion of NCR, shows a strong positive impact on 
strike activity. This implies a concern over job rights identified by Turner et al. 
(1967) and would suggest that its impact is concentrated upon non-pay stoppages but 
our earlier concerns over this variable need to be borne in mind here.
For the period from 1949-1990 the number of new car registration continues to exert 
a strong but declining influence upon stoppage numbers. In contrast to the shorter 
period, when run separately it accounted for 53 % of the variation in strike numbers 
and failed to achieve significance, and taken in conjunction with the results for the 
period after 1969 (see below) suggest that its influence lay in the period of the 1950s 
and 1960s. This conclusion is reinforced by the results from equation (3) where the 
NCR variable is not significant when run alongside the dummy variable for the Trade 
Union Act and a dummy to capture the impact of incomes policies.
The results for the Trade Union Act support the view that the legislation of the 1980s 
has had a depressing impact on stoppage activity over and above the impact of rising 
unemployment. This adds considerable weight to those who argue for the
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effectiveness of pre-strike ballots and it is likely that these coupled with the threat and 
use of injunctions to restrain strikes in breach of the legislation (Evans 1987). This 
is reinforced by the fact that the motor industry was one of the first to use the 
legislation (Austin-Rover successfully prevented action taking place in November
1984) and this could have demonstrated to car workers the companies willingness to 
use the law and its potential effectiveness against them. There can certainly be little 
doubt at an aggregate level that the legislation enacted since 1979 and particularly that 
of 1984 has exerted downward pressure on strike activity (in the case of the car 
industry by approximately 47 strikes per year) but other factors were operating in 
conjunction with the 1984 Act which could overstate its impact, in particular the 
initial signs of collapse of the miners strike in late 1984 and the final defeat in 1985.
The results for the 1949-1990 period indicate the declining influence of aggregate 
unemployment and the fact that the association with stoppages is now a positive one. 
This results from the fact that the aggregate unemployment term is normally 
negatively associated with pay stoppages which dominated the post-war strike activity 
in motor vehicles. After 1979, non-pay stoppages dominated with which 
unemployment has a positive association and for the period beyond 1982 the 
conflicting influences produce a positive but insignificant association with strike 
numbers.
Overall, the results obtained for the post-war period are mixed but they do offer 
support to the underlying model at least as far as pay stoppages are concerned. It is 
clear that product market influences are particularly important up to 1982, although 
the impact of NCR may have been declining from the late 1960s when import 
penetration and falling market share became a more immediate issue for UK car 
manufacturers. The evidence also offers support for the impact of legislation and the 
role of government more generally (i.e through product market changes), and 
confirms the earlier conclusions about the role of trade union organisation.
In order to gain a clearer picture of the influences upon strike numbers it was decided 
to run equations for both pay and non-pay stoppages for the period after 1969. This
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year was chosen as it is the earliest year for which data on motor vehicles was 
available; prior to this it was available for vehicles only. The results are contained 
in equations (5), (6), (7) and (8) overleaf.
The evidence on pay stoppages appears to highlight the role played by incomes 
policies in conjunction with the level of product demand and the lagged price inflation 
term. However, the NCR variable has a negative coefficient (cf the results for 
1949-82 and 1949-90) and the import penetration variable is insignificant suggesting 
that product market influences have become less significant or that their impact has 
changed. The results were investigated further using individual correlation 
coefficients and these revealed that the most important influence upon pay stoppages 
was import penetration, accounting for almost 60% of the variation in stoppage 
numbers and that the lagged price inflation term was only significant when included 
alongside other variables. The results for import penetration are important in 
confirming the continuing impact of product market pressure on stoppage activity and 
in offering support for the contention that the impact of NCR is mainly in the 1950s 
and 1960s, with increased competition exerting a stronger influence thereafter, a 
finding which supports the conclusions of DMR (1983) in their analysis of the 
industry.
In the theoretical model the relationship between import penetration and strike activity 
was left open with the proviso that managerial actions in response to it could directly 
affect worker attitudes and expectations. For the period until 1973 the variable was 
seen to exert a strong positive impact upon stoppage numbers whereas from 1969- 
1990 the variable is again significant but the sign is negative. A possible 
interpretation of the results for the later period is that its impact operates through 
management responses such as changes to collective bargaining or that it is picking 
up the effect of other variables such as rising unemployment. Although, import 
penetration did not show as a significant determinant of non-pay stoppages it is clear 
that it was a critical factor behind management attempts to regain control of the 
shopfloor in the late 1970s and 1980s.
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STRIKE NUMBERS 1969-1990: ECONOMETRIC RESULTS
Variable Mean St Dev PAY NON-PAY
STOPPAGES STOPPAGES
(5) (6) (7) (8)
Constant 66.1 37.25 39.67 22.1
Agg U 8.2 4.66
YP 12.7
(3.24)
NCR 149.5 36.89 - 0.27
(2.96)
Pt-1 9.55 5.34 - 1.18 - 0.54 -0.29
(3.43) (1.3) (0.89)
IMP 36.1 13.77 -0.04 - 0.53 - 0.387
(0.2) (2.42) (1.25)
TUACT -9.03 -11.1
(2.07) (1.36)
0.52
(1 .1)
SDE 5.16 6.36 5.82 4.55
14.4 28.9 13.48 5.08
R2 0.77 0.59 0.69 0.46
D.W 2.82 2.39 2.34 2.17
Note: Variables as in previous table.
304
Overall, the results point to the continuing impact of product market influences on 
pay stoppages, but not significantly on non-pay stoppages. The importance of the 
Trade Union Act dummy is confirmed as is the role of incomes policy but, 
unemployment and other labour market factors appear to be less important although 
this may be affected by our inability to test for the impact of industry unemployment 
after 1982.
In contrast the results for non-pay stoppages are disappointing, accounting for less 
than half of the variation in such stoppages and with none of the variables significant. 
However, these results are not surprising; in an industry where a contest for control 
was ever present in many plants (Beynon 1973) it is understandable that external 
factors exerted such a limited impact. This is not to suggest that external influences 
were unimportant, merely to stress that their impact was critically affected by 
management responses to them (see next section), and it is these responses 
particularly in relation to shopfloor control which contributed significantly to the 
number of non-pay stoppages.
The variables used to analyse stoppage numbers were also tested on the series for 
workers involved and days lost but their impact, with the exception of the Trade 
Union Act on workers involved in pay stoppages were insignificant. Although 
difficult to pick up in econometric work observation of the workers involved and days 
lost over pay stoppages showed an association with major pay negotiations, as at 
Austin Rover in 1982 and 1984, Ford in 1987 and Vauxhall in 1984, 1988 and 1989. 
This would confirm the view that changes in the level of collective bargaining may 
alter the incidence and the form of stoppages. The average size of pay stoppage (in 
terms of workers involved) increased from 570 (1970-1978 average p.a) to 1526 
(average p.a 1980-1990) and it is probable that a critical influence upon this was the 
fact that from 1980 all the major manufacturers operated a system of company-wide 
bargaining. This issue is taken further in the final section on the period after 1970.
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STRIKE ACTIVITY IN MOTOR VEHICLES 1970-1990
The aim of this final section is to examine strike patterns in motor vehicles from the 
late 1960s until 1990 focussing upon the years after 1974, in the wake of the first oil 
price explosion and the end of DMR’s examination of the industry. It permits an 
assessment of competing explanations for those patterns particularly those of Turner 
et al. (1967), DMR (1983) and Willman (1984, 1985, 1986) and offers an additional 
interpretation in terms of contradictions within the industrial circuit of capital.
The analysis that forms the remainder of this section draws upon the econometric 
work presented above but concentrates upon developing a longer term perspective 
which examines the ways in which managements responded to product and labour 
market pressures through changes in the labour process and the consequences of these 
for strike activity. It begins by presenting an overview of strike activity and then 
sub-divides the period into that from 1970-1978, and from 1979-1990 with a 
particular focus upon the period of major change from 1977-1983.
The table allows us to draw out some general points about the strike activity in the 
industry over the twenty-three year period. First, that although pay stoppages exhibit 
peaks between 1968 and 1974 and between 1976 and 1979 they decline significantly 
both absolutely and relative to non-pay stoppages after 1979. Secondly, that non-pay 
stoppages remain important throughout the period with peaks between 1969 and 1974, 
1976-1979 and from 1981-1984 (averaging 27.6 per 100000 employees per year).
A third factor is the general decline in strike activity in overall numbers and when 
weighted by employment. This clearly parallels the pattern in most other sectors of 
the economy in the 1980s as does the significant increase in the share of non-pay 
stoppages, never more than half in the period from 1969 to 1979 and never less than 
half thereafter. The maintenance of conflict over non-pay issues and its significance 
in the early 1980s in particular needs to be seen in the context of managerial attempts 
to change the effort bargain in a number of companies (Willman 1984, 1985) and in 
BL and Talbot to radically restructure industrial relations and the labour process. The
306
strike patterns will be examined in more detail later in this section but before doing 
that attention needs to be given to the years immediately preceding the changes in 
management strategy in the late 1970s.
STRIKE ACTIVITY A COMPARISON BY DECADE
YEARS PAY STOPPAGES NON-PAY STOPPAGES
1970-1979 25.2 p.a. 20.6 p.a.
1980-1990 10.77 p.a. 19.9 p.a.
(Source: as above)
1970-1978
From the late 1960s the car industry moved into a new phase following the formation 
of BLMC, the takeover of Rootes by Chrysler and the removal of hire purchase 
restrictions in 1971. The consequence of the latter was a significant expansion in 
demand which continued until 1974 when, in the wake of the oil crisis demand fell 
by nearly 40%. It appears that the early 1970s was critical for the industry as the 
expansionary government policies of the time ushered in a surge of imports (see table 
below) and in Dunnett’s (1979) view the
linkage of the British public with British producers was irrevocably
weakened’ (1979)
This rapid increase in import penetration was particularly severe in the small car 
segment, thus affecting BLMC and Chrysler disproportionately. Imports’ share of 
this market segment increased from 10.5% in 1969 to 29.5% in 1972 and to 45.4% 
in 1977 (Pryke 1981). UK producers were therefore being squeezed by a contracting 
market after the oil price increase and by a rapid increase in import penetration. 
Furthermore, productivity declined significantly between 1973 and 1975 and this 
coupled with the precarious product market position produced losses in all the major 
manufacturers except Ford and prompted the effective nationalisation of BLMC in 
1975. As Dunnett (1979) has argued further;
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Overview of Strike Activity 
in Motor Vehicles 1968-1990 
STRIKE ACTIVITY 1968-1990
PAY NON-PAY
YEAR STRIKES PAY% STRIKES*
1968
1969 27.66 50.9 26.65
1970 40.55 61.9 24.95
1971 24.8 51.7 23.2
1972 25.92 58.5 18.37
1973 29.8 51.2 28.43
1974 27.2 60.5 17.7
1975 17.5 53.4 15.3
1976 20.1 47.1 22.54
1977 25.43 55.7 20.26
1978 21.02 53.8 18.05
1979 20.18 53.3 17.66
1980 8.67 39.1 13.5
1981 10.58 27.9 27.3
1982 13.4 30.1 31.15
1983 7.44 25.5 21.68
1984 27.05 47.2 30.25
1985 8.76 38.1 14.23
1986 5.64 23.8 18.05
1987 16.54 43.0 21.92
1988 7.05 33.9 13.75
1989 7.01 33.9 13.65
1990 6.32 32.7 13.01
(Source:Strike statistics; Employment Gazette, figures on employment 
from Annual Abstract of Statistics, March each year)
Strikes*; Strikes per 100000 employees
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By 1975....the UK motor industry had for the most part 
become unprofitable, outdated and uncompetitive (1979: pl26)
The consequence of these factors was a rapid rise in labour’s share of value added 
after 1978 with a decline only evident after 1982/83 when redundancies, the impact 
of technology and new working practices began to feed through into productivity. The 
movements in the main performance indicators are detailed in the table overleaf. The 
changes highlighted in the table also precipitated significant changes in the industrial 
relations sphere in the major companies which in Friedman’s (1977) view constituted 
a move towards ‘direct control’ strategies over labour. We have already noted the 
high levels of unionisation in the industry and the highly developed nature of shop 
steward organisation and workplace control over the effort bargain which management 
had largely ceded in the late 1950s and 1960s. As Lewchuk (1982) has stated;
The interwar strategy of granting labour a degree of control 
over the pace of work through the piecework system could 
severely backfire. Under conditions of full employment labour 
was able to exploit weak management control through the 
establishment of formal trade unions’ (1982: pl48-9).
The piecework system, established in all the major companies except Ford and 
Vauxhall was therefore an area of management concern in the context of hardening 
product markets and limited productivity growth, in part because of its association 
with wage drift and workplace bargaining but also because of the control it gave to 
shop stewards. The first moves to change this came in 1969 with Chrysler’s decision 
to abolish piecework and move to a measured daywork system, with BLMC following 
in 1971 at Cowley and 1972 at Longbridge, and with the introduction of new 
procedures in 1972. In both companies managements were concerned to regain 
control over workpace and pay and one consequence was the effective ending of the 
gang system in Coventry (Friedman 1977). Within BLMC the transition to daywork 
was associated with protracted strikes at both STI and Jaguar (Thoms and Donnelly
1985) but achieved with little difficulty at Cowley and Longbridge, in the case of the
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latter because half the workforce were already paid as day workers (Friedman 1977). 
The conflicts that arose did so over the decrease in the power of shop stewards and 
over the loss of control within the workplace. Measured daywork appears to have 
brought a change of emphasis in bargaining towards issues of status, pensions, 
holidays, safety and other fringe benefits with stewards having to relinquish a number 
of quasi-managerial functions. In general it seems to have been associated with 
heightened conflict representing a considerable fall in earnings for those previously 
on piecework, compressed differentials (Scullion, 1981) and did nothing to raise 
productivity.
The failure to raise productivity was a consequence of management maintaining the 
manning levels of the 1960s and the fact that few foremen were trained to implement 
MDW (Pryke 1981). However, by the end of the 1970s at Chrysler self-supervision 
had ended, the number of supervisors doubled and a tougher management approach 
emerged with more use of discipline and frequent lay-offs (Hyman and Elgar 1981). 
Factors which probably contributed to the high number of disputes in the company 
in the second half of the decade.
Changes of a different nature were also taking place at Ford. In 1967 the company 
introduced a system of work measurement together with a complex operating system 
accompanied by a substantial pay increase but also by major strikes in 1968, 1969 and 
1971 (Friedman 1977). Indeed the period 1968-1972 was a period of heightened 
conflict generally within Ford with 150 strikes and 11 overtime bans in 1970 alone 
(Dunnett 1979). The national stoppage in 1969 over pay led to the introduction of 
a procedure agreement with penalty clauses against ’unconstitutional action’ and a 
change in the constitution of the NJNC (Friedman and Meredeen 1981, Tolliday 
1991) and finally brought to an end the company’s policy of dealing exclusively with 
national union officials and ignoring shop stewards (Starkey and McKinlay 1989). 
The early 1970’s also saw the ending of the Coventry Toolroom Agreement in 1971 
and the merger of the TGWU with the NUVB which placed the TGWU in the 
position of being the dominant union in the industry, with around 35% of the 
industry’s unionised workforce (Seglow and Wallace 1984).
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TABLE 3
MAIN INDICATORS OF PERFORMANCE IN MOTOR VEHICLES 1970-1990
YEAR NCR* IMPORT
PEN.
RWB LSVA %
Y/N
%
PBR
IndU
1970 100.0 18 100 - -6.4 N/A 2.5
1971 118.5 15 101.8 - 8.4 N/A 2.4
1972 151.0 18 103.8 - 13.5 N/A 2.6
1973 149.8 23 106.4 77.2 -12.7 39.9 1.4
1974 109.5 19 106.9 78.0 -9.9 30.5 1.2
1975 104.9 24 101.2 87.5 -14.2 30.0 2.7
1976 113.4 28 106.5 82.2 12.4 35.6 3.7
1977 116.5 34 103.2 76.4 -8.0 44.6 2.7
1978 140.1 37 106.6 76.3 -7.6 44.8 2.6
1979 151.3 41 97.3 91.0 -10.6 34.0 2.6
1980 135.2 39 89.0 107.6 -4.4 37.4 3.3
1981 133.1 42 75.1 105.0 34.6 45.5 9.1
1982 140.6 47 67.2 101.2 -1.0 53.1 13.7
1983 160.8 50 65.2 91.0 33.2 52.3 -
1984 156.5 50 63.8 88.6 -9.4 - -
1985 160.1 50 64.2 83.6 9.5 62.7 -
1986 163.2 51 64.2 78.5 0.3 73.8 -
1987 174.2 48 63.3 75.3 14.9 72.9 -
1988 191.2 49 67.1 77.2 3.6 71.3 -
1989 198.9 51 67.9 70.4 5.0 70.5 -
1990 172.3 50(est) 66.3 - 0.6 66.7 -
Sources over page:
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NCR; new car registrations from Annual abstract of Statistics.
IMPORT PEN.; Imports as a percentage of UK sales from DMR until 1973 
and from Annual Abstract of Statistics 1974-1990.
RWB, Index of Real Wage Bill, calculated as for other industries.
LSVA, Labour’s share in value added, from National Income Blue Book 
PRODUCTIVITY; Annual change in producticity calculated from Index of 
output and employment figures both from Annual Abstract of statistics 
%PBR; The percentage of workers in the industry on payment by results 
schemes, from New Earnings Survey.
Ind U; The percentage of workers unemployed in the industry calculated 
from Employment Gazette figures on unemployment by industry expressed 
as a percentage of total employment. These figures are not available 
after 1982.
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The changes in payment systems at BLMC and Chrysler brought the companies in 
line with Ford and Vauxhall on day-rate systems and sought to eliminate piecework 
bargaining with the associated problems of short unofficial and unconstitutional 
stoppages (a general concern of employers in the industry; see evidence to the 
Donovan Commission 1968) and shop steward control and influence. However, many 
of the underlying problems remained and as late as 1976, BL Cars still operated with 
56 manual bargaining units and settlement dates covering a nine month period 
(Willman 1984). This produced the associated problems of ‘leapfrogging’ pay claims 
and strikes over pay parity and differentials which reached a peak in 1977 with the 
toolroom workers dispute. Throughout the 1970s strike activity in the industry was 
dominated by events at BL and Chrysler with Ford’s Halewood and Vauxhall’s 
Ellesmere Port plants also having significant strike problems.
Throughout the 1970s Chrysler lost an average of a million man hours a year through 
disputes (Grunberg 1976) and between 1972 and 1974 the company estimated that it 
lost 129000 vehicles (Thoms and Donnelly 1985) through disputes, with Ryton 
characterised by numerous short duration stoppages over working conditions, 
discipline and safety reflecting an on-going contest for control over the labour process 
(Grunberg 1976). At Linwood and Ryton in 1978 there were over 700 separate 
industrial relations disputes which led one observer to describe the company as having 
been ‘tom apart by appalling industrial relations’ (Dunnett 1979). The situation at 
Chrysler has been viewed as a consequence of a falling market share and trading 
losses (as at BL) but also of the failure of the US parent company to appreciate the 
system of industrial relations in Coventry and the imposition of US style management 
techniques on an insecure labour force (Thoms and Donnelly 1985). However, the 
precondition for the levels of conflict was the very significant shop steward presence 
in the company and the strength of the shop floor movement often acting separately 
from shop steward organisation, especially at Ryton (Willman 1985).
The changes introduced by BLMC and Chrysler did little to increase productivity or 
profitability and both companies experienced a further deterioration in their trading 
position by the mid 1970s. At BLMC productivity fell from 1973 to 1976, unit costs
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increased by 11% between 1972/73 and 1974/75 and by a further 10% between 1974 
and 1978, and losses mounted. In response the government effectively nationalised 
BLMC in 1975 and supported Chrysler through massive financial injection in 1977. 
Indeed with the exception of Ford, by the mid 1970s the UK car industry was in 
Dunnett’s phrase largely unprofitable, he added that;
By the 1970s not only were labour management relations in chaos and 
management shopfloor relations weak, but labour-labour relations were in 
disarray’ (1979)
This was certainly the case at Chrysler, but at BL as Seglow and Wallace (1985) have 
shown union organisation was highly developed, if fragile as subsequent events 
proved (Jefferys 1988). The period 1975-77 was a period of severe conflict at BL 
Cars (Willman 1984) especially over non-pay issues despite the company’s ailing 
position and the fact that BL introduced particpation as part of the Ryder package of 
reforms. The extent of unionisation in the industry has already been described but 
at BL in the mid 1970s shop steward organisation was arguably more developed and 
advanced than elsewhere in the industry. The Cars Division recognised 17 unions for 
negotiating pay and conditions, with 100% unionisation for manuals and 70% for 
non-manuals in 1978 (Seglow and Wallace 1984). In the Cars Division there were 
4000 shop stewards in 1976, eleven senior stewards at Longbridge and five at the 
Cowley Body plant. The Cowley Body plant had 268 stewards in total with 235 at 
the Cowley Assembly plant, Castle Bromwich had 530 stewards, Common Lane 90 
stewards and in all the Longbridge plants there were approximately 700 stewards 
(Seglow and Wallace 1985; all figures relate to 1978). In addition to steward 
numbers there were also Works Committees at Longbridge and the Cowley Body 
plant with Works Councils at Castle Bromwich and Cowley Assembly. Shop Steward 
combines, comparatively rare outside the industry even in the 1970s and not 
recognised by the national unions had existed at BMC, Jaguar and STI from the early 
1960s and after the formation of BLMC a new combine committee was formed.
It is clear that despite the attempts by BLMC and Chrysler managements in the period
1969-72 to regain control from shop stewards through the abolition of piecework the
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latter had significant control and influence in both companies by the second half of 
the 1970s. It should be noted that this control and organisation was more highly 
developed in some parts of these companies than others, particularly at Ryton and at 
STI in contrast with Linwood and Longbridge and Cowley (Tolliday 1985). In 
contrast the position at Ford and Vauxhall indicates a less powerful shop steward 
presence due much to the operation of day-wage systems and significant management 
control. As Tolliday and Zeitlin (1986) have argued, at Vauxhall ’it is arguable 
whether there has ever been a powerful shop steward organisation’ (pl03), whilst at 
Ford there is a clear contrast between Dagenham, described as ’sporadically 
powerful’ (Tolliday 1985) and Halewood, where stewards had a significant presence 
and a reputation for militancy with a well-established shop stewards committee by the 
late 1960s (Beynon 1973). At Halewood stewards also seem to have exerted a 
significant degree of job control, having learned from the experiences of Dagenham, 
although this control was seen as being ultimately frail (Tolliday and Zeitlin 1986, 
Beynon 1973). The Dagenham case is illustrated clearly by Tolliday and Zeitlin who 
argued that;
At Dagenham in the 1960s, stewards were not consulted over 
speed-up, the company was able to move workers around the 
factory more or less at will, and individuals were pressurized 
by supervisors into accepting additional tasks on their jobs for 
the same money (1986: pl04).
These factors may go some way towards explaining why Halewood became the Ford 
’problem plant’ in terms of shop floor militancy from the mid 1960s (Tolliday and 
Zeitlin 1986) and dominated the company’s strike record into the 1980s although 
Dagenham experienced a number of acrimonious disputes. As management attempted 
to ensure adherence to procedure and increase efficiency conflicts arose in both 
plants. The late 1970s witnessed major stoppages over working practices and 
lay-offs (particularly following unofficial stoppages) the latter provoking violent 
clashes at Dagenham from 1973-77. At Halewood, working practices were the major 
issue after 1976 with Ford ’declaring war’ on informal practices such as ’welt 
working’ (Tolliday 1991). Disputes concerning this issue contributed significantly to
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the rise in hours lost in the plant in 1977 and 1978. The contrast between Halewood 
and Dagenham is also a product of significant differences in workforce composition. 
Historically, Dagenham has employed a large proportion of workers from a variety 
of ethnic backgrounds (currently over 60% of production workers) with different 
traditions reinforcing sectionalism in the plant. Halewood, in contrast has had a more 
homogeneous workforce (in terms of ethnic background) providing a more fertile 
ground for greater solidarity and class consciousness to develop (also Zeitlin (1980) 
on the significance of Welsh workers at the Cowley plant in the 1930s).
By the late 1970s the industry, faced by a crisis of profitability, stagnating 
productivity and increasing competition in a contracting UK market sought new 
strategies for future growth. At BL the position was precarious, it was noted above 
that competition in the small car segment was particularly intense and overall market 
share in the car market fell to 24% in 1978. These factors were compounded by the 
fact that the company was producing too many products with outdated designs in 
insufficient quantities (Bhaskar 1979), poor product quality and a production process 
which allowed shop stewards a significant degree of control and exposed the 
perceived weaknesses of the company’s management (Edwardes 1983). The structure 
of collective bargaining in BL, little changed since the 1968 merger meant that in the 
company as a whole there were 246 separate bargaining units in 1976 (Willman 1984) 
and in the following year over 700 industrial disputes (Dunnett 1979). At Chrysler, 
as we noted, a similar set of circumstances existed both in terms of product market 
decline and competition and labour process control. The position at Ford and 
Vauxhall was less serious although the latter was experiencing losses and increasing 
import penetration and suffered through a series of supplier strikes in the 1970s 
(Willman 1985), management still had significant control over the labour process as 
it appears to have done at Ford, at least at Dagenham. Thus if there was a dominant 
view that in order to raise productivity and restore profitablility attempts had to be 
made to restructure the labour process and ’wrest control from the shop floor’ these 
pressures were much more acute at BL and Chrysler/Talbot than elsewhere.
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STRIKE ACTIVITY 1970-1977: SOME EXPLANATIONS
We began this chapter by reviewing the work of Turner at al. and their focus upon 
changing worker expectations in terms of job rights, notions of fairness, and 
‘institutional obsolescence’. Despite the procedural and payments syterns changes 
introduced in the late 1960s and early 1970s many of the managerial responses seem 
to have been a continuation of what had gone before. The product market changes 
between 1974 and 1978 were countered within the industry by the traditional method 
of adjusting the number of hours worked rather than by shedding labour. The 
numbers employed fell by 6% between 1970 and 1978 whilst the number of hours 
worked in overtime varied from 11.5 millions in 1970 to 14.6 millions in 1973, and 
the percentage of those on short time varied from 2.5% in 1970 to 9.8% in 1974. 
The continuation of traditional management responses into the 1970s suggests a 
reinforcement of the conclusions of DMR for the period up to 1973 that;
If loss of employment were resisted it was because its (the 
workforce’s) expectations over job rights and earnings were 
violated rather than because of fears over the lack of 
alternative employment’ (1983: p326)
This may also help to account for the relative unimportance of non-pay stoppages in 
the period to 1979/80 at least at BL and Chrysler where shopfloor control appears to 
have remained strong and where the structure of pay bargaining permitted relatively 
frequent bargaining and ’leapfrogging’ of pay claims. At BL following the Ryder 
reforms the management approach changed towards one of encouraging more 
participation and joint decision-making but against a bckground of a company which 
was effectively bankrupt. It is likely that Willman (1985) is correct in his assertion 
that it is doubtful whether the output lost through strikes between 1974 and 1977 
could have been sold. At Ford and Vauxhall with bargaining conducted at a company 
level annually the ability of the shopfloor to influence pay on a regular basis was very 
limited but major disputes did occur over dismissals, work allocation and manning 
levels between 1975 and 1978 at Ford and particularly at Halewood suggesting an 
on-going contest for control over aspects of the labour process. Within Vauxhall 
major disputes periodically occurred at Ellesmere Port as in 1976 and 1978 but were
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absent from the company’s Luton plant.
It was noted earlier that a consequence of measured daywork was the compression of 
differentials. This created considerable friction, particularly within BL, undermined 
notions of fairness and generated a series of conflicts between 1975 and 1977 
involving toolmakers who were particularly aggrieved about the compression of their 
differentials (Scullion, 1981), and culminated in the introduction of a new incentive 
scheme in 1977. Similarly at Chrysler the period was marked by intense conflict and 
after Peugeot-Talbot took over the company in 1978 an incentive scheme was 
re-introduced.
Although we would concur with the view that pay strikes in the industry have tended 
to have more to do with internal rather than external relativities (see Turner et al. 
1967, DMR 1983) the worsening product market position had a direct impact on the 
relative earnings of car workers. From being the fifth highest paying industry in 
1970, by the early 1980s it had dropped out of the top ten (Marsden 1983). Average 
earnings in the industry relative to average manual workers earnings fell significantly 
from 1971-1974, rose slightly to 1977, stabilised and then fell again to 1983 so that 
by that date they were approximately 20% below the level of 1970. These factors 
coupled with the impact of inflation and the Social Contract on pay were probably 
significant in the build up to larger pay disputes towards the end of the decade, 
notably at Ford in 1978, whilst the Social Contract may have contributed to an 
increase in non-pay stoppages from 1976-78.
In summary a number of influences appear to be operating in the period from
1970-1978 to account for the changing strike patterns. First, as the econometric 
results show the product market position through fluctuations in new car demand and 
more significantly growing import penetration exerted a continuing influence upon the 
industry and its strike patterns. Second, the introduction of MDW, which by 
challenging established workplace control and shop steward influence gave rise to new 
grievances and as Friedman (1977) and Lewchuk (1982) have argued marked a 
significant shift in managerial approach towards labour management and control.
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Third, the impact of MDW, as well as having implications for control also disturbed 
established differentials and thereby notions of fairness in pay which contributed 
significantly to strikes particularly at BL. Fourth, the relative decline of pay in the 
industry allied to the impact of the Social Contract may have been of some
significance in the latter part of the decade. Fifth, the structure of collective
bargaining also seems to have played an important role in the number of stoppages 
in particular. As Willman (1984, 1985) has stressed, the main types of stoppage at 
both BL and Chrysler were short, small and unofficial. The available evidence 
suggests that the frequency of disputes was much greater at these two companies than 
at either Ford or Vauxhall where company bargaining existed (Dunnett 1979, Thoms 
and Donnelly 1985, Willman 1985), although by the late 1970s Vauxhall had also 
introduced its own incentive scheme. Finally, the car industry provides a clear 
indication of the significance of shop steward organisation in relation to strike 
activity. Within BL and Chrysler strong and highly developed organisation existed 
although at times there appears to have been strong workplace organisation
independent of this. At Ford such organisation was more fragile, at least at
Dagenham but conflicts over control issues were a constant issue at both Dagenham 
and Halewood well into the 1980s, whilst at Vauxhall shop steward and union 
organisation was not as developed as in the other companies, reflected in the 
relatively low strike incidence within the company and particularly at Luton.
THE PERIOD SINCE 1978
The late 1970s marks a watershed in approaches to labour management in the 
industry. The strategies adopted by the main manufacturers have differed in 
important respects depending upon the severity of their respective problems but they 
have all been concerned with similar issues.
Some of these changes will be discussed in greater depth later in this section but for 
the purposes of our analysis we are concerned with the period from 1978-84 in terms 
of managerial responses to product market decline and to contradictions within the 
circuit of capital and their consequences for strike activity.
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The analysis of the period until 1978 revealed an industry experiencing considerable 
difficulties, generally viewed as unprofitable and unproductive. By the late 1970s 
these problems had intensified with UK manufacturers’ share of the British market 
falling from 52% in 1978 to 38.2% in 1979 (Seglow and Wallace 1985) and with 
particular concern over imports from Japan. This greater awareness of competitive 
pressures was reflected not just in a wish to emulate and better the Japanese 
performance but also within companies, particularly Ford and Vauxhall where 
productivity comparisons between UK plants and those in Germany and Belgium 
became more important. It is also arguable that this awareness of competitive 
pressures also filtered down to the shop-floor. In addition it was clear that product 
quality and design was lacking amongst some UK producers (CPRS 1975) and 
increasing the uncompetitiveness of the industry so that there was a need for greater 
flexibility in the product and in the production process to meet changing market 
needs, particularly the fragmenting of markets. These problems were further 
compounded in 1978/79 with the ’second oil crisis’ which produced a significant fall 
in demand in 1979.
These pressures were felt in the labour market with a general decline in demand for 
labour, particularly semi- skilled and unskilled workers. This was coupled to skill 
shortages for some groups and a need for flexibility amongst employees and 
multi-skilling requiring an emphasis upon training.
Within the labour process all UK manufacturers have been concerned with raising 
productivity, achieving greater flexibility and making the most efficient use of new 
technology. Within BL, Peugeot-Talbot and Ford’s Halewood plant this has involved 
a concentration on reducing ’downtime’ and shop steward influence. Using the 
classification developed by Leman and Winterton (1991) the strategies developed by 
managements in the UK car industry since 1978 can be identified as follows:
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Technological Restructuring:
The introduction of new technology especially within the assembly areas. BL at 
Longbridge in the late 1970s, and Cowley in the early 1980s. Ford at Halewood in 
1980 and 1983 and at Dagenham between 1980 and 1983. Vauxhall at Ellesmere Port 
and Luton from 1984 and from this date at Peugeot-Talbot’s Ryton plant.
Economic Restructuring:
Plant closures, as at BL’s Speke plant in 1978 and in Belgium. Peugeot-Talbot’s 
closure of Linwood and Dublin in 1981 and Ford’s closure of its Dagenham foundry 
in the mid 1980’s. The concentration of production on fewer sites together with a 
considerable reduction of employment on these sites. Employment in the industry fell 
by 44% between 1978 and 1983. Also, there has been a change in the way the main 
companies see their UK operations; Ford and Vauxhall in varying degrees seeing it 
as part of their wider European operations whilst Peugeot-Talbot view the UK 
essentially as an assembly operation.
Labour Process/Industrial Relations Restructuring:
Major changes have occurred through the introduction of new technology. Changes 
to working practices especially at BL and Peugeot-Talbot with a recent emphasis at 
Ford and Vauxhall. All companies have attempted to curb shop steward power and 
influence and at BL and Peugeot this has been accompanied by a strong reassertion 
of management control. Also at BL significant changes have taken place in collective 
bargaining and to the payments system in the late 1970s, and new work organisation 
was introduced in all companies in the 1980s.
The remainder of this section examines the strategies pursued by the main 
manufacturers and links these to changes in the strike pattern in each. The main 
indicators of which are detailed below for the period 1974-83. The following analysis 
of the stategies employed by the main companies since 1978 attempts to examine the 
linkages between the strategies and the nature and volume of strike activity. It begins 
with the well-documented case of BL and draws heavily on the work of Willman 
(1984, 1985, 1986) and Marsden et al. (1985).
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Table
WORKING DAYS LOST IN SELECTED UK MOTOR MANUFACTURERS 
1974-1983
BL/ROVER FORD VAUXHALL
YEAR WDL WDL* WDL WDL* WDL WDL*
1974 N/A N/A 484.6 N/A N/A N/A
1975 7987.4 - 230.8 - - -
1976 N/A - 185.4 - 12.5 -
1977 3375.0 17307 370.9 5080 413.5 13692
1978 1312.5 6836 2726.0 36837 52.3 1570
1979 1850.0 10452 71.2 937 637.4 19429
1980 437.5 2787 56.4 770 13.8 475
1981 380.0 3016 370.6 5434 15.0 714
1982 275.0 2546 157.0 2368 21.7 1033
1983 187.5 1820 207.2 3397 41.3 1966
(Source: Company figures quoted in Willman 1985; Chrysler/Talbot figures were 
unavailable for the period.
WDL ; Working days lost, figures in thousands.
WDL*; Working days lost per 1000 employees).
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BL/Rover Group
Under the participation arrangements introduced as part of the Ryder reforms for the 
company, a Joint Management Committee reported in 1976 and identified a number 
of factors causing low productivity in the company. These were a high rate of 
industrial disputes, high relaxation allowances and high allowed non-productive time 
(Marsden et al. 1985). The significance of the Committee’s conclusions only became 
apparent with the appointment of Michael Edwardes as chairman in 1977 with 
company reorganisation in 1978 and a strategic plan which identified the need for 
product led recovery and substantial investment in new technology. If such 
technology was to be utilised efficiently it required significantly greater management 
control over operations to reduce ‘downtime’ and potential ‘conflict points’.
BL’s strategy in labour relations had two components; the reform of collective 
bargaining, decreasing its frequency and its scope (Willman 1984), and the 
introduction of new working practices. The collective bargaining reforms were 
effected between 1977 and 1979, involved the establishment of a group-wide pay 
structure (finally introduced in 1980) and centralised bargaining in 1980 with two year 
pay agreements. These reforms effectively eliminated the problem of ’leap-frogging’ 
pay claims between plants and the associated potential for strike activity and in 
Willman’s view was critical in reducing the number of pay stoppages by effectively 
eliminating the previously large number of small stoppages.
The reform of working practices has arguably had a more significant impact on 
industrial relations within the company. By the late 1970s top management was 
losing patience with shop stewards and the relationship between the former and 
full-time stewards in particular was progressively worsening (Edwardes 1983). The 
relationship was strained further with the publication of two documents in 1979, one, 
‘Management in BL’ provided a clear statement of ’management’s right to manage’, 
embodied further in the ’Blue Newspaper’ which synthesised this philosophy, seeking 
to re-establish management control over working practices and manning levels and 
the abolition of ’mutuality’. The reforms, finally imposed in April 1980 meant the 
use of industrial engineering techniques to determine manning levels and standard
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times and would no longer be the subject of negotiation. Stewards, already beginning 
to be marginalised through techniques of direct communications with the workforce 
and the ’purge’ on certain full-time stewards over the instruction to vote against 
Edwardes recovery plan were to have their role further curtailed. They would exist 
to represent and communicate trade union information. As Willman has argued;
BL Cars reformed the structure of collective bargaining and 
scope in such a way as to re-establish central control over 
wage determination and management control over work 
allocation (Willman 1984: p9)
With the consequence that:
From April 1980 onwards, management had virtually complete 
control over work practices’ (Williams et al. 1987)
Most of the changes, including teamworking and flexibility within teams, had been 
introduced by 1981, at least at Longbridge. The Longbridge plant had therefore 
experienced a dramatic change in its formal industrial relations machinery and in the 
nature of the labour process. The introduction of new technology in the late 1970s 
allied to the changes in work organisation and management control produced a 
particular pattern of strike activity with major stoppages in 1979, 1980 and 1981 
(Willman and Winch, 1985). These stoppages, large and damaging in terms of days 
lost and workers involved, arose over non-pay issues and were largely ’won’ by 
management which probably contributed to the relative absence of conflict at the plant 
in 1982/83 and after 1984. With the re-tooling of Cowley in 1981 the focus of strike 
activity shifted, particularly with the launch of new models. The apparent calm of 
Longbridge was mirrored by a worsening of management-steward relations at Cowley 
with some evidence that steward organisation had broken down in the plant in the 
early 1980s (Willman 1986). The ’early finishing’ dispute at the time of the Maestro 
launch in 1983 indicated the deep feelings amongst the workforce about treatment by 
supervisors and that given an (albeit temporary) increase in bargaining power the 
workforce was still prepared to use the strike weapon. Like Longbridge, strikes at 
Cowley in the early 1980s were predominantly concerned with non-pay issues with 
the extension of management control and re-tooling. Overall, the Cowley plant
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experienced further strike activity in 1984, including those surrounding the pay 
negotiations which also affected Longbridge and provoked one of the first uses made 
of the 1984 Trade Union Act, but in 1985 only 0.05% of man-hours were lost in the 
entire company (Williams et al. 1987) and since this date strike activity has remained 
at very low levels within Rover Group.
The evidence from BL would seem to offer support to Willman’s view that the critical 
relationship is between changing work practices, re-tooling and strike activity. 
Within BL the centralising of pay bargaining channelled pay issues into formal 
machinery with negotiations every two years, and significant disputes occurred 
throughout the 1980s associated with these negotiations. The incentive scheme, with 
its high bonus component (Willman 1986) and associated instability of earnings was 
a source of some disputes but between 1978 and 1982/3 the levels and focus of strike 
activity were largely the result of the changes initiated by management in terms of 
control of the labour process. The evidence would also suggest that the size of these 
disputes was also affected by shifts in bargaining power with new model launches 
providing an opportunity to express deep grievances over aspects of the changes 
introduced. The importance of re-tooling is also the result of the fact that the initial 
period of a new product is often associated with ‘teething troubles’ as well as new 
working arrangements, bonuses and staffing levels so that the potential for 
disagreement is increased. When the product is established, management flexibility 
and willingness to concede on certain working arrangements is likely to be greater 
and fewer disputes would arise.
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PEUGEOT-TALBOT
Given the trading position of the company when it was taken over by Peugeot in 1978 
it is not surprising that the strategies adopted by management look similar to those 
pursued by BL. In the sense that at BL a hard line was possible because the costs of 
strike action for the company in terms of lost saleable output was low, at Peugeot the 
acquisition of the manufacturing operations was not of immediate importance, rather 
it wished to obtain Chrysler’s dealer network in the UK. It is therefore possible that 
the prospect of the closure of manufacturing plants in the UK would not have been 
seen at the time as being disastrous.
Changes were introduced almost immediately, with the introduction of a new 
incentive scheme but the crisis point for the company came with a 14 week strike in 
1979 ostensibly about pay, and in which management comprehensively triumphed. 
Subsequently, the workforce accepted increased output without an increase in labour 
(Marsden et al. 1985) and management mounted an assault on shopfloor power with 
the introduction of French working practices into its plants (Grunberg 1986).
At Ryton, new working practices were introduced in the wake of the 1979 strike with 
an increase in the authority of first line supervisors. Management also changed its 
style and developed new forms of communication with employees (Pettigrew and 
Whipp, 1991) which by-passed shop stewards and in conjunction with other changes, 
greatly reduced their number and influence, particularly full-time stewards. In the 
1970s, as many as 60% of all stewards on each shift were full-time, by 1985 only 
two full time convenors remained in the company and the ratio of stewards to 
members rose from 1 to 20 in the 1970s to 1 to 35 in 1983 (Marsden et al 1985). 
Overall, stewards were stripped of functions and power and issues of manning 
became exclusively a management decision as at BL.
The changes were also associated with redundancies and plant closures (Linwood and 
Dublin in 1981) with a fall in employment from 25000 in 1979 to 6000 in 1983 and 
to 4000 in 1990. Effort levels in the company increased significantly after 1979 
(Marsden et al. 1985) with productivity increasing by 40% between 1979 and 1983
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due much to the reduction of ’down-time’, increased track speed, cuts in rest periods 
and increased flexibility (moving workers around the factory and merging job areas) 
as well as the effects of the re-introduced incentive-based pay scheme (Pettigrew and 
Whipp, 1991). No significant capital investment was made at Ryton until the second 
half of the 1980s, yet the UK company achieved profitability in 1983 and 1984, with 
spectacular growth since 1987.
Peugeot-Talbot represents an interesting contrast with the other main UK companies 
in that having changed working practices significantly, re-tooled in the late 1980s and 
introduced new products, the company claims that it has had no major dispute on the 
shopfloor since 1979 and not within the company since a strike involving ASTMS in 
1981. This may be due in part to the fact that until the mid 1980s the plant was a 
peripheral element within Peugeot’s European operations, producing largely outdated 
products for export. Only in 1986 did this change with the decision to produce the 
309 and 405 models at Ryton, so that until that time considerable uncertainty hung 
over the plant’s long-term future. In contrast, Peugeot-Talbot argue that the absence 
of strikes has much to do with a significant culture and attitude change within the 
company. Unlike the other companies, it experienced a long and protracted stoppage 
which resulted in a defeat for the workforce and unions. The 1979 strike represents 
a tough approach from a management which had little to lose at the time (see 
argument above) and which represented a clear break with past actions. This 
approach met with seemingly entrenched shopfloor organisation and workplace 
attitudes. The fact that one big strike occurred rather than the number of large 
disputes at BL may have more to do with the issue (pay), and the level at which it 
was negotiated (company), uniting the entire workforce whereas at BL issues were 
generally about non-pay issues which often affected different plants at different 
times. As the cases of British Steel and the docks show, (but cf. coal) where one 
major stoppage occurs further widespread stoppages are unlikely and management can 
push forward unemcumbered to effect broad and deep changes in industrial relations 
and the labour process. The case of Peugeot-Talbot would also provide tentative 
support for Waddington’s (1987) argument that following a major confrontation and 
a ’victory’ for management or workers, a set of new workplace values becomes established.
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FORD
In the previous sections it was stressed that within Ford, Halewood was seen as the 
’problem plant’ in the UK. Like BL and Chrysler it was seen as being high on 
non-productive time, high manning levels with productivity comparing unfavourably 
with that at Saarlouis in the late 1970s (Marsden et al. 1985). Overall, the company 
estimated that the plant operated at two thirds of capacity between 1976 and 1982 and 
in an attempt to remedy these deficiencies it introduced new working practices at the 
plant in 1978 (which precipitated a protracted strike), a new efficiency package in 
1981 and introduced new technology between 1980 and 1981 with further re-tooling 
in 1983 (Marsden et al. 1985). Halewood experienced major disputes over non-pay 
issues in 1980, 1981 and 1982 due much to a new disciplinary code introduced at the 
plant in November 1980 which created significant problems throughout 1981 
(Tolliday 1991). The code coincided with the launch of the new Escort in 1980 and 
the problems associated with the former forced it to be rescinded by the company in 
1981. The ‘efficiency package’ was also strongly resisted as were many of the 
companies initiatives between 1980 and 1983 in the areas of self-certification, on-line 
maintenance and the removal of demarcation and culminated in the Kelly dispute of 
March/ April 1983.
According to Starkey and McKinlay (1989), Ford in the 1980s has pursued a twin 
strategy of greater rationalisation and efficiency allied to a long term approach 
designed to build more consensual labour management relations whilst safeguarding 
management prerogative. In 1979, the company attempted to introduce quality 
circles, taken further in 1981 with the ‘After Japan’ programme, aimed at reducing 
inventory holdings, eliminating a number of supervisory and manual grades and 
reducing the number of production workers by twenty percent (Foster and Wolfson 
1989). In the late 1980s, the failure to gain acceptance of QCs (finally abandoned 
at this time) saw the emergence of the El strategy aimed at building trust over a 
10-15 year period but as with the QC experiment, union resistance has diminished the 
significance of the programme although the company’s EDAP scheme has apparently 
been more successful and has been copied by both Jaguar and Peugeot-Talbot.
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Within the general UK operations the company has attempted to gain greater 
conformity to procedures (Marsden et al. 1985). It has also sought to gain greater 
efficiency through rationalisation, redeployment and flexibility. The numbers 
employed in Ford UK fell from 58561 in 1979 to 37027 in 1985 (Tolliday 1991), and 
to less than 30000 by the end of 1991. Tolliday has argued that Ford’s strategy 
towards labour changed from around 1983 onwards. Up to that point it had been 
based upon discipline, enforcing existing agreements and the control of work through 
technology. After 1983 (with earlier attempts the year before) the company has 
attempted to ’bring stewards on board’ in terms of gaining their commitment to 
changes and made the pursuit of efficiency through greater flexibility a key objective 
with attempts to obtain agreement on this in 1982, 1985, 1987 and again in 1989. 
Based upon the acquisition of new skills and the elimination of demarcation lines 
(Starkey and McKinlay 1989). The 1985 Agreement marked a major breakthrough 
for the company involving broader job classifications with the new position of 
’production operator’ replacing 86 separate job titles (Tolliday 1991). The fact that 
Ford has made several attempts at agreement on flexibility linked to pay is indicative 
of the problems it has had in reaching agreement and illustrates the strength that the 
unions and workforce generally can periodically exercise within the company. Within 
Ford, union membership remains at around 100% and shop steward organisation is 
still strong with stewards increasing their involvement in certain areas of 
decision-making. However, the attempts to gain greater flexibility in both 1987 and 
1989 produced major conflicts throughout Ford’s UK operations although in general 
resort to strike action has been rare in the period after 1985. It is perhaps significant 
that absenteeism within the company and particularly at Dagenham remains high, to 
the extent that part-timers are frequently drafted in on Mondays and Fridays, and 
considerably above the levels of other manufacturers.
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VAUXHALL
The general picture at Vauxhall in the 1970s appears to be one of few internal 
industrial relations difficulties although strikes amongst suppliers caused severe 
disruption at times. Those disputes that did occur took place largely at Ellesmere 
Port and it is indicative that the initial attempts to adopt a firmer line in industrial 
relations were at Ellesmere Port rather than at Luton. In 1979, the company focussed 
attention on attempting to resurrect long standing procedures to gain greater flexibility 
at the Cheshire plant (Marsden et al. 1985).
Although shop steward organisation does not appear to have been as significant at 
Vauxhall as elsewhere there is evidence that the company made efforts to reduce 
steward power and change the role of the steward in the 1980s. Significantly, as at 
Peugeot-Talbot, the Luton plant doubled output between 1979 and 1983 without 
significant changes in technology. The re-tooling at Vauxhall took place later than 
the other major manufacturers; at Ellesmere Port in 1984 for the launch of the Astra 
and in the late 1980s at Luton for the development of the Cavalier. Again there is 
a clear association between re-tooling, new models and strike activity. The company 
experienced major disputes in every year from 1984, initially at Ellesmere Port but 
latterly at both it and Luton. The major strikes at Luton are noteworthy in the 
context of broader changes in industrial conflict. In late 1986 the findings of an 
Industrial Society investigation into absenteeism revealed a widespread problem at 
Luton (Guardian 30/10/86). Absenteeism was well organised, implying significant 
workplace organisation in the 1980s (cf. Tolliday and Zeitlin, 1986). This finding 
may also account for the relatively low levels of strike activity in the plant for, as 
management responded with a ’clamp-down’ on absenteeism, the response from the 
workforce was an immediate stoppage. The changes are important in that they 
suggest that a clear ’indulgency pattern’ had built up at Luton which had been 
’tolerated’ or ignored by management until the pressures for more efficient use of 
new equipment and new model development forced management to confront it. The 
consequence for workers was a loss of control and a worsening of the effort bargain 
leading to a search for other sanctions against management.
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POSTSCRIPT
The late 1980s witnessed significant changes in industrial structure in the motor 
vehicles sector which have important consequences for union presence and 
organisation, the nature of industrial relations in the short and medium term, and 
strike activity. As with the previous discussion the concern here is with car 
production although commercial vehicles also experienced important structural 
changes.
In 1986, the Japanese owned Nissan company opened a factory in Durham and 
secured a single union deal with the AEU. The deal, in providing for single status, 
harmonisation of terms and conditions and a compulsory conciliation clause broke 
new ground in an industry dominated by multi-unionism and low trust industrial 
relations. In practice, union density at the plant does not appear to have exceeded 
30%, and by 1989 was below 20% (Garrahan 1988, Wickens 1989). In 1989 Honda 
established a new plant in Swindon, but decided not to recognise a trade union, 
making it the only non-union major car manufacturer in the UK and in 1991, Toyota 
after deciding to open a plant in the UK opted for a single union deal again with the 
AEU.
This influx of direct Japanese investment has had a number of important short term 
effects. First, the main manufacturers now number seven, diffusing the dominance 
of Rover, Ford and Vauxhall and by giving the Japanese better access to the UK and 
other European markets adds to the competitive pressures faced by the existing 
manufacturers. Second, the union density in the industry has fallen although it 
continues to remain high at Rover and Ford, and it is clear that the single union 
option or at least single table bargaining has been considered or adopted by the 
existing companies. Third, the new entrants have also placed a number of personnel 
and industrial relations issues to the forefront of the considerations of the existing 
companies. Whilst all had made moves towards adopting certain Japanese style 
practices, notably quality circles, teamworking and greater flexibility, the moves to 
single status, longer working weeks (47 hour week at Nissan including eight hours 
compulsory overtime: Oliver and Wilkinson 1988) and single union deals do not seem
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to have been seriously considered. Companies like Rover appear to have 
incorporated aspects of Japanese work organisation without adopting personnel 
practices but in the late 1980s this approach changed. In 1991 the company 
announced its intention to move towards single status and harmonisation having 
earlier succeeded in gaining agreement to seven day working. A further illustration 
of the change is provided by Ford’s attempt in 1988 to open a factory at a 
’greenfield’ site in Dundee which would have by-passed the existing multi-union 
agreements in the company by granting a single union deal to the AEU. Although 
the attempt failed, the intention to break away from existing multi-union agreements 
was clear. Fourth, the new deals have increased the importance of the AEU in the 
industry, it now stands as the only union with recognition in all the companies that 
have recognition agreements. Given the publicly more co-operative stance of the 
AEU, as compared with the TGWU this may be expected to have an impact on the 
conduct of industrial relations in the foreseeable future. Finally, the Japanese 
companies have tried to operate policies designed to build commitment and evoke 
high trust responses, similar examples of which can be seen at Rover, Peugeot-Talbot 
and Ford. To what extent they are likely to be successful may depend upon their 
ability to sustain and build market share, remain profitable and critically on their 
ability to allow their employees to share in the benefits of this. The latter would also 
seem to be a sine qua non for keeping unions at bay, or at least on the margins.
As yet the new recruits to the UK industry have not experienced a strike and given 
their meticulous attention to recruitment and selection, induction and training have 
sought to minimise the likelihood of such disruption occurring (see also developments 
at Rover: Smith 1988, IRRR, 514). However, the intense work regime did create 
problems initially at Nissan in terms of high turnover of staff, and lack of information 
prevents us knowing the current position although it is claimed to have fallen 
markedly (Wickens 1989).
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CONCLUSIONS
At the beginning of this chapter we argued that someone wishing to understand 
post-war strike activity in the motor vehicles industry needed to appreciate the 
relationship between changes in product and labour markets, management responses 
to these and the development of union capacity. In the first half of the chapter we 
documented the development of union organisation and particularly that of shop 
stewards, the role played by these in strike activity and confirmed by econometric 
analysis and the critical role of product and labour markets in strike incidence. For 
the 1950s and 1960s changing demand conditions and, most significantly, the spread 
of trade union organisation were the key influences upon strike numbers. The peaks 
and troughs in product demand, exacerbated by government policies were further 
amplified by management responses in the form of variations in overtime and through 
lay-offs and served to heighten the instability in earnings and employment insecurity 
described by Turner et al. (1967).
The econometric work revealed that the main direct impact of product market changes 
fell upon pay stoppages and it is significant that in the 1970s and 1980s the main 
product market influence shifts from new car registrations in the UK to the level of 
import penetration. This reflects a growing concern with increasing competition and 
it is noteworthy that this exerted a depressing effect upon pay strike numbers. The 
argument of the second half of the chapter is that the level of import penetration has 
continued to exert a significant impact upon non-pay stoppages but indirectly through 
the various management responses to it and other product market failures. The ways 
in which the main companies responded to their unique difficulties have been 
documented at length with very different consequences at the level of strike activity. 
The general attempts to regain control of the effort bargain and the associated 
resistance explain much of the strike activity in the 1970s and 1980s particularly the 
persistance of non-pay stoppages. The evidence also provides support for two of 
Willman’s propositions; namely that reform of collective bargaining can have an 
impact upon the number and form of strike activity although the timing cannot be 
divorced from other changes which could also have exerted an influence, and second,
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that in the 1980s strike activity is concentrated in the periods of re-tooling and new
model launches. Initially, at Longbridge and Cowley, then Halewood and Dagenham
and latterly at Ellesmere Port and Luton. As Willman (1985) has argued;
Much of the strike activity since 1980 can be explained in 
terms of the refusal of those workers employed in plants where 
new product launch provides a modicum of security to
acquiesce in effort and the surrender of job property rights
(1985)
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‘BUCKING THE TREND’
STRIKE ACTIVITY AND CHANGING INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS 
THE BRITISH COAL MINING INDUSTRY
OVERVIEW
For much of the post-war period until the early 1960s, aggregate strike activity in the 
UK was dominated by events in the coal-mining industry. The industry became the 
focus for a number of studies which attempted to identify the precise causes of its 
strike proneness and the reasons for the subsequent decline in its strike propensity in 
the 1960s. Many of these studies are reviewed in the light of the evidence presented 
in this chapter, but it has a number of more specific aims.
First, it was felt valuable to re-visit the period of analysis examined by Durcan, 
McCarthy and Redman, to appraise and assess their conclusions together with those 
of other writers. Second, to set the strike record of the post-war period in the context 
of the experience of the industry and its workers in the inter-war period. Third, as 
with motor vehicles, to assess the industry’s strike record in the period since the 
ending of the DMR study and the first oil crisis, a focus which until now has not been 
undertaken, and to further analyse longer term movements in strike dimensions. 
Fourth, to provide a further analysis of the role of governments in shaping the nature 
and conduct of industrial relations within a specific industry and finally, to examine 
and offer explanations for, the continuing levels of strike activity in the wake of the 
1984/85 dispute, particularly within parts of the Yorkshire coalfield.
A further point is that a study of coal-mining provides an interesting test of the 
theoretical model. Previous studies have found that what worked well in accounting 
for strike activity in some industries did not work well when applied to coal (e.g 
Pencavel 1970). In addition, the attitudes sections suggest that the model might 
permit an insight into the extent to which solidaristic orientations and the ‘traditional 
proletarian’ have persisted in coal-mining rather than the instrumentalism we have 
argued has become more commonplace in the post-war period. If this is the case it 
highlights an important continuing difference between coal (or parts of it) and other 
industries. A more fundamental issue concerns employer attitudes. These were
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examined largely in the context of private organisations operating for the pursuit of 
profit. Coal, in being state owned for the entire period of study has not had the same 
requirement for most of the period. This said, it has had pressure imposed on it to 
control costs and has faced varying degrees of competition since the 1960s, and 
particularly since the late 1970s, when pressures towards a more commercial 
orientation for the industry are more in evidence. Taken together the evidence on 
attitudes would suggest that the model would be most applicable and most successful 
for the second half of the post-war period.
The evidence presented in this chapter confirms the results of writers who have laid 
stress upon the role of changing payments ssytems and product market factors in 
contributing to changing strike incidence and levels, but also highlights the 
importance of other previously neglected factors. In particular the spread of 
mechanisation through powerloading in the 1950s and 1960s and the productivity 
changes in the 1980s, the latter associated with new payment schemes, changing 
working practices and the intensification of effort.
The chapter begins with a consideration of the historical context of the industry and 
the experience of those working in it prior to nationalisation. It then reviews 
previous studies before analysing the strike experience of the industry from 
nationalisation to 1990, placing particular emphasis on the period from 1970 to 1990.
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THE INDUSTRY BEFORE NATIONALISATION
The period from 1913 to 1947 witnessed dramatic changes in coal mining and 
inflicted considerable hardship on mining families and communities, the legacy of 
which continued long into the post-war period. As Supple (1987) has argued;
In the generation after 1913, the coal industry experienced a 
disastrous retreat from...(its)...position of international 
dominance, as output, exports, employment all fell (1987:10).
The consequences of which were that the industry;
came out of the second world war, a vulnerable, smaller and 
enfeebled industry (1987:10).
For those employed in coal mining the experiences of the wage cuts and 
unemployment of the inter-war period magnified already deep divisions between 
owners and miners. As Barnett (1986) points out a ‘ferocious industrial struggle was 
a long tradition of the industry’ (1986:67) with bad feeling and antagonism pervading 
it, manifested in low morale, non - co-operation and indifference. These, Barnett 
contends created problems of complacency and incompetence, the predominance of 
traditional habit and inertia and the failure to adapt to major changes in the operating 
environment. The consequences of which were that in the period 1935-38, although 
only accounting for 6% of the insured working population of Britain coal mining 
accounted for 64% of all disputes and 52% of days lost.
If the deficiencies of the industry described by Barnett are accurate their origins lay 
in the background and experiences of those who worked in it. Notwithstanding the 
impact of depression, throughout the inter-war period there was a constant shortage 
of able colliery managers and adequately trained engineers (Barnett 1986) and a 
deeper problem of managers obsessed with ‘short-termism’ constituting in Barnett’s 
view a ‘classic case study of the survival in Britain of the practical man’ (1986: 68) 
whose horizon was bounded by short-term gain. Such a view is evident in the report 
of the Reid Committee in 1945 where concern is expressed about the ‘insularity of
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management’ in the industry.
The position of the miners and their associated communities, Lockwood’s ’traditional 
proletarian workers’ has been clearly described by Supple (1987).
Miners employment and society were exceptional, his work 
and work situation gruelling, dangerous and calculated to 
excite his suspicion and antagonism to those who employed 
him. He lived in communities which were isolated and 
characterised by monolithic class structure which could enforce 
as well as reinforce ’militant’ social and industrial attitudes, 
the very inward-looking nature of his daily social and cultural 
pre-occupations helped to perpetuate both his suspicion of the 
rest of society and a formidable mutual loyalty and solidarity 
in the face of adversity which was such a marked feature of 
miners lives and mining disputes’ (1987:483-484).
Implicit in this passage is the view that communities based upon a single occupation 
produce considerable social convergence and solidarity (see Bulmer’s (1976) 
ideal-typical mining communities) and made miners vigorous in the pursuit or defence 
of their own interests. In Berry’s (1940) terms, the aspirations and demands of life 
were communal rather than individual in character (see also Dennis et al. 1956, for 
post-war support for this view). Critically, this communality and shared experience 
particularly of past defeats, ’fostered recollections, magnified and mythologized by 
time’ and produced considerable bitterness albeit a ’bitterness of acquiescence’ 
(Supple 1987:487). In Fox’s (1974) terms this describes a case of ’institutionalised 
low trust’ supported and reinforced by the communities in which people lived, it was 
in part a hope that through the nationalisation of the industry an improvement in 
relations between the miners and the mines new owners would materialise.
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NATIONALISATION AND A NEW BEGINNING
The National Coal Board came into existence on 1 January 1947 charged with:
making supplies available, of such qualities and sizes, in such 
quantities and at such prices, as may seem best calculated to 
further the public interest in all respects’...(and to)... operate 
so that its revenues shall not be less than sufficient to meet 
its outgoings...’on an average of good and bad years’.
It was an explicit belief that in bringing the industry under social ownership industrial 
relations would improve and the achievement of the NCB’s overall objectives 
necessarily made easier. A number of important developments in the period 
preceding nationalisation and particularly those subsequent to it offered hope for such 
an outcome.
In the inter-war period, union organisation in coal mining was far more developed 
than in most other industries with union density standing at around 75% of the 
workforce in 1913 (Supple 1987). Union organisation had been based on districts 
although large county unions emerged in the late nineteenth century in 
Northumberland, Durham and Yorkshire (Allen 1981). These unions were grouped 
under the Miners Federation of Great Britain (MFGB) in 1898 which rationalised 
some of the structure although in the wake of the 1926 General Strike a number of 
company unions were formed as ’Spencerism’ took hold in some coalfield areas. 
During World War 2 the 36 county unions in existence amalgamated and after 1940 
the MFGB acted ’as a national union even though formally it was not one’ (Allen 
1981:26). In practice the MFGB was internally unstable with divisive organisational 
uncertainties which were only begun to be dealt with by the formation of the NUM 
in 1944. Although not being the only union recognised in coal mining it consistently 
represented over 75% of the workforce, and from 1952 to 1969, over 80% (DMR 
1983).
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In addition to the potential centralisation and control which the formation of the NUM 
provided the Corporation, the government and the NCB encouraged the appointment 
of trade union leaders to serve the Corporation in the capacity of dealing with labour 
matters. These included prominent NUM figures such as Citrine, Edwards and 
Homer and although some in the NUM were hostile to those who took NCB positions 
the NUM, nationally, assisted the Board in recruiting from trade union ranks 
(Ashworth 1986).
In the immediate post-nationalisation period the NCB and the unions quickly 
established a new institutional framework for dealing with industrial relations matters. 
This centred around new conciliation and consultative committees established in 1947, 
the former consisting of a National Negotiating Committee and a National Reference 
Tribunal to deal with issues in dispute as well as a new pit conciliation scheme with 
unresolved disputes being referred to a Joint Disputes Committee and then to a pit 
umpire. The consultative framework involved a National Consultative Council agreed 
in 1946, strictly precluded from dealing with wages or terms of employment as these 
were matters for the conciliation machinery, Divisional Consultative Councils and 
Colliery Consultative Committees. By the end of 1947 all divisions had Councils and 
most collieries their own consultative committee.
The institutional framework for industrial relations described above remained largely 
unaltered until the aftermath of the 1984/85 strike although new procedures were 
developed in other areas, notably re-deployment, redundancy and colliery closures. 
There is considerable debate surrounding the efficacy of these initiatives and changes 
in remedying the industry’s labour relations problems but it is clear from the vantage 
point of the 1990s that ‘the advent of public ownership did little to resolve the 
tensions in the industry’s industrial relationships’ and that these; ‘shaped the 
atmosphere as well as the structure of the public corporation’ (Supple 1987:689, 620). 
The account presented in the remainder of this chapter attempts to illuminate the 
factors which contributed to the persistance and magnitude of grievances and tensions 
within the industry focussing particularly on the period after 1973.
340
AN OVERVIEW: 1947-1990: POST-WAR DEVELOPMENT AND STRIKE 
ACTIVITY
The period following the nationalisation of the coal industry can usefully be divided 
into a number of sub-periods associated with very different patterns of strike activity. 
Using Ashworth’s (1986) periodization based largely upon product market changes 
the years 1946-57 are associated with a drive for high output with coal in a 
near-monopoly position in the fuel market, although declining in competitiveness 
towards the end of the decade. Output and inland coal consumption peaked in 
1956/57 and from 1958 to 1972 the industry experienced a period of severe 
contraction faced by falling energy prices and increased competition, notably from oil 
which, from meeting 15% of fuel requirements in 1957 rose to 38% in 1968 (Allen 
1970). The period of contraction was also one of significant internal changes 
particularly the spread of mechanisation through powerloading and associated changes 
(in 1966 and 1971) to the payments system. With oil crises in 1973/74 the industry 
found itself in a stronger competitive position with output stabilising between 1972 
and 1982/83 but with inland consumption declining rapidly after 1979. Ashworth’s 
sub-periods can then be extended from 1983 onwards with inland consumption 
stablising in the second half of the 1980s at a level 10-15% below that of the late 
1970s and with output standing at 75% of its 1978 level. The later period is 
characterised by the industry’s responses to these changes following the 1984/85 
strike and the fact that the output levels of the late 1980s have been achieved with a 
workforce a quarter of the size of that in 1975.
The phases identified by Ashworth of 1946-57, 1958-72, 1973-82 and that of the 
period from 1983 are also broadly associated with significant shifts in the personnel, 
policies, general approach and composition of the NCB and the NUM. The period 
of contraction in particular was associated with the appointment of Robens from 1961 
as Coal Board Chairman and the adoption of more a more paternalistic approach and 
collaborationist policies (Allen 1981), with the NUM under the control of Ford and 
Paynter (until 1972 and 1968 respectively). Similarly in the 1973-82 period the 
industry was increasingly dominated by the close working relationship between Ezra
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as Coal Board Chairman and Gormley. Their retirements in 1982 and succession by 
McGregor and Scargill respectively marked the move to a much more 
confrontationist era in the post-war coal industry.
Within the general context of product market changes the main actors have sought to 
develop policies and introduce initiatives to respond to changed circumstances. At 
a strategic level the NCB and governments have attempted at a number of points to 
restructure various parts of the corporation’s operations and these are briefly 
considered here.
In the period of ’maximising output’ the corporation embarked on a mechanisation 
programme with powerloading introduced to coalfaces, a process which gathered 
momentum between 1957 and 1968 and was virtually completed by 1970. This 
programme coincided with the falling demand of the period 1958-68, with significant 
changes in payments systems and prompted a process of economic restructuring 
throughout that period (Leman and Winterton 1991) which led to the closure of nearly 
60% of the Board’s collieries (between 1960 and 1970) and a reduction in 
employment of over 40% between 1958 and 1967. The continued deterioration of the 
product market led to a further period of economic restructuring in 1968 (Leman and 
Winterton 1991) which saw an additional cut of over 25% in workforce numbers 
between 1968 and 1971, many of which were enforced redundancies rather than 
adjustments via natural wastage.
The shift to powerloading also stimulated debates about methods of payment. With 
faceworkers traditionally paid by piecework, the spread of powerloading made pay 
less dependent upon worker effort and in a series of initiatives in 1955, 1966 and 
1971 the industry moved towards a measured daywork system. In the 1970s as 
output stabilised the corporation embarked on a policy of modernisation and the 
introduction of new capacity particularly following the agreement to ’Plan For Coal’ 
in 1975. However, the failure of productivity to rise in the daywork era led the NCB 
to revert to local incentive schemes, in 1977 following a failure to gain agreement to 
a national scheme. The emphasis upon incentive schemes has subsequently been
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maintained, although modified in the wake of the 1984/85 strike and has been a 
critical element in the management of labour in the 1980s (Edwards and Heery 1989).
The mechanisation phase of the 1950s and 1960s constituted the last major 
development of production techniques in the industry. The technological restructuring 
in the 1980s has involved computer monitoring of faces and equipment to increase 
machine utilisation and reduce down-time (Bums et al 1985, Leman and Winterton 
1991 on MINOS and FIDO). Alongside these changes has been a further phase of 
economic restructuring as demand has fallen further and the NCB has been required 
to adopt a more commercial approach and meet tighter financial targets. This has 
typically involved the elimination of ‘high-cost’ pits and the further concentration of 
output in the central coalfield. The number of collieries has fallen from 211 in 
1980/81 to 73 in 1989/90, and employment by around 70% over the same period, 
with major redundancies in 1985-87 when nearly 78000 miners were made redundant 
or dismissed (NCB Report and Accounts). The significance of the 1980s also lies in 
the attempts of the NCB (British Coal from 1987) and the government to restructure 
the labour process (Leman and Winterton 1991) with significant changes to 
procedures, working practices and other substantive industrial relations issues.
STRIKE PATTERNS IN COAL MINING: SOME EXPLANATIONS
The phases described and the strategies and initiatives that were associated with them 
provide an important backcloth against which strike activity in coal mining has to be 
set. Coal mining dominated the strike totals in the 1950s and in terms of strike 
proneness miners have, with the exception of dockers, been the most strike prone 
group in Britain throughout the post-war period. Significantly, movements in strike 
activity in the industry have not followed the patterns found in manufacturing (see 
below), nor has the composition of stoppages been similar with coal experiencing a 
much higher proportion of non-pay stoppages than that found in most other industries. 
However, like the engineering sector strikes have for most of the period been small, 
short, generally unofficial and in breach of procedure (DMR 1983). The figures 
overleaf detail the movements in the main dimensions of stoppages and it can be seen 
that the movement of strike activity in coal closely follows the path of internal coal
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consumption particularly from the mid 1950s to around 1971 with stoppage numbers 
per 100000 workers rising consistently from 1950 to 1957 and then declining 
markedly from 1960 to 1971 for both pay and non-pay strikes. In the early 1970s the 
emergence of large national stoppages were an important new development but the 
trend of stoppages, especially over non-pay issues is more erratic. These fluctuations 
continue into the 1980s but with the level of strikes per 100000 workers significantly 
higher on average than that for the 1960s or 1970s and particularly for non-pay 
stoppages.
Distilling from a number of studies of strike activity in coal-mining for various 
periods following nationalisation it is possible to identify a variety of factors exerting 
an influence on stoppage numbers and strike proneness. First, there is general 
agreement on the impact of the economic environment on strike activity, particularly 
strike numbers (McCormick 1979, Handy 1981, Winterton 1981, DMR 1983, 
Ashworth 1986). As DMR have argued for the 1950s;
Workers realised that high demand and limited stocks ensured 
that stoppages were likely to produce a more rapid managerial 
response than referring disputes through procedure (1983:210)
This would account not only for the number but also the form these stoppages took. 
Similarly, Winterton (1981) stressed the role of declining coal consumption in 
reducing the relative strike proneness of the coal industry but as both Handy (1981) 
and have Winterton argued, whilst the fall in demand led to a significant fall in strike 
activity this was due to a reduced willingness to strike not to a reduced number of 
grievances. Coal Board evidence supports the greater use of conciliation procedures 
after 1957 and as Ashworth has stated;
The greater willingness to use conciliation procedures rather 
than walk out, was in part a response to a perception of 
changed economic and employment conditions in the industry 
(Ashworth 1986:p.301).
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Evidence also suggests that this greater use of conciliation machinery affected the 
form as well as the level of conflict (Scott et al. 1963, Winterton, 1981).
DMR emphasised that although the industry’s economic position was important a 
focus upon this ignores changes in the use of capital equipment and in payment 
systems as well as the manner in which such changes were brought about. DMR did 
not develop the point in respect of mechanisation but it is clear that at least two issues 
are potentially important for strike activity. First, the increase in mechanisation and 
its level (McCormick 1973) and second, the associated introduction of district 
powerloading agreements. In an analysis of strike activity in the Yorkshire coalfield 
McCormick argued that, ceteris paribus, the level of mechanisation would be 
associated with fewer strikes, but that the increase in mechanisation through 
disrupting work organisation would be expected to increase stoppage numbers. He 
found no significant support for either of these propositions (although the direction 
of influence was as predicted) nor did Hepworth et al. (1973) in their study of 
technological change in the same location. For Clegg (1979) the role of district 
power loading agreements in the 1950s were critically important in accounting for 
the decline in stoppages between 1957 and 1965. However, the impact of district 
PLA’s was uneven (Winterton 1981, Handy 1981), in Yorkshire the decline in strike 
activity preceded the District Agreement in 1958 whilst in general the fall in the 
percentage of stoppages over wage issues did not take place until the early 1960s 
(Handy 1981). The role of district powerloading agreements is discussed further 
below in consideration of changes to the payments system.
A further factor seen as affecting the strike proneness of the industry and changes in 
this has been the nature of payments systems in operation. From 1947-1966 between 
40 and 50% of the industry’s workforce were on some form of piecework system, 
declining to around 22% between 1966 and 1971 and to a daywork system for all 
between 1971 and 1978. Since 1978 local incentive schemes have operated for the 
workforce with modifications in the 1980s until the present day. The work of Scott 
et al. (1963) testified to the problems associated with piecework and its abolition in 
stages to 1971 clearly contributed to a decline in stoppage frequency. Of the changes
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to the payments system those introduced under the National Powerloading 
Agreement of 1966 have generally been seen as the most important in terms of 
declining strike activity (although see discussion of Clegg above) by diminishing the 
range of earnings and the scope for fragmented bargaining (Clegg 1979, DMR 1983). 
Apart from reducing the numbers on piecework, the day wage structure had the effect 
of centralising wage bargaining and thereby changing the form of strike activity 
(DMR 1983) but they stress that by compressing internal differentials the NPLA 
created grievances which contributed to the rise in militancy in the late 1960s and 
early 1970s (see also Handy 1981). As Ashworth (1986) has argued
By starting a move towards greater uniformity...it contributed 
to greater solidarity. By compressing differentials it made men 
who lost most by the compression feel they had less to gain by 
remaining restrained’ (1986:p.301)
Winterton (1981) is also more cautious than Clegg in ascribing declining strike 
activity to the NPLA and district PLAs and it is clear that the period after 1960 and 
particularly after 1964 was associated with a fall in both pay and non-pay stoppages 
which might suggest the economic context (and possibly union acceptance of 
contraction) rather than the NPLA was exerting the major influence.
A number of writers have also stressed the role of alternative work opportunities and 
union support for closures in the period of contraction as factors in the decline in 
stoppage numbers (McCormick 1979, DMR 1983). DMR have argued that the 
alternative work opportunites (and arguably the Board’s own re-location and transfer 
schemes) helped to reduce the incidence of overt conflict but that by the end of the 
1960s when enforced redundancies took place the ability to obtain alternative work 
diminshed with 52% of those leaving the industry between 1967 and 1973 finding 
’difficulty in obtaining alternative work’ (DMR 1983) with a peak of over 80% in 
1972/73. It is likely that this contributed to the conflict which manifested itself at the 
end of the decade and may have particular application to the heightened levels of 
conflict in the 1980s.
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Others factors cited as influencing strike activity, particularly the increased militancy 
of the 1969-74 period include the erosion of external pay differentials (Hughes and 
Moore 1972, Handy 1981, DMR 1983, Ashworth 1986), the change in NUM 
leadership (Handy 1981, Ashworth 1986), the changed market position of coal and 
particularly the shortages of certain non-craft occupations (Handy 1981).
Taken together these explanations confirm Handy’s view that although cyclical 
patterns in economic activity probably accounted for much of the variation in strike 
activity up to 1957 it is factors within the industry which must account for what 
happened after that date. In order to test this and the factors identified above 
further a number of equations were run using our own theoretical and operational 
models for various periods up to 1990. In the following section the results of these 
are presented and analysed.
ECONOMETRIC RESULTS AND ANALYSIS
The results detailed in this section benefitted greatly from access to data on a wide 
range of variables and in testing the underlying theoretical model use was made of 22 
operational variables for the period 1947-1990. To ensure compatability with the 
approach in previous chapters the dependent variables were deflated by employment 
with the number of strikes per 100000 workers as the main variable used.
Equations to account for variations in stoppage numbers were run for the periods 
1947-1985 and 1947-1990 with the best results for the longer period run for the 
sub-periods 1947-68 and 1969-1990. From 1959-1990 the data permitted an analysis 
broken down between pay and non-pay stoppages and as with other industries 
equations were run for stoppage numbers and for workers involved and days lost by 
type of stoppage.
Summary of main results
In general the results for the econometric work provided a good deal of support for 
the theoretical model with the variables providing an overall significance and 
explanatory power considerably in excess of that normally found in analyses of coal
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ECONOMETRIC RESULTS 1947-1985 AND 1947-1990
All Stoppages per 100,000 workers
1947-1985 1947-1990
(a) (b) (c)
Variable M SD
Constant -98.6 - 309.4 - 148.58
AggU - 9.65
(4.63)
TUD + 3.01 + 3.46 + 2.76
(2.9) (3.8) (3.26]
NPLA -76.0 - 29.9 - 34.8
(4.53) (1.41) (2.23;
LG - 31.76 - 34.83
(2.13) (2.45)
STOCKS + 1.37
(1.65)
PL + 3.13
(6.25)
ICC + 0.84
(2.5)
%OMS + 5.91 + 5.86
(3.95) (4.5)
SDE 40.73 38.73 36.3
F 17.4 21.58 31.7
R2 0.725 0.74 0.76
DW 1.49 1.328 1.71
Sources:
Agg U is the percentage rate of aggregate unemployment; Annual Abstract 
TUD; trade union density figures from Milner and Metcalf (1990)
NPLA and LG are dummy variables for the periods 1967-77 and 1947-50,1965-70 and 74-78 for full 
years.
STOCKS; level of stocks both distributed and at coalfields: NCB Report and Accounts 
ICC; Inland coal consumption: NCB Report and Accounts 
PL; percentage change in powerloading: calculated from NCB Report & A/c 
%OMS; percentage change in faceworkers OMS: NCB Report and Accounts.
MEAN and STANDARD DEVIATION: AggU: 5.06 and 4.61 (to 1990), 4.74 and 4.61 (to 85). 
Stocks: 29.0 and 9.47 (to 1985), PL: 9.45 and 12.85 (to 1990), ICC: 159.7 and 42.3 (to 1990). 
%OMS: 4.62 and 4.76 (to 1990). TUD: 95.013 and 7.583 (1947-1985), 94.518 and 7.32 (to 1985).
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mining stoppages. In all the equations a few variables exerted a consistently strong 
and significant influence upon stoppage numbers and accounted for much of the 
variation in this variable. In particular the level of trade union density (+ ), the 
percentage change in output per man shift (+), the percentage change in 
mechanisation (+) (as measured by powerloading faces) and the operation of the 
National Powerloading Agreement (-). From the sub-period analysis the trade union 
density variably emerged as a consistent influence whilst the main impact of the 
productivity changes fed through after 1969 and particularly after the 1984/85 strike 
(see below). In contrast the impact of the spread of powerloading is concentrated in 
the period up to 1968.
1947-1990
The best results of the equations run for the period 1947-1985 and for 1947-1990 are 
described in Table 2 in columns (a), and (b) and (c) respectively. Equation (a) 
utilising aggregate unemployment, trade union density, the NPLA, Labour 
government and the level of coal stocks accounted for over 72% of the variation in 
stoppages with all variables other than stocks having the expected sign and significant 
at the 5% level. Of particular interest are the results for the NPLA and for the 
Labour government, with the existence of the NPLA effectively reducing stoppages 
by around 230 a year in the late 1960s. The use of a dummy variable to proxy the 
NPLA is necessarily imprecise and covers the period which includes the introduction 
of the Third Daywage Structure (1971) which could have served to further reduce the 
number of disputes. In addition, as subsequent analysis shows, the impact of the 
NPLA expectedly fell upon pay stoppages. The existence of a Labour government 
further acted to reduce stoppages in coal mining, a result which supports Cronin’s 
(1979) view that workers would not wish to threaten their ‘friends’ when they are 
in power. A Labour government was shown to be significant in other industries (e.g 
Metals, although its effect was to increase strike numbers) but the depressive impact 
on stoppages gives support to those who stress the close supportive relationship of 
NUM leaderships to Labour governments and may also offer support to those who 
see a close integration of political and industrial consciousness on the part of miners 
(Allen 1981, Supple 1987).
351
Equations (b) and (c) confirmed the results of the shorter period and permitted a 
closer examination of additional variables. Equation (b) accounted for 74% of the 
variation in the dependent variable and with only the NPLA variable failing to achieve 
significance, a problem which arose when it was run in conjunction with the ICC 
variable suggesting an element of multi-collinearity. Equation (c) provided the best 
results for the longer period with TUD, NPLA, the percentage change in faceworkers 
productivity and the spread of powerloading accounting for over three-quarters of the 
variation in stoppage numbers. The impact of the mechanisation and productivity 
terms are particularly strong, however care is needed in their interpretation. 
Increases in productivity are closely linked to the payments system in operation and 
the associated levels at which collective bargaining is conducted (Handy 1981, Pryke 
1981). The strong positive coefficient may be the consequence of a shift to incentive 
schemes, particularly after 1977 and the departure from the pre-eminence of national 
bargaining, the main impact of which would fall on wage stoppages. Alternatively, 
or simultaneously, changes in productivity may be the result of increased 
mechanisation, the working of better, thicker coal seams and/or of greater 
intensification of labour. In the case of mechanisation it could serve to de-skill 
workers or to re-skill some or to remove some of the more mundane or unpleasant 
jobs, overall the impact on stoppages is uncertain. Certainly mechanisation made 
productivity much more dependent upon machine speed and utilisation and there is 
evidence that it was associated with increased supervision of work (Allen 1981). In 
the case of the intensification of labour, the pressure for extra effort ceteris paribus, 
would tend to lead to pressure for wage increases to compensate and increase the 
probability of wage stoppages arising. Pressure for greater effort per se would be 
likely to increase the possibility of non-wage stoppages particularly if these are 
associated with redundancies, reductions in manning on faces etc, and would also be 
expected, to be associated with a rising incidence of accidents and absenteeism. If 
the results for productivity are linked to pay systems then the major impact would fall 
on pay stoppages before 1966 and after 1977, whereas if the effort/intensification 
argument is correct it would show up in the 1980s and specifically after the 1984/85 
strike. Finally, if the mechanisation/work humanization view has validity it would 
tend to operate between 1955 and 1968 and serve to reduce the number of stoppages.
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An attempt to test these competing views is taken further in the analyses by 
sub-periods and of stoppages by cause.
Given the results for equation (c) it was decided to test for the stability of the 
relationships by undertaking a sub-period analysis covering 1947-68 and 1969-90. 
The relatively small number of observations (22) means care is needed in the 
interpretation of the results particularly those of NPLA in the first period and the 
spread of powerloading in the second. The results are presented in equations (d) and 
(e) in Table 3 overleaf.
Both equations performed well in terms of explanatory power and overall significance 
which differed little between the two periods. Although the Durbin-Watson statistic 
for the former period suggests a problem of autocorrelation. Significantly, the trade 
union variable maintains a consistent influence across the two periods but the other 
variables are exerting an influence in only one period and in the case of the NPLA 
in neither, a result which is probably due to the small number of observations in the 
former period and the dominance of other variables (e.g %OMS, percentage change 
in faceworkers output per man shift) in the latter. The change in productivity exerts 
little influence in the 1947-68 period despite significant changes in the period 1957-67 
and has a negative coefficient (cf equations (c) and (e)). It is likely that the variable 
is picking up the effect of other changes notably the fall in product demand in this 
period. In contrast it is exerting the major influence in the period after 1969. 
Given that productivity growth was slow between 1969 and 1977 (Handy 1981, an 
increase of around 15% for the entire period) it is the period after this date and the 
associated introduction of local incentive schemes which probably gives the variable 
its significance. The spread of powerloading conforms to the expected pattern 
achieving significance in the former period when it increased from 2.4% in 1947 to 
nearly 90% by 1968. It reached a peak in 1977 of 93.8% but the increase in faces 
affected from 1969-77 was negligible and probably accounts for the lack of 
significance in the later period. In addition to the differences in significance of the 
variables between the two sub-periods there is a clear difference in the strengths of 
the coefficients on the variables. Although continuing to exert a strong influence the
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impact of trade union density declines in the second period, this could be due to the 
magnitude of changes in density in the earlier period with significant increases in 
density in the period 1949-54 being associated with rising stoppage numbers and 
major falls in density in 1966-67 coinciding with a declining incidence of stoppages.
The strength of the coefficient on the change in OMS in the later period is 
particularly notable. It implies that, ceteris paribus, in the early 1980s a 1 % increase 
in productivity was associated with an increase of over 20 stoppages per year. Given 
that productivity increases between 1980 and 1990 averaged 8.8% per year it is clear 
that this variable was exerting a major influence on strike totals. Indeed the 
coefficient suggests that in 1986 the variable was contributing 240 stoppages to the 
total, which in that year stood at 351.
ANALYSIS OF STOPPAGES BY CAUSE 
Pay stoppages
The results presented in equation (e) illustrate the strong influence of the change in 
OMS, trade union density and the NPLA operating in conjunction with product 
market demand on pay stoppages. All the variables are significant and together 
account for 88% of the variation in the dependent variable. To test the impact of 
these variables further a number of equations were run over the period 1959-1982 
with the objective of testing for the impact of industry unemployment. Although the 
latter variable was insignificant in all equations it was found that two variables, the 
spread of mechanisation and the NPLA accounted for 94% of the variation in pay 
stoppages and with the addition of the lagged nominal earnings variable and trade 
union density this rose to over 96% with all variables significant.
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ECONOMETRIC RESULTS: SUB-PERIOD ANALYSIS
1947-1968 1969-1990
Variable M SD (d) (e)
Constant - 358.12 - 238.6
%OMS - 2.7 8.8
(0.71) (5.57)
TUD 5.53 3.4
(3.25) (3.04)
NPLA - 17.2 - 4.17
(0.45) (0.2)
PL 1.8 15.22
(2.14) (0.46)
SDE 36.15 30.67
F 14.29 15.89
R2 0.77 0.789
D.W 1.22 2.314
Sources: As above.
MEAN and STANDARD DEVIATION: %OMS: 3.76 and 2.85 (to 1968), 5.48 and 5.98 (1969- 
1990). PL: 18.77 and 12.5 (to 1968) and 0.13 and 0.26 (1969-1990). TUD: 93.55 and 7.438 (1969- 
1990). 95.514 and 7.021 (1947-1968).
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For the longer period 1959-1990 the results for ICC confirm the arguments of Handy 
(1981), Winterton (1981) and DMR (1983) that the decline in product demand fed 
through to workers willingness to strike which, combined with the collaboration 
between the NCB and NUM over pit closures and the general contraction of the 
industry reduced strike activity and proneness. The impact of the change in 
faceworkers OMS served to increase the number of stoppages, an expected result 
given that faceworkers were traditionally on piecework (until 1966) and more 
sophisticated incentive schemes after 1977. However, in the equations run for 
1959-82 the change in OMS was not significant and its main impact is therefore 
operating after this period and particularly in the years following the 1984/85 strike.
The trade union density variable again exerted a strong and significant influence upon 
stoppage numbers emphasising the role of trade union organisation in strike activity. 
One caveat to this is that changes in TUD are closely related to employment changes 
which are in turn linked to changes in product demand and it could be the latter 
which is most critical.
Notwithstanding the imprecise and unsatisfactory nature of a dummy variable to 
capture the impact of the NPLA, the results appear to support the view of Clegg 
(1979) and DMR (1983) that with the move towards centralised bargaining and 
removal of piecework, the frequency of pay disputes fell. One qualification to this 
is the earlier point that the fall in stoppage numbers pre-dates the introduction of the 
NPLA and applies to both pay and non-pay disputes. Furthermore, it is probable that 
the NPLA served to increase the size of pay disputes increasing the likelihood of 
national stoppages (as in 1972 and 1974) and by narrowing internal differentials 
created new sources of conflict which emerged in the late 1960s Handy 1981).
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ECONOMETRIC RESULTS : STOPPAGES BY CAUSE
Pay stoppages Non-pay stoppages
Variable M SD (e) (f) (g) (h)
Constant - 173.6 - 55.26 156.5 - 154.5
ICC 0.52
(3.27)
%OMS 1.88
(2.89)
3.86
(2.96)
TUD 1.63 1.2 
(3.38) (3.58)
2.19
(3.76)
2.3
(3.26)
NPLA - 27.27 -27.4 
(3.13) (5.02)
86-90 32.28
(1.87)
Et-1 - 0.39 
(2.15)
PL 2.43
(9.84)
2.59
(4.2)
LG - 14.59 
(1.33)
RED 4.81
(3.87)
2.17
(1.62)
SDE 12.88 7.71 21.96 25.86
F 49.69 134.4 20.2 12.69
R2 0.88 0.966 0.75 0.65
DW 1.59 2.24 1.95 1.72
Sources: As above.
M E A N  and STANDARD DEVIATION: ICC: 141.46 and 34.77. %OMS: 5 
and 9.94. PL: 4.12 and 7.33. TUD: 94.55 and 7.585.
.72 and 5.07.
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The lagged nominal earnings variable (but not lagged real earnings) was significant 
in equation (f) and had the predicted sign with its impact likely to have been 
particularly important in the early 1970s. Variables employed to measures changes 
in external relativities were not significant (cf DMR 1983) but this could be due to 
the fact that the erosion of such differentials occurred slowly over a period from the 
mid 1950s to the late 1960s and again from 1972-74 and the inadequacy of the 
variables used, so that there is a considerable lag between reduced differentials 
creating grievances which then led to overt conflict as in the period 1969-1974.
Finally, the results for the spread of mechanisation show a strong positive influence 
which runs counter to the established views on the impact of mechanisation. We have 
discussed the possible consequences for strike activity above but in general the 
changes brought about by the spread of powerloading would be expected to affect 
established working patterns (see non-pay stoppages) and alter pay systems as well 
as creating demands for new craft groups to operate power-loading faces. In addition, 
the spread of District Powerloading Agreements did not signify an end to piecework. 
As Hepworth et al. (1969) have shown a number of pits in Yorkshire operated on a 
contract system after the DPLA was signed there in 1958 and some pits operated with 
a day wage system on some faces and a contract system on others. These changes 
together would have served to accentuate workforce divisions and disturb established 
differentials and provide a basis for heightened grievances. Overall, the results point 
to the importance of a hitherto, largely neglected variable in analysis of coal-mining 
strikes. That mechanisation, and the associated changes in payment systems, would 
have reduced the opportunities for bargaining and therefore the possibility of 
stoppages arising (although the level of mechanisation in equations was not 
significant), the process of adoption of powerloading generated a considerable amount 
of conflict as the changes necessarily involved disruption to what was a very complex 
system of allowances and the rationalisation of job titles (of which there were over 
600 in the mid 1950s, Handy 1981).
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Non-Pay Stoppages
The results for non-pay stoppages are described in equations (g) and (h), and although 
having a lower explanatory power than equation (f), they again support the view that 
factors internal to the industry have exerted the major impact on stoppage numbers 
since 1959. Again the trade union density, spread of powerloading and changes in 
faceworkers OMS contributed most to the explanatory power of the equations and all 
were significant. The 86-90 dummy was only significant in the absence of the 
redundancy or OMS terms and when OMS and the number of redundancies were run 
together only the former was significant, again confirming the dominance of this 
variable in the 1980s in accounting for stoppage numbers.
In comparing the results for pay and non-pay stoppages it should be noted that 
although the same variables are important, both TUD and %OMS exerted a stronger 
influence on non-pay than pay stoppages with the impact of PL broadly the same. 
Overall, the evidence suggests that changes in the level of trade union density have 
been a critical influence upon the number of pay and non-pay stoppages throughout 
the period 1959-1990 contributing to the decline in stoppages in the mid 1960s, the 
rise in the early 1970s and continued maintenance of those levels throughout the 
decade.
The high levels of non-pay stoppages particularly in the period 1959-64 are 
significantly affected by the spread of powerloading to new coalfaces and the 
slowdown in that spread after 1968 contributed to declining strike activity at least 
until 1972. For the 1980s the most significant influence on all stoppages has been the 
rapid rise in productivity and the changes associated with this particularly the 
operation of incentive schemes and the more general attempts to restructure industrial 
relations (Leman and Winterton 1991) given the maintenance of strong trade union 
organisation, notably in Yorkshire. The issue of the Yorkshire coalfield is taken 
further in the section on trends since 1973 but it should be noted that from 1985-1990 
Yorkshire accounted on average for nearly 72% of all the strikes in coal mining 
(Employment Gazette) and further analysis of this may provide a useful insight into 
the factors underpinning the results for the productivity variable.
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WORKERS INVOLVED AND DAYS LOST: 1959-1990
Variable M ST Workers Involved Working Days Lost
Pay Non-Pay Non-Pay
Constant - 1005.2 355.6 - 37739.7
U
Pt-1
65-69
ICC
Stocks
OMS*
TUD
NPLA
Soc. Con
LG
- 4.86 + 38.51 
(0.19) (4.6)
- 16.6 
(2.23)
- 185.1
(1.1)
-3.27
(0.98)
-6.83
(1.44)
+ 15.9 
( 1. 12)
+ 17.08 
(1.69)
+ 335.2 
(1.81)
- 435.0
(2.3)
+ 5815.7 
(6.48) 
- 3984.4 
(4.94)
- 1117.9
(2.39) 
-4004.3 
(5.28) 
+ 954.8 
(1.66)
- 1815.1
(0.18)
+ 24337.6 
(3.05)
SDE
F
R2
DW
284.4 157.3
1.51 14.63
0.31 0.61
2.81 2.11
15487.0
9.1
0.726
2.34
Sources: As above.
MEAN and STANDARD DEVIATIONS: AggU: 6.29 and 4.86. Pt-1: 7.32 and 5.5. ICC: 141.46 
and 34.77. Stocks: 33.6 and 6.91. OMS: 5.72 and 5.07. TUD: 94.55 and 7.585.
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Workers Involved and Working Days Lost
For these dimensions of stoppages there emerged a clear distinction between pay and 
non-pay stoppages. In general the variables employed in equations for stoppages 
explained no more than 20% of the variation in days lost and workers involved in pay 
stoppages with correspondingly low figures for overall explanatory power. In 
contrast the same variables accounted for over 60% of the variation in these 
dimensions for non-pay stoppages. A tentative interpreation of this discrepancy is 
that it may be the result of the changes in the level at which pay bargaining was 
conducted over this period which had much less of an impact on non-pay stoppages. 
Although this would be reflected in the NPLA dummy it is notable that this variable 
approached significance in the equation for workers involved in pay stoppages and 
was never significant in equations run for non-pay stoppages. Indeed it is only NPLA 
and the Social Contract dummy which were or approached significance in the 
equations for pay stoppages and then only for workers involved.
The results of days lost in non-pay stoppages are encouraging in light of the results 
for other industries. The two macro-economic variables, the political variable 
(Labour government), together with stock levels and changes in productivity were all 
significant although the variables togther have a low explanatory power. The results 
confirm the strong upward impact of unemployment on days lost, although this is 
clearly biased by the affect of the 1984/85 dispute and the strong effect of changes 
in productivity on reducing working days lost. This latter result is likely to be the 
consequence of the fact that the productivity results are tied to area or pit-specific 
incentive schemes, so that disputes that do arise (cf. under the NPLA) are likely to 
be localised.
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STRIKE ACTIVITY 1974-1990
The decision to focus on the analysis of coal mining stoppages in the period after the 
oil crisis of 1973/74 has been made in order to meet a number of distinct aims. 
First, that hitherto, no attempt has been made to undertake an analysis specifically of 
strike patterns in coal since the first oil crisis. Second, that it permits an extension 
of the work of DMR beyond 1973 and third it provides a case study of increasing 
strike proneness in a period when strike activity and strike proneness in almost all 
other industries has been declining.
The section draws on the previous econometric work and uses this to support the 
contention that the period of heightened conflict in the 1980s was the consequence of 
NCB and government initiatives to address major product market weaknesses which 
contributed to contradictions in the circuit of capital, and to redefine industrial 
relations within the industry, albeit that many of the problems at the time were 
themselves ‘engineered’ through government policies towards the industry. It is our 
view that contradictions can also be seen in the late 1950s and 1960s but that in 
contrast with the 1980s these did not manifest themselves in heightened levels of 
conflict and we attempt to show why the contradictions worked themselves out in 
conflict in the later period rather than in the former.
The Changing Context
In 1974 the industry found itself in a significantly changed economic situation, the 
previous fifteen years had witnessed a sustained decline in demand, with increasingly 
severe effects for those employed in the industry (Jackson, 1974). The redundancies 
from 1968-1973 came at a time when unemployment generally was rising making it 
increasingly difficult for those leaving the industry to find alternative work and there 
was evidence that miners were becoming disenchanted with the Labour government’s 
attempts at introducing legislation and in maintaining wage restraint (Allen 1981). 
More significantly there was evidence of general discontent amongst miners and the 
re-emergence of radicalism after years of apparent compliance. Evidence for these 
trends can be seen in the shift of the Yorkshire area to the left in the late 1960s,
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Daly’s election to General Secretary in 1968 and the major disputes in 1969, 1970, 
1972, and 1974. The strikes of 1969 and 1970 may be seen as the direct result of the 
radicalism begun by Daly’s campaign, but as Turner (1986) has argued, the 1972 
strike had more long-lasting consequences (also Gormley 1982). Not only was the 
self-confidence of miners restored but it also provided the basis for the emergence of 
Scargill, who became Yorkshire President in 1973 and an increasingly important 
figure on the NEC (Turner 1986, Taylor 1984).
Of perhaps greater significance, at least for the 1970s was the election of Gormley 
as NUM President in 1972 and Ezra as NCB Chairman. In the previous section the 
relationship built up between them was noted and it would appear that the nature of 
the political exchange and what Edwards and Heery (1989) describe as ’sectoral 
corporatism’ following the 1974 strike and ’Plan For Coal’ owed much to the degree 
of trust between the two men (see also Pendleton (1988) on the ’tacit alliance’ at BR 
during this period).
The national stoppages of 1972 and 1974 had a marked impact upon those involved 
in the industry and on the incoming Labour government. The pay award following 
the Wiberforce enquiry in 1972 was quickly eroded by a rise in earnings in 
manufacturing and in 1974 the NUM campaigned hard for a restoration of that 
differential. Their bargaining power was significantly enhanced by a four-fold 
increase in the price of oil in 1973/74 which dramatically improved coal’s relative 
competitiveness. The Pay Board established in 1974 recommended pay increases of 
around 32% and although these were eroded throughout that year they were restored 
in 1975 when miners accepted a 19% pay increase (Ashworth 1986). Overall, miners 
earnings rose by 23% relative to those in manufacturing between October 1968 and 
October 1978 (Pryke 1981).
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1974-1982
The immediate period after 1974 provided a halt to the decline of the previous decade 
and a half. The ‘Plan For Coal’ agreed in 1974/75 was an expansionary programme, 
involving modernisation and the creation of 42 million tons of new capacity (incl. 
Selby) together with the closure of older capacity on grounds of exhaustion or 
economic reasons. The Plan made explicit the assumption that OMS would increase 
by 4% per year but with a relatively stable output so that within the logic of the Plan 
closures were necessary (Ashworth 1986).
Both the NUM and NACODS had a national policy of opposition to closures other 
than those caused by a total exhaustion of reserves or for safety reasons (Turner 
1986). The NCB’s wish to maintain good industrial relations precluded faster 
progress with pit closures particularly following the introduction in 1973 of the 
Colliery Review Procedure which reviewed colliery performance quarterly and 
through which decisions to close could be processed. In practice, between 1973/74 
and 1979/80, 61 collieries were either closed or merged but the majority were on the 
grounds of exhaustion. The 27 pits closed in the five years to April 1980 involved the 
loss of 14000 jobs, approximately 5.4% of the workforce (Turner 1986). But this 
disguises the fact that after 1974/75;
closures on economic grounds effectively ceased
(Ashworth 1986, also Pryke 1981)
As the table overleaf shows, by the end of the decade the NCB began to experience 
considerable difficulties in its operations. In what follows we make considerable use 
of the NCB’s accounts and figures which have been the subject of considerable 
criticism (see Glyn 1984, Berry et al. 1985, Fine 1990). It is not our aim to examine 
the merits or otherwise of the Board’s accounting conventions but rather to stress that 
the increasing shift towards commercialism and associated accounting frames of 
reference by the NCB and government after 1979/80 gave additional importance to 
the Board’s accounts and in representing a major break with other objectives made 
the potential for conflict more likely.
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A number of clear trends are discernible from the accounts. First, that despite the 
profitability of opencast mining, deep mined coal generated losses from 1972-75 and 
from 1978-81 and in the later period these losses increased dramatically, standing at 
£226.1 millions in 1981/82. The significance of this lies in the fact that deep mined 
coal accounted for 80% of the value of turnover and 88% of total output. On the 
basis of evidence presented to the MMC, of the 198 collieries in 1981/82, 141 made 
an operating loss with the majority of these concentrated in the peripheral coalfields 
of Scotland, Wales and the North-East (MMC 1983).
It was noted earlier that although government imposed cash limits were introduced 
in 1976 and significantly tightened after 1979/80, the industry’s costs increased 
significantly throughout the decade (operating costs were 80% higher in 78/79 than 
in 68/69; Pryke 1981) and it was forced to borrow heavily in 1977/78 with an 
attendant rise in interest payments. From 1979/80 the Corporation had to rely on the 
government to finance deficits incurred which, by 1981/82 had risen to £428 millions, 
with total government assistance to the industry in that year amounting to over £570 
millions. In the context of the requirements laid down in the 1973 Coal Industry Act 
for the Corporation to break-even after payment of interest and receipts of 
government grants, the performance in the 1970s was highly satisfactory. However, 
as product demand fell at the turn of the decade (by 7% between 1979 and 1981) and 
coal was stockpiled, the nature of the difficulties faced by the industry became 
apparent, exacerbated though they were by increasingly stringent financial controls 
imposed by government.
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TABLE 3
MOVEMENTS IN INDICATORS OF PERFORMANCE: 1972-1983
Year Real Wage BUI ICC
per unit output
1972 100 129.8
1973 96.8 123.5
1974 97.9 125.7
1975 99.7 123.5
1976 120.4 124.0
1977 115.9 122.4
1978 117.6 122.3
1979 123.3 126.9
1980 115.8 123.5
1981 126.0 118.4
1982 123.4 108.9
1983 124.0 109.5
Operating Wastage LSVA
Profit/(Loss) OMS Rate
(59.9) 2.33 10.6 88.0
(135.7) 2.15 14.6 86.4
(35.7) 2.29 10.0 96.1
(31.1) 2.28 9.0 92.0
31.9 2.21 9.0 92.5
0.3 2.19 13.1 93.9
(26.1) 2.24 11.5 95.0
(121.4) 2.31 10.8 90.8
(106.5) 2.32 8.0 86.5
(226.1) 2.40 8.9 86.4
2.44 7.7 83.7
2.43 12.5 78.2
NOTE: Real wage per unit of output; calculated from NCB Report and Accounts 
refer to calendar years.
ICC: Inland Coal Consumption from NCB Statistical Tables, refers to calendar 
years.Operating profit/(loss); for deep mined output only from NCB Report and 
Accounts, figures fefer to financial years.
OMS; overall output per manshift for deep mined output from NCB Report and 
Accounts, figures refer to financial years.
Wastage rate; total wastage as a percentage of average numbers employed, calculated 
from NCB Report and Accounts, figures refer to financial years.
LSVA (Labour Share Percentage of Value Added); National Income Blue Book.
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The table reveals that for much of the 1970s productivity was static with OMY (not 
shown) virtually the same in 1979/80 as ten years previously. The succession of pay 
increases to restore differentials meant that miners were at the top of the earnings 
league in 1978, 1979 and 1980 and second in 1981 and 1982 (Ashworth 1986) but 
without increases in productivity and/or reductions in employment, unit labour costs 
rose. It is clear that the NCB hoped that a combination of relatively high earnings 
and an incentive element (after 1977) would lead to higher productivity (Ashworth 
1986) and although productivity rose after 1978 and absenteeism declined, strike 
activity increased (wage stoppages were over three times higher from 1977-83 than 
1970-76) and that overall the real wage bill per unit of output was over a quarter 
higher in 1981 than in 1972. In contrast, labour’s share in value added fell after 
1978 presumably reflecting rising productivity following the introduction of the new 
incentive scheme and by 1983 was lower than at any point in the previous decade. 
Interestingly this suggests that the justification for a massive closure programme was 
much clearer in the mid 1970s than in the early 1980s, however by the latter period 
the ’goalposts’ had shifted and a new agenda of commercialism and changing 
industrial relations had become priorities for the government and the NCB.
The changes in the industry’s fortunes and the perceived need to cut costs in the early 
1980s led to confrontation in 1981 with the NCB, under increasing financial pressure 
from the government to increase the rate of closures and to stop restricting them to 
cases of the physical exhaustion of resources (Turner 1986). In February 1981, the 
NCB announced its intention to close 23 pits amounting to 10 million tonnes of 
capacity with this to be effected quickly involving a departure from the normal 
Colliery Review Procedure. The threat of industrial action following a ballot forced 
the government to back down and agreed to make more finance available to the 
industry but closures took place through local agreements in 15 of the 23 pits listed 
by July 1982 (Fine 1990). The climate was worsened further in November 1982 by 
a Teaked’document identifying 75 ’short-life’ pits employing 50000 miners and in 
June 1983 the Corporation announced its intention to shed 70000 jobs in the following 
five years. From March 1981 to March 1983, 20 pits were closed or merged and 
from March 1981 to March 1984, 41000 jobs were lost with local industrial action
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over closures in a number of locations.
An additional factor of importance not revealed by the figures and one that suggests 
a significant ‘hidden agenda’ behind government and NCB actions is the issue of the 
alleged erosion of managerial prerogative that took place in the late 1970s. Edwards 
and Heery (1989) have argued that from 1976-1981 the NUM gained significant 
involvement in areas of managerial prerogative; work organisation, deployment, 
overtime allocation, safety, shift organisation and incentive pay although they stress 
that this increase in union power occurred in areas where management was happy for 
it to go although it is likely that it went much further in some areas (e.g Doncaster) 
than others. If this was true for management in the late 1970s the attitude of the 
NCB changed dramatically with the appointment of McGregor as Chairman and the 
assertion of the ‘right to manage’. As McGregor stated after the 1984/85 strike;
There was no way I was going to let their (NUM’s) leadership 
stand in the way of establishing management’s right to
manage we were going to exert our right to manage the
enterprise. From now on there didn’t need to be a ritual 
genuflection to the NUM everytime we wanted to do anything 
(McGregor 1986: 237, 358).
This view reflected an element in the revisionism in government circles following the 
Conservative election victories in 1979 and 1983. Particularly the broader issues of 
management’s right to manage’ and the alleged role of trade unions in undermining 
and hampering that ‘right’. More specifically it reflected the government view that 
the price of the political exchange and neo-corporatism after the 1974 strike and 
embodied in the ‘Plan for Coal’ had been too high (Edwards and Heery (1989), a 
view which was reflected in other areas of the public sector (e.g British Rail, 
Pendleton, 1988).
368
STRIKE ACTIVITY: 1970-1982
The description of the changes that took place within the industry in the 1970s can 
now be married to the evidence on strike patterns to develop a more complete picture 
of strikes than that provided by the econometric work. The detailed movements are 
described in the Table 4 overleaf.
The trend of pay stoppages is upwards for the period with a particular jump in 1978, 
the first full year of the new incentive scheme’s operation. The incentive scheme 
undoubtably contributed to a marked increase in the number of pay stoppages after 
this date and given the wide disparities in earnings it generated both within and 
particularly between pits in the same area was a source of constant friction (NUM: 
1983). In Yorkshire, the NUM estimated that of the 235 stoppages occurring in the 
year September 1982 to September 1983, 50% were attributable to the incentive 
scheme (NUM: 1983). There is also a clear trend for pay stoppages to involve 
more workers after 1976 although not for them to become longer. The increase in 
size of stoppage may be due to the nature of the new schemes, which as well as 
increasing bargaining opportunities and enhancing worker motivation (Edwards and 
Heery 1989) were based on groups rather than individuals. The impact of the Labour 
government and the social contract should also be noted, as the econometric work 
suggested that both contributed to reducing particular dimensions of stoppages. It is 
difficult to disentangle the effects of the two but the post 1974 settlement in the 
industry did involve the NUM in an explicit compliance with the Social Contract 
provisions and this could be exerting the major influence (Allen 1981). It is also 
probable that the operation of the incomes policy and the disillusionment with the 
Labour government contributed to the increase in stoppages in the late 1970s. These 
factors are held to have influenced the leftward shift in the NUM and may have 
directly contributed to higher strike activity in the 1980s (Campbell and Warner
1985).
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Table 4
STRIKE ACTIVITY IN COAL MINING: 1970-1982
Year Pay Stoppages Non-Pay Stoppages Yorks Coalfield
S WI WDL S WI WDL WI% WDL% TL%
1970 19.2 353.4 3630.4 37.4 47.3 113.1 44.2 47.1 -
1971 12.0 16.6 81.3 36.8 46.3 148.5 44.9 23.1 -
1972 18.4 1163.2 39594.7 66.0 84.0 199.0 27.0 25.2 29.8
1973 19.5 35.2 62.5 99.6 137.5 293.0 65.2 60.4 30.6
1974 20.2 1081.222618.2 59.0 73.1 121.2 30.3 26.4 39.0
1975 17.8 27.6 89.1 70.1 80.2 137.8 50.8 48.2 52.0
1976 23.0 31.6 69.9 93.3 127.0 258.9 68.7 51.3 69.4
1977 31.6 106.7 195.1 81.4 104.6 224.2 36.0 29.7 49.1
1978 75.3 237.0 588.2 73.2 85.9 237.0 39.4 41.0 56.7
1979 60.1 128.3 416.1 72.5 77.6 133.0 36.0 28.1 50.3
1980 57.7 111.1 282.0 76.8 227.3 438.2 39.4 41.0 56.7
1981 62.8 112.5 302.6 75.0 292.7 722.7 42.6 32.2 64.5
1982 63.2 884.0 1497.9128.9 156.0 280.6 37.1 42.5 43.0
S; Stoppages per 100000 workers using average numbers employed.
WI; Workers Involved per 10000 workers, deflating as with S.
WDL; Working Days Lost per 1000 workers, deflating as with S.
Yorks figures are percentages of the total for WI, WDL and tonnage lost. All figures 
Employment Gazette, except TL (NCB Report & A/cs).
The trend of non-pay stoppages is less clear with peaks in 1973, 1976 and 1982 but 
on average running at levels well above those of pay stoppages. In the late 1970s 
there were a particularly large number of disputes over manning levels, work 
allocation and working conditions which may have been linked to the operation of the 
incentive scheme and in 1980 and 1981 the figures are affected by the TUC Day of 
Action and NUM action over pit closures and redundancies. In 1982 and 1983 it is 
again issues of manning and work allocation which dominate the strike figures. 
Following Edwards and Heery’s view that the NUM encroached significantly into 
areas of managerial prerogative after 1976 this would have increased the probability 
of strikes arising as the bargaining scope was extended and would account for the 
increased number of disputes over manning and work allocation in the late 1970s.
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Overall, the rise in stoppage activity in the 1970s for non-pay stoppages and after 
1977 for pay stoppages should be seen in the context of the slowdown in contraction 
of the industry, increased competitiveness of coal as a fuel, changes in the payments 
system and the growing encroachment of the NUM into new areas of influence. In 
addition the decade saw significant increases in trade union density especially 
1973-1976 and 1978-1982 (Milner and Metcalf 1991) and changes within the NEC 
of the mineworkers union with the increasing influence of left-wing areas.
By the early 1980s the relative stability experienced by the industry began to be 
challenged. First, by the increasingly stringent financial controls and commercial 
requirements imposed by the Conservative governments after 1979, reflected in a 
changing NCB position, particularly after Ezra’s departure. Second, the decline in 
demand in the recession of the early 1980s together with the rise in unit operating 
costs of the previous decade meant a renewed search by the Board and the 
government for areas of cost saving. Third, the increasing pressure from the late 
1970s to increase productivity and utilise equipment more fully. Together these 
developments led to a focus upon two related issues which dominated industrial 
relations in the 1980s, the perceived need to eliminate ’high cost’, ’uneconomic’ pits, 
and to concentrate output and investment on the central coalfield where productivity 
gains could be greatest. As Winterton and Winterton (1989) have argued;
As restructuring proceeded without increased demand for coal, 
pit closures on grounds other than exhaustion became 
inevitable (Winterton and Winterton 1989:41).
The first signs of the difficulties in effecting such a strategy by the Board came in 
1981 (discussed above) the subsequent attempts and the post-strike regime of the 
Board and its implications for strike activity are the subject of the final section.
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1983-1990
The growing climate of distrust in the industry particularly over pit closures in the 
early 1980s is evidenced by the election of Arthur Scargill to the NUM Presidency 
and the significant increase in strike numbers in 1982 and 1983. The worsening 
relations between miners and the Board was further exacerbated by the appointment 
of Ian McGregor in 1982 as Chairman and worsened a period of already growing 
estrangement between the NUM and the Board. Given the experience of McGregor 
at BL, and British Steel, the NUM saw the appointment as a highly provocative act 
and one which was almost bound to engender conflict. As a one-time economic 
adviser to the NUM put it;
Ian McGregor appears to have moved around the input-
output table of the British economy, a kamikaze personification 
of the Keynesian multiplier in downward spiral (Fine 
1990:155).
The fact that the most contentious issue at this time was the perceived need to 
rationalise the industry through the closure of ’uneconomic pits’ presented the NUM 
with difficulties. Historically, the union had always experienced problems in fighting 
closures nationally because their impact was concentrated in specific areas (Turner
1986) and attempts by the union to get national action over closures again failed in 
1982 and 1983. The overtime ban which began in October 1983 was designed both 
to reduce coal stocks (partly a response to declining demand and also to a conscious 
NCB policy) and to highlight low levels of basic pay (Fine 1990). The NCB 
responded in early 1984 with the announcement that Cortonwood colliery in 
Yorkshire would close, in breach of the colliery review procedure and so began the 
longest and most bitter strike in the post-war era.
In interpreting the strike of 1984/85 and its aftermath as the consequence of 
contradictions having emerged in the circuit of capital a number of initial points must 
be stressed. Whilst the economic context significantly worsened in the early 1980s 
this was accentuated by government policies which operated to artificially create a 
situation which was more problematic than it could have been. Given the nature of
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many public sector organisations and the close relationship between any nationalised 
industry and the government of the day it is always possible to create a crisis situation 
by imposing a new set of strategic and operational criteria (e.g more commercial 
objectives) and that this would be particularly acute when an industry is so dependent 
upon the government for finance, pricing decisions and where subsidies are critical 
for continued production. Therefore, in the early 1980s product market changes led 
to stockpiling of coal and losses worsened by the increasingly severe financial 
constraints imposed by government. These took place against a backcloth of 
modernisation of capacity but static productivity and a relatively unchanged labour 
process. The focus of the Board became one of a concern to increase productivity 
and reduce costs quickly, the strategy one of eliminating high cost capacity and 
concentrating investment and new technology in bigger pits in the central coalfield to 
reap benefits of economies of scale. The increased modernisation and computer 
monitoring equipment would necessarily raise productivity (In experiments at Wistow 
colliery in the late 1980s with the latest developments in technology a figure of 254 
tonnes per man-shift was achieved; FT 20/3/89) and reduce numbers and dependence 
upon labour (Bums et al 1985, Leman and Winterton 1991).
It is not our aim to discuss the strike in any detail (see e.g Adeney and Lloyd 1986, 
Goodman 1985, Winterton and Winterton 1989) rather, our concern is with its causes 
and its aftermath in terms of changing industrial relations and strike activity. 
Although the immediate cause of the dispute was the announcement to close 
Cortonwood it is clear that behind this was a belief within parts of the Board and 
government that coal should ‘pay its way’ and that tighter financial discipline and a 
greater commercialism were necessary and would necessarily involve pit closures. 
As was argued earlier, a further ’hidden’ or ’opaque’ agenda was that management 
should be able to manage unencumbered by being answerable to the NUM and the 
wish to marginalise the latter was clearly a factor in McGregor’s calculations as well 
as some of those in government (see above). From the perspective of the NUM, the 
attempt to accelerate the closure programme in 1981 significantly worsened its 
relations with the Board, and the climate of distrust between the two sides was 
damaged further by the personalities of Scargill and McGregor who rarely disguised
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their dislike for each other. Similarly the growing distrust between miners and the 
Board is clear from the strike patterns and accentuated further by Scargill’s 
‘counter-hegemony’ (Turner 1986) particularly the propagation of the view that the 
Board had a ‘hit-list’ of over 60 collieries for closure, considerably more than was 
admitted in 1981.
TABLE 5
MOVEMENTS IN THE CIRCUIT OF CAPITAL: 1983-1990
YEAR REAL
WAGE
BILL/Q
ICC OMS EMP.
CHANGE
LSVA
1983 124.0 109.5 2.43 -14.8 78.2
1984 N/A 77.3 2.08 -16.5 58.6
1985 N/A 105.4 2.72 -19.2 73.0
1986 104.5 114.2 3.29 -27.0 77.7
1987 93.0 115.9 3.62 -23.1 81.2
1988 82.0 111.5 4.14 -18.4 77.3
1989 79.0 107.6 4.32 -17.2 84.6
1990 108.8 4.52 -12.3 90.8
Note: All figures relate to calendar years except OMS.
Emp. Change; Change in numbers employed (thousands), source NCB and Ashworth 
(1986) adjusted for calendar years.
Sources: As table for 1970-1982.
374
The preceding table illustrates changes in a number of elements in the industrial 
circuit of capital prior to, during and following the strike of 1984/85. Inland coal 
consumption stabilised at a level it had declined to at the beginning of the decade with 
the nationalised coal industry’s deep mined coal output meeting around 80% of this 
demand after the strike. Significantly, output of deep mined coal from 1985-1990 
stood at between 75 and 80% of its 1978/79 level with around 200000 fewer miners. 
The deterioration in the miners labour market position is evidenced by the continued 
reductions in employment through pit closures (from 169 pits in the mid 1980s to 50 
by August 1992) and voluntary redundancies with over 100000 leaving the industry 
from the end of the dispute to 1990. The consequences for those who remained is 
illustrated by the significant increases in productivity after 1984 and considerably 
understates the productivity advances made in certain areas such as Selby which has 
benefitted from substantial investment in technology. The productivity changes and 
declining real wage bill per unit of output suggest major changes in the labour process 
following the dispute which are discussed further below and overall the performance 
since 1984/85 indicates a greater congruence between product market, labour market 
and labour process than that existing in the early 1980s. One qualification to this 
‘encouraging’ view is the increase in labour’s share of value added particularly in the 
late 1980s. Part of the explanation for this lies in attempts by the industry to reduce 
coal prices to remain competitive with imported (and often heavily subsidised) coal 
to satisfy its major customers, the electricity generating companies. This 
consideration, and the fact that the generating companies are likely to reduce their 
requirements of coal, which in 1992 stands at 65 million tons (80% of output) means 
further closures and redundancies are likely (if the requirement falls to around 40-45 
million tons as has been suggested (Independent; 30/8/92) around 30 further pits and 
25000 jobs would be lost. Currently the Selby complex alone supplies around 15 
million tons annually).
The important point for our analysis is that since 1982 and particularly since 1985 
there has been a concerted attempt to redefine the criteria of success in the industry 
and to realign employment and labour utlisation in light of this criteria and the 
precarious product market position. The nature of the strategy embarked upon by the
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Board and its implications for strike activity are the subject of the next two sections.
STRIKE ACTIVITY: 1983-1990
The table below identifies the main dimensions of stoppages . It is clear that far from 
declining, strike activity in the wake of 1984/85 has increased, particularly amongst 
non-pay stoppages. A brief comparison with the 1970s reveals this clearly. From 
1971 to 1980 pay strikes per 100000 workers averaged 33.6 per year, and non-pay 
72.9; in the period 1981-1990, the figures were 51.3 and 120 respectively giving an 
overall increase of nearly 61%. Taking the period 1980-84 and 1985-90 shows how 
this increased in the decade;
TABLE 6
STRIKES PER 100000 WORKERS
1980-1984 1985-1990
Pay 49.2 54.1
Non-Pay 89.4 138.4
Source: Employment Gazette
The evidence from the table presents a marked contrast with the experience of other 
industries in the 1980s, notably steel, printing, docks and areas of motor vehicles and 
runs counter to Waddington’s (1987) view that in the wake of major conflicts such 
as that of 1984/85 there is a tendency for new workplace values to emerge. The 
evidence in coal-mining is that the legacy of the 1984/85 strike is one of considerable 
distrust particularly in areas such as South Yorkshire where industrial relations has 
remained poor and probably worsened (Taylor 1988).
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TABLE 7
STRIKE ACTIVITY:1983-1990
Pay Non-Pay
YEAR S WI WDL S WI WDL
1983 49.6 511.5 1938.6 134.0 385.2 2005.1
1984 12.9 231.3 1050.3 32.4 878.2 146541.9
1985 20.1 93.9 400.5 79.5 1020.0 25525.7
1986 85.1 301.2 549.7 179.2 338.9 519.6
1987 71.1 273.5 601.6 198.7 619.9 1376.5
1988 46.0 635.3 1719.6 123.8 372.4 701.0
1989 45.9 94.5 283.4 153.8 242.9 418.4
1990 56.6 64.7 356.0 95.5 453.1 1116.5
Note: All figures relate to calendar years.
S, WI and WDL as in Table 4 above.
Sources: as previous tables.
The aim of the remainder of this section is to identify some of the main reasons for 
the persistance of stoppage activity and the increasing importance of the Yorkshire 
coalfield within the strike totals. An insight into the main factors was provided by 
the econometric work which stressed the particular role of changes in faceworkers 
productivity on the totals. The impact of this variable was so strong that other 
attempts to capture changes since the strike, such as the percentage of workers 
dismissed and made redundant, and the use of a dummy variable for the period 
1986-1990 were insignificant when run alongside it. However, the earlier discussion 
highlighted the problems in interpreting the changes in productivity given that they 
have been associated with a variety of other changes as part of a new management 
strategy (see overleaf) and had an impact on both pay and non-pay stoppages.
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Management Strategy Since 1984/85
In the 1980s the increased pressure upon the Corporation to meet financial targets via 
closures and redundancies has already been noted but the strategy adopted has a 
number of distinct elements which stem from this context. According to Leman and 
Winterton (1991) with the publication of the Board’s ’New Strategy For Coal’ in 
October 1985 the NCB’s (Hereafter referred to as British Coal or BC as it was 
renamed in 1987) overriding priority is profit and the containment of costs, and more 
specifically the extraction of surplus value, first through increasing productivity 
through the intensification of labour and, second, increasing productivity through the 
introduction of new technology. In Winterton and Winterton’s terms the strategy is 
concerned with moving;
To a form of production entailing a higher organic composition 
of capital and an increased rate of surplus value (Winterton 
and Winterton 1989:215).
Certainly there is clear evidence of a different strategic approach since the 1984/85 
strike (Winterton and Winterton 1989, Fine 1990) and a greater managerial 
self-confidence at an operational level (Richardson and Wood 1989). Fine notes BC’s 
wish to turn ’an institution into a business’, that ’BC is no longer a social service’ 
and a significant attempt to change culture ’from tonnes to money’ with investment 
criteria linked closely to world coal prices, stressing the perceived importance of 
international competitiveness. A further example of the latter is the requirement that 
the marginal cost of new investment should be £1.00 per gigajoule for new output and 
overall operating costs in the colliery to be below £1.50 per gigajoule (approximately 
£38 per tonne, NCB 1985 quoted in Fine 1990). The revisions to the payment 
system, notably the ’Doncaster option’ are also explicitly linked to financial targets 
rather than physical output (see below).
For Leman and Winterton (1991) the new strategy consists of three elements, parts 
of which existed before the strike. First, economic restructuring; the introduction of 
new capacity (e.g at ’super pits’ such as Selby), the greater use of ATM (Advanced 
Technology Mining) with microelectronic control and monitoring equipment (manning
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levels at fully integrated MINOS pits only 53 % of that at conventional pits (Leman 
and Winterton 1991) and the increased use of retreat mining, developments which 
have been concentrated on the central coalfield. The last arm of the restructuring has 
been the closure programme concentrated on the peripheral coalfields, in shedding 
these high profits would accrue to low cost collieries free from the burden of 
cross-subsidy (Winterton and Winterton 1989). The second element in the strategy 
has been described as technological restructuring and consists of the increasing use 
of computer monitoring of machinery and faces to reduce ‘downtime’ and increase 
productivity. These two elements it is argued have facilitated the restructuring of the 
industrial relations and the labour process which has constituted the third element, 
particularly since 1985.
In the wake of the 1984/85 strike it is possible to identify a number of broad changes 
in industrial relations strategy which reflect the sentiments contained in the statements 
from Ian McGregor outlined above. As Richardson and Wood (1989) have argued 
the new industrial relations strategy essentially involved an attempt to reduce the 
authority of the NUM and to take advantage of the new opportunities to reassert 
managerial prerogative and change working practices. Specifically BC has attempted 
to confine NUM access to decision-making at lower levels in the industry and to 
issues covering only a limited agenda of collective bargaining (Edwards and Heery 
1989), a policy of ’labour exclusion’ and marginalising of union influence which 
marks a formal abandonment of the 1974 settlement. This can be seen at a local level 
with branch officials by-passed, changes in working practices imposed unilaterally 
(and precipitating strike action in some areas) and management making much more 
use of direct communication with the workforce (Winterton and Winterton 1989). 
The policy has been aided considerably by the emergence of the UDM and BC’s 
encouragement to the latter. For Taylor (1988) the growth of the UDM was critical 
to BC’s strategy as it provided an opportunity to split the workforce and further 
weaken the NUM. How BC attempted to encourage the UDM had important if 
indirect consequences for strike activity which will be briefly discussed.
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Following the 1984/85 strike, management saw with the rise of the UDM an 
opportunity to develop differential pay awards between the NUM and the UDM and 
in effect to by-pass the national bargaining procedure by conducting separate 
negotiations with the UDM, so that since September 1986 industry wide terms and 
conditions have been negotiated with the UDM alone (Leman and Winterton 1991). 
In addition, BC terminated the 1946 Conciliation procedures which effectively ended 
the NUM’s exclusive representation over mineworkers grades and which provoked 
an overtime ban in 1987. Under the new scheme BC would operate separate 
agreements with the NUM and UDM with each agreement covering all employees at 
collieries at which either the NUM or UDM had a majority in membership based on 
the premise that the UDM would expand. The core of the new scheme was a 
majority/minority principle, that the majority union at a pit would have exclusive 
negotiating rights with the majority decided annually by BC on the basis of the 
‘check-off’ system (Taylor 1988). Whilst the UDM agreed to the new procedures in 
1987, the NUM rejected the majority/minority principle and remained outside the 
formal conciliation machinery at local level (Leman and Winterton 1991). This 
effectively meant that from early in 1987 there were no effective procedures for 
resolving local issues and this contributed significantly to the large increase in tonnage 
lost through disputes in South Yorks (Leman and Winterton 1991).
The UDM has also been a significant weapon in BC’s attempts to expand the use of 
numerical flexibility especially in the ’high-tech’ pits such as Selby, and in attempts 
to extend the working week and move to 6 day working and 4 continental shifts 
(Taylor 1988, Leman and Winterton 1991). The representation of the UDM at the 
new pits at Margam and Asfordby has allowed it to develop a foothold outside of 
Nottinghamshire where it has largely been confined.
Other elements in the new industrial relations include a modified colliery review 
procedure agreed at the end of 1985, although it appears that its effect in practice has 
been limited as pits have been closed without opposition as miners have opted to take 
what have been for some, considerable sums in redundancy pay. One consequence 
of which has been a substantial reduction in the average age of the workforce. A
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further important development has been the new disciplinary code, which extended 
to action away from the workplace and which created additional difficulties with 
miners sacked during the 1984/85 strike, a particularly sensitive issue in Yorkshire. 
In 1987 South Yorkshire experienced a major stoppage over the new code and a 
threatened stoppage in North Yorkshire.
Productivity, incentive schemes and strike activity
Central to our account of stoppage activity in the 1980s was the role played by 
increases in productivity for both pay and non-pay stoppages. The point was made 
that there was some ambiguity attached to the variable in that it could act as a proxy 
for a number of changes taking place particularly in the industrial relations 
environment. In order to investigate this further there is a need to identify where the 
productivity changes have arisen from. The conventional view has been that in coal 
the major increases in productivity have arisen from technological developments and 
particularly mechanisation (MMC 1983, BC evidence to MMC 1988, Ashworth 1986, 
NUM 1992). However in the 1980s there have been few developments in 
mechanisation but rather an attempt to make more effective use of existing capital 
equipment through computerised monitoring (Bums et al 1985). Work by Richardson 
and Wood (1989) suggests that productivity gains in coal mining in the 1980s were 
due partly to the closure of ’high cost’ pits and shift towards greater use of retreating 
faces but that the major influences were changes in the payments system and 
industrial relations more generally and the raising of productivity in previously ’lax’ 
pits. Additionally, they stress that these influences may be contingent upon the 
situation in South Yorkshire where their study was undertaken and where there was 
considerable evidence of greater management self-confidence.
Richardson and Wood stress caution in interpreting the results given the relatively 
small number of observations but a number of inferences can be made from their 
results. First, the increases at previously Tax’ pits supports the view that managers 
have moved swiftly to limit custom and practice, reduce manning levels and the 
number of coalfaces and increase sub-contracting as well as the use of improved 
monitoring techniques. Second, the changes to the payments system in the form of
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the ‘Doncaster option’ which Richardson and Wood suggest raised productivity by 
over 30% in the pits in which it operated combined with other industrial relations 
changes would imply that this could be a major factor in accounting for high strike 
levels in the second half of the 1980s particularly as these new incentive schemes are 
now determined unilaterally by management on the basis of work study techniques 
(NUM 1992). However, the expectation would be that its impact would fall mainly 
on pay stoppages and although the earlier econometric results confirmed the link 
between productivity changes and pay stoppages the main impact was upon non-pay 
stoppages. Additionally, Richardson and Wood focused upon overall productivity 
whereas the productivity variable employed in this work was that of faceworkers as 
they have traditionally been the most strike prone group in mining and whose 
productivity is likely to have been affected more by the technological developments 
in pits between 1982 and 1986.
A tentative conclusion could be that the high level of stoppages associated with rising 
productivity in the 1980s is due much to management attempts to change the labour 
process and overturn the system of industrial relations in the industry so that the 
variable is acting largely as a proxy for these. This probably does constitute a greater 
’intensification of labour’ (Leman and Winterton 1991) and it is significant that the 
numnber of accidents in mining rises appreciably after the strike (NCB Report and 
Accounts). However, it is clear that the management offensive has frequently been 
stifled by the cohesiveness of miners in the core of the coalfield and by managers 
need to secure the co-operation of the workforce (Winterton and Winterton 1989) with 
local managers still retaining some discretion in securing such co-operation (Edwards 
and Heery 1989). These points also provide an important qualification to Richardson 
and Wood’s view of a new industrial relations based upon rising productivity, rising 
wages and falling strike activity at least for coal. A point not lost on British Coal as 
it stated in 1988 in respect of stoppages;
The Corporation is determined to continue their policy of 
bringing about a cultural change which will eradicate this 
damaging feature of the industry (Report and Accounts 
87/88:10).
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It is clear that resistance in some areas is still strong and as Richardson and Wood 
point out miners do not appear to have undergone a significant change in attitudes 
towards the job. Quoting one manager who highlighted the huge continuation of 
mistrust in the industry, worsened by the strike and described a void ’almost 
insurmontable in terms of trust’ (1989:54). In that this mistrust manifests itself in 
terms of strike activity its severity would appear to be much greater in Yorkshire than 
elsewhere. Although strikes in Yorkshire coalfields were ’an important percentage 
of an important percentage’ in the 1950s (McCormick 1973) this appears to be even 
more true in the late 1980s and early 1990s and a consideration of Yorkshire’s strike 
activity is provided below.
Yorkshire: An Aberrant Case?
The continuing high levels of strike activity in the Yorkshire coalfield following the 
1984/85 dispute has important implications for this study as a whole. First, it appears 
to conflict significantly with the trends in strike activity elsewhere although replicating 
the general decline in pay stoppages. Second, it contrasts with the experience of 
other industries and companies that have undergone a major dispute and where the 
aftermath is one of workforce compliance or the establishment of new workplace 
values (see B.Steel, Peugeot-Talbot and Ansells (Waddington 1987)). Third, as 
Waddington et al. (1991) have suggested, Yorkshire may represent the persistance of 
collectivist values and attitudes in a general environment where these have either 
disappeared or gone into recess.
The changes introduced as part of the new strategy in BC have intentionally been 
highly divisive; between central and peripheral coalfields, between pits within the 
same coalfield and between miners. It is also the case that in the peripheral coalfields 
where the closure programme has been concentrated resistance has been muted. In 
addition, within the central coalfield strike proneness has varied considerably, with 
South Yorkshire having tonnage lost due to industrial disputes thirteen times higher 
than in Notts in 1986-87 (Taylor 1988). The figures for the Yorkshire coalfield are 
given overleaf.
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The figures are not adjusted for employment so they significantly understate the 
maintenance of strike activity throughout the period but they highlight the increasing 
share of the coalfield in the strike record of the industry. This is due in part to the 
decline in other traditonal areas of militancy such as Scotland and Wales but we have 
seen that overall strike proneness in coal significantly increased in the 1980s despite 
the decline of these areas so that Yorkshire becomes an increasing percentage of an 
increasing percentage.
STRIKE ACTIVITY IN THE YORKSHIRE COALFIELD: 1983-1990
YEAR STRIKES WI WDL S% WI% WDL
%
TL
1983 N/A 55.7 140 N/A 31.8 18.2 40.8
1984 N/A 114.2 8647 N/A 57.5 32.7 42.6
1985 83 76.0 1844 50.9 42.7 44.5 42.6
1986 230 50.0 91 65.5 58.8 64.1 57.8
1987 207 57.0 145 69.9 58.2 66.8 54.9
1988 120 46.0 109 77.4 50.0 49.3 59.8
1989 128 16.0 35 86.4 64.0 67.3 84.7
1990 74 13.0 27 78.7 40.6 29.7
(Source:Employment Gazette for S, WI and WDL; NCB Report & A/cs, TL)
In a general context the Yorkshire coalfield has been a key component in BC’s 
strategy for raising output, productivity and achieving profitability. Constituting a 
large part of the central coalfield, pits that have remained open (currently numbering 
21, August 1992) have benefitted from investment in new technology and incentives 
to increase productivity through revisions to the payments system and opportunities 
to work substantial amounts of overtime (on average fourteen hours per underground 
worker in 1991/92). The consequences ofwhich have been very high productivity and 
earnings. In one pit in Yorkshire all underground workers were earning over £20000 
per year and within the Selby complex, some over £30000 (NUM figures). Thus, the 
pressure for output has increased the bargaining power of miners but has also raised
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the costs of industrial action, particularly action short of a strike. However, these 
factors are not exclusive to Yorkshire and many areas of the central coalfield and 
Notts particularly fit the Richardson and Wood description of rising productivity, 
rising wages and falling strike activity. This suggests that the Yorkshire experience 
needs to be seen in the context of a combination of these general factors with those 
that are more specific to the Yorkshire coalfield.
The Yorkshire coalfield now comprises two elements; North Yorkshire, largely the 
Selby complex, and South Yorkshire, mainly the Barnsley and Doncaster areas. 
Although both have experienced strike activity significantly higher than the rest of 
BC, it is South Yorkshire and especially Doncaster which have been most strike 
prone. A number of writers have stressed that the legacy of the 1984/85 dispute and 
the continued bitterness over sacked miners has been especially significant in 
Yorkshire (Taylor 1988, Winterton and Winterton 1989) but it must be emphasised 
that the Doncaster area and particularly pits such as Frickley have a history of 
militancy and although there is evidence that branch officials may be a factor, 
Doncaster pits show evidence of strike activity across generations. As McCormick 
(1973) showed in his study of Yorkshire strikes between 1960 and 1974, Yorks 
accounted for 46% of all days lost in mining but only 20% of those employed and 
emphasised the importance of South Yorkshire in that total. He cited an NCB Report 
of 1952 which highlighted the concentration of stoppages in the Doncaster and 
Rotherham areas and it appears to be the case in Doncaster that the same pits that 
were militant in the 1950s and 1960s are also militant today. It is also true, that in 
the aftermath of the 1984/85 dispute, BC saw Doncaster as a Tax’ area (Richardson 
and Wood 1989). In Edwards and Heery’s terms union involvement had probably 
gone further there than in many other areas and BC saw it as a test-bed to reassert 
management control and raise ’unduly low’ levels of productivity. The fact that the 
Doncaster option began there, although subsequently extended to most other areas in 
Yorkshire, is no accident. This said, the strike record indicates that the changes were 
not introduced without considerable resistance and many management initiatives do 
not appear to have gone as far in Yorkshire as elsewhere (e.g in the use of 
contractors).
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From the perspective of union organisation the NUM’s powerbase is increasingly 
within Yorkshire given the decline of the peripheral coalfields, where membership is 
still around 100% and where loyalty to the leadership remains strong. In addition the 
NUM has not accepted the majority/minority principle nor the new conciliation 
procedures so that effective constitutional mechanisms for resolving disputes at pit 
level have largely been absent.
In terms of management, we have noted the tougher line in certain areas of the Yorks 
coalfield. In addition, management changes have meant a new breed of younger 
manager at pit level with limited experience of the industry and with a clear remit to 
meet strict commercial objectives. Where unofficial disputes have occurred BC has 
consistently sought to remove ’check-off arrangements in the pits affected and to use 
the legislation enacted since 1980 to seek damages from union officials where such 
action has taken place.
Although strike activity declined in Yorkshire in the early 1990s, in 1992 the only 
areas to experience disputes within BC have been North and South Yorkshire (BC 
Monthly returns August 1992). In general therefore although miners have been 
affected by the harsher disipline and working environment in the wake of the 1984/85 
dispute and have become increasingly disaffected by the industry their responses have 
differed widely. Some have responded individually by leaving the industry or by 
’grudging compliance’ (Fox 1974) or by adopting a more instrumental orientation to 
work (as in Nottinghamshire), others a more collectivist response by resurresting the 
credibility of the union (Waddington et al. 1991). In Yorkshire given the traditions 
of mining communities, the legacy of the strike and the centrality of the union the 
response has tended to be more collectivist.
The Yorkshire experience therefore illustrates an interaction of many of the factors 
relevant to our explanation of strike activity. The push for high output, productivity 
and profits on the central coalfield through a harsher management strategy and 
operational approach continues to provoke clashes with a strongly unionised and 
cohesive workforce with long collectivist traditions. It may also remain true as
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Dennis et al. (1955) identified that, in contrast with instrumental workers where the 
divisions between work and non-work are distinct, for Yorkshire miners the work, 
union and community are inextricably linked so that preservation of a satisfactory 
working environment is paramount. A factor made more potent where the 
opportunities for alternative employment are limited.
CONCLUSIONS
We have attempted in this chapter to provide at first an account of stoppage activity 
and patterns for the entire period of nationalisation up to 1990 and a more detailed 
analysis of these in the period since the oil crisis of 1973/74. The econometric work 
for the post-war era illustrated the consistent influence of trade union organisation and 
strength, the impact of changing payment systems and of the introduction of new 
machinery and latterly of productivity and labour process changes on variations in 
stoppage numbers. The results for changes in mechanisation are particularly 
important in that they highlight a factor which has previously been largely ignored in 
accounts of strike activity in coal-mining. Significantly the impact of broader 
economic factors was slight with their impact confined to an influence upon workers 
involved and days lost although political variables were more important influences 
particularly in the 1970s. However, we wish to emphasise some of the more 
intangible factors in our analysis, particularly the role of leadership and the 
relationships between the Board, governments and the NUM.
At the beginning of the section on the period from 1974-1990 the issue of changes in 
the circuit of capital in the late 1970s and 1980s was addressed and the point was 
made that changes and contradictions emerged to an extent in the late 1950s but that 
these did not materialise in the form of intensified strike activity as they did in the 
1980s. A critical difference between the two periods was the leaderships of the actors 
within the system. In the late 1950s and early 1960s the Conservative government 
largely continued the policies towards the industry begun under Labour so that a 
genuinely bi-partisan policy towards the industry was followed (Ashworth 1986). The 
period of the Presidency of Ford at the NUM was one of collaboration with the NCB, 
accepting the logic of closures and attempting to make the closure programme as
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painless as possible. As Allen (1981) has argued one effect of this was to depoliticise 
miners and in turn to make contraction easier. Similarly the paternalistic style of 
Robens at the NCB and the attempts to ease contraction through redeployment again 
served to reduce overt conflict.
The contrast with the 1980s could hardly be more different, discontent which emerged 
in the late 1960s and reflected in a shift in the NEC of the NUM towards the left 
gathered momentum in the 1970s and culminated in the election of Arthur Scargill to 
the presidency in 1982. Scargill’s election was obviously a product of deeper changes 
taking place in the industry and arguably a changed consciousness after 1974 
signifying that ’miners were no longer subdued or disillusioned’ (Allen 1981) but his 
leadership, as with those before him was significant. As Allen has argued;
Miners had to be persuaded about the nature and extent of the 
deterioration in their work situation and convinced that they 
had the industrial power to halt it (Allen 1981:320)
Similarly the change in government and the break with the settlement reached after 
1974 together with the appointment of Ian McGregor served to increase distrust in an 
industry where a considerable amount of distrust already existed.
This reinforces the points made in previous chapters, that the emergence of crisis 
situations in terms of contradictions between product market, labour market and 
labour process make the possibility of conflict more likely to arise but whether such 
conflicts do emerge is dependent upon how these crises are responded to and the 
extent to which these responses and initiatives undermine established practices. To 
an extent the crisis in the early 1980s was manufactured by the government in its 
wish to shift the NCB towards a more commercial orientation and possibly through 
its wish to defeat the miners on a battleground of its own making. In the event it is 
clear that the legacy of 84/85 is one of continued distrust which in Yorkshire still 
manifests itself in very high levels of strike activity. Trade union organisation 
remains strong in many pits and the willingness collectively to respond to what may 
be seen as managerial excesses is still significant. Coal-mining solidarity has been
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weakened considerably by a succession of initiatives which served to divide miners, 
notably the incentive schemes, the decentralisation of collective bargaining, decisions 
on new investment and the central/peripheral coalfield split. These have made the 
possibility of effective national action more remote but in those areas with strong 
collectivist traditions the potential for strike action remains real.
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ADDENDUM 
POOLED DATA ANALYSES
In view of the small number of observations available for some of the equations and 
the consequence lack of significance of some variables it was decidec U) run a series 
of equations using pooled data in order to try and overcome some of these 
shortcomings. It was hoped that this would permit a more considered evaluation of 
some of the variables employed in the econometric work. Three sets of pooled data 
were analysed; the first, covering the period 1950-1982 examined the three industry 
groupings of construction, engineering and metals giving 99 observations in total. 
The second covered the period 1969-1990 and examined iron and steel and motor 
vehicles, and the third, the same period and industries with the addition of 
engineering. The third set of equations were examined as it was felt that they would 
prove to be particularly illuminating for the strike experience of the 1980s, and, 
because they constituted a significant part of manufacturing industry would give 
valuable insights into the factors affecting strike activity in that sector and, for the 
economy as a whole. Equations for the period 1969-1990 were also run with the 
inclusion of coal-mining, but the dominance of that industry in terms of strikes per 
100,000 workers seriously biased the results and in consequence further examination 
of that industry was not undertaken.
The results for the pooled data analysis for the period 1950-1982 are detailed in Table 
1. They confirm the importance of aggregate unemployment and the output term 
operating in conjunction with trade union density and growth, with incomes policies 
exerting an influence when they were in force. Despite the hope that by pooling the 
data a more considered assessment of the industry unemployment term would have 
been possible, in practice the variable continued to have a negative coefficient when 
run separately but a positive coefficient when run alongside the aggregate variable. 
A similar problem was found with the price inflation term, whilst the lagged nominal 
earnings variable never approached significance in any equations in which it was 
contained as an explanatory variable. Overall, the results from pooling the data 
confirm the influence of a combination of macroeconomic, political, product market
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TABLE 1
POOLED DATA: Construction, Engineering, Metals: 1950-1982
(i) (ii) (iii)
CONSTANT -25.0 -22.88 -22.28
IND 1 (Eng) -20.29 -20.84 -19.64
(5.75) (5.9) (5.55)
IND 2 (Metals) -9.87 -10.57 -9.48
(3.41) (3.6) (3.28)
AGG.U -4.14 -2.59 -3.17
(4.27) (2.12) (2.71)
Pt-1 _ -0.324 _
(1.37)
YP _ 6.29 4.04
(3.18) (2.01)
LG 2.46 _ 2.16
(1.37) (1.2)
Y 0.11 0.102 0.1
(3.9) (3.48) (3.4)
UI 1.82 1.47 1.49
(3.52) (2.6) (2.64)
TUD 0.81 0.78 0.74
(6.04) (5.38) (5.25)
TUG _ 0.4 0.297
(1.9) (1.45)
SDE 7.14 7.08 7.1
F 15.3 14.11 14.0
R2 0.58 0.59 0.59
DW 1.51 1.536 1.46
'Jotes: IND1+2: dummy industry variables for Engineering and Metals
AGG.U: percentage rate of aggregate unemployment
Pt-1: price inflation lagged one year
YP: dummy variable, incomes policy
LG: dummy variable, Labour government
Y: output by industry
UI: percentage rate of industry unemployment
TUD: Trade Union density by industry
TUG: Trade Union growth by industry
Sources: As in Industry chapters
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TABLE 2
POOLED DATA: 1969-1990 
TWO INDUSTRIES
(0 (ii) (iii)
Constant -12.47 49.31 -25.08
IND 1 (Eng) - - -
IND 2 (1+S) 3.31
(0.26)
-15.99
(3.0)
6.23
(0.46)
AGG.U - - 0.162
(0.25)
Y 0.218
(3.41)
- 0.23
(3.1)
IMP -0.7
(4.29)
- -0.83
(3.1)
TUD 0.512
0.2)
- 0.646
(1.39)
TU Act -11.16
(1.87)
-11.83
(2.93)
-12.2
(1.86)
1980-1990 - -14.93
(2.88)
3.42
(0.5)
SDE 8.73 8.87 8.89
F 23.24 36.5 16.08
R2 0.754 0.732 0.758
DW 1.92 1.8 2.08
Notes: IND 1: a dummy variable for Engineering industry
IND 2: a dummy variable for Iron and Steel industry
AGG.U: percentage rate of aggregate unemployment
Y: new car registration and steel consumption
TUD: Trade Union density
TU Act: dummy variable 1984 TU Act
1980-1990: dummy for Conservative government
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TABLE 3
POOLED DATA: 1969-1990 
THREE INDUSTRIES
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv)
Constant 12.78 14.9 7.08 4.19
IND 1 (Eng) -7.4
(1.15)
-7.22
(1.33)
-5.92
(1.01)
-6.26
(1.06)
IND 2 (1+S) -3.34
(0.52)
-3.18
(0.59)
-5.82
(0.98)
-7.6
(1.29)
AGG.U -1.1
(3.9)
+0.24
(0.58)
-0.39
(1.05)
-
Y +0.12
(2.1)
+0.1
(2.08)
+0.17
(2.71)
0.236
(4.62)
IMP - - -0.54
(2.6)
-0.75
(5.39)
TUD +0.23
(1.44)
+0.26
(1.86)
+0.39
(2.58)
0.31
(2.15)
TU Act -12.62
(3.21)
-12.46
(3.64)
-11.09
(2.87)
-9.54
(2.57)
1980-1990 - -16.33
(4.05)
-
Pt-1 - -0.67
(3.26)
-0.42
(1.82)
SDE 8.76 7.41 7.95 8.06
F 26.4 30.9 25.9 32.97
R2 0.729 0.813 0.78 0.77
DW 1.0 1.54 1.61 1.69
Notes: IND1: a dummy variable for Engineering industry
IND2: a dummy variable for Iron and Steel industry
AGG.U: percentage rate of aggregate unemployment
Y: new car registration and steel consumption
TUD: Trade Union density
TU Act: dummy variable 1984 TU Act
1989-1990: dummy for Conservative Government
Pt-1: price inflation lagged one year
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and organisational factors, with trade union density, output and aggregate 
unemployment particularly important determinants. The results for trade union 
density, suggest that the results for construction (where TUD had a negative 
coefficient) were inconsistent with the general direction and strength of its influence.
The results for the period 1969-1990 are presented in Tables 2 and 3. In both sets 
of data analysis it should be stressed that the variable with the highest individual 
correlation coefficient was trade union density. Interestingly, for the two industry 
equations in Table 2 the combination of product market, organisational and, to a 
lesser extent, political variables were the major determinants of movements in 
stoppage numbers. In contrast, for the three industry results in Table 3 aggregate 
unemployment appeared to have a more direct influence upon variations in stoppage 
numbers although again in conjunction with product market, organisational and 
political factors.
The role of political factors merits further discussion. The pooled data equations 
confirmed the importance of the 1984 Trade Union Act in reducing strike numbers 
although it should be again stressed that the Act cannot be divorced from other factors 
in operation at that time, most notably the collapse of the miners strike. Given the 
opportunities provided by pooling the data, it was decided to try and test for two 
other political factors, the operation of the 1982 Employment Act and a dummy 
variable to capture the period of Conservative governments from 1980-1990. The 
former was not significant for any equations in which it was included but the latter 
was a strong and significant influence in reducing stoppage numbers. However, a 
number of cautionary points are necessary here; first, in stepwise analysis the 
individual correlation coefficient of this variable was very small (at least for the two 
industry equations) and smaller than that of any other variable. Second, its inclusion 
significantly reduced the coefficient on the aggregate unemployment variable and 
changed its sign. In the analysis of the three industries the 1980-1990 term was 
substituted by a time trend operating from 1980 to signify that the effect of these 
governments may have been to an extent cumulative in their depressive effect upon 
stoppage numbers but this variable was not significant. It should be stressed that the
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Thatcher governments variable exerted a strong and significant effect on stoppages 
when run alongside the Trade Union Act variable implying an impact additional to 
that of the legislation and was particularly important in the three industry equations, 
but these points need to be interpreted with care. There is foremost a problem of 
cause and effect, the variable may be picking up the impact of other factors (notably 
unemployment) and may be acting as a proxy for another variable or variables, such 
as a change in attitudes towards striking. Given the electoral promise to ‘curb union 
power’ in 1979 it is possible that these governments merely reflected deeper changes 
taking place at the time. Overall, although the impact of these governments may have 
been considerable it is likely that in respect of strikes, their main influence 
(independent of the legislation enacted) probably operated at an ideological level 
through the elevation of issues of market forces, non-intervention and ‘managements 
right to manage’.
The results for the product market variables are particularly interesting. Although 
consistently stronger and more significant for the two industry rather than the three 
industry analyses they confirm the increasing importance of competitive pressures for 
managers. This reflects the findings of work on managers generally in the 1980s 
(Storey 1992) and it is notable that the import penetration term is particularly 
important in the equations for iron and steel and motor vehicles where competitive 
pressures have been so acute. Two points follow from this; first, that for these two 
industries product market factors appear to have been a more significant factor in 
declining strike activity than labour market factors and, second, that the ways in 
which managers have responded to competitive pressures have had a significant 
influence upon declining strike activity. This latter point has more general relevance 
in the context of debates surrounding HRM but it would appear that management 
actions have been important albeit within contexts which have made such initiatives 
easier to introduce.
The three industry pooled data equations confirm the continuing importance of 
aggregate unemployment in strike activity since 1969. The fact that this finding is 
achieved largely because of the engineering industry suggests that it has more general
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applicability. Engineering employed around 1.4 million people in the second half of 
the 1980s and represented a significant proportion of manufacturing employment. It 
may also be the case that the impact of unemployment on strike numbers alters after 
the former has reached a certain critical level. Additionally, there may be a more 
significant attitudinal consequence of high unemployment which operates during and 
long after unemployment has fallen. Cronin’s description of a ‘post-depression 
mentality’ in the years immediately following the Second World War provides an 
illustration of this. It should also be stressed that in addition to its direct impact on 
strikes the unemployment term is also heavily influencing both the level of trade 
union density, the level of product demand and the ability of managers to effect 
changes in work organisation.
Overall, the evidence presented for the period 1969-1990 confirms many of the 
findings of the individual industry chapters and suggests that an adequate analysis of 
strike activity in the 1980s needs to take account of macroeconomic factors 
(principally aggregate unemployment), product market factors and particularly the 
increasing competitive pressures on organisations, trade union organisation and direct 
and indirect political influences. The pooled analyses suggest that future research on 
the strike experience of the 1980s and 1990s could profitably focus upon the ways 
managers have responded to increased competition in ways which have not led 
workers to have recourse to the strike weapon, and to the role of political factors 
particularly the cumulative effect of legislation and a more considered assessment of 
the role of the Thatcher governments.
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SECTION V 
CONCLUSIONS
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CONCLUSIONS
In the Introduction to this study we aligned the approach with Cronin’s observation 
that an adequate analysis of strike activity ‘must be above all multi-dimensional, 
encompassing factors that affect the attitudes and desires of workers and those that 
affect their ability to translate consciousness into action’. Our attempt has been to 
develop a theoretical and operational framework which is faithful to this and which 
makes adequate provision for the attitudes of employers in order to account for 
variations in post-war strike activity in the UK. In doing so it has also drawn heavily 
on Cronin’s work in two other important respects. First, through a methodology 
which attempts to link ‘the dynamic concerns of historians with the more rigorous 
methodological techniques of other social scientists’ and second through the 
acknowledgement that a time-series study of strikes needs to offer an explanation not 
just of year-to-year variations in the totals but also broader peaks and troughs in the 
overall series.
As well as the aim of developing a comprehensive model of strike activity which 
would allow some prediction of future trends in addition to accounting for past 
movements a central objective of the study has been to provide a test and extension 
of the work of Durcan, McCarthy and Redman (1983). In this final section we 
present our conclusions and contrast them with those of DMR and other writers.
At the outset it should be stressed that the model has been tested on a range of 
industries which have different histories of management and workplace organisation, 
different market and organisational contexts and contrasting strike records. However, 
the four main industries together with construction and engineering have accounted 
for the bulk of aggregate strike activity (numbers, workers involved and days lost) 
in the post-war period. In addition, excluding coal-mining they have accounted for 
most of aggregate net strike activity and the broad metals sector has consistently made 
up the majority of stoppages in manufacturing. The lessons from these industries can 
therefore shed considerable light on movements in aggregate totals and in particular 
sectors. Overleaf is a summary table of the main results for the industries examined.
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SUMMARY TABLES (to 1982)
Metals
(49-82)
Eng
(50-82)
Con
(49-82)
Vehicles
(49-82)
Coal
(49-90)
S &M  
(50-80)
Const
ant
-107.2 -32.19 46.82 -92.2 -309.4 62.0
Agg.
U
-11.8
(4.07)
-10.6
(6.07)
-2.23
(4.46)
-12.8
(2.87)
-2.57
(2.18)
Pt-1 -0.386
(1.117)
+0.5
(1.64)
Ind.U +5.87
(3.55)
+ 11.4 
(5.97)
+4.76
(2.68)
Et-1 -0.315
(1.81)
REL +0.87
(2.3)
Y +0.237
(2.09)
+0.164
(6.18)
+0.39
(6.0)
+0.84
(2.5)
Y. +  1.5
(2.56)
IMP 1.0
(1.9)
TT *-0.007
(2.94)
-0.28
(4.97)
TUG +0.67
(1.72)
+0.74
(3.54)
+0.69
(3.66)
TUD +2.02
(6.49)
+0.5
(2.29)
-0.78
(2.3)
+3.46
(3.8)
Y/N +5.91
(3.95)
-0.83
(1.56)
LG +5.56
(2.33)
-2.38
(2.13)
-34.83
(2.45)
YP +3.48
(2.8)
NPL
A
-29.9
(1.41)
SDE 6.34 3.187 2.55 9.05 38.13 9.2
F 18.03 37.33 20.73 14.38 21.58 7.55
R2 0.824 0.913 0.848 0.76 0.74
0.537
DW 1.69 2.03 1.89 0.97 1.33 2.07
♦Con: Variable is ratio of profit to total compensation 
Sources: as in Industry Chapter
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Notes: Agg U: Percentage rate of aggregate unemployment.
Pt-1: Percentage retail price inflation rate, lagged one year.
Ind U: Percentage rate of industry unemployment.
Et-1: Percentage change in nominal earnings lagged one year.
REL: Ratio of industry earnings to average manufacturing earnings.
Y: Level of industry output/product demand.
Y .: Rate of change of industry output.
TT: Level of real profit (net).
TUG: Percentage change in trade union growth by industry.
TUD: Level of trade union density by industry.
Y/N: Level of productivity, output per person.
LG: Dummy variable for periods of Labour government.
YP: Dummy variable for periods of Incomes policy.
NPLA: Dummy variable to denote period of National Powerloading 
Agreement.
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MACRO-ECONOMIC FACTORS
In common with the studies by Pencavel (1970), Shorey (1977) and Cronin (1979) 
this study confirms the importance of macro-economic factors on a number of 
dimensions of aggregate and industrial stoppage activity. The level of aggregate 
unemployment, the level of gross domestic product and earnings (real or nominal) all 
exerted an influence on strike numbers with price inflation having an impact at certain 
times, although the disaggregated analysis revealed that these factors operated very 
unevenly between industries (see summary table). Aggregate unemployment had a 
strong negative impact on pay stoppages in all the industries examined with the 
exception of coal-mining. It also operated differently for pay than non-pay stoppages 
(as the theory predicted) and exerted the major influence upon pay stoppages. Its 
impact also varied between periods (in motor vehicles the sign on the coefficient 
actually changed) having a much stronger depressive influence after 1968. The 
evidence also suggests that whilst the decline in stoppage activity in the early 1980s 
owes much to the impact of high unemployment operating on pay stoppages it also 
points to the possibility of their being some threshold level of unemployment above 
which strike activity declines significantly given the reduced significance of the 
variable in the second half of the 1980s.
One interpretation of the results is that macro-economic factors have exerted much 
less of an influence on the more traditional areas of conflict such as coal-mining and 
shipbuilding (see also Pencavel for coal) where militancy and a relatively ‘closed’ 
system of industrial relations have persisted and where strike activity owes much 
more to factors internal to the industries and organisations within them than to 
broader economic changes. If this is correct, the results for the effect of 
macro-economic factors on aggregate strike numbers are obtained because their 
impact is greatest where workplace organisation is relatively underdeveloped or 
fragile (and where workforce attitudes are instrumental), although these areas also 
tend to have more decentralised bargaining structures and are more susceptible to the 
influence of broader external factors. It is also clear that the impact of high 
unemployment has been particularly significant in those areas where the threat of job 
losses has been greatest (the private sector generally) where pay stoppages were
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important (e.g much of manufacturing) and where the degree of shopfloor control was 
limited.
Macro-economic factors have also affected the numbers of workers involved and 
working days lost in three of the four industries. The main factor has been aggregate 
unemployment, reducing workers involved and days lost in iron and steel but 
increasing them for non-pay stoppages in coal-mining and for workers involved in 
non-pay stoppages in shipbuilding. For coal-mining and shipbuilding an additional 
influence was the lagged price inflation term which reduced the number of workers 
involved in non-pay disputes in both, and days lost in non-pay disputes (coal) and pay 
disputes (shipbuilding). These results need to be set in the context of organisational 
and bargaining changes in these industries which may have made them more 
susceptible to these broader influences (cf metals and engineering generally where 
they do not appear to be important).
POLITICAL INFLUENCES: THE ROLE OF THE STATE
For DMR, the role of government is a key factor in the changing volume of strike 
activity but our analysis suggests that it is more helpful to view governments as 
performing a number of roles in respect of strikes some direct (as with legislation and 
arbitration) others more indirect (macro-economic policies, industrial policy) and that 
frequently its role and impact is one of mediating or exacerbating the effects of 
developments at international, national and industry levels. Taken together these 
factors directly affect broader movements in strike totals and indirectly through 
management initiatives in response to product market decline and stagnation, and to 
contradictions in the industrial circuit of capital.
Despite considerable difficulties in testing empirically the role played by many 
government initiatives the industry studies revealed a number of important influences. 
In terms of those factors identified by DMR the role of incomes policies was 
particularly important. Our industry analyses revealed that incomes policies did have 
an impact on strike activity in metals, motor vehicles and construction and that the 
effect was to increase the number of stoppages. The data did not distinguish between
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pay and non-pay stoppages and it might be that, as Davies (1979) suggests, they serve 
to reduce pay but increase non-pay stoppages, although our evidence from motor 
vehicles would contradict that view. Given the nature of such policies in the UK it 
is likely that their major impact has fallen on those groups where the potential for 
additional earnings increases such as PBR or overtime has been most limited and 
where governments have been most able to apply pressure on management to resist 
pay increases in excess of policy targets (e.g its own employees). Thus, where pay 
and earnings are determined largely by national agreements or significant company 
agreements (e.g Ford) and the scope for local bargaining is limited, incomes policies 
may be most effective in controlling pay and may be associated with the biggest build 
up of grievances over the policies’ operation.
The impact of industrial relations legislation on strike activity was confined to the 
impact of what Cronin terms ‘repressive legislation’. Such attempts at legal control 
of aspects of industrial relations were seen by DMR as significantly contributing to 
enhanced strike activity but the evidence for the 1980s is that the legislation of the 
1980s (especially the 1984 Trade Union Act) served to reduce overall strike activity 
with particularly strong effects in certain industries. At the aggregate level the 1984 
Act may have reduced stoppages by around 420 per year, with a reduction of 160 
per year in both motor vehicles and engineering. These results suggest that the 
impact of the legislation has fallen mainly on manufacturing and give support to 
Brown and Wadhwani’s (1990) view that the legal changes since 1979 have served 
to reduce stoppages independently of the impact of unemployment, although the main 
impact of the legislation may have fallen in the period after 1984 and operated as a 
background factor leading the parties to change their behaviour.
Evidence for the role played by state sponsored conciliation and arbitration since the 
formation of AC AS is more difficult to assess. Movements in the number of 
conciliation cases and stoppage numbers are closely related with both falling 
significantly in the 1980s, although the two series move against one another between 
1976 and 1978, suggesting ACAS may have had an important influence on keeping 
strikes below the level they would otherwise have been in that period. More
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significantly, ACAS has dealt increasingly with individual conciliation cases in the 
1980s which may reflect a move from collective disputes to individual grievances in 
the context of declining trade union membership and workplace organisation.
The results at both an aggregate and industry level for Cronin’s additional variables 
was mixed but the existence of a Labour government appears to have had an 
important influence on a number of dimensions of strike activity (see also Pencavel). 
In aggregate analysis the existence of a Labour government was seen to increase the 
number of stoppages by over 300 per year for the period 1946-1987 but the 
disaggregated analysis revealed contradictory trends. In coal-mining the existence of 
a Labour government appears to have significantly reduced strike numbers supporting 
the view that the strong links between politics, the union and mining communities has 
served to operate in such a way that miners tend not to undermine their ’friends’ 
when they are in power, but in metals it is associated with more stoppages (although 
a reduced number of workers involved and days lost). This result may be due to the 
fact that in metals the closure programme coincided with the 1974-79 Labour 
administration which represented a clear break with post-war practice of viewing the 
inherent inefficiencies of the industry as less of a cost than industrial conflict.
In the course of the analysis it has also become clear that governments have 
influenced stoppage activity in other important respects. The impact of monetary and 
fiscal policies on the general strike pattern and on specific industries is particularly 
notable as at a micro level is the active encouragement to productivity bargaining in 
the 1960s, government sponsored reorganisations of industries, (BLMC, GEC), and 
the post-Geddes reforms in shipbuilding. However, one of the most important, but 
essentially background influences has been the operation of cash limits since the late 
1970s. Our evidence shows how the tightening of these was a critical precursor to 
strike activity in both steel and coal, and in the latter case it is significant that these 
were relaxed after the government’s climbdown in 1981 but tightened again three 
years later.
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The fact that our industries were all nationalised or part-nationalised provides a 
further insight into the impact of government policies on strike activity. The example 
provided by shipbuilding illustrates a number of factors which are relevant to our 
argument generally. In shipbuilding it is clear that one aim of the government in 
public ownership was to placate the unions and the initial period of nationalisation 
was one of considerable optimism. The nationalisation was also associated with the 
centralising of collective bargaining and the greater numbers of workers involved and 
days lost in the industry after nationalisation is probably attributable to this. 
Significantly the initial board members of British Shipbuilders were long serving 
individuals who had a commitment to nationalisation and were to an extent trusted by 
the union leaders in the industry. Personnel changes in the early 1980s coupled with 
tighter cash limits and shifting priorities towards a more commercial orientation led 
to growing estrangment between the board and the unions and to increasing conflict.
The period from 1979-87 and beyond can be viewed as one in which the state 
attempted to dismantle much of the neo-corporatist machinery which had been 
established in the preceding 15 years, and move much of the public sector away from 
an essentially production orientation towards a more commercial market orientation. 
Given the importance of the ’logic of market forces’ argument to the Conservative 
government in 1979 and the belief that union power had to be curtailed legally and 
within organisations in terms of management’s ‘right to manage’ the fact that the 
public sector became the source of prolonged conflicts in the 1980s is not surprising. 
If a form of ‘indulgency pattern’ had developed in the nationalised industries the 
period after 1979 can be seen as an incremental attempt to change this industry by 
industry with the ultimate objective of privatisation, further emphasising the fact that 
the state has objectives of its own.
The important point for our purposes is that attempts at incorporation by the state in 
the 1960s and 1970s were, with exceptions associated with heightened conflict and 
that the deliberate attempts to dismantle these in ways that were surprisingly similar 
to each other produced a series of major public sector conflicts in the 1980s. The 
fact that moves to open up the sector to competition and to dismantle bureaucratic
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structures led to greater conflict is consistent with our theoretical approach and 
emphasises the point that the process of change, by challenging existing ways of 
working and heightening uncertainty and insecurity may produce greater conflict 
particularly where sectors are still relatively insulated from the worst elements of 
recession.
INDUSTRY LEVEL INFLUENCES 
THE ROLE OF PRODUCT MARKETS
The four industries on which most of this study is based are characterised by relative 
and absolute decline for most of the post-war period. Strike activity in these 
industries is critically affected by product market conditions and that these are 
particularly important in accounting for year to year variations in pay stoppages. 
More controversially we have argued that product market stagnation and decline are 
the main determinants of longer term movements in pay and non-pay strike activity 
within these industries as managements (and governments) have attempted to respond 
to disarticulations in the circuit of capital prompted by product market decline and 
labour’s increasing share of value added.
Product market changes account for much of the short-term cyclical nature of strike 
activity particularly in those industries, such as motor vehicles and shipbuilding where 
variations in demand and output have been particularly marked. These findings 
largely confirm those of other writers (Rees 1952, Mayhew 1979, DMR 1983) and 
it is significant that as Rees has argued,their impact falls mainly on pay stoppages. 
The evidence also shows that industrial strike activity exhibits longer term cycles, 
even when allowance is made for employment changes, which appear to be the result 
of management responses at particular stages in the industries growth and 
development.
The approach to analysing long-term movements in strike activity suggested that 
strike activity would tend to be concentrated in periods of product market maturity 
and stagnation and at critical turning points such as those between growth and 
maturity and maturity and stagnation. All the industries examined here experienced
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some combination of these developmental stages in the Post-War period. The turning 
point for them all seems to come in the late 1950s, representing a short term 
recession coming at the end of prolonged expansion as government sought to redress 
a balance of payments problem. In three of the industries greater competition was 
experienced after 1957 and strike activity increased significantly, a fact which 
endorses Cronin’s view that the market and competitive pressures are critical to the 
emergence of stoppages, and their persistance to industries being entangled in the 
pressures and tensions of the market.
The nature of changes introduced in periods of maturity, stagnation and decline have 
an impact on both pay and non-pay stoppages. Whilst critical turning points may be 
reflected mainly in pay stoppages (see motor vehicles in the late 1970s) attempts to 
reorganise work and regain control over the labour process show up mainly in 
non-pay stoppages. The effects on strike activity are greatest where attitudes are most 
sympathetic to the use of the strike weapon, where union organisation is most 
developed and where the workforce has a significant degree of control over work and 
the effort bargain. In coal, shipbuilding and parts of motor vehicles stagnation 
phases have been associated with changing payments systems reforming collective 
bargaining and procedures together with other industrial relations changes and 
technological restructuring. Indeed in all four industries many of the most significant 
changes have been at the end of stagnation phases and into decline.Linking these 
phases to strike activity shows that in coal mining strike activity was highest at the 
peak of the stagnation phase, at the turning points back to stability in the early 1970s 
and again as stability gave way to contraction in the 1980s. In motor vehicles 
increased strike activity emerged towards the end of a growth phase in the 1950s and 
continued to rise during a period of maturity/stagnation peaking in 1970 and 
continuing throughout the 1970s. Non-pay stoppages persisted throughout the 1980s 
as managements continued to restructure operations and reassert control. In 
shipbuilding the main period of strike activity occured between 1964 and 1974 in a 
stagnation phase and was characterised by considerable restructuring and 
reorganisation. Similarly, in metals between 1968-78 a period of stagnation was 
associated with high levels of strike activity with major conflict arising in 1980 as the
407
industry turned towards contraction.
A final point to stress on product markets is the consequence of increased competitive 
pressures for strike activity. The evidence for motor vehicles and iron and steel 
provide support for the influence of competitive pressures through increasing import 
penetration, emphasised further in the results from the pooled data analyses. The fact 
that these competitive pressures operated to reduce strike activity, in contrast to the 
view presented by Cronin (1979) suggests that attention needs to be given to how 
managers and employees experience these pressures and how managers have sought 
to respond to them in ways which have not provoked strike action.
LABOUR MARKET FACTORS
The evidence from the industry studies established that local labour market factors 
exert an influence upon a number of dimensions of stoppage activity but their impact 
needs to be interpreted with care, particularly that of industry unemployment. The 
existence of alternative employment opportunities, or lack of these was clearly an 
important factor in rising strike activity in the late 1960s and in a number of 
industries in the 1980s.
General movements in industry earnings were found to be significantly related to 
stoppage numbers in iron and steel and to non-pay working days lost and workers 
involved in shipbuilding and marine engineering. In addition, those groups with most 
bargaining power and workforce organisation (as in coal, shipbuilding and motor 
vehicles) were the groups most able to secure increased pay without recourse to strike 
action and help to account for the discrepancy between the aggregate results, where 
earnings are clearly important and the results for these industries.
It did not prove possible to adequately test for the impact of movements in 
intra-industry earnings on stoppages but it is clear from the historical analysis that 
these were an important source of grievances in shipbuilding and motor vehicles 
where piecework systems predominated and at BLMC and Chrysler after the 
introduction of measured daywork where differentials were eroded. Further, the
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existence of the Coventry Toolroom Agreement allowed direct comparisons to be 
made of earnings in the industry and evidence suggests that notice was taken of other 
pay agreements within the industry most notably at Ford. In coal it is the 
deterioration in inter-industry earnings which appears to be an important motor behind 
increasing strike activity suggesting that restricted ’orbits of comparison’ have not 
applied to the same extent there as in other industries.
UNION ORGANISATION AND CAPACITY
For DMR the development of shop steward organisation was a necessary precondition 
for the emergence and persistance of strike activity and was responsible for the spread 
of strike activity across different industries, a phenomenon they termed the contagion 
effect. Thus, the increase in stoppage activity in many industries and the spread to 
new industries in the 1960s was directly attributable to the consolidation of shop 
steward organisation and its emergence in hitherto unorganised areas.
Our evidence strongly confirms this interpretation. In the general metals and 
engineering sector the emergence and growth of shop steward organisation in the 
1950s and 1960s was closely associated with rising strike activity. The case of motor 
vehicles is particularly informative, where workplace union organisation became 
firmly established in most of the major plants in the 1950s, the exact period in which 
strike activity underwent a marked increase. In coal-mining it is also clear that much 
of the persistance of strike action in the Yorkshire coalfield after the 1984/85 dispute 
owes much to the continuing strength of workplace organisation and the NUM 
generally (where 100% trade unionism has survived in Yorkshire) allied to workforce 
grievances and hostility to many of the changes.
Where trade union organisation is under threat or in decline, the evidence suggests 
a significant depressive effect on strike activity. The results of the pooled data for 
the period 1969-1990 highlight the contribution made to declining strike numbers in 
the 1980s by the fall in trade union density. This provides additional support for the 
role of organisation in strike activity and its absence or decline to the inability or 
difficulty of undertaking effective strike action.
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There is a further aspect of trade union organisation which merits some discussion in 
its effects upon strike activity. From our studies of coal-mining, shipbuilding and 
metals in particular the role of the national union leadership and its relationship with 
senior management emerged as a key factor in strike propensity. The role of 
leadership in strikes has long been recognised (see Lane and Roberts (1974), Batstone 
et al. (1978)) and shop steward leadership particularly within decentralised bargaining 
structures and its relationships with line managers and supervisors may also be critical 
in the emergence or avoidance of stoppages. However, where bargaining is more 
centralised, national leadership appears to have an important affect. Whilst we would 
not wish to exaggerate the impact of leadership, the role of leaders and personalities 
in the collective bargaining process may serve to help reach compromise and 
understanding, or conversely prevent agreement (or negotiation taking place) when 
other factors are working in contradiction to this (Stephenson and Allen (1987)).
MANAGEMENT INITIATIVES:
Collective Bargaining, Payment Systems and the Labour Process
It has been a repeated theme throughout this study that management initiatives have 
played a key role in strike activity and nowhere is this more true than in the 
management of change. That is the nature of the changes and the manner in which 
those changes are introduced. Daniel (1987) noted in his study of technical change 
that the most difficult changes in terms of how they were received and the grievances 
they generated were those associated with organisational change; such as closure, 
structural reorganisation, merger and the organisation and control of work.
Daniel noted that in most cases such changes were achieved peacefully. In contrast 
the evidence here is that organisational change in the form of restructuring has 
frequently been associated with very considerable conflict, a fact that may have much 
to do with the different periods of study and the fact that our industries are unusual 
for their high levels of union organisation and workers who have experience of 
successful disputes. Further, periods of technological restructuring have also 
generated heightened conflict, the spread of powerloading in coal in the 1950s and 
1960s, the application of BOS furnaces in steel in the early 1970s, re-tooling in motor
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vehicles between 1978 and 1986 and the replacement of riveters by welders in the 
1960s in shipbuilding all support this contention.
In the four industries many of the periods of most intense conflict were associated 
with attempts by management to reorganise and regain control over aspects of the 
work situation. In general non-pay stoppages were especially prevalent in those 
industries where there was an ever present contest for control of the labour process 
and were affected more by factors internal to particular organisations, requiring 
analysis at a more disaggregated level than that examined in this study. The 
argument here is that at particular points in time, notably in periods of industrial 
maturity and stagnation, management initiatives to achieve greater integration between 
the elements of the industrial circuit of capital were often most frequent and 
far-reaching, generating a greater volume of grievances and involving a greater 
number of workers in non-pay disputes.
The study also confirms the role of payments systems in affecting the level of pay 
stoppages in particular. In coal-mining the decision to move to a day wage system 
in the 1960s, and the succession of district agreements as well as the NPLA, 
contributed to the decline in the number of stoppages. In contrast, the decision to 
move back to a payment by results system in the late 1970s was associated with 
increasing pay stoppages. The evidence from shipbuilding and motor vehicles 
reinforces that in coal-mining with motor vehicles illustrating the potential for conflict 
associated with changing payments systems.
The association between strike activity and management initiatives in institutional and 
procedural reform are mediated by a number of important factors and in general are 
dependent upon the context in which they are introduced. The 1980s has seen a major 
shift towards decentralised bargaining (WIRS 1 and 2, Batstone 1984), but as the case 
of motor vehicles and British Steel shows, one which has not been associated with 
heightened levels of strike activity. As Edwards (1983) suggests, this may be because 
the impact of broader economic factors, and market forces generally have undermined 
the ability to contest issues and generally have a more direct impact on worker
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resistance within decentralised than centralised structures (see also the evidence from 
the pooled data analyses). Thus the different contexts are likely to account for the 
apparently greater effectiveness of institutional reform in the 1980s than the 1960s 
and 1970s in reducing stoppage numbers. In both periods it is clear that institutional 
reform does affect the numbers of workers involved although the evidence on days 
lost, particularly in the 1980s is less clear given the impact of product markets and 
legislation (see discussion above). Second, whilst many of the reforms when in 
place appear to have reduced stoppage numbers the process of change has often been 
associated with heightened conflict (see Goldthorpe 1974) as at BL in the late 1970s.
The impact of procedural changes on stoppages also suggests that deeper attitudinal 
issues play a critical role. The evidence from the shipbuilding industry is particularly 
instructive. Whilst the 1967 disputes procedure appears to have operated to increase 
the number of disputes and to increase the number of workers involved and days lost 
in pay disputes. New procedures, introduced in the more co-operative climate of 
nationalisation appear to have met with more success. One implication is that where 
grievances are deep-rooted and low trust prevails, procedural changes are unlikely to 
meet their objectives at least in the short-term and may themselves be a source of 
grievance. This is particularly likely where procedures have not been agreed or 
imposed unilaterally. In contrast where procedures have been agreed in ’good faith’ 
and reflect some trust between the parties their chances of success are significantly 
improved. Additionally, changes such as decentralisation of bargaining, may by 
enabling established practices to be ’bought out’ and earnings enhanced be welcomed 
by workers and this may be a factor in the relatively peaceful transition to 
decentralisation in the 1980s.
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THE GENERAL THESIS AND PROSPECTS FOR THE FUTURE
In this section we draw together the main strands of our argument to account for 
observed strike patterns at both the industry and aggregate levels. In addition we will 
seek to outline directions for the future course of strike action, an exercise which 
necessarily addresses the question of attitudes and the extent to which these have 
undergone significant change in the 1980s.
The model developed in the early chapters confirmed much of the DMR study 
particularly the preconditions for the emergence of strike activity and the factors 
affecting variations in stoppage numbers on a year-to-year basis. The role of attitudes 
favourable to the use of the strike weapon and effective union organisation emerge 
as critical prerequisites for strike activity as the evidence from motor vehicles 
testifies. The spread and sophistication of shop steward organisation in manufacturing 
in the 1950s and 1960s against a backcloth of tight product and labour markets 
contributed to a greater volume of strikes, a change in their form as well as to their 
emergence in hitherto ’virgin’ territories. The contrast with the slack labour markets 
but tight product markets of the early 1980s characteristic of much of private 
manufacturing exposed the apparent fragility of such organisation in the face of more 
sophisticated management approaches. Significantly, where such conditions were not 
in evidence, workplace trade union organisation continued to retain some strength.
Where favourable attitudes and union organisation existed, the influences upon 
short-term variations in strike activity comprised a combination of general 
macro-economic factors (particularly aggregate unemployment and to a lesser extent 
price inflation), political factors (notably incomes policy and the government in 
power), labour market conditions, management initiatives in the form of changes to 
payment systems and institutional and procedural changes and product market 
conditions. The latter consistently emerged as a critical influence on pay stoppage 
numbers and indirectly on non-pay stoppages through its impact upon managerial 
initiatives.
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In the first decade and a half after 1945 aggregate strike activity is largely a story 
about coal-mining. Whilst the period from 1945 to 1950 is one of falling strike 
activity in coal and other industries due much to the popularity of the Labour 
government and the strong links between it and the TUC (DMR 1983) coal mining 
dominates the statistics. In coal and shipbuilding where union organisation and 
attitudes favourable to striking had been established well before the war strike activity 
is affected largely by variations in product demand and factors internal to those 
industries. In coal-mining, the spread of technology in the form of powerloaded faces 
and in shipbuilding to the level of profitability and to the persistence of inter-union 
conflicts over demarcation. In both industries strike numbers and their form were 
affected by the predominance of piecework payment systems. More generally the 
emergence of higher strike levels throughout the decade owes much to changing 
competitive pressures, especially in metals and engineering in the late 1950s coupled 
with product market fluctuations (themselves partly a consequence of government 
policy) and the emergence and re-emergence of shop steward organisation. National 
engineering stoppages in 1952, 1957 and again in 1962 which dominated working 
days lost can be seen as a consequence of these competitive pressures and emerging 
trade union strength in the context of national bargaining and near full employment.
In the 1960s all our industries with the exception of coal exhibit trends characteristic 
of much of the rest of manufacturing with product market and to a lesser extent 
labour market pressures dominant against the backcloth of trade union growth and the 
spread of workplace organisation. However, political variables assume a more direct 
role than in the 1950s with both incomes policies and the Labour government exerting 
an influence upon stoppage numbers, workers involved and days lost (see metals). 
In coal-mining, strike activity declines consistently as home demand falls and the 
NPLA in 1966 and 1971 effectively replace piecework by a day-wage system. 
Additionally, the NUM leadership’s loyalty to the Wilson government and the 
collaborative relationship between senior personnel in the NCB and NUM further 
served to reduce strike activity.
The emerging interventionist role of the state in the 1960s requires further discussion.
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In addition to legislation and proposed legislation (‘In Place Of Strife’) and its 
continuing influence on product markets through ‘stop-go’ policies, the state 
intervened indirectly through the IRC and directly, with the nationalisation of steel 
in 1967. However, it was in shipbuilding where the range and impact of government 
initiatives was seen to greatest effect. Government investment grants and aid began 
in the early 1960s and encompassed active encouragement of productivity bargaining 
and reorganisation of the industry following the Geddes Report. Notwithstanding the 
good intentions of the government, given the product market position and increasing 
labour share of value added the reforms of the late 1960s significantly contributed 
to increased levels of strike activity. In addition by accepting the Geddes 
recommendations the government endorsed the proposals for procedural changes, the 
effects of which have more general application in the context of the time.
From 1968-1973 aggregate strike activity reached historically high levels, an 
experience replicated in three of our four industries, the explanations for which lie 
more in long-term than short-term factors as Cronin and others have suggested. What 
is beyond doubt is that the strike activity is a general phenomenon and explanations 
based on individual industries are inadequate. The strike activity was not only of a 
greater volume but spread across more industries with strikes frequently larger, 
longer and more often securing official trade union backing. The evidence suggests 
a continuing role for shop steward organisation and for greater links between shop 
stewards and union officials with the latter bolstered by a significant rise in trade 
union membership in the late 1960s. These combined with the growing unpopularity 
of the Wilson administration, antagonism over incomes policy and proposed legal 
curbs on trade unions, rising unemployment (and lack of alternative job opportunities) 
and the general slowdown in the world economy. The consequences of this were that 
expectations built up in periods of growth and full employment were not met by the 
economy’s capacity to deliver rising incomes. Additionally, the late 1960s was 
characterised by merger activity and rationalisation (e.g shipbuilding and motor 
vehicles) which served to further increase insecurity and at the same time widen 
‘orbits of comparison’. Whilst the responses in shipbuilding were a direct result of 
contradictions in the circuit of capital and increasing share of value added taken by
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labour it is arguable that these factors were more general (Glyn and Sutcliffe 1972) 
if not as marked as in shipbuilding.
In the years following 1973, the pressures of competition, macro-economic factors 
and government have become more intense and more important as influences upon 
the strike patterns in our industries and the economy overall. Changes in product 
markets were significant in the re-emergence of coal-mining stoppages throughout the 
decade, as was the reversion to incentive payments in 1977 following the stagnation 
in productivity and a dramatic rise in labour’s share of value added. In contrast the 
competitive pressures in metals and motor vehicles served to dampen strike numbers 
as import penetration increased, although management’s responses to these 
competitive pressures initially contributed to heightened levels of strike activity. The 
state’s role was enhanced further, through incomes policies (especially the Social 
Contract), the establishment of AC AS, increasing public ownership of which BL, 
UCS and British Shipbuilders are directly relevant to this study and the passing of 
new labour laws. The incomes policies certainly served to reduce strike activity in 
the 1975/76 period but contributed significantly to raising it in the 1978/79 period 
(Hyman 1984) although this may also have been linked to the increasing unpopularity 
of the Callaghan Government. Macro-economic factors, particularly inflation and 
unemployment also increased their influence on all three main dimensions of 
stoppages although unemployment had its main effect upon the number of stoppages 
over pay. It is likely that in a context of static growth, the pressures arising from 
inflationary expectations met very gloomy managerial expectations about the future 
and in a context of slack demand meant that many managers were prepared to ‘take 
a strike’, leading strikes to be longer and more protracted (see for example Willman’s 
(1985) account of BL in the 1970s).
In contrast, the 1980s exhibit marked changes in the main dimensions of aggregate 
strike activity. First, strike levels fell dramatically in 1980, again in 1984/85 and 
experienced a further decline at the end of the decade. Second, the decline has been 
much more marked amongst pay than non-pay stoppages (at least until the late 
1980s). Third, major stoppages have been concentrated in the public sector and in
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parts of this sector strike activity has continued to increase into the 1990s. Finally, 
despite high unemployment stoppages have tended on average to remain short affairs 
with protracted disputes being confined largely to the public sector or areas of the 
private sector facing slack product demand.
The evidence from the industry studies shows that the major determinants of strike 
numbers in the decade have been product market factors, aggregate unemployment 
and the impact of labour legislation. The rise in unemployment in late 1979 has been 
the major factor responsible for the decline in pay stoppages after 1980, with labour 
legislation feeding in from the mid 1980s for both pay and non-pay stoppages. Whilst 
the decline in pay stoppages after 1979 owes much to the rapid rise in unemployment, 
its impact may have weakened in the second half of the decade so that the impact of 
a rise in unemployment from two to three millions has less of an effect upon strike 
numbers than an increase from one to two million. This reflects the way 
unemployment is perceived and suggests a possible threshold effect of unemployment 
in relation to stoppage numbers. The fact that many of the stoppages have also been 
short (especially over pay) is partly the result of the fact that many firms, especially 
in manufacturing, experienced tight product markets and in the event of a stoppage 
wished to settle quickly in spite of the slackness evident in labour markets.
The fact that the decline in strike activity has been most marked in the private sector, 
manufacturing and construction particularly is mainly due to their relative exposure 
to competitive pressures and the impact of unemployment. Whilst this has probably 
served to dampen worker expectations it has also exposed the frail nature of much 
workplace union organisation even in places such as Longbridge and Ryton where it 
was perceived as being powerful.
The rise in unemployment and the introduction of new legislation have combined with 
changes in collective bargaining and procedures and new management approaches to 
significantly reduce strike activity in much of the UK in the 1980s and early 1990s. 
In motor vehicles particularly the strike pattern in the decade closely reflects the 
negotiating timetable of the major manufacturers. In addition as Edwards (1991) has
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shown, strike activity in the 1980s has been significantly affected by changes in the 
structure of the economy away from mining and manufacturing where strikes have 
tended to be more plentiful towards the service sector where they have been rare (but 
cf the experience of other countries; see Jackson 1987). This said those remaining 
in manufacturing and construction have clearly been less willing (or able) to have 
recourse to the strike weapon. From accounting for around 940 stoppages a year 
between 1960 and 1968, and 1901 a year between 1969 and 1973 (39.6% and 65% 
of stoppage totals respectively) strikes in manufacturing dropped to 253 per year in 
the period 1985-90, representing under 30% of the total. In metals and engineering 
the average for the latter period is around 45% of the 1969-73 totals, in textiles, 
footwear and other manufacturing around 20%, and construction below 10% of the 
1969-73 levels. These results give added potency to the view that it is in those areas 
most exposed to competitive forces and the recessionary climate of the early and late 
1980s which have seen their strike totals (and particularly pay strikes which are most 
susceptible to changes in unemployment) diminish the most. In addition, for those 
who have remained in work, earnings increases in manufacturing have remained well 
above the rate of inflation which may give a further indication of the reasons for the 
decline in pay stoppages in this period. As we have repeated, where sectors have 
been relatively insulated from the impact of unemployment and/or where workforce 
organisation has remained strong and prepared to confront management (i.e where 
organisation is relatively recent or well entrenched) strike activity remains and in 
many areas has increased.
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THE WITHERING AWAY OF THE STRIKE; 1990’s STYLE?
A further issue is the extent to which the decline in strike activity is likely to be a 
permanent phenomenon or merely a temporary decline in a world of limited 
alternative job opportunities and a dimished ability to mount effective action.
With strike activity in the 1980s having fallen to levels associated more with the early 
post-war period it has become a commonplace in journalistic accounts of this 
phenomenon to cite changing attitudes amongst workers and unions ( e . g  Bassett 
1986,) and to new enlightened management approaches to employee relations 
(Armstrong 1987). Whilst these views may be correct, and we have stressed the 
possible long-term effects of high unemployment on attitudes, there are a number of 
reasons for treating them with care, or at least to locate them within a broader 
context. As we have shown above, one factor in declining strike activity has been 
structural shifts in the economy away from areas of manufacturing where union 
density has traditionally been high (at least amongst manual workers) towards the 
service sector, where apart from the public sector elements and that of financial 
services, union density and collectivist attitudes have been largely absent. There is 
little reason to suppose that such a state of affairs is permanent, workers within the 
service sector have not been averse to joining unions or engaging in strike activity 
(see evidence from Scandinavian countries, Jackson 1987) and the increase in 
competitive pressures that many service sector companies are beginning to experience, 
may as Cronin’s work suggests be likely to provoke managerial responses that make 
the possibility of overt conflict more likely. In addition, productivity in the service 
sector is much lower than in manufacturing (Gershunny and Miles 1980) and the 
scope for savings and efficiency is considerable if competition intensifies.
Second, the decline in strike activity in the 1980s is not a phenomenon unique to the 
UK. Although the decline is more dramatic here, most European countries have 
experienced a decline (ILO statistics 1991), suggesting that an analysis based upon 
nation - specific influences is necessarily inadequate. If attitudes are a key factor the 
evidence on strike patterns implies they are changing across countries at the same 
time, or that more general influences are at work. The increasing levels of
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unemployment, decline in trade union organisation and membership and structural 
shifts in the economy are developments in many countries and it is probable that they 
are exerting the major influence with legislation playing an additional role in the UK 
context.
Third, and to reiterate an earlier comment, the decline in strike activity at the 
aggregate level has a number of distinct components. Most notably, the decline has 
been concentrated particularly on pay stoppages, and has been most marked in 
manufacturing and construction (although in the late 1980s the decline in non-pay 
stoppages has been considerable). Whether this marks a more fundamental change 
in attitudes or a temporary display of compliance with the ’necessity of circumstance’ 
is more difficult to say. Our assumption that instrumental attitudes have become 
more prevalent in the UK within the post-war period suggests falling strike activity 
as a result of a calculative or at best compliant response by workers to rising earnings 
and high unemployment together with limited opportunities for alternative 
employment. Our own industry studies tentatively suggest that where instrumental 
attitudes have been most in evidence strike activity has significantly fallen. In 
coal-mining most evidence points to the continuation of distrust, with high 
productivity and earnings more a response to ‘making hay whilst the sun shines’ than 
to any long term commitment to the industry. Attitudes would appear to differ 
between coalfields and the apparent persistance of Lockwood’s ‘traditional 
proletarian’, at least in parts of the Yorkshire coalfield contrasts with the 
instrumentalism of many Nottingham miners (Waddington et al. 1991) but 
Nottingham miners have been willing to use the strike weapon when they have had 
grievances and perceived injustices. In motor vehicles, the willingness to use the 
strike weapon is still present at certain times as it is in metals but in these sectors the 
ability to use it given the collapse of workplace organisation in some areas is 
considerably diminished. The experience of metals and motor vehicles and the 
’marginalising’ of trade unionism may be more widespread as may the willingness not 
to ’rock the boat’ in an uncertain economic environment. One point of interest is that 
although coal-mining has increasingly dominated stoppage activity in the 1980s as has 
the public sector more generally, most industries still experience some strikes as do
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all regions (Edwards 1992). This may suggest that the combination of shop steward 
organisation and a willingness on the part of workers to resort to strike action has 
remained intact in industries outside of the established areas of manufacturing and the 
public sector and provide a vehicle for transmitting grievances into strike activity.
Although the redundancies of the 1980s and 1990s have significantly altered the age 
profile in many industries and younger workers may be less willing to invoke the 
strike weapon, it is doubtful that workers generally have rejected the use of the strike 
weapon. Indeed the evidence of those sectors relatively insulated from unemployment 
such as the public services sector suggests that the exposure to competition and the 
organisational changes which are associated with it are capable of generating 
grievances which are increasingly channelled into strike activity as Cronin’s work 
suggests (see discussion of the possibility of such a situation arising in services, 
above). Furthermore, in those sectors which have retained some significant 
workplace organisation, redundancies themselves have been a source of considerable 
resistance and strike activity as in coal, metals and shipbuilding in the 1980s.
The role of management in strike activity has been stressed throughout this study. 
The focus of DMR on management initiatives is particularly relevant here, as it 
implies ad hoc, largely reactive responses to circumstances that arise. Given the 
increased attention to HRM, and its purportedly more strategic, pro-active focus it is 
reasonable to ask whether this will make much difference to strike activity. Since 
such initiatives are relatively recent and outside the scope of this study any comments 
are necessarily tentative but much would seem to depend upon external factors, the 
extent to which HRM can develop genuine trust and commitment, the future 
development and concerns of trade unions and the manner in which changes are 
introduced and managed (although the role of new management approaches in 
competitive contexts receives some support from the pooled data analyses). In 
addition, given the pressures on many organisations for short-term results, arising 
from ownership and other structural constraints (Scott 1985) and evidence of the ad 
hoc or pragmatic approach to corporate planning (Connock and Brewster 1990) the 
ability of organisations to develop and implement strategic initiatives in the UK
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context appears to be very limited.
Reflecting upon the changes in strike activity from the vantage point of the early 
1990s suggests the maintenance of current levels of strikes for the forseeable future. 
Whilst unemployment has served to dramatically curtail pay stoppages, the new legal 
framework has had an impact upon both pay and non-pay strikes (see Millward et al. 
1992). In addition the significant decline in non-pay strikes in the late 1980s could 
suggest considerable management success in gaining control of the labour process in 
many workplaces and with weakened local organisation a continuing contest over 
control would be largely absent. It follows that in such circumstances any discontent 
would be more likely to manifest itself in individual responses rather than strikes or 
other forms of collective action.
The increasing impact of macro-economic factors and legislation has had its main 
influence in the private sector where sectors are most ’open’ and the environmental 
pressures most intense. The continuation of these for the foreseeable future suggests 
that strike activity in the public sector is likely to increasingly dominate the statistics. 
A further reason for this is that pressures for greater efficiency through cash limits 
and more commercial objectives remain and sectors of transport and communications, 
notably British Rail, London Regional Transport, and the Post Office all face 
pressures for change in the short-term.
Additionally, the likely continuation of high unemployment (and possibly rising real 
earnings for those in work) and restrictive legislation will further undermine trade 
union organisation and limit the ability to mount effective action outside of parts of 
the public sector. Although collective bargaining changes in these areas may generate 
conflicts, the decentralisation of bargaining more generally will continue to reinforce 
the impact of broader and more local economic changes and ensure that action that 
does arise will be relatively small-scale.
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CONTRASTS WITH OTHER APPROACHES
In the Introduction to this study, we outlined a range of approaches which have 
sought to explain various aspects of strike activity. Our general concern was that 
many, particularly those advocated by some economists and sociologists tended 
towards mono-causal explanations of what are highly complex phenomena. In 
contrast our approach started from the premise that to explain strike activity what was 
required was a framework which recognised this complexity and sought to draw upon 
insights from a range of disciplines. We have attempted to do this by developing a 
framework which permits an explanation of both short-term and longer term 
movements in strike activity and of variations in pay and non-pay stoppages. We 
believe that the results obtained throughout confirm and endorse that approach as well 
as supporting the view that detailed historical studies of particular industrial and 
organisational contexts contributes significantly to the understanding of the factors at 
work in strikes.
Much of the inspiration and focus for this study came from the work of Durcan, 
McCarthy and Redman and the wish to develop a model of strike activity which could 
provide a test of their conclusions and an extension of their study beyond 1973. The 
model developed in the earlier chapters to account for year-on-year variations in 
stoppage numbers provides support for many of their conclusions although the 
stability of the operational form varies significantly across different time periods. The 
variables they identify are generally significant determinants of stoppage numbers 
although the model performs better for pay than for non-pay stoppages and for 
stoppage numbers than for other dimensions of strike activity. The evidence from the 
industry studies confirms the emphasis they place upon the role of attitudes and union 
organisation, and suggests that these have a particularly important role to play in 
diminishing the impact of broader economic factors so that the broader influences 
have their greatest effect where attitudes are most instrumental and union organisation 
most fragile.
Compared with DMR, macro-economic factors, aggregate unemployment, price 
inflation and movements in real earnings have had a much more pervasive influence
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upon strike activity since the early 1970s than in the period of their study. Our 
evidence in testing for the period after 1973 also suggests a greater role for product 
market factors and changes in technology, although their stress on the role of industry 
product and labour markets together with managerial initiatives is supported by the 
results of this study. Where we depart from DMR is in the determinants of longer 
term movements in strike dimensions and specifically the role of government. 
Although the evidence offers considerable support for their interpretation of the 
importance of institutional factors (see below) and government initiatives (as they 
define them), governments have clearly affected strike activity in ways not identified 
by DMR (see discussion below). Additionally, general movements in strike activity 
at the industry level appear to owe much to general phases in industrial development 
and to managerial responses to product market crises, particularly where the latter 
generate dislocations between elements in the industrial circuit of capital most notably 
between product markets and the labour process.
Contrasting our results with those of other approaches, whilst economic factors have 
undoubtably increased in importance throughout the period of study in affecting all 
dimensions of stoppages they have done so within changing political, institutional, 
organisational and socio-cultural contexts, factors which are generally given scant 
consideration in most economists accounts of strike activity. Indeed, although this 
study confirms the role of economic factors in strike activity it supports the criticisms 
of economic approaches. In particular, the failure in theoretical formulations to 
adequately model worker (and employer) attitudes, and empirically, problems with 
the stability of the equations and the weaknesses they encounter when extended into 
the 1970s and 1980s. With their original equations run beyond the late 1960s both 
Pencavel and Shorey’s approaches had a much lower explanatory power and relied 
for that explanatory power on one or two variables included despite their dubious 
theoretical rationale. In the case of Pencavel, the time trend accounted for much of 
the variation in stoppage numbers as it did in his original equation. However, his 
tentative interpretation of the positive coefficient on this variable in terms of the 
growth of shop steward organisation is questionable in light of the experience of the 
1980s in particular. Shorey, like Cronin made use of the lagged dependent variable
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as an explanatory factor and in the 1970s and 1980s it is this factor that accounts for 
most of the equations explanatory power. In the case of both Pencavel and Shorey, 
the two approaches when extended perform superficially well but when examined in 
detail add little to our understanding of the factors causing variations in stoppage 
numbers.
Turning to some of the major sociological studies of strikes, we would concur with 
recent revisionist work on the validity of the Kerr and Siegal thesis (Church, Outram 
and Smith 1991), support for which comes from our own study of Yorkshire 
coal-mining. Yet, whilst the Yorkshire case indicates that some pits remain strike 
prone across generations, the general experience of the coalfield in the 1980s needs 
to set this in the context of particular product market conditions, union organisation 
and a much tougher management approach to industrial relations rather than a reliance 
upon structural factors characteristic of the Kerr and Siegal approach.
The work of Edwards and Scullion and their focus upon the nature of the labour 
process in conditioning the form of conflict in specific organisational contexts also 
merits further attention. Given the industry focus of this work any discussion of their 
study is necessarily qualified but some general points are relevant. First, the 
evidence from the industry studies confirms the relative autonomy of the labour 
process. In coal-mining, shipbuilding, and parts of motor vehicles, trade unions 
were, for much of the period, able to maintain a significant degree of job control and 
to resist attempts at incursion into these by utilising a variety of weapons including 
strikes. Second, in all the industries there were critical periods when the pressure 
from external product market forces provided managements with the opportunity and 
ability to introduce significant changes to labour processes which had important 
consequences for strike activity. This confirms the view that it is more illuminating 
to view the labour process as an element within the full circuit of capital, something 
which a time series analysis permits much more effectively than the largely cross- 
sectional approach adopted by Edwards and Scullion. Third, it is not clear how 
various forms of conflict emerge in the first place in specific organisational contexts. 
In common with Cronin, our evidence suggests, product market competition allied to
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an effective vehicle to translate grievances into action would appear to play a critical 
role. Where these continue strikes may become viewed by both management and 
workers as an accepted and legitimate means of achieving results.
Of particular interest to this study was that of institutionalist approaches, the ‘strong’ 
variants of which find little support from our industry studies. In accounting for the 
differences in response to procedural changes in coal-mining and docks, DMR 
distanced themselves from Clegg and the Donovan Commission’s view of the efficacy 
of procedural reform by arguing that procedural changes per se would have little 
impact upon strike activity unless underlying substantive issues were resolved. The 
evidence from this study generally confirms that of DMR and supports the role 
institutional change plays in affecting the numbers of workers involved and days lost 
in disputes. However, the effectiveness of institutional change in reducing the 
number of disputes is greatly affected by the economic, organisational and industrial 
contexts in which they are introduced. The experience of shipbuilding in the 1960s, 
the 1976 disputes procedure in engineering, and motor vehicles (particularly BL) in 
the late 1970s and 1980s clearly illustrate the importance of broader influences upon 
the efficacy of institutional and procedural change. At BL, the reform of collective 
bargaining needs to be set against the backcloth of the Speke closure, the purge of 
senior stewards and the product and labour market contexts. The 1987 disciplinary 
procedures introduced in coal mining in contrast, met with considerable resistance in 
some areas where they were seen as unfair and open to abuse, reflecting the distrust 
that was the legacy of the 1984/85 strike, and where workers still retained significant 
bargaining power.
The arguments of political approaches, particularly those of Korpi and Shalev are also 
called into question on the basis of the evidence. Although a range of political factors 
are clearly important in short and long term movements in stoppage activity, the lack 
of significant working class representation at the political level would, in their terms 
have served to increase strike activity in the 1980s. The fact that the reverse 
occurred only serves to further emphasise the need to take account of the array of 
factors outside of the political sphere which operate upon strike activity.
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In general, although the work endorses the view that movements in aggregate strike 
totals are crucially affected by the activities of governments, it argues that the impact 
of government is more pervasive and complex than they suggest. In particular there 
is much support in this study for Tolliday’s (1985) view that it is often the unintended 
consequences of government action and particularly those in response to ailing 
economic performance at both national and industry levels which have had a key 
impact on industrial relations, and as a consequence on strike activity. Specific 
examples would be the effects of the post-Geddes reforms in shipbuilding and the 
subsequent nationalisation of that industry and the formation of BLMC in the motor 
industry. More generally, macro-economic policies, particularly fiscal and monetary 
policies have played an important role in creating uncertainty and instability in 
specific organisational and industrial contexts as have the operation of cash limits. 
The latter have been discussed at length above, but the progressive tightening of these 
served in three industries as a critical precursor to major periods of strike activity. 
These points together emphasise the breadth of government influences upon strike 
activity and suggest the need for more detailed case study research into the 
relationship between governments and strikes and how this alters over time as 
contexts change.
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Consideration also needs to be given to the work of Cronin and the ways in which 
our conclusions differ from his. His work is an extremely important and valuable 
contribution to the understanding of strike activity and much of our analysis owes a 
considerable debt to the insights that his work provides. Our concerns about aspects 
of his work have been discussed already but one very serious weakness emerged in 
extending his period of study, and the results from the equations run. One variable 
(the lagged dependent variable) accounted for much of the explanatory power of his 
equations and for the consistently good results for the Durbin-Watson statistics. 
Whilst Cronin offers a rationale for its inclusion (incidentally different from that 
offered by Shorey when using the same variable), theoretically its meaning is at best 
ambiguous and his econometric results must accordingly be treated with caution. In 
addition, the movement of broad economic cycles fails to explain why strike waves 
occur in different industries at different times and why a significant strike wave has 
not emerged in the 1980s. Our analysis endorses the role played by broader 
economic changes, in the world and national contexts but argues that what is more 
important for strike waves is the responses of governments and critically 
managements in specific industrial and organisational contexts to these factors 
particularly where they manifest themselves in contradictions in the industrial circuit 
of capital and an increasing share of value added accounted for by labour.
In addition, Cronin’s model of industrial strike activity appears to apply but with 
important qualifications. In terms of the industries examined here, the critical 
variable of competition operates to increase strike activity initially but as industries 
contract as a result of the effects of greater competition strike activity declines even 
when the effects of employment decline are allowed for (cf coal, but see textiles in 
the post-war period). This raises questions about how workers experience the effects 
of competition, and how this changes over time, but it also focuses attention upon the 
role of management in mediating between those factors and its actions in dealing with 
competition and managing change more generally.
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The role of management is a common omission from much work on strikes. 
Although a role is identified by both DMR and Cronin which is a considerable 
advance on many previous formulations, particularly those of economists, 
management actions and attitudes are left largely undefined. Whilst there are clearly 
problems with the essentially structural formulation of attitudes developed in this 
work we would argue that in spite of its deficiencies it is an advance over ‘managerial 
blindness’ in accounts of strike activity, and that the model from which it, and worker 
attitudes is developed performs well over a 40 year period.
In one sense it is an obvious truism that management action is a critical factor in 
strike activity, which makes the lack of attention paid to it even more surprising, but 
this study has permitted the nature of that action in particular contexts to be explored 
more fully. One important result has been the consequences for strike activity of the 
ways in which managements have responded to perceived crises at specific points in 
time. Coal provides an interesting contrast between the managed decline in the 
1960s, where NCB and NUM liaison proved crucial in effecting a relatively peaceful 
contraction, and the highly conflictual period of the 1980s, characterised by a more 
aggressive management style and predominantly low trust relationships between the 
Board and the NUM. Similar effects of the gradual dismantling of higher trust ‘neo- 
corporatist’ frameworks can be seen in steel and to a lesser extent in shipbuilding. 
More generally, managerial acquiescence in strikes emerged as a key factor in strike 
levels in shipbuilding, where the desire to maintain the main features of craft 
production appeared to dominate concerns about the costs of strikes, the latter seen 
as an accepted consequence of this concern, at least until the pressures of competition 
forced managements to change.
429
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Aaronovitch, S., Sawyer, M. (1975). Big Business: Theoretical and Empirical 
Aspects o f Concentration and Mergers in the U.K. London: Macmillan.
Abrams, M. (1975). ‘Subjective Social Indicators’. Social Trends.
Abromeit, H. (1986). British Steel: An industry between the State and private sector. 
Leamington Spa: Berg.
Ackrill, M. (1987). Manufacturing Industry Since 1870. London: Philip Allan.
Adeney, M., Lloyd, J. (1986). The Miners Strike 1984-5, Loss Without Limit. 
London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.
Alexander, K. J. W., Jenkins, C. L. (1970). Fairfields: A study of industrial 
change. Harmondsworth: Penguin.
Allen, V. L. (1971). The Sociology of Industrial relations. Harlow: Longman.
- (1981). The Militancy of British Miners. Shipley: Moor Press.
Armstrong, A. G. (1967). ‘The Motor Industry and the British Economy’. District 
Bank Review (163). 19-40.
- and Silberston, A. (1965). ‘Size of P lant, Size of Enterprise and 
Concentration in British Manufacturing Industry’. Journal o f the 
Royal Statistical Society, Series A, 128.
Armstrong, P., Goodman, J ., Hyman, J. (1981). Ideology and Shop Floor 
Industrial Relations. London: Croom Helm.
Ashenfelter, O. C. and Johnson, G. E. (1969). ’Bargaining Theory, Trade Unions 
and Industrial Strike Activity’. American Economic Review, 59: 1. 35-49
Ashworth, W. (1986). The History o f the British Coal Industry, Vol. 5, 1946-1982, 
The Nationalised Industry. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Atkinson, J. (1984), ’Manpower strategies for flexible organisations’. Personnel 
Management, August.
- and Meager, N. (1986), ’Is flexibility a flash in the pan?’, Personnel 
Management, September.
Bain, J. S. (1956). Barriers to New Competition. Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press.
430
Bain, G. S., Elsheikh, F. (1976). Union Growth and the Business Cycle: An 
Econometric Analysis. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
Bain, G. S., Price, R. (1980). Profiles of Union Growth. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
Baldamus, W. (1961). Efficiency and Effort. London: Tavistock.
Bamber, G. (1986). Militant Managers: Managerial Unionism and Industrial 
Relations. Aldershot: Gower Press.
Barnett, C. (1986). The Audit of War: The illusion and reality of Britain as a Great 
Nation. London: MacMillan.
Bassett, P. (1986). Strike Free: New Industrial Relations in Britain, London: 
Macmillan.
Batstone, E. (1984). Working Order. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
- (1988a). The Reform of Workplace Industrial Relations. Theory, myth and 
evidence. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- (1988b). ‘The Frontier of Control’, in Gallie, D. (ed.), Employment in 
Britain. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
Batstone, E., Boraston, I. and Frenkel, S. (1978). The Social Organisation of 
Strikes. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
- (1977). Shop Stewards in Action. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
Batstone, E. and Gourlay, S. (1986). Unions, Unemployment and Innovation. 
Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
Bean, R ., and Peel, D. A. (1974). ’A quantitative ananlysis of wages strikes in four 
industries, 1962-70. Journal of Economic Studies.
Beaumont, P. B. (1987). The Decline o f Trade Union Organisation. London: 
Croom Helm.
Beer, S. (1982), Britain Against Itself, New York: W. W. Norton.
Behrend, H. (1957), ’The effort bargain’, Industrial and Labor Relations Review, 10.
Bell, D. (1961). The End of Ideology. New York: Collier-Macmillan.
Bern, D. J. (1970). Beliefs, Attitudes and Human Affairs. Belmont,
California: Brooks/Cole.
431
Bendix, R. (1956). Work and Authority in Industry. New York: Harper and Row.
Berry, A. J ., Capps, T., Cooper, D. J ., Hopper, T. M., Lowe, E. A., (1985).
‘NCB Accounts, a Mine of Mis-Information’. Accountancy Today.
Beswick (1985). Steel Closure Review: Interim report by Lord Beswick, London: 
HMSO.
Beynon, H. (1973). Working For Ford. Harmondsworth: Penguin.
- and Blackburn, R. M. (1972). Perceptions of Work, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press.
Bhaskar, K. (1979). The Future of the U.K Car Industry. London: Kogan Page.
Blackburn, R. and Mann, M. (1979). The Working Class in the Labour Market. 
London: Macmillan.
Blanchflower, D., Cubbin, J. (1986). ‘Stike Propensities at the British
Workplace’. Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics, 48(1). 19-40.
Blauner, R. (1964). Alienation and Freedom. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Blyton, P. (1991). ‘Steel, a Classic Case of Industrial Relations Change in 
Britain’. Journal o f Management Studies. Vol. 29, No. 5. 635-650.
Boll, F. (1989). ‘Changing Forms of Labour Conflict: Secular Development or Strike 
Waves’, in L. H. Haimson and C. Tilly (eds.). Strikes, Wars and 
Revolutions: An International Perspective. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press.
Booth, A. and Cressy, R. (1990). ‘Strikes with asymmetric information: theory and 
evidence’. Oxford Bulletin o f Economics and Statistics, 52: 269-92.
Booz-Allen (1973). British Shipbuilding 1972: A report to the Department o f Trade 
and Industry by Booz-Allen and Hamilton International B. V. London: 
HMSO.
Boraston, I, Clegg, H. A., Rimmer, M. (1975). Workplace and Union, London: 
Heinemann.
Bowen, P. (1976). Social Control in Industrial Organisations: Industrial relations and 
industrial sociology, a strategic and occupational study of British steel 
making. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.
Braverman, H. (1974). Labour and Monopoly Capital: The Degradation o f Work in 
the Twentieth Century. New York: Monthly Review Press.
432
British Coal (1987-1992). Monthly Returns (Selected Issues). London: British 
Coal.
- Annual Reports (1987-1991). London: British Coal.
British Shipbuilders (1980-1987). Employment News (Selected Issues). London: 
British Shipbuilders.
- Annual Reports (1978-1986). London: British Shipbuilders.
British Steel Corporation (1980). The Return to Financial Viability: A business 
proposal for 1980-81. London: BSC.
- Annual Reports (1970/71 - 1985/86). London: BSC.
Brown, R. K., Brannen, P. (1970). ‘Social relations and social perspectives amongst 
shipbuilding workers - a preliminary statement: part two: Shipbuilding ‘a craft 
industry’. Sociology, Vol. 4.
- and Cousins, J. M., Samphier, M. L. (1972). ‘The contours of solidarity: 
Social stratification and industrial relations in shipbuilding’. British Journal 
of Industrial Relations, Vol. 10.
- (1973). Leisure in Work: The ‘occupational culture’ of shipbuilding workers 
in M. A. Smith, S. Parker, C. S. Smith, (eds). Leisure and Society in 
Britain. London.
Brown, W. A. (1973). Piecework Bargaining. London: Heinemann.
(ed.) (1981). The Changing Contours of British Industrial Relations. Oxford: 
Basil Blackwell.
- and Sisson, K. (1975). ‘The Use of Comparisons in Workplace Wage 
Determination’. British Journal of Industrial Relations, Vol. 13, 23-51.
- and Nolan, P. (1988). ‘Wages and Labour Productivity: the Contribution 
of Industrial Relations Research to the Understanding of Pay Determination’. 
British Journal o f Industrial relations, Vol. 26. 339-62.
- and Wadhwani, S. (1990). ‘The economic effects of industrial relations 
legislation since 1979’. Discussion Paper no. 376, Centre for Labour 
Economics, London School of Economics.
Bryer, R. A., Brignall, T. J ., Maunders, A. R., (1982). Accounting for British 
Steel. Aldershot: Gower Press.
Burawoy, M. (1979). Manufacturing Consent. London: Verso.
433
- (1985). The Politics of Production: Factory Regimes under Capitalism 
and Socialism. London: Verso.
Burns, A., Newby, M. and Winterton, J . (1985). ‘The restractuing of the British 
coal industry’. Cambridge Journal of Economics, Vol 9, No. 1.
Burns, T. and Stalker, G. (1961), The Management of Innovation, London 
Tavistock.
Bulmer, M. (ed.) (1975). Working Class Images o f Society. London: Routledge and 
Kegan Paul.
Cameron, G. C. (1964). ‘Post-War Strikes in the North-East Shipbuilding and Ship- 
repairing Industry 1946-61. British Journal o f Industrial relations, Vol. 2, 
No. 1.
Campbell, A., W arner, M. (1985). ‘Leadership in the miners union: Arthur 
Scargill’s rise to power’. Journal o f General Management. Vol 10, No. 3.
Central Policy Review Staff. (1975). The Future of the British Car Industry. 
London: HMSO.
Child, J. (1972). ‘Organisation Structure, Environment and Performance. Society, 
6 .
- (1984). Organization: A Guide to Problems and Practice. 2nd edition. 
London: Harper and Row.
- and Partridge, B. (1982). Lost Managers: Supervisors in Industry and 
Society. Cambridge: Cambridge University press.
Chinoy, E. (1955). Automobile Workers and the American dream. New York 
Doubleday.
Church, R., Outram, Q. and Smith, D. N. (1990). ‘The ‘isolated mass? revisited: 
strikes in British coal mining’. Sociological Review, 39: 55-87
Clack, G. (1967). Industrial Relations in a British Car Factory. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press.
Clegg, H. A. (1976). Trade Unionism under Collective Bargaining: A Theory based 
on Six Countries. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
- (1979). The Changing System o f Industrial Relations in Great Britain. 
Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
- and Adams, R. (1957). The Employers' Challenge. Oxford: Basil
434
Blackwell.
Coates, D. (1989). The Crisis of Labour: Industrial Relations and the State in 
Modem Britain. Oxford: Philip Allan.
Cockerill, A. (1974). The Steel Industry - international comparisons o f industrial 
stmcture and performance. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- (1979). The UK Steel Industry. Salford: University of Salford.
- (1980). ‘Steel’, in P. S. Johnson (ed.), The Stmcture o f the British 
Economy. St. Albans: Granada.
- arid Silberston, A. (1974). The Steel industry, International Comparison of 
Industrial Stmcture and Performance. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press.
Commission on Industrial Relations (1971): Report: Shipbuilding and Repairing. 
Cmnd 4756. London: HMSO.
Conservative Party. (1968). Fair Deal at Work: The Conservative Approach to 
Modem Industrial Relations. London: Conservative Political Centre.
Cowling, K. (1982). Monopoly Capitalism. London: MacMillan.
Cronin, J. E. (1979). Industrial Conflict in Modem Britain. London: Croom Helm.
- (1984). Labour and Society in Britain 1918-1979, Batsford.
- (1989). ‘Strikes and Power in Britain: 1870-1920’, in L. H. Haimson and
C. Tilly (eds.). Strikes, Wars and Revolutions: an international perspective. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Crouch, C. (1977). Class Conflict and the Industrial relations Crisis. London: 
Heinemann.
- (1979). ‘The State Capital and Liberal Democracy, in C. Crouch (ed.), 
State and Economy in Contemporary Capitalism. London: Croom Helm.
- (1982). Trade Unions: The Logic of Collective Action. London: Fontana.
- and Pizzorno, A. (1978). The Resurgence of Class Conflict in Western 
Europe: 2 Volumes. London: Macmillan.
Dahrendorf, R. (1959). Class and Class Conflict in an Industrial Society.
London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.
435
Daniel, W. W. (1969). ’Industrial behaviour and orientation to work’, Journal of 
Management Studies, 6.
- (1975). The P.E.P Survey on Inflation. XLI, Broadsheet No. 553.
- (1987). Workplace Industrial Relations and Technical Change. London: 
Gower.
- and Millward, N. (1983). Workplace Industrial Relations in Britain. 
London: Heinemann.
Davies, R. J . (1979). ’Economic activity, incomes policy and strikes: A quantitative 
analysis. British Journal of Industrial Relations, 17, 2. pp 205-23.
Dennis, N., Henriques, F., Slaughter, C. (1956). Coal is our Life. London: Eyre 
and Spottiswood.
Department of Employment (1983). Democracy in Trade Unions. Cmnd 8778. 
London: HMSO.
Docherty, C. (1983). Steel and Steelworkers: The Sons of Vulcan. London: 
Heinemann.
Donovan, Lord (Chairman) (1968). Report of the Royal Commission on Trade
Unions and Employer's Associations 1965-68. London: HMSO (Cmnd 3623).
Dubin, R. (1956). ‘Industrial Workers Worlds: A Study of the ‘Central Life Interest’ 
of Industrial Workers’. Social Problems, 3. 131-42.
Dunleavy, P. and O’leary, B., (1987), Theories o f the State, London: Macmillan.
Dunlop, J. T. (1955). Industrial Relations Systems. New York: Holt
Dunn, S. (1987). ‘Zeitlinism’, Review Article of S. Tolliday and J. Zeitlin (eds.), 
Shopfloor Bargaining and the State. British Journal of Industrial Relations.
Dunnett, P. J. (1979). The Decline of the British Motor Industry. London: Croom 
Helm.
Durcan, J. and McCarthy, W. E. J. (1974). ’The state subsidy theory of strikes: 
an examination of statistical data for the period 1956-70’. British Journal o f 
Industrial Relations, 12: 1.
Durcan, J. W, McCarthy, W. E. J, Redman, G. P. (1983). Strikes in Post-War 
Britain. London: George Allen and Unwin.
Edwardes, M. (1983). Back from the Brink. London. Pan
436
Edwards, C., Heery, E. (1986), ’The incorporation of workplace trade unionism?’, 
Sociology 19: 3.
- (1989). Management Control and Union Power, a study o f labour relations 
in coal mining. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Edwards, P. K. (1977), ’A Critique of the Kerr-Siegel Hypothesis of Strikes and the 
Isolated Mass: A Study in the Falsification of Sociological Knowledge’, 
Sociological Review, XXV.
- (1978). ‘Time Series Regression Models of Strike Activity:
A Reconsideration with American Data’. British Journal o f Industrial 
Relations, Vol. 16, 320-334.
- (1980). ’ Size of plant and strike-proneness’. Oxford Bulletin o f Economics 
and Statistics, 42.
- (1982). ’Britain’s changing strike problem’. Industrial Relations Journal, 
13.
- (1983). ’The pattern of collective industrial action’. In G. S. Bain (ed.). 
Industrial Relations in Britain. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
- (1986). Conflict at Work. Oxford: Basil Blackwell
- (1987). ‘Does PBR Cause Strikes?’ Industrial Relations Journal, 18, 210-17
- (1992). ’Industrial conflict: Themes and issues in recent research’. British 
Journal of Industrial Relations, 30.
- and Scullion, H. (1982). The Social Organisation of Industrial Conflict. 
Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
- and Terry, M. (1988). Conclusions: Another Way Forward, in M. Terry 
and P. K. Edwards (eds). Shopfloor Politics and Job Controls: The post-war 
engineering industry. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
Eldridge, J. E. T. (1968). Industrial Disputes: Essays in the Sociology o f Industrial 
Relations. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.
Evans,E. W., Creigh, S. W.,(eds) (1977). Industrial Conflict in Britain. London: 
Cass.
Evans, S. (1987). ‘The use of injunctions in industrial disputes, May 1984-April 
1987’. British Journal of Industrial Relations, 25: 419-35
Ferner, A. (1988). Governments, Managers and Industrial Relations: Public
437
Enterprises and their Political Environments. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
Fevre, R. (1989). Wales is Closed: The quiet privatisation o f British Steel. 
Nottingham: Spokesman.
Fidler, J. (1981). The British Business Elite: It's Attitudes to Class, Status and 
Power. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.
Fine, B. (1990). The Coal Question. Political Economy and Industrial Change from 
the Nineteenth Century to the Present Day. London: Routledge and Kegan 
Paul.
Fogarty, M., Brooks, D. (1986). ‘Trade Unions and British Industrial Development’. 
PSI Research Report No. 658. London: Policy Studies Institute.
Foster, J, Woolfson, C. (1989). ‘Corporate Reconstruction and Business Unions: 
The Lessons of Caterpillar and Ford’. New Left Review 174. 51-66.
Fox, A. (1966). ‘Industrial Sociology and Industrial Relations’. Research Papers 3, 
Royal Commission on Trade Unions and Employers Associations. London: 
HMSO.
- (1973). ‘Industrial Relations: A Social Critique of Pluralist Ideology’. In J. 
Child (ed.). Man and Organisation. London: George Allen and Unwin.
- (1974). Beyond Contract: Work, Power and Trust Relations. London: 
Faber.
-and Flanders, A. (1969). ‘The reform of collective bargaining: from 
Donovan to Durkhein’. British Journal o f Industrial Relations, Vol 7, No. 2. 
151-80.
Freeman, R. B., Medoff, J. L. (1984). What Do Unions Do? New York: Basic 
Books.
Friedman, A. L. (1977). Industry and Labour: Class Struggle at Work and 
Monopoly Capitalism. London: Macmillan.
Friedman, H., Meredeen, S. (1980). The Dynamics of Industrial Conflict. London: 
Croom Helm.
Gallie, D. (1978). In Search o f the New Working Class: Automation and Social 
Integration in the Capitalist Enterprise. Cambridge University Press.
- (1983). Social Inequality and Class Radicalism in France and Britain 
Cambridge; Cambridge University Press.
438
Gamble, A. (1988). The Free Economy and the Strong State: The Politics o f 
Thatcherism. London: Macmillan.
Geddes Report. (1966). Shipbuilding Inquiry Committee 1965-1966. Cmnd 2937. 
London. HMSO.
Gennard, J. (1982). ’The financial costs and returns of strikes’. British Journal of 
Industrial Relations, 20:2.
Glyn, A. (1985). The Economic Case Against Pit Closures. Sheffield: NUM.
- and Sutcliffe, B. (1972). British Capitalism, Workers and the Profits 
Squeeze. Harmondsworth: Penguin.
Goldthorpe, J. H. (1977). ‘Industrial Relations in Great Britain: a Critique
of Reformism’, in T. Clarke and L. Clements (eds.), Trade Unions Under 
Capitalism. London: Fontana.
- (1978). ‘The Current Inflation: Towards a Sociological Account’, in
F. Hirsch and J. Goldthorpe (eds.). The Political Economy and Inflation. 
London: Martin Robertson.
- Lockwood, D., Bechofer, F. and Platt, J ., (1968). The Affluent Worker: 
Industrial Attitudes. London: Cambridge University Press.
Goodman, G. (1985). The Miners Strike. London: Pluto.
Gordon, D., Edwards, R. and Reich, M. (1982). Segmented Work, Divided
Workers: the Historical Transformation of Labor in the United States 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Gormley, J. (1982). Battered Cherub. London: Hamish Hamilton.
Gouldner, A. W. (1955). Wildcat Strike: A Study in Worker-Management 
Relations. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.
Government Social Survey. (1968). Workplace Industrial relations. London: HMSO
Grunberg, L. (1986). ‘Workplace Relations in the Economic Crisis: a comparison 
of a British and a French Automobile Plant’. Sociology, Vol. 20, 503-30.
Habermas, J . (1976). Legitimation Crisis. Trans. T. McCarthy. London: 
Heinemann.
439
Hakim, C. (1990). ‘Core and Periphery in Employers Workforce Strategies:
Evidence from the 1987 ELUS Survey’. Work, Employment and Society, 
Vol. 4, No. 2.
Handy, C. (1984). The Future of Work. London: Penguin.
Handy, L. J. (1981). Wages Policy in the British Coalmining Industry: A study of 
national wage bargaining. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Hannah, L., Kay, J. (1977). Concentration in Modem Industry. London: 
MacMillan.
Harbison, F. H. (1954). ‘Collective Bargaining and American Capitalism’, in 
A. Kornhauser, R. Dubin, A. M. Ross (eds.) Industrial Conflict.
New York: McGraw-Hill.
Harrop, M. (1979). ‘Democracy and Inequality: Mass Conceptions of Stratification 
in Britain’, Ph.D thesis, Yale University.
Hart, P. E., Clarke, R. (1980). Concentration in British Industry 1935-75: A study 
of the growth, causes and effects of concentration in British manufacturing 
industries. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Hartley, J ., Kelly, J. and Nicholson, N. (1983). Steel Strike: A Case Study in 
Industrial Relations. London: Batsford.
Hawkins, K. (1973). Theory o f the Firm. London: Macmillan.
Heal, D. W. (1984). The Steel Industry in Post-War Britain. Newton Abbot.
Hepworth, R., Kelly, A., Slokoe, A., Williams, S., Weaver, J ., Welsh, M., 
McCormick, B. J. (1969). ‘The Effects of Technological Change in the 
Yorkshire Coalfield 1960-1965’, in M. Kelly and D. J. Forsyth (eds.) 
Studies in the Coal Industry. London: Pergamon.
Hibbs, D. A. (1978). ’On the political economy of long-run trends in strike activity’. 
British Journal of Political Science, Vol 8: 2. 153-75.
Hicks, J. R. (1963). The Theory of Wages. 2nd edition. New York: MacMillan.
Hill, C. W. L. and Pickering, J. F. (1986). ’Divisionalisation, decentralisation and 
performance of large United kingdom companies’. Journal o f Management 
Studies, 23: 1
Hill, S. (1974). ‘Norms, Groups and Power: The Sociology of Workplace Industrial 
Relations. British Journal o f Industrial Relations. Vol. 12, No. 2. 213-35.
440
- (1976). The Dockers: Class and Tradition in London. London: Heinemann
- (1981). Competition and Control at Work. London: Heinemann.
Hill-Samuel Report. (1972). Shipbuilding on the Upper Clyde. Cmnd 4918. London: 
HMSO.
Hillebrandt, P. M., (1984). Analysis o f the British Construction Industry.
London: Macmillan.
Hirsch, J. and Addison, J. T. (1985). The Economic Analysis o f Unions: New 
approaches and evidence. London: Allen and Unwin.
Hobsbawm, E. J. (1964). Labouring Men: Studies in the History of Labour. 
London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson.
Hogwood, B. W. (1979). Government and Shipbuilding: The politics o f industrial 
change. Northampton: Saxon House.
Hougham, J. (1992). ‘Law and the Working Environment: The Ford Experience’, 
in W. E. J. McCarthy (ed.). Legal Intervention in Industrial Relations:
An Assessment o f Losses and Gains. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
Hughes, J ., Moore, R. (eds) (1972). A Special Case? Harmondsworth: Penguin.
Hunter, L. C. (1973). ‘The Economic Determinants of Strike Activity: A
Reconsideration’. University of Glasgow Discussion Papers in Economics 
No. 1. Glasgow: University of Glasgow, Department of Economics.
Huxley, J. (1983). ‘Scraping the Bottom’. Sunday Times, 13/3/83.
Hyman, R. (1972). Strikes. London: Fontana-Collins
- (1975). Industrial Relations: A Marxist Introduction. London: Macmillan.
- (1979), ’The politics of workplace trade unionism: recent tendencies and 
some problems for theory’, Capital and Class, 8.
- (1983), ’Trade unions, structure, policies and politics’, in G.S. Bain (ed), 
Industrial Relations in Britain, Oxford; Basil Blackwell.
- and Eiger, T. (1981). ‘Job Controls, the Employers’ Offensive and 
Alternative Strategies’. Capital and Class, 15, 115-49.
-(1984). Strikes (3rd Edition). London: Fontana.
Independent. (1992). ‘30000 jobs to go in coal’. Independent. 30/8/92.
441
Industrial Relations Review and Report (1992). ‘Lean Production and Rover’s new 
Deal’. 514, 12-15.
Ingham, G. K. (1974). Strikes and Industrial Conflict. London: Macmillan.
Ingram, P., Metcalf, D. and Wadsworth, J. (1991). ‘Strike incidence and duration 
in British manufacturing industry in the 1980s’. Working Paper no. 88, 
Centre for Economic Performance, London School of Economics.
Inns of Court Conservative and Unionist Society (1958). A Giant’s Strength: 
Some Thoughts on the Constitutional and Legal Position o f Trade Unions 
in England. The Society, Johnson. 315.
Iron and Steel Trades Confederation (1980). New Deal for Steel. London: ISTC.
Jackson, M. P. (1974). The Price o f Coal. London: Croom Helm
- (1987). Strikes: Industrial conflict in Britain, U.S.A. and Australia. 
Brighton: Wheatsheaf.
Jeffries, S. (1988). The Changing Face of Conflict: Shopfloor Organisation at 
Longbridge, 1939-1980, in M. Terry and P. K. Edwards (eds). Shopfloor 
Politics and Job Controls: The post-war engineering industry. Oxford: Basil 
Blackwell.
Jessop, B. (1980), ’The transformation of the state in post-war Britain, in R. Scase 
(ed.), The State in Western Europe, London: Croom Helm.
- (1982). The Capitalist State. Oxford: Martin Robertson.
Jowell, R., Witherspoon, S., Brook, L. (1987). British Social Attitudes: The 1987 
Report. London: Gower/SCPR.
Kaufman, B. E. (1981). ‘Bargaining theory, inflation and cyclical strike activity in 
manufacturing. Industrial and Labor Relations Review, 34(3).
Kelly, J. (1984). ‘Management Strategy and the Reform of Collective Bargaining: 
Cases from the British Steel Corporation’. British Journal o f Industrial 
Relations. Vol. 22. No. 2.
- (1988). ‘Labour Utlisation and Industrial Relations at Scott-Lithgow 
1967-87. Industrial Relations Journal. Vol. 19, No. 4.
Kelly, J . E. (1982). Scientific Management, Job Design and Work Performance. New 
York: Academic Press.
- (1985). ’Management’s re-design of work’: labour process, labour markets
442
and product markets. In D. Knights, H. Wilmott, D. Collinson, Job
Design: Critical Perspectivs on the Labour Process. London: Gower Press.
- (1987). ‘Trade Unions Through Recession - Symposium: British Workplace 
Industrial Relations 1980-84. British Journal o f Industrial Relations.
Vol. 25. No. 2. 275-282.
- (1988). Trade Unions and Socialist Politics. London: Verso.
- and Nicholson, N. (1980). ’The causation of strikes: a review of theoretical 
approaches and the potential contribution of social psychology’. Human 
Relations, 33.
Kelly, M., Forsyth, D. J. (eds.) (1969). Studies in the Coal Industry. London: 
Pergamon.
Kennan, J. (1986). ‘The Economics of Strikes’, in O. Ashenfelter, and R. Layard 
(eds). Handbook of Labour Economics, Vol. 2. Amsterdam: North-Holland.
Kerr, C. and Siegel, A., (1954). ’The inter-industry propensity to strike’, in A. 
Kornhauser, R. Dubin and A. Ross (eds). Industrial Conflict. New York: 
McGraw-Hill.
Kerr, C, Dunlop, J . T., Harbison, F. H., Myers, C. A. (1973). Industrialism and 
Industrial Man. Harmondsworth: Penguin.
Kiesler, C. A. (1969). ‘Group Pressure and Conformity’, in J. Mills (ed.).
Experimental Social Psychology. New York: Macmillan.
Knight, K. G. (1972). ’Strikes and wage inflation in British manufacturing industry 
1950-68’. Bulletin of the Oxford Institute of Economics and Statistics. Vol 34, 
No. 3. 281-94.
Knowles, K. G. J. C. (1952). Strikes - A Study in Industrial Conflict: With Special 
Reference to the British Experience d  11-47. Oxford: Basil Blackwell
Kochan, T., Katz, H. and McKersie, R. (1986). The Transformation o f American 
Industrial Relations. New York: Basic Books.
Korpi, W. and Shalev, M., (1979). ’Strikes, industrial relations and class conflicts 
in capitalist societies’. British Journal o f Sociology. Vol 30, No. 2. 164-87.
Koutsoyiannis, A. (1979). Theory of Econometrics. London: Macmillan.
Kuhn, J. W., (1961). Bargaining in Grievance Settlement: The Power o f Industrial 
Work Groups, Columbia University Press.
443
Lane, A. and Roberts, K. (1971). Strike at Pilkingtons. London: Fontana.
Lash, S., Urry, J  (1987). The End of Organised Capitalism. Cambridge: Polity.
Leadbetter, C. (1987). ‘In the Land of the Disposessed’. Marxism Today. 31/4.
Leman, S., Winterton, J. (1991). ‘New Technology and the Restructuring of Pit 
Level Industrial Relations in the British Coal Industry’. New Technology, 
Work and Employment, Vol.6, No. 1. 54-64.
Lewis, R. (1986). ‘The Role of the Law in Employment Relations’, in 
R. Lewis (ed.). Labour Law in Britain. Oxford: Basil Balckwell.
Lewchuk, W. (1986). ‘The Motor Vehicle Industry’. In B. Elbaum and W. 
Lazonick (eds), Th Decline o f the British Economy. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Liebenstein, H. (1966) ‘Allocative efficiency vs X-efficiency’, American Economic 
Review, Vol. 56.
Littler, C. R. (1982). The Development of the Labour Process in Capitalist Societies. 
London: Heinemann.
Lockwood, D. (1966). ’Sources of variation in working class images of society’ in 
M. Bulmer (ed) (1975), Working Class Images o f Society’, London: 
Routledge and Kegan Paul.
Lorenz, E. H. (1991). Economic Decline in Britain: The shipbuilding industry 1890- 
1970. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Lowry, P. (1990??). Employment Disputes and the Third Party??
Lupton, T. (1963). On the Shop-Floor. Oxford: Pergamon.
MacGregor, I. (1986). The Enemies Within: The story of the miners strike 1984-5. 
London: Collins.
McCarthy, W. E. J. (1970). ’The nature of Britain’s strike problem’. British 
Journal o f Industrial Relations, 8.
- (1966). The Role of Shop Stewards in British Industrial Relations, Research 
Paper No. 1 to the Royal Commission on Trade Unions and Employers 
Associations, HMSO.
- (ed.) (1992). Legal Intervention in Industrial Relations: An Assessment of 
Losses and Gains. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
- and Parker, S. (1968), Shop Stewards and Workshop Relations, HMSO,
444
Donovan Commission Research Paper 10.
- Ellis, N. D. (1973). Management by Agreement: An Alternative to the 
Industrial Relations Act. London: Hutchinson.
McCormick, B. J. (1969). ‘Strikes in the Yorkshire Coal Industry’, inM . Kelly and
D. J . Forsyth. Studies in the Coal Industry. London: Pergamon.
- (1979). Industrial Relations in the Coal Industry. London: MacMillan.
McGoldrick, J. (1983). ‘Industrial relations and the division of labour in the 
shipbuilding industry since the war’. British Journal o f Industrial Relations, 
Vol. 21, No. 2.
Mann, M (1973). Consciousness and Action Among the Western Working Class. 
London: Macmillan.
Marginson, P., Edwards, P. K., Martin, R., Purcell, J ., Sisson, K. (1988).
Beyond The Workplace: Managing Industrial Relations in the Multi- 
Establishment Enterprise. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
Marglin, S. (1976), ’What do bosses do?’, the origins and function of hierarchy in 
capitalist production, in A. Gorz, The Division o f Labour: The Labour 
Process and Class Struggle in Modem Capitalism, Brighton: Harvester.
Marsden, D. (1983). ‘Wage Structure’, in G. S. Bain (ed.). Industrial Relations in 
Britain. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
Marsden, D., Morris, T., Willman, P., Wood, S. (1985). The Car Industry: 
Labour Relations and Industrial Adjustment. London: Tavistock.
Marsh, A. I., and Coker, E. E. (1963), ’Shop steward organisation in the 
engineering industry’. British Journal o f Industrial Relations 1: 2.
Mauro, M. J. (1982). ’Strikes as a result of imperfect information’. Industrial and 
Labor Relations Review. Vol. 34, No. 4. 522-38.
Mayhew, K. (1979). ’Economists and strikes’. Oxford Bulletin o f Economics and 
Statistics, Vol. 41, No. 1.
Meknan, S. (1958). Decision-Making and Productivity. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
Metcalf, D., Wadsworth, J ., Ingram, P. (1993). ‘Do Strikes Pay’? in D. Metcalf 
and S. Milner (eds.). New Perspectives in Industrial Disputes. London: 
Routledge.
445
Middlemass, K. (1979). Politics in Industrial Society: The Experience o f the British 
System since 1911. London: Andre Deutsch.
Miliband, R. (1985). ‘The New Revisionism in Britain’. New Left Review. 150. 5- 
26.
Mill ward, N. and Stevens, M. (1986). British Workplace Relations 1980-1984. 
Aldershot: Gower Press.
- and Smart, D., Hawes, W. R. (1992). Workplace Industrial Relations in 
Transition. The ED/ESRC/PSI/ACAS Surveys. Aldershot: Dartmouth.
Milner, S., Metcalf, D. (1991). ‘A century of UK strike activity, an alternative
perspective: Discussion Paper no. 22. Centre for Economic Performance, 
London School of Economics.
Monopolies and Mergers Commission (1983). National Coal Board: A report on the 
efficiency and costs in the development, production and supply o f coal by the 
NCB. Cmnd 8920, London: HMSO.
- (1988). British Steel Corporation. A Report on the Efficiency and Costs 
in Discharging its Functions o f the British Steel Corporation. Cm 437. 
London: HMSO.
- (1989). British Coal Corporation: A Report on the Investment Programme. 
Cm 550. London: HMSO.
Moore, W. J ., Pearce, D. K. (1982). ‘A comparative analysis of strike models
during periods of rapid inflation, 1967-77’. Journal of Labor Research, 3 (1).
Morgan, K. (1983). ‘Restructuring Steel: The crises of labour and locality in 
Britain’. International Journal of Urban and Regional research. Vol 7, No. 
2 .
National Union of Mineworkers (1983). ‘Study of the Incentive Scheme’. 
Industrial Relations Department Mimeo. Sheffield: NUM.
- (1989). ‘The Attack on Union Organisation in the Deep-Mined Coal 
Industry’. Industrial Relations Department Mimeo. Sheffield: NUM.
- (1992). ‘Fragmentation and Flexibility in the Deep Coal-Mining 
Industry: A Study of the Struggle for Control of the Labour Process 
Since 1984/85. Industrial Relations Department Mimeo. Sheffield: NUM.
Neale, A., Haslam, C. (1989). Economics in a Business Context. London:
Van Nostrand Reinhold International.
446
Neumann, G. R. and Reder, M. W. (1984). ’Output and strike activity in US
manufacturing: How large are the losses? Industrial and Labor Relations 
Review, 37: 2.
Nichols, T. (1969), Ownership, Control and Ideology, London: Allen and Unwin.
- (1986). The British Worker Question. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.
- and Beynon, H. (1977). Living with capitalism: Class relations in a 
Modem Factory. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.
Nickell, S., Metcalf, D. (1978). ‘Monopolistic industries and monopoly profits’. 
Economic Journal, Vol. 88, pp 254-68.
Oliver, N., Wilkinson, B. (1988). The Japanisation of British Industry. Oxford: 
Basil Blackwell.
Pahl, R. E, Winkler, J. T. (1974). ‘The Economic Elite: Theory and Practice’, 
in P. Stanworth and A. Giddens (eds.), Elites and Power in British 
Society. London.
Panitch, L. (1976). Social Democracy and Industrial Militancy. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press.
Parker, P. A. L., Hawes, W. R., Lumb, A. L. (1971). The Reform o f Collective 
Bargaining at Plant and Company Level. Department of Employment. 
Manpower Papers No. 5. London: HMSO.
Parker, S. (1974). Workplace Industrial Relations, 1972. London: HMSO
- (1975). Workplace Industrial relations, 1973. London:HMSO.
Parkinson, J. R. (1960). The Economics of Shipbuilding in the United Kingdom. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Pencavel, J. H. (1970). ’An investigation into industrial strike activity in Britain’. 
Economica, 37: 147.
Pendleton, A. (1988). ‘Markets or Politics? The Determinants of Labour Relations 
in a Nationalised Industry. Public Administration. Vol. 66 (Autumn). 279-86.
P.E.P, (1966). Attitudes in British Management. London: Political and 
Economic Planning (P.E.P).
Peters, T. J. (1978)
- and Waterman, R. (1982). In Search o f Excellence. Lessons from
447
America’s best run companies. London: Harper and Row.
Peters, T .J, Austin, N. (1985). A Passion for Excellence: the leadership 
difference. London: Collins.
Pettigrew, A. M., Whipp, R. (1991). Managing Change for Competitive Success. 
Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
Phelps Brown, E. H., Browne, M. H. (1962). ‘Earnings in Industries of the U.K, 
1948-59. Economic Journal, LXXII, 517-49.
Pizzorno, A. (1978). ’Political exchange and collective identity in industrial conflict’ 
in C. Crouch and A. Pizzorno, (eds.). The Resurgence o f Class Conflict in 
Western Europe since 1968: Volume 2, Comparative Ananiyses, London: 
Macmillan.
Pollert, A. (1988). ‘The Flexible Firm: Fixation or Fact. Work, Employment and 
Society. Vol 2. No. 3, 281-316.
Poole, M., Mansfield, R., Blyton, P., Frost, P., (1981). Managers in Focus: The 
British Manager in the Early 1980s. Aldershot: Gower
Poole, M., Mansfield, R. (1993). ‘Patterns of Continuity and Change in 
Managerially Attitudes and Behaviour in Industrial Relations, 1980-1990. 
British Journal o f Industrial Relations. Vol. 31, No. 1. 11-36.
Prais, S. J. (1978). ’The strike-proneness of large plants in Britain’ Journal o f Royal 
Statistical Society, Series A (general), Vol. 141, Part 3. 368-84.
Pratten, C. F. (1976). labour productivity differentials within international 
companies. University of Cambridge, Department of Applied Economics. 
Occasional Paper 50. Cambridge University Press.
Price, R. (1986). Labour in British Society: An Interpretative History. London: 
Croom Helm.
Pryke, R. (1981). The Nationalised Industries. Policies and Performance since 1968. 
Oxford: Martin Robertson.
Purcell, J. and Sisson, K., (1983). ’Strategies and practice in the management of 
industrial relations’, in Bain, G. S. (ed.), Industrial Relations in Britain. 
Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
Reder, M. W. (1955). ‘The Theory of Occupational Wage Differentials’. American 
Economic Review, XLV, No. 5. 833-52.
448
- and Neumann, G. R. (1980). ‘Conflict and constraint: The case of strikes’. 
Journal o f Political Economy, 88,(5).
Reekie, M. (1980). Managerial Economics. London: Philip Allan.
Rees, A. (1952). ’Industrial conflict and business fluctuations’. Journal o f Political 
Economy, Vol. 60, No. 5.
Reid, A. (1991). ‘Employers’ Strategies and Craft Production: The British 
shipbuilding industry 1870-1950’. In S. Tolliday and J. Zeitlin (eds), The 
Power to Manage: Employers and industrial relations in comparative- 
historical perspective. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.
Rhys, G. (1972). The Motor Industry: an economic survey. London: Butterworths.
Richardson, R., Wood, S. (1989). ‘Productivity Change in the Coal Industry and 
the New Industrial Relations’. British Journal of Industrial Relations, Vol. 
27, No. 1, 33-55.
Roberts, G. (1967). Demarcation Rules in Shipbuilding and Shiprepairing. 
Cambridge Occasional Papers: Cambridge University Press.
Robertson, J. D., (1990). ‘Transaction-Cost Economics and Cross-National Patterns 
of Industrial Conflict: A Comparative Institutional Analysis’. American 
Journal o f Political Science, 34. 153-87.
Roethlisberger, F. J. and Dickson, W. J. (1939). Management and the Worker, 
Cambridge Massachusetts: Harvard University Press.
Ross, A. M (1948). Trade Union Wage Policy. Berkeley: University of 
California Press.
- and Hartman, P. T., (1960). Changing Patterns o f Industrial Conflict. 
New York: Wiley.
Routh, G. (1980). Occupation and Pay in Great Britain 1906-79. London: 
Macmillan.
Runciman, W. (1966). Relative deprivation and Social Justice, a Study of 
Attitudes to Social Inequality in Twentieth Century England. London: 
Routledge and Kegan Paul.
Sayles, L. R. (1958). Behaviour of Work Groups. New York: Wiley.
Schor, J . D., Bowles, S. (1987). ‘Employment Rents and the Incidence of Strikes’. 
Review o f Economics and Statistics. Vol. 69. 584-92.
449
Scott, J. (1985). Corporations, Classes and Capitalism. Second Edition.
London: Hutchinson.
Scott, W .H., Mumford, E., McGivering, I. C., Kirby, J. M. (1956). Coal and 
Conflict: A Study of industrial Relations at Collieries. Liverpool: Liverpool 
University Press.
Screpanti, E. (1987). ’Long cycles of strike activity: an empirical 
investigation’ .British Journal of Industrial Relations, 25.
Scullion, H. (1981). ’The Skilled Revolt Against General Unionism: the case of the 
BL Toolroom Committee’. Industrial Relations Journal, 12, 15-17.
Seglow, P., Wallace, P. (1984). Trade Unions and Change in the British Car 
Industry. Research Paper 84/2. London: Policy Studies Institute.
Shalev, M. (1978). ‘Lies, Damned Lies and Strike Statistics: The Measurement 
of Trends in Industrial Conflict’, in C. Crouch and A. Pizzorno (eds.)
The Resurgence of Class Conflict in Western Europe since 1968.
Vol. 1, 1-19.
Shepherd, W. G. (1966). fChanges in British Industrial Concentration 1951-58\  
Oxford Economic Papers. 18.
Shipbuilding Negotiating Committee. (1979-1986) Minutes. London: CSEU
Shonfield, A. (1968). ‘Note of Reservation to the Donovan Report’, in Donovan. 
Royal Commission on Trade Unions and Employers’ Associations 1965-1968. 
Report. Cmnd 3623. London: HMSO.
Shorey, J. (1975). ’The size of work unit and strike incidence’, Journal o f Industrial 
Economics, Vol. 23, No. 3: 175-88.
- (1976). ’An inter-industry analysis of strike frequency’, Economica 43.
- (1977). ’Time series analysis of strike frequency’. British Journal of 
Industrial Relations, Vol. 15, No. 1: 63-75.
Shorter, E., and Tilly, C. (1974). Strikes in France, 1830-1968. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press.
Siebert, W. S., and Addison, J. T. (1981). ’Are strikes accidental?’ Economic 
Journal, 91.
Smith, C. T. B., Clifton, R., Makeham, P., Creigh, S. W., Burn, R. V., (1978).
Strikes in Britain. Department of Employment, Manpower Paper 15, London: 
HMSO.
Smith, D. (1988). ‘The Japanese Example in South-West Birmingham’. Industrial 
Relations Journal, Vol. 19, No. 1, 41-50.
450
Starkey, K., McKinlay, J. (1989). ‘Beyond Fordism? Strategic Choice and Labour 
Relations in Ford, UK’. Industrial Relations Journal. Vol. 20, No. 2.
Steer, P. and Cable, J. (1978). ’Internal organisation and profit: an empirical 
analysis of large UK companies’. Journal of Industrial Economics, 27.
Stephenson, G. M., Brotherton, C. J. (eds.) (1979). Industrial Relations: A Social 
Psychological Approach. Chichester: Wiley.
Stephenson, G. M., Allen, P. (1987). ‘Bargaining in Industrial Relations’, in 
P. W arr (ed.), Psychology at Work. London: Pelican.
Stewart, M. B. (1987). ‘Collective Bargaining Arrangements, Closed Shops and 
Relative Pay’. Economic Journal, 97. 140-56.
Stigler, G. J. (1963). Capital and Rates of Return in Manufacturing Industries. 
Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Storey, J. (1992). Developments in the Management of Human Resources. Oxford: 
Basil Blackwell.
Supple, B. (1987). The History of the British Coal Industry. Vol. 4, 1913-46: the 
political economy of decline. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Taylor, A. (1984). The Politics of the Yorkshire Miners. London: Croom Helm.
- (1988). ‘Consultation, Conciliation and Politics in the British Coal industry’. 
Industrial relations Journal. Vol. 19, No. 3.
Taylor, R. (1982). ‘The Shipbuilding Shake-Up’. Management Today, January, 51- 
58.
Taylor, R. (1982). ‘British Steel’s Melt Down’. Management Today, September, 50-
' ' ■ 57.......................................................................................................................
Terry, M. (1983), ’Shop steward development and managerial strategies’ in
G.S. Bain (ed), Industrial Relations in Britain. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
- (1986). ’How do we know if shop stewards are getting weaker? British 
Journal o f Industrial relations, 24: 2.
Thomas, D. (1983). ‘British Shipbuilding - Demand Linkage and Industrial
Decline’, in K. Williams, J. Williams, D. Thomas. Why are the British 
Bad at Manufacturing. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.
Thoms, D. W., Donnelly, T. (1985). The Motor Car Industry in Coventry since the 
1890s. London: Croom Helm
Thompson, P. (1983). The Nature of Work: An Introduction to Debates on the
451
Labour Process. London: Macmillan.
- (1990). ‘Crawling From the Wreckage: The Labour Process and the Politics 
of Production’, in D. Knights and H. Willmott (eds.). Labour Process 
Theory. London: Macmillan.
Thurley, K. E., Wirdenius, H. (1973). Supervision: A Reappraisal. London: 
Heinemann.
Tolliday, S. (1985). ‘Government, Employers and Shop Floor Organisation in the 
British motor Car Industry, 1939-1969’. In S. Tolliday, and J . Zeitlin 
(eds.), Shop Floor Bargaining and the State. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press.
- (1991). Ford and ‘Fordism’ in Post-War Britain, in S. Tolliday and J. 
Zeitlin (eds), The Power to Manage: Employers and industrial relations in 
comparative-historical perspective. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.
- and Zeitlin, J. (eds.), (1986). The Automobile Industry and its Workers, 
Between Fordism and Flexibility. Oxford: Polity. Blackwell.
Trade Union Congress: Steel Committee. Minutes. London: TUC.
Turner, H. A., (1968). ’The Royal Commission’s Research Papers’. British Journal 
of Industrial Relations, Vol 6, No. 3. 346-359.
- (1969). Is Britain Really Strike Prone? London: Cambridge University 
Press.
- Clack, G., Roberts, G. (1967). Labour Relations in the Motor Industry. 
London: George Allen and Unwin.
- Roberts, G., Roberts, D. (1977). Management Characteristics and Labour 
Conflict. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Turner, P. L. (1985). ‘Post-war pit closures: The politics of de-industrialisation’. 
Political Quarterly. Vol 56, No. 2.
Upham, M. (1980). ‘The BSC: Retrospect and prospect’. Industrial Relations 
Journal. July/August.
- (1990). ‘Passages on the path to privatisation: The experience of British 
Steel’. Industrial Relations Journal, 21, 2.
Urry, J. (1981). The Anatomy of Capitalist Societies. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press.
Utton, M. A. (1977). ‘Large firm diversification in British manufacturing industry’. 
Economic Journal, Vol. 87, pp 96-113.
452
Vaizey, J. (1974). The History of British Steel. London:
Waddington, D. P. (1987). Trouble Brewing: A Social Psychological Analysis of the 
Ansells Brewery Dispute. Aldershot: Gower Press.
- and Wykes, M., Crichter, C., Hebron, S. (1991). Split at the Seams: 
Community, Continuity and Change after the 1984-5 Coal Dispute. Milton 
Keynes: Open University Press.
Walker, C. R. and Guest, R. H., (1957). The Man on the Assembly Line. New 
Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press.
Watson, T. J. (1980). Sociology, Work and Industry. London: Routledge and 
Kegan Paul.
Wedderbum, D. and Crompton, R., (1972). Worker Attitudes and Technology, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
White, M., Trevor, M. (1983). Under Japanese Management: The Experience of 
British Workers. London: Heinemann.
Wickens, P. (1987). The Road to Nissan: Flexibility, Quality, Teamwork. London: 
MacMillan.
Wigham, E. (1973). The Power to Manage. London. MacMillan.
Wilkinson, F. and Turner, H. A. (1972). The wage-tax spiral and labour militancy. 
In Jackson, D., Turner, H. A., Wilkinson, F. (eds). Do Trade Unions 
Cause Inflation? London: Cambridge University Press.
Williams, K., Williams, J . and Thomas, D. (1983). Why are the British Bad at 
Manufacturing? London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.
Williams, K., Williams, J . and Haslam, C. (1987). The Breakdown o f Austin 
Rover. Leamington Spa: Berg.
Williamson, O. E. (1975), Markets and Hierarchies: Analysis and Antitrust 
Implications. New York: Free Press.
- (1986). Economic Organisation. New York: Free Press.
Willman, P. (1982). Fairness, Collective Bargaining and Incomes Policy.
Oxford: Clarendon Press.
-(1984). ’The Reform of Collective Bargaining and Strike Activity at BL 
ar
Cars’. Industrial Relations Journal, 15, 1-12.
- (1985a). ‘Strikes’, in D. Marsden, T. Morris, P. Willman, S. Wood. The
Car Industry: Labour Relations and Industrial Adjustment. London:
453
Tavistock.
- (1985b). ‘Labour Relations Strategy at Austin Rover’, in S. Tolliday, J. 
Zeitlin (eds.). Between Fordism and Flexibility. Oxford: Oxford Policy Press.
- and Winch, G. (1985c). Innovation and Management Control. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press.
Winkler, J. T. (1974). ’The ghost at the bargaining table: directors and industrial 
relations’, British Journal o f Industrial Relations, 12: 3.
Winterton, J . (1981). ‘The Trend of Strikes in British Coal-Mining, 1949-79’. 
Industrial Relations Journal. 12(6).
- Winterton, R. (1989). Coal, Crisis and Conflict: The 1984-85 
Miners Strike in Yorkshire. Manchester: Manchester University Press.
Wood, S. (1982). The Degradation of Work? Skill, Deskilling and the Labour 
Process. London: Hutchinson.
Woodward, J. (1965). Industrial Organisation: Theory and Practice. London: 
Oxford University Press.
Zeitlin, J. (1974). ‘Corporate Ownership and Control’. American Journal of 
Sociology, Vol. 75, No. 5.
- (1980). ‘The Emergence of Shop Steward Organisation and Job Control 
in the British Car Industry: a Review Essay’. History Workshop Journal, 16, 
119-37.
- (1985). ‘Shopfloor Bargaining and the State: A Contradictory Relationship’, 
in S. Tolliday and J. Zeitlin (eds.). Shopfloor Bargaining and the State. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 1-45.
454
